Custom, law and representation: a study of the factors in Hegel's pre-systematic theory of political civilisation by Hodgins, Timothy Michael
THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL 
Custom, Law and Representation: 
a study of the factors in Hegel's 
pre-systematic theory of political 
civilisation. 
being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in the University of Hull 
by 
Timothy Michael Hodgins B. A. 
April, 1981. 
'Are we to embark on a whole lot of market regulations 
and the like? ... Good men need no orders. They will 
find out easily enough what legislation is in general 
necessary ... if God enables them to preserve the laws 
we have already described. ... Otherwise they will 
spend their whole time making and correcting detailed 
regulations ... under the illusion that they are re- 
forming society ... You mean that they will lead lives 
like invalids who are too vicious to give up their un- 
healthy habits' 
- Plato, The Republic, 425. 
'Public Law is what has respect to the condition of 
things Roman; private law is what has respect to the 
utility of individuals'. 
- Ulpian, De iustitia et iure, Digest I, paragraph 2. 
'So long as one has not in his power reform and the 
withdrawal of reforms attempted and found to be harmful, 
one would do well to be content to remain the same in 
the midst of all such variations the consequences of 
which can be surveyed and reckoned, and simply to stop 
up the sources of abuse ... So long as everything 
remains in the old condition, so long as the people 
does not know its law, so long is no community available; 
so long is the power of the bureaucracy not limited, so 
long will popular election serve only to bring about 
the utter destruction of our constitution' 
- Hegel, The Wuerttembergschrift. 
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The thesis of this study first took shape in response to 
G. A. Kelly's argument that Hegel sought to adapt the classical 
metaphor, 'second nature', so that it should stand not for custom 
(Sitte), but for the deliberate yet, equally with custom, natural 
devotion of the individual to his community, which depends not on 
inclination, but upon a sense of duty '. Duty is ethical life 
(Sittlichkeit) in the active-voice of law, second nature become 
self-conscious. Hegel's mature equation of ethical activity 
(Sittlichkeit) with duty was prefigured in his earliest work, from 
which it is clear that, in the relationship between custom and law 
and in the manner in which they prevail, he saw the heart of the 
problem how civilisation might be preserved in the cinematic world 
brought about by the advance of culture and industry, that of which 
custom is made and unmade, in the modern world with increasing 
irregularity. 
The object of this study is to show that Hegel believed custom 
to be capable of prevailing in two modes. That which he preferred, 
for the sake of the maintenance of the integrity or wholeness of a 
people, is shown to be the mode of active, lively and intelligent 
performance. This mode of custom (Sitte), and of the ethical 
activity (Sittlichkeit) which is law, is ethical (sittlich), inas- 
much as only by such performance may a people be expected to main- 
tain itself as an integral and immortal whole. It is argued that 
only in this mode may a people remain civilised, which means the 
same as ever-anew become civilised, in the face of novel. circum- 
stances whose effect might otherwise be conducive to barbarity. 
G. A. Kelly Idealism, Politics and History, p. 290. 
I 
Barbarity is the condition in which the members of a people are 
not disposed to have regard for the public good but to look only 
to their private advantage or utility. Hegel is shown to believe 
that such advantage is of no ultimate interest to a people, since 
interest is truly added to its existence only when a people lives 
and acts together as a law-bound whole. 
The mode which Hegel contemned is argued to be that which 
renders the people which it afflicts quite incapable of civilised 
adaptation to changing circumstances. It is the mode of passive, 
deadly or unintelligent observance of what is customary or legal. 
This mode is habitual rather than ethical, inasmuch as those whose 
behaviour exhibits the capacity of custom and law to depart from 
their proper dedication, as expressions of the ethics (Sitten) of 
the people (ethon), to the interest of its public life and activity, 
behave in ignorance of the consequences. They know not what they 
do, so that they may not in strictness be said to act at all and 
are all the more at the mercy of unhappy events and vicious men. 
Knowledge of the consequences of social activity for the 
political community which sustains it is shown to depend, in Hegel's 
view, upon knowledge of the law. In particular, it is shown to 
depend upon everyone to keep to what he knows to be his place within 
a system of stations, their rights and their duties. 
Hegel's 
abiding belief was that only on that condition may political 
community, which he valued above all, coexist with social 
differences, 
of whose customary plurality he strongly approved. 
The dispositional dimensions in which these modes subsist are 
argued to be the present (die gegenwaertige), a-term often used 
by 
Hegel, as well as variants of it (such as die vorhandene), to 
signify intention towards that which is sensibly accessible and 
sensuously satisfactory. The term absent, not quite used by Hegel 
II 
but alone capable of comprehending the meaning of various sub- 
stantives such as image (Bild) and epithets like invisible 
(unsichtbar), whose common significance is that of some thing or 
affair whose existence is contingent upon its being the object of 
intention towards that which is accessible and satisfactory only 
to intelligence, is used in antithesis to the term present. 
Community is shown to be an affair which, in Hegel's view, has to 
be thought into effective existence, setting aside appetite for 
that, the present, which, no sooner than it is, is not. The 
absence of the intelligible, unlike the presence of the merely 
sensible, commands fondness of fancy and heart, where it makes its 
abiding dwelling place, dispelling indifference and habituation 
to what is to hand. Enlightened with the torch of law, public 
relationships are woven into an intelligible text, whose warp is 
station and weft is duty, that may be worn not like an ill-fitting, 
outlived habit but like a custom-made and long-serving costume. 
The public relationships of political community are shown to 
have an affinity with the personal relationship between man and 
God, in that in the State as in God there may be supposed to in- 
here something transcending human consciousness of what it is to 
act, some kind of action whose independence of finite conditions 
imparts, to the citizen who has knowledge of it, joy such as he 
would have had he immediate experience of it, the joy of parti- 
cipation in an immortal affair in which social differences are 
deprived of political effect. Political cultures are contrasted 
in which the need for this knowledge and vicarious experience is, 
on the one hand, satisfied perversely by a Being with which man 
can have nothing to do, and is, on the other, well met. 
The achievement and maintenance of political community in spite 
of circumstantial social difference and change, which feat is 
III 
change in the truest sense, of self-adaptation in the face of 
adversity, is required if men are not to endure passive lives as 
creatures of helpless habit, but to comport themselves like men 
of virtue, with whose costume the law in which they put their 
faith clads them. Yet such change, if men are truly to bear it, 
must, though to be sure it may not be merely inhabited, be some- 
what habitable. 
Change can no more be civilised if it requires of the citizen 
the total dedication of his activity to purely intelligible absence 
than if it happens haphazardly in response to the passionate 
impulses of merely sensible presence, no more if it is coercive 
from without than permissive from within. Its cause must come 
from this side of the present as well as yon side, must be of it 
or by it as well as from it. 
Civilised change, which is essentially the maintenance of the 
harmony between the spontaneous habitat of custom, or civil culture, 
and the regular environment of law, or civic enlightenment, a 
harmony that depends upon common knowledge of station to resist 
disruption by those ignorant of the good of living and acting 
together as a whole made up of technically specific but ethically 
general parts, ultimately requires cooperation, communication or 
convergence between those who apprehend what is right in the 
dimension of presence and thos who apprehend it in the dimension 
of absence. Due must be given to the values, sensible and 
intelligible, of each, the unenlightened and the enlightened, the 
present-minded proprietor and the absent-minded altruist, if 
change is to be endurable. The unenlightened especially must 
feel that they get liberty in matters of opinion in exchange for 
their constraint or, better, self-restraint, in matters of 
earnest. Unless these many can endure its limitation of the 
public effect of their appetites, law itself cannot endure. 
IV 
To the end that it may endure, the law, the intelligible articula- 
tion of the absent idea of community, must be made congenial to 
the customs, the civil and political culture, of men of whom it 
would be too much to expect that they should utterly eschew their 
sensible view of right. 
If that can be done, change in their dispositions is effected 
that appears to be change wrought by themselves. It is a work 
of genius to persuade a people that none other than its members 
themselves have made the changes essential to its maintenance. 
The organisation given to the work of persuasion that the action 
of the community is none other than, or at least resembles, what 
individuals would do had they but judgment and power must differ 
in the modern world from its natural occurrence in the ancient 
world, in that it cannot immediately, but only by representation, 
involve the participation of the citizen. 
In Hegel's view, the system of monarchical-cum-representative 
authority is best fitted for this job of persuasion, for it assures 
the people that, as well as decisive in favour of the absent 
interest of community, decisions of the sovereign will be careful 
of the present interests of individual and corporate members of 
civil society. As well as absolutely independent of the mandate 
of any one member, wherefore none of its acts is partial to any 
present thing, whose presence would, if so, manifestly be at the 
expense of another, the sovereign's power is kept from gratuitous 
interference in the affairs of civil society. 
While this is the system of a status mixtus, it is such not 
by virtue of division of eccentric powers, each of which would be 
designed to place external constraint upon others supposed to have 
an inclination partially and gratuitously to meddle in such affairs, 
to the detriment of civilian independence, but by virtue of a 
concentric distribution of maiestas, whose advantage is that 
V 
sovereignty is not compromised either by external trammels or by 
the inward partiality of its constituent moments which would make 
such trammels necessary. Sovereignty is rather distributed to 
circles of political authority, each in itself more or less 
representative of political unity and social plurality, both 
having the same centre, which consists in their equal subordina- 
tion to the law of the land. 
It is shown that Hegel was of the opinion, peculiar to a 
German tradition of reflection on the idea of the status mixtus, 
that any solution to the tension between present and absent minded 
views of what is right that distributes sovereignty otherwise than 
within a unitary public authority, or rather divides it, is a 
derogation from public law in favour of private utility. Through 
a system of representative government (supposed by Hegel to be 
rooted in German customs, as well as formally reflective of 
customary social polycentricity) whose presupposition is that at 
the same time as its legal power is absolutely sovereign and 
independent, its scope is limited and does not extend to the 
regulation of the whole of customary variety, a people whose 
members are themselves active comes to regard itself as an agent 
proper. By the regular constitution of one aspect of its customary 
heritage, the German people, it is shown, were held to have the 
capacity to recover their former integrity, lost because of the 
inherent incompetence of custom to conserve itself or its source, 
to adapt itself in the face of circumstantial vicissitudes. 
Through the representation of the people, knowing what it intends 
or wills itself to be, could be recovered the sense of community 
prevalent among primitive Germans. ' Change in that direction 
would be reflexive, rather than a transitive process, which would 
entail coercion, towards an utterly new order. 
Only change that is-reflexive in the sense that its object 
VI 
does not in the process become so utterly other than it was that 
there must come a point where it ceases to be identical with the 
subject - which, to be such, must remain innerly the same - was 
regarded by Hegel as a genuine process of modernisation. 
Modernisation was equated by him with the civilisation of a law- 
less notion of freedom whose inherent integrity, under the dis- 
harmonious circumstances of modern economic society, was in- 
creasingly inept to withstand perverse exploitation. Modern- 
isation, then, is nothing but the civilisation of a customary 
disposition to live and act in harmony with others, its adapta- 
tion so that it remains essentially the same, and so has changed 
in the face of new circumstances by which it would otherwise be 
changed. 
While it will be made clear that Hegel was no revolutionary, 
even at any point in his youth, it will become equally evident 
that he was likewise no backward looking utopian. He looked for 
the restoration neither of the content of old German ways, let_ 
alone Greek, nor of their form, but regarded the past of both 
Germany and Greece as furnishing only concrete models, in need of 
reshaping, of how the whole might appear to the intelligence and 
imagination of its members. To the rebuilding of a like model 
some customs would be serviceable and some would not, but in either 
case they could not be used just as the revolutionary, whether his 
utopia is located in the past or the future, would like. 
Just as Hegel is argued to be no advocate of coercive 
revolution, but rather of the civilisation of the present that is 
to hand, so it will be clear that he was not a German susceptible 
to the tyranny of Greece. It is to be hoped that the archaeolog- 
ical method of this study, which consists in the interpretation, of 
his theological essays, usually held to show Hegel to have had a 
period of sympathy with an aspiration eradically to change 
VII 
Europeans into neo-Hellenes, in the light of a period whose out- 
look is generally accepted to be nearly as conservative as any in 
his life, will give the lie to the view that Hegel was ever other 
than a conservative believer in the value of harmonious mediation 
of political community and social difference, by means of a 
civilised, legally articulate political and social order of duties 
and their stations. The same method, it is hoped, will, as it 
achieves the assimilation of the Jugendschriften to the Verfass- 
ungsschriften and other works whose point of view approaches that 
of Hegel's maturity, likewise disclose the much neglected human 
touch of the constitutional writings, whose delicacy in this 
respect is surely a much greater achievement than that of the 
early theological writings, the subject matter of which appealed 
so much more readily to 18th century German sensibility than did 
that of the Verfassungsschriften. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction: Notes towards the definition of Civilisation 
'L? t his Absolute, like a four walled house, be put up'decently' 
(Louis MacNeice, Ode) 
1. A decision for practical philosophy 
There is no better point at which to begin an account of 
Hegel's development up to the time when he laid aside his work on 
religious and constitutional matters in order to pursue the 
elaboration of his philosophical system, than the famous letter 
which he wrote to F. W. J. Schelling in November 1800, about two 
years before the completion of his manuscript on the constitution 
of the Holy Roman Empire, one of the Verfassungsschriften (VSN), 
1 
and less than two months after the revision of the introduction 
to the essay on 'The Positivity of the Christian Religion, one 
of his so-called theologische Jugendschriften (JSN) 
2. 
In this letter is to be found evidence, if not that Hegel was 
in two minds as to what he wanted to do with the second half of 
his life, then at least that he was troubled by the difficulty of 
deciding to what he should devote his attention in the immediate 
future. On the one hand. he had begun to contemplate the task of 
elaborating a philosophical system. Quite apart from any question 
of his personal inclination to do so, this was a professional 
imperative for anyone who wished to join the charmed circle of 
teachers of philosophy in the University of Jena. On the other 
hand, he still had to bring to a satisfactory conclusion, which he 
had just accomplished in the, case of his reflections on Judaic 
religious and political culture, the work to which he had committed 
himself on the constitutional problems of contemporary Germany. 
1. 
Before he would venture into the "literaryburly-burly of Jena" 
3 
he wished to sojourn in some other place where he could enjoy good 
beer and the company of a few literary acquaintances. It had 
occurred to him that Bamberg would suit him, the more so because 
Schelling, who had just spent about six months there, could give 
him the benefit of his local knowledge concerning accommodation and 
could introduce him to congenial company. Erfurt or Eisenach would 
do as well but in any case he would prefer a catholic to a protestant 
city, for he wanted for once "to see the former religion at close 
quarters" 4. 
Assuming that Hegel was being quite frank, rather than that he 
was covertly soliciting a professsional favour of him to whom he had 
neglected to write for over four years, we may infer from this express 
preference that his immediate interest was to inform himself more 
fully upon the constitutional problem, endemic in Germany, of the 
implication of confessional affairs in political matters. If that 
was the case we may take it that, when he told Schelling that he 
found himself at last in a position to leave behind his former 
relatibnships, to spend a while in an independent position and to 
devote his time, free of pedagogic commitments, to work and studies 
already begun (angefangenen Arbeiten und-Studien) 
5, he had in mind 
the continuation of his studies of German constitutional history. 
It might be thought that by "work and studies already begun" 
Hegel meant, or perhaps intended Schelling to understand that he 
meant, research which, according to another source, he had under- 
taken into the philosophy of Fichte. For according to the 
BrockhausIches Konversationslexicon of 1827 
6, Hegel is reported to 
have said, what corresponds with his statement to Schelling concern- 
ing the availability to him of new found independence, that a bequest 
from his father, who had died on the lkth January 1799, provided him 
the means in 1801 "to go to-Jena in order there to elaborate 
the 
Idea of Philosophy, which had taken shape in him after the study of 
Fich: te's Wissenschaftslehre in particular". If that is indeed what 
2. 
he meant in his letter to Schelling, it is hard to see why he should 
have wished, even temporarily, to avoid the hurly-burly of Jena. It 
is even harder to see how removal to a catholic city could have been 
thought by him to serve the purpose of elaborating the Idea of 
Philosophy. Hence we may conclude that on November 2nd, 1800 at 
any rate, Hegel was- more interested in what he self-deprecatingly 
called a baser sphere 
7 than that described by Schelling's 
theoretical efforts, than in the service done in Jena to the 
speculative needs of mankind. That he actually went straight to 
Jena in January 1801 does not falsify the assumption that 
constitutional problems continued to attract him more strongly than 
and other. It shows only that he ceased to think there was any 
conflict between his main interest, positively'established as such 
by his earlier domiciliary intentions but actually and ultimately 
independent of them, and life in Jena. As it happened Hegel busied 
himself during his first six months in Jena exclusively, excepting 
one trivial item 
8, 
with constitutional matters. 
Only thereafter, between July 1801 and November 1802, did Hegel 
deliver himself of a spate of philosophical articles, properly 
speaking critical rather than systematic, promising rather than 
beginning to articulate the systematic structure of his mature 
philosophy. He then returned to his manuscript on the German 
Constitution. Indeed, as we shall see with reference to the first 
and last of these articles, "The Difference between the 
Philosophical Systems of Fichte and Schelling", the Differenzschrift 
(DS) 9, and'On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law!, the 
Naturrechtsschrift (NRS) , Hegel can hardly be said to have 
10 
departed at all from his pro-eminent interest, which was not, the 
title of the first article notwithstanding, systematic philosophy. 
It is in the light of these facts that we must appraise his 
almost defiant declaration in the letter to his meteorically 
successful friend; 
"I have watched your great public career with admiration and 
'3. 
pleasure; forgive me if I do not speak humbly of it or pay deference 
to you; lavail myself of the formula, that I hope we will become 
friends again. In my scientific development, which began with the 
subordinate needs of men, I was bound for philosophy and the ideal 
of my youth had to take reflective form, to turn into a System; I 
now wonder, while I am still occupied with it; what way back to 
intervention in the life of men is to be found"". That Hegel beat. 
a hasty retreat to a more obsequious attitude, flattering Schelling's 
understanding of men for itb, purity, as being "wholehearted and 
without vanity"; that he credited his old friend, rather dishonestly, 
with having' recognized and seen the value of his own "disinterested 
efforts, even if their sphere were baser" 
12 than that described by 
the Wunderkind, cannot disguise the fact that it was his hope to meet 
Schelling as an equal, from the advantage of mastery of an under- 
standing of human affairs which would make Schelling eat humble pie, 
as he had on a previous occasion to which we shall shortly have 
reason to advert 
13. 
This advantage could best be gained by reversion to interests 
with a pragmatic bent, to what was known in Hegel's day as Gelartheit 
or practical wisdom, as opposed to Gelehrtheit or theoretical 
scholarship. For it was in this kind of knowledge that the literati 
of Jena were deficient. Their want of practical wisdom is perhaps 
best expressed by the following pronouncement of Schelling on 
momentous events of 1799,1800 and 1801: 
"Bonaparte might become First Consul ... conquer Marengo, win 
the Left Bank at Luneville, conclude a Concordat with the Pope ... 
I feel nothing of this. Before our philosophy, before the 
Absolute everything is as nothing" 
14. 
This cavalier attitude to him whom Hegel later called the world 
spirit on horseback doubtless came as no surprise to Hegel, who had 
long felt the sting of Schelling's indifference to his mundane 
interests and frustration at his friend's misunderstanding of them 
as trivial compared to the elaboration of a systematic philosophy. 
This misunderstanding is documented in their correspondence of 1795. 
In his letter 
15 
of the 4th February 1795 Schelling had misunderstood 
Hegels remark, made in a letter 
16 
written at the end of January, 
that the influence of philosophy upon the times could only be 
achieved, that those whom Schelling called $the masses' 
17 
could 
only be apprised of the premisses as well as of the results of the 
Kantian philosophy, by 'communication and social work' 
18 
(gesellschaftliches Arbeit). Hegel's emphasis was upon Kant's 
'results' and their application to the correction of current ideas 
and generally useful concepts. He was not really interested in 
re-thinking the process by which those results had been achieved. 
Although Schelling had implored Hegel to essay the realization 
'in the sensuous world' of the 'dissolution of the last veil, the 
last philosophical-superstitious spider's web of privileged philos- 
ophers' 19; though he conceded Hegel's judgment of Reinhold's 
'Attempt at a new theory of human imagination' 
20 that its signifi- 
cance was limited to the sphere of 'theoretical reason', and Fichte's 
'Critique of All Revelation' 
21, that it was dogmatic and scholastic 
in its deductive method: yet his abomination of personality in the 
face of the Absolute showed him to have missed completely the mean- 
ing for Hegel of the communication and, social effect of practical 
philosophy and the importance for him of consideration for the needs 
of merely conditioned human beings. For Schelling was prepared to 
envisage, in order to the achievement of freedom for the Absolute 
Ego unconditioned by anything objective, what he called 'demolition 
of finitude ... demolition of our personality' 
22, 
a process oppo- 
site to that which we shall see it was Hegel's intention to promote, 
namely the erection of a dwelling place for free men. This would 
have an inestimable practical advantage over Schelling's Absolute, 
Which did not differ significantly from Fichte's Ego in this respect, 
which Hegel would later make the object of his sharpest criticism, 
that, as Schelling put the matter in his letter, the hoped for 
'transition into the absolute sphere of Being ... is not possible in 
5" 
all eternity' 
230 Freedom was to be the object of an asymptotic 
quest.. But for Hegel, freedom was to be sought in the meantime. 
To this incomprehension Hegel could only reply in exasperation 
that, to be sure 'an esoteric philosophy there will always be - the 
idea of God as the, Absolute Ego will belong there, 
24. He continued 
to urge the availability of Kant's results as a basis for a 'revolu- 
tion in the thought - system of all Germany ... which will proceed 
from principles which are to hand and need only be universally worked 
out and applied to all previous knowledge' 
25. Besides a scientific 
revolution, Hegel also expected that Kant's conclusions would be the 
basis for the realization of the 'dignity of man' and the recognition 
of his 'capacity for freedom' 26. The question which troubled him 
however was why these'. conclusions had come so late upon the scene. - 
He was in no doubt that, when he should get round to reading Fichte's 
Wissenschaftslehre, he would find an expression of them 
27. But he' 
appears to have been more interested in the political causes of the 
fact that they had not prevailed earlier than in the philosophical 
reasons behind their current exposition by the likes of Fichte. In 
his letter of January 1795 to Schelling he had recorded, perhaps with 
a trace of irony, how Hölderlin had written to him of Fichte, inspir- 
ed with a view of him as a 'Titan who fights for humanity and whose 
sphere of influence will certainly not be confined within the walls of 
the auditorium' 
28. At any rate, Hegel himself made no comment on the 
likely effect either of Fichte's 'Reclamation of Freedom of Thought 
from the Princes of Europe', which Schelling had recommended to him 
29, 
or of his 'Lectures' on the Vocation of the Scholar; extolled to him by 
Hölderlin 30. What interested him, after all, were not the 'great in- 
tentions' of Fichte, nor perhaps the readiness of Hdlderlin to give 
credit for these, but the circumstances of contemporary Germany that 
conspired to innoculate its body politic against such intentions. 
Hegel identified as such circumstances the fact that religion 
and politics had 'acted out the same pretence: the former has taught 
what despotism wanted, contempt of 
the human race, its incapability 
6. 
of any goodness, of being something in its own right. With the 
spread of ideas as to what should be, the indolence of the sedate 
people, eternally accepting everything as it is, will disappear' 
31. 
It should be noted that it is above all an attitude to "what id'rather 
than necessarily "everything as it is" in which Hegel sought change. 
His declamation might seem to provide grounds for imputing to Hegel 
a positive attitude to the brand of Sollenpolitik which he would later 
contemn in Fichte. But it needs to be emphasiz6d that Hegel made 
elevation of the hearts of men, to the point where they would have 
learnt to sacrifice themselves and what, in August 1795, he described 
to Schelling as their 'cosy system of indolence' 
32, 
conditional upon 
the spread of concepts 'quite other' (the words are Schelling's, 
21-7-1795 33) than those of Schelling and Fichte. Schelling 
admitted to Hegel, protesting that he was not feigning the feeling 
of having been confounded by Hegel's criticisms, that the arguments 
of his work could be communicated only to 'everyone who feels the 
same ... My main mistake was that I did not know men, that I have 
expected too much of their good intentions ... of their talent for 
intuition, 34. 
The conceptual basis of Hegel's Sollenpolitik, which did not 
take revolution to be available at the drop of a philosophical 
hat, and did not need to be instructed that 'the revolution which 
must be effected by philosophy is still far off', provided it an 
orientation to Realpolitik. Hegel's views concerning what ought 
to be were never fashioned in blissful ignorance or despite of what 
is, particularly what is the condition or the disposition of mens, 
hearts. Hegel's concepts were indeed 'quite other' than those of 
the philosophy of the'Absolute Ego which, upon Anstoss with the 
'Conditioned world of the ordinary man, could not but come to grief. 
He had specified his concepts for Schelling's benefit as the 
definite and limited ideas'of the Fatherland, of its constitution 
etc. ' 35. Could these be made to animate the hearts of the 
indolent people, Hegel believed that a political revolution might be 
?. 
accomplished: 'I believe', he wrote, 'that there is no better sign 
of the times than this, that humanity will present itself to 
itself as worthy of respect; it is a proof that the halo is dis- 
appearing from the heads of the oppressors and gods of the earth. 
Philosophers demonstrate this dignity; the peoples will learn to 
feel it and will not, humbled in the dust, ask for, but will them- 
selves take, themselves appropriate, their Rights, 
36. 
There is doubtless a touch of enthusiasm about Hegel's 
Sollenpolitik, but it is clearly nowhere near as detached from an 
appreciation of the real obstacles to effecting a revolution in the 
hearts of men as that of Schelling and Fichte. In his letter to 
Schelling of August 1795, with a view to comforting him in his 
despair, Hegel delivered a homily, with apologies for its trite- 
ness, on the fate of all systems of those men whose dpirit'hastens 
in advance of the beliefs and prejudices of their time'. He 
expressed, too, pity for Fichte: 'beerglasses and patriotic swords 
have withstood the power of his spirit' 
37. Between the lines there 
seems to hover the thought; Nothing else is to be expected by 
those who detach themselves from their times. 
Hegel was clearly aware that Schelling, despite his mea culpa 
38, had not yet grasped what was the purpose of the communication 
and social effect which he wanted to achieve for the concepts of 
the fatherland and its constitution. Schelling had written of 
his hopes, 'which the activity and the enlightened disposition of 
the new duke (Ludwig Eugen) inspires in us. The despotism of our 
philosophical half-men will, as I hope, be dealt a great blow by 
this change. It is inconceivable how much that moral despotism 
has damaged: had it lasted another year it'would have repressed 
freedom of thought in our fatherland more thoroughly than any 
political despotism could have done. Ignorance, superstition 
and fanaticism had by degrees assumed the mask of morality and - 
what is more dangerous still - the mask of enlightenment ... 
8. 
The demand was not for learned but merely for morally credulous 
theologians and philosophers who make the irrational rational 
and disregard history' 39. Schelling's concern in this letter 
of July 1795 was clearly with the threat of 'moral despotism' to 
the freedom of thought in the University above all. Hegel was 
well aware that what troubled Schelling was the criterion - 
'character' rather than 'knowledge and talents' - of appointment 
to the college of Tutors. Not only did he take a broader view 
of the problem of freedom of thought than Scheiling, but also, 
he showed himself much less indulgent towards the 'enlightened 
disposition' of Ludwig Eugen, just as he had reserved judgment 
on the 'great intentions' of Fichte to reclaim that freedom. 
Political despotism was regarded by Schelling as innocuous 
by comparison with the moral despotism of the pseudo-Kantians 
whose academic ascendancy he so deplored. Indeed he welcomed 
enlightened political despotism in the hope that it would 
humiliate these 'philosophical half-men' 40. Hegel, on the other 
hand, regarded this not as an improvement in 'our present 
condition' but as a danger: 'I have recognized in your 
description', he wrote, charitably refraining from pointing out 
to Schelling that he had failed to recognize it, 'the spirit 
which the above governments threaten to introduce' 
41. Hegel's 
view was that political despotism, be its disposition ever so 
enlightened, was an extended species of moral despotism rather 
than a remedy for it. This spirit was 'grounded in hypocrisy 
and cowardice (a consequence of Despotism) and is even in turn 
the father of hypocrisy - the spirit which must become prevalent 
in every public constitution which has the chimerical conceit to 
want thoroughly to examine the heart and entrails and to take 
virtue and piety as the criterion of the estimation of merit 
- and the 
distribution of offices. I feel most ardently the 
9. 
deplorability of such a condition where the state wants to 
descend into the holy deeps of morality and to regulate them; 
it is deplorable even if the state means well, and infinitely 
more sad still when hypocrites get hold of judicial office, which 
must happen even if, in the beginning, it were from good inten- 
tions' 42. Here, in nuce, are stated the grounds of Hegel's 
hostility to enlightened despotism, and no less, to the policy 
of the Jacobins. He had already, in a letter to Schelling of 
Christmas Eve 1794, intimated his general agreement with Oelsner, 
the principal correspondent on French affairs of Archenholz's 
Minerva, whom Hegel met in Switzerland and praised as 'a young man 
whom one can see has worked a great deal'. On this occasion he 
had written to Schelling: 'Did you know that Carrier has been 
guillotined? Dö you still read French newspapers? - If I 
remember aright, somebody told me they were banned in Württemberg. 
This process is very important and has revealed the total infamy 
of the Robespierrists' 43. To have to regulate mens' hearts and 
dispositions is to attest that all changes which it has been 
attempted to produce in their way of life have been in vain. 
Similar considerations later, if not already, inclined Hegel 
towards hostility to the Prussian machine-state and to the 
coercive politics of Fichte's works on natural law 
44. The 
Jacobins, the Prussian bureaucracy, the Dukes of Württemberg 
and Fichte had in common the 'chimerical conceit', articulated in 
the case of the last named as the prerogative of the Absolute Ego 
to ride roughshod over the constraints of the conditioned Non-Ego, " 
to police the conscience of the individual 
45. Such a conceit 
betokened, in Hegel's view, the fact that communication and'social 
work' had been neglected in the vain hope that good intentions and- 
a talent for the intuition of what ought to be-would transcend the 
self-interest upon which, according to Hegel, the spirit of all 
10. 
despotic constitutions had 'grounded its Kingdom' 
46 
. 
We may say, then, by way of summary of this provisional out- 
line of Hegel's practical outlook, that insofar as he expounded 
the dignity and rights of man, he was an advocate of Sollenpolitik, 
or of the view that what ought to be must prevail over what is. 
To that extent he may be considered to be sympathetic to the ends 
of the French Revolution. Yet it must be emphasized that his dis- 
approval of Jacobin means to the regulation of moral dispositions 
distinguishes Hegel as one who believed that political and social 
change is not merely vain but vicious if the hearts and disposi- 
tions of men are not prepared in advance to eschew self-interest. 
Otherwise what they ought to do, the change which they ought to 
make, must be beyond their power and must devolve upon another. 
Because ought implies can, Hegel's Sollenpolitik is directed above 
all to the end of providing that wens' dispositions are so fit 
that whatever they ought to do their laws enable but do not force 
them to do. As we shall see, Hegel regarded what men ought to 
do as a matter for determination according to the Sitten -a term 
which connotes the customary and legal ethics of a people rather 
than a universal morality - of their fatherland and its consti- 
tution. It is a Sollenpolitik which it is inappropriate to 
regard as revolutionary for, as we shall see, the implication of 
revolution is in Hegel's view such a radical wrench from custom 
that those amongst whom it is introduced cannot but feel that they 
are passive rather than active in its achievement. It is a 
major objective of this thesis to prove that the young Hegel, no 
less'than the old, was cautious, not to say suspicious, of radical 
change. To this end it will be shown, particularly in this and the 
next chapter, that the sympathies of Hegel's early writings lie 
decidedly, not withstanding the consensus in favour of the contrary 
view which has prevailed since the 1930's, with that kind of polity 
11. 
which places considerable but always intelligible constraints 
upon social and political change. It will be made clear, for 
example, that the import of his reflections upon the genius of 
ancient Greece is not at all of a kind which may be thought to 
have been inspired by a romantic yearning - conventionally 
regarded as characteristic of youthful aesthetes devoted to 
singing the praises of the French Revolution - for the recovery 
of values supposedly extant in an Attic eutopia. They rather 
signify his interest in the problem of how best may political 
life be arranged so that the activity of individuals, on the one 
hand, and, on the other, of the community, appears not to be in 
competition, which would give rise to the injustice that either 
try to be unlike what it is. 
2. Gelartheit and the terms of change within measure. 
Hegel was not, of course, being simply contrary when he 
decided in 1800 that as far as he was concerned the 'reflective 
form', namely the Infinite or the Absolute, the systematic version 
of the ideal of his youth, which we may provisionally specify as 
one of harmony (not greatly different from Schiller's ideal of 
the 'harmony of a completely accomplished civilization, 
47) 
between objective social station and subjective sense of duty, 
had for the time being to be neglected, though it would not 
entirely cease to occupy him, in favour of less exalted interests. 
Nor was it a sense of inadequacy in the face of Schelling's 
systematic achievements, though such a riotive is certainly 
detectable in his letter, that inclined him to undertake histor- 
ical and sociological investigations of what he called, in the 
revised introduction to The Positivity of the Christian Religion, 
a presupposed need of human nature 'to recognize a Being who 
12. 
transcends our consciousness of human agency, 
48, 'instead of a 
'metaphysical treatment of the relationship between the finite and 
the infinite'49. Quite apart from Schelling's cavalier attitude 
to matters closely touching human happiness and its contrast with 
Hegel's view of the same issues 
50, Hegel had from the beginning 
of his scientific development evinced a long standing devotion 
to Gelartheit in preference to Gelehrtheit. 
Once we have examined the impact of this outlook on Hegel 
the student, we shall be in a position to identify that in the 
JSN which, quite regardless of system, Hegel had elaborated as 
the expression of the ideal of his youth and was to incorporate 
into the VSN as their conceptual foundation. This is the chief 
interest of this study: to demonstrate the basis of the VSN in 
the JSN and thus to show that though the former fall far short 
of a philosophy of law they are much more than the Gelegenheits- 
schrift for which they have often been mistaken but are rather 
an attempt to explain long-standing German constitutional 
problems in terms of categories first devised for the purpose of 
criticising judaic religious culture and Christian ecclesiastical 
practices. 
That Hegel should have thought such an attempt to be worth- 
while will come as no surprise to whoever attends closely to the 
import of the letter to Schelling. Reflection on the constitu- 
tional problems of Germany was to be Hegel's way back to inter- 
vention in the life of men. As such it was to be the means to 
the recovery of the ideal of his youth from premature system- 
atization and probable dissipation of its' analytic utility in 
respect of human affairs, a quality confessedly absent from 
Schelling's literal Absolute, which Hegel would later liken to a 
'night in which all cows are black' 
51. It was perhaps against 
the seductive monovalence of this Absolute, its sheer attractive 
13. 
density, that Hegel wished first to 'strengthen himself' in 
Bamberg. 
52 
and perhaps it was to the fortification of his ideal 
in analytic encounter with concrete problems that is due the 
ultimately more down-to-earth character of the eventual system. 
Hegel's mature Absolute, in contrast to Fichte's and Schelling's, 
is designed and fit for human habitation. 
Büt what is more to the point, our present purpose being to 
explain the relation of the JSN to the VSN, Hegel's attempt should 
come as no surprise to whoever is familiar with the facts of 
another crisis of decision than that of 1800 - albeit decision 
not of his own making - which Hegel had undergone about ten years 
earlier. For when he was twenty, Hegel had been determined to 
abandon the study of theology in order to take up the study of 
law. He was frustrated in this design by his father, who had a 
heavy financial interest in the state-aided higher education of his 
son, which was only available to students ostensibly training for 
Christian ministry. But it is clear from the theological writ- 
ings to which he knuckled down that Hegel continued to be strong- 
ly inclined to direct his studies towards the discovery of the 
significance of any historical matter for his understanding of 
the idea of law. That being the case, it is easy to see that 
the conceptual structure of the JSN could readily be exploited 
in the VSN. 
Let us examine briefly the question, what, apart from his 
growing impatience with the repetitive course of instruction in 
the theological faculty of the University of T. iebingen 
53rwere 
Hegel's positive motives, what first induced him to regard the 
vocation of jurisprudence as the calling best adapted to 
'intervention in the life of men'? It has been argued by Harris 
that it was Hegel's desire, as it was his friend Hoelderlin's, 
to emulate the Stuttgart poet and lawyer G. F. Staeudlin, who 
14. 
was in turn a follower of 'the great champion and martyr of 
liberty and enlightenment in Wuerttemberg, the poet Daniel 
Schubart'. 
54. But the admitted anachronisms involved in this 
argument should incline us to look for another who may have been 
a model for the young Hegel. Such another was most probably 
Johann Jakob Moser, the jurisconsult whom Duke Karl Eugen of 
Wuerttemberg had imprisoned from 1759 - 1764 on charges of 
sedition and who subsequently railed against the Duke's regime 
for its suspension in 1771 of the old Landtag. In one of the 
earliest extant pieces of Hegel's juvenilia, he wrote of Moser, 
'our great patriot' who died in 1785, when Hegel was fifteen 
years old, that he had written more books than it is possible to 
read in a lifetime 
55. Hegel eventually came to adopt a rather 
more critical attitude to the constitution of the Holy Roman 
Empire than that struck by Moser 
56. Yet he seems to have 
sympathized not only with Moser's doughty resistance to en- 
lightened despotism but to have identified with him as a parti- 
cular exponent of a more general outlook, that of Gelartheit, 
which pervaded his work and lay behind his hostility, shared by 
Hegel, to the rationalism of Pufendorf for instance 
57. 
Moser had learnt the ideal of Gelartheit from Christian 
Thomasius who first distinguished it from Gelehrtheit, as being 
more concerned with the social effect of knowledge and the 
education of worthy citizens than with formal criteria of truth 
and the learning of scholars 
58. There is to be found in 
Hegel's juvenilia express and clearly approving reference to 
the ideal of philosophical Gelartheit. 'Practical philosophy', 
he wrote down from an encyclopaedic work that he was reading in 
March 1787, 'relates to the outward and inner happiness of men' 
and in general 'shows how the free actions of men must be linked, 
through the will, to the good and how man can attain the highest 
15. 
good and temporal happiness' 
59- 
Hegel did not, to be sure, mention Thomasius by name. But 
it is scarcely to be doubted, even though he was, at the age of 
sixteen, receiving this outlook only at second hand 
60, that Hegel 
was aware, as he recorded his various definitions of politics 
('the theory of the happiness of whole states or civil societies')and 
of policy science (that part of politics which concerns 'the care 
of all kinds of private need, all that which does not pertain 
merely to the security of life and property') 
61, that in this 
beginning of his scientific development in the 'needs of men', he 
was heavily indebted to a tradition in the study of public law 
which extended at least as far back as Thomasius' attempt to 
inspire legal scholarship with the ideal of Gelartheit. 
Nor is it to be doubted that the chief critical significance 
of this ideal was certainly not lost upon the young Hegel. That 
lay in the fact that, because it involved attention to the social 
environment of knowledge, and the bearing of that environment upon 
both the manner in which 'truths', notably those of natural law, 
are apprehended and the forms in which they are put into practice, 
in short, because its. measure of truth was rhetorical rather than 
exclusively rational 
62, the ideal of Gelartheit contributed 
significantly to the awareness of the importance of the specific- 
ation of universal public law in accordance with local and 
historical circumstances. Hegel carefully noted what had been 
maintained since Thomasius and sympathisers such as Justus Henning 
Boehmer and Heinrich Christian von Senkenberg (both of whom Hegel 
mentioned in relation to. the study of particular german law, public 
and private 
63) had insisted upon it: namely the principle that as 
well as natural or universal. public law, which defines in the 
abstract, as rational principles, the reciprocal duties and obliga- 
tions of the citizen and ruler, theoretical and practical account 
16. 
had tobe taken of the 'particular public law of free states ... 
based on particular laws and contracts between the subjects and 
rulers. The most important sources of German particular public 
law are the old customs, the so-called imperial tradition, the 
Golden Bull, the public peace (Landsi. ede), the imperial parti- 
tion, the caesarian election, the peace of Westphalia, 
64. 
We shall see in the fourth and fifth chapters how Hegel came 
to deepen his understanding of the peculiarity and individuality 
of customary sources of. public law and to object to the prejudice 
in favour of the rationality of Roman law. This he was to do 
under the influence of a less electic practical-cum-scientific 
ideal than that of Gelartheit: ratio status. But it was surely 
Gelartheit which served him as a source of youthful inspiration 
when, aged sixteen, he wrote that there existed for him a 'natural 
philosophy which knows nothing of tedious and extensive enquiries; 
in order to discover the first springs of truth, it uses no method, 
it takes its material as it appears and reflects upon it purely 
at the discretion of healthy reason (Vernunft). One could call 
it worldy wisdom ... 
' Man learns this wisdom purely through 
experience and worldly intercourse if he observes with fit sagacity 
everything which comes before him' 
65. - Even in 1802, when he had 
joined more sophisticated company, Hegel was ready to give himself 
out as a doctor of this worldly wisdom 
66. 
It may be said, then, that Hegel first encountered the science 
of jurisprudence, and concerned himself with the relationship 
between knowledge of this kind and political practice, as a 
sympathiser with the anti-rationalistic trend of the German 
Enlightenment towards emphasis upon rhetorical validity rather 
than rational truth, that is upon the 'truths' by which a society 
lives and expresses its, peculiar character rather than upon those 
which its, learned strata represent to it as the eternal truths by 
17. 
which it ought to live, deviation from which is reproved as if it 
were from the order of nature. His sympathy for that trend is 
still more evident from the fact that about one week after he had 
made his notes from Sulzer, Hegel drew upon another luminary of 
the German Enlightenment, Ghristian Garve, for further reinforce- 
ment of his favourable opinion of Gelartheit and of the idea that 
validity resides elsewhere than that which is claimed to be 
eternal truth. 
It may be that it was from Garve that Hegel first learned to 
be doubtful of the compatibility between system-building and 
effective intervention in the lives of men. For in Garve's 
Examination of the Faculties 
67, from which Hegel copied out a long 
extract in March 1787, there occurs a critique of the abstract 
method of the kind of philosopher for whom 'mathematics is a true 
touchstone' of certain and coherent truth 
68 
This method, which 
Garve called Paisonnement 
69, had produced 'the system-builder, the 
limited art-critic and the one-sided moralist' 
70. To it Garve 
opposed not a method but a gift for the imaginative or 'rapid 
survey' of 'human' or 'social' life and for sympathy with its. 
relations of time and place 
71. Hegel went even further, ex- 
aggerating Garve's sympathetic treatment of this 'practical 
understanding' 72 by endowing it with a destiny 'to apply the 
sciences to human life and to the real advantages of society' 
73. 
This 'destiny' or 'vocation for Praxis' 
74, 
as Garve put it, could 
not be fulfilled by one-sided moralists whose commitment to 
abstract principles of rationality forbids the sympathy with the 
pathological or doxalogical circumstances and relations of time 
and place, with custom and sentiment, in the absence of which the 
application of the sciences to, their enlightenment of, human and 
social life, cannot take place, except by coercive attempts 'to 
show man his business and his vocation, 
75. 
18. 
We shall see in chapters three and five how Hegel, first in 
1799 and then in 1801, elaborated the rudiments of the view, 
available to him in Garve's work, that enlightenment, indeed 
change in general, if it is to be thoroughgoing and not liable 
to be rejected as an alien transplant by the body onto which it 
is to be grafted, must accord with the present propensities of 
that body. This view was to be the foundation of his critique 
of the political rationalism of Fichte which has been aptly 
described by Kelly as a creed of coercive chiliasm 
76. Fichte's 
conception of political change, based on the assumption that 'un- 
reason can never become reason', a dictum which Kelly calls a 
'mythopoeic expression of rationalism' 
77, involves, as Hegel was 
to argue in 1801, the recommendation that change be effected by a 
'community of rational beings'78 guided by the imperative of a one- 
sided Absolute, to be 'extraneously' 79 imposed upon the contempt- 
ibly limited or merely 'present' world 
80 
of the 'community of 
sensible beings' 
81 
If license be given to resort to the terms of the poem cited 
at the beginning of this chapter we may say that Hegel, at the age 
of sixteen, was beginning to build, without any inkling that this 
would be the cause for which he would some day fight as a David 
against Fichte's Goliath, the opposite of the constructions of 
'one-sided moralists'. He was beginning to build a 'four-walled' 
Absolute, 'decently put up' with a view to its being valid for 
and habitable by him whom Hegel, in a fragment of his own composi- 
tion written at the age of fifteen, had called the 'common man', 
him whose enlightenment had always been rather of a worldly and 
temporal than of an otherworldly and sempiternal kind, him whose 
'temporal advantages, temporal fortune' or happiness must be taken 
into account by the would-be practical scholar. 
82. 
To say that Hegel was, very early in his career, hostile to 
rationalistic conceptions of change and enlightenment is not to 
19. 
say that, any more than his mentors of the German Enlightenment, 
he absolutely preferred custom and opinion to change and truth. 
Rather he held that truth and opinion often coexist inextricably 
and that, accordingly, the protagonist of enlightenment or change 
should be considerate of the customary environment into which it 
is to be introduced, lest he destroy what is valid for the sake 
of what is true but invalid. As he put the matter in an essay 
which he wrote just two weeks before his seventeenth birthday 
and almost seventeen months after he had written that the en- 
lightenment of the common man is not abstract but takes the shape 
of his religious and technological occupations 
83, he had been 
convinced by the endeavour of the Greeks and Romans (men who 
'shared just the same faculties as ourselves') to fashion en- 
lightened and sublime conceptions of God, of the 'difficulty of 
attaining pure truth undistorted by errors' 
84. Hegel was prepared 
to allow that the religious ideas and common opinions, especially 
of the Greeks, though they may be considered in modern times 'to 
be falsehoods, are perhaps truths' 
85. At the very least they 
served as strong curbs upon the passions against which 'the 
grounds of reason and a purer religion are not effective enough" 
86 
They may not seem rational but they were actual or effective 
(wirksam). 
Between his writing of this essay and of his excerpts from 
Sulzer and Garve, Hegel encountered an essay by Moses Mendelssohn 
on the question, What is Enlightenment? 
87. This article con- 
firmed Hegel in view that, as we may put it, the reformer ought not 
to throw out the ethical or customary. baby with the doxalogical 
bathwater, not destroy the truths by which a people lives for the 
sake of those by which it ought to live. So 
did a section which 
Hegel excerpted from Friedrich 
Nicolai's Description of a Journey 
through Germany and Switzerland wherein Hegel noted the argument 
that 'Culture (Kultur) and Enlightenment 
(Aufklaerung) are both 
20. .. 
powerful sources of the well being of a nation; both must work 
together in proper relation to one another, in proper relation 
with the prevailing mass of activity and national cast of mind. 
Failing this their effect will be neither sure nor durable, 
88, 
It is interesting that in another section of this work from 
which Hegel took a brief extract, Nicolai, on the important 
question how culture and enlightenment might be assured a 'durable 
influence', rather than be rejected as a transplant alien to and 
contemptuous of the environment into which it is imported, argued 
that this would be facilitated not through enlightened despotism 
but through a middle-class which, so long as it is 'not obliged 
to worry about the most necessary requirements of the body, .. 
will and can think and be active. To put them in this position 
is the highest art of a King and certainly advances the welfare 
of a nation more than any direct orders or commands, 
89. 
Prescinding, for the time being, from the matter of the wide- 
spread preference amongst the leading lights of the German En- 
lightenment for change in accordance with the independent activity 
of the 'middle class of the people' rather than with the extraneous 
mandates of a political or transcendental master, a preference 
which, as we have seen 
9C, 
was to be a. cause of disagreement 
between Hegel and Schelling, let us examine the more elaborate 
statement of the general view that change must be considerate of 
custom, and the more thorough analysis of the conditions or terms 
of change, Culture and Enlightenment, of which Hegel took note 
from Mendelssohn's article. 
Mendelssohn had argued, according to Hegel's record, that if 
he 'may not propagate certain useful and humane truths without 
tearing down the principles of religion and morality to which man 
is accustomed, the virtue loving Aufklaerer will act with prudence 
and discretion and prefer to tolerate prejudice than to drive out 
the truth so fast entwined with it' 
91. In order to understand 
21. 
how Mendelssohn came to this conclusion, in which is implicit 
the idea that truth is a quality of subjective validity that 
may adhere to what falls short of objective truth, it is necess- 
ary to examine what he intended by his advocacy of an alternative 
to the eradication of customary prejudice. 
His intention was that there should obtain a harmony between 
Culture and Enlightenment, which he distinguished as the two 
factors in civilization (Bildung). Civilization as a whole he 
defined as the product of 'men's industry and efforts to improve 
their social condition' 
92. Failing harmony between Culture and 
Enlightenment the civilized (gebildete) nation can not be preserved 
from the danger which presents itself to peoples which have come, 
through civilization, to the peak of happiness, beyond which they 
cannot ascend 
93. Should Enlightenment advance in disregard of 
Culture, national happiness will be sacrificed. 
Culture has to do with practical matters. In objective terms 
it is 'goodness, refinement and beauty in handicrafts, arts and 
social ethics'. In subjective terms it is the 'skill, industry 
and aptitude' for handicrafts and arts, and 'inclinations, drives 
and custom' in social ethics 
94. Nations have more culture the 
more, throughout all social stations, the aptitudes, skills, 
opinions, drives, social ethics and customs of their members are 
in conformity with their calling in civil life 
95. But as well 
as his calling to a. civil station, the individual has a human 
vocation. Besides cultural adjustment of his subjectivity to 
his calling as a member of society, civilization requires that the 
individual should not regard himself or be regarded as a citizen 
only but as a human being and that his subjectivity should 
accordingly be adjusted to that end. 
In this case, Mendelssohn meant theoretical subjectivity 
which, unlike practical subjectivity, 
has a value out of relation 
to social life. The Enlightenment 'which interests man as man 
22. 
(and) is universal without social distinction' 96 is to Culture 
what theory is to praxis 
97. In objective terms, Enlightenment 
is 'rational knowledge' 
98; In subjective terms it is an 'apti- 
tude for rational reflection on things human, with a view to 
measuring their importance for and influence on the vocation of 
man' 
99. The vocation of man is the goal according to which his 
subjectivity must be adjusted and to which his striving should be 
100 directed Nations have more enlightenment the greater is 
the body of their scientific knowledge, the greater is the amount 
of that knowledge related to the vocation of man in the first 
place and to his calling as a citizen in the second; and the 
more that knowledge is propagated throughout all estates rather 
than according}to social calling 
101. 
Mendelssohn admitted,.. 'however, that in reality Culture and 
Enlightenment are not so detached as is implied by his remark that 
102 'Man as man needs no culture but he needs enlightenment' .A 
nation's language, which achieves Enlightenment through the 
sciences and Culture through social intercourse, poetry and 
rhetoric, exemplifies their mutual penetration. It is because 
it is such a good exemplar that the 'language of a people is the 
best index of its civilization' in theoretical and practical 
matters 103. It is to be stressed that language is merely an 
index of civilization and is not a means to its conservation. 
On the contrary, it is something the precarious perfection of 
which is dependent upon the freedom of social intercourse so 
prized by this devotee of Socrates, and, as we shall see below, 
apropos the encouragement afforded by the political practices of 
the republican state to free intercourse even with the-lowest 
masses 
10, by Hegel. 
Mendelssohn's view is that either constituent is actually 
dependent on the other or impresses its. character on the other. 
For on the one hand, the adjustment of practical subjectivity to 
23. 
the requirements of social station and calling presupposes a 
minimum of objective and subjective enlightenment; while on the 
other hand, enlightenment is not entirely universal without social 
distinction but, as it relates to the citizen, 'changes according 
to station and calling' 
105. In fine, culture depends upon and 
compromises enlightenment. Ultimately, though Mendelssohn did 
bewail the misfortune of the state in which the vocation of man 
is not in harmony with the vocation of the citizen, where 'the 
Enlightenment which is indispensable to humanity cannot be 
propagated among all estates without putting the constitution in 
danger, or bringing it to the ground'106, he affirmed that 
'Certain truths which are useful to man as man, can at the same 
time harm him as citizen' 
107. For if, thanks to the erosion, 
in the name of human enlightenment, not only of civil culture, 
that is of practical adjustment of subjectivity to the social 
station to which it is called, but also of civil enlightenment, 
which is the theoretical buttress of that practical adjustment, 
man were without the objective and subjective determinations of 
social calling, the constitution would 'cease to be' 
108. 
To put the matter in plain language, it may be said that if 
man's sense of social place loses the support of a customary 
social ethic, whose strength is not a little dependent on laws 
which supply a theoretical means of knowing that place, its 
rights and its duties, then his nation and its constitution 
must perish. This is the likely consequence of preferring 
rationality to the subjective validity of customs or social 
ethics and their corresponding laws, of stations and their 
particular rather than universal duties and rights. 
On the whole then, to the end that Enlightenment and Culture 
progress in step with one another,. in which case they preserve 
each other from corruption, the former being restrained by the 
24. 
latter from promoting hardness of heart, egoism, irreligion and 
anarchy, and the latter by the former from arrogance, hypocrisy, 
effiminacy, superstition and servility 
109, 
-it is for the best 
that the social condition of a people should be harmonized with 
the vocation of man chiefly through indigenous practical faculties 
110. These faculties, assuming a minimum of human enlightenment, 
consist not only of the skills and customs which constitute the 
subjective aspects of technology and social ethics but also of a 
measure, in the case of the latter, of legal articulation, i. e. 
of the 'civil enlightenment' which affords 'every individual 
according to his station and calling' theoretical insight, and 
the skills requisite for its acquisition 
111 into the 'duties 
and rights of every member' of society, including himself. It 
is in virtue of this immanent criterion for the adjustment of 
subjectivity to communal needs, not through subjection to the 
transeunt standards of an exogenous objective order, that a 
people may be advanced and maintained in civilization. 
In short, Mendelssohn may be said to approve only of change 
(that consists, on the one hand, in gradual objective social 
improvement effected casually in the course of spontaneous 
personal effort and industry 
112 
and, on the other hand, of the 
adaptation of subjectivity, enabled by the expression of custom 
as laut deliberately to address itself to the object of national 
happiness, in the face of the circumstantial and internal 
Vicissitudes to which all living things, amongst which 
Mendelssohn indludes societies of people 
113, 
are subject. 
In what is undoubtedly the most important of the essays of 
Hegel's schooldays, 'On some of the characteristic differences 
(of ancient from modern poets)', composed three weeks before his 
eighteenth birthday, there is to be found evidence of the conflu- 
ence upon him of the work of Garve and 




'Observation of some differences in the works of the most ancient 
and modern writers, particularly the poets' 
114 Hegel borrowed 
the substance of his argument 
115. 
Our present interest is confined to one point of correspond- 
ence between Garve's view and Hegel's, namely that the ancients 
got to know the duties of every station yet 'without having 
striven to do them' 116. In Hegel's essay there is to be found 
exactly the same proposition: 'Each got to know the duties of 
other stations than his own without, however, any intention of 
learning (to do) them'. This statement nestles like a cuckoo's 
egg in the midst of an argument to the effect that the ancients 
were impressed by the tsensuous appearance of visible Nature' 
whereas the moderns are 'better instructed in the inner play of 
forces and, in general, know better (than the ancients) the causes 
of things' 117. To this Hegel attributed the fact that ancient 
literature was simple and accessible to the whole people, vlile 
modern writers are obliged either to vulgarize their ideas or to 
content themselves with an audience that shares their level of 
understanding. 
The meaning of the above proposition becomes more transparent 
if vre unpack it in terms of the argument which Hegel had assimil- 
ated from the work of Mendelssohn and Nicolai. To 'know the 
duties of other stations' is the corollary of 'civil enlighten- 
ment' or 'theoretical insight' on the part of the individual into 
the system of social stations by which he is related to others and 
to the whole. It is to have one's subjectivity adjusted by 
theoretical means, knowledge of the rights and duties of every 
member of society, to one's station in civil life and to its 
obligations. This is the buttress of civil, culture, of the 
practical adjustment of subjectivity to station, whereby the 
individual is dissuaded from any intention to answer any calling 
26. 
but that for which he is fitted. When civil enlightenment, that 
is, law cooperates with civil culture, that is, custom, there 
obtains, as there did in the ancient world, notwithstanding the 
fact that society was socially stratified and that legal and 
customary obligations varied according to social station, a 
healthy condition in which the wisdom of poets is available to 
everyone. For while there may be classes, the laws and consti- 
tution make their 'conceptions and culture' intelligible to one 
another. That this was not the case in Germany, where, on the 
contrary, the 'conceptions and culture of the classes are ... 
too distinct for a poet of our times to be understood and read by 
everyone' 118 is the reason why Klopstock, four great German epic 
poet has ... not been accessible to as many as would have been 
the case if our public relationships were Greek' 
119. 
Hegel clearly did not believe that the remedy for Germany's 
cultural fragmentation into a mass of 'common people'-sustained 
by 'adventurous stories which are connected neither with our 
religious tradition nor with true history' and, on the other hand, 
'polite society' entertained with 'brilliant and charming' 
120 
imitations of classical literature, lay in the introduction of 
Greek customs and laws to Germany. He was surely sufficiently 
impressed by Garve's denial that the 'cast of mind of the 
ancients' 121 could be recovered to have thought this possible, 
let alone desirable. That would have involved, after all, the 
'direct orders and commands' which Nicolai denied could exert 
'durable influence' upon the 'activity and national cast of mind' 
122 
of the Germans Rather he looked for a solution of the kind 
suggested by Nicolai to what Hegel, clearly under his influence, 
called the excessive pre-occupation of all but the upper classes 
with the 'ever increasing needs and comforts of life' 
1231; 
That solution, it will be recalled, was that the middle 
class should be encouraged to 'think and be active' so that 
Englightenment might 'spread from the middle to the lower classes 
h 27. 
of the people', on condition that it too be 'not depressed by 
poverty, superstition, foulness and dull sensibility'. Likewise might 
Enlightenment then spread 'into the higher ranks' 
124. 
On condition, of course, that it eschew a life of merely 
private or economic pre-occupation, a thinking and active middle 
class could arise to be the vehicle for the spread of transparency 
or intelligibility in public relationships so that all might 
genuinely know rather than merely inhabit their places in society. 
This would enable political community to be founded in spite or 
indeed on the basis of social difference and transform society 
into a whole, intelligible to all, of parts or callings to be 
performed by each. Not the direct orders and commands of en- 
lightened despotism but another and higher art of kingship, 
providing a legal framework within which private men could regard 
themselves also as members of a public and taking account of their 
weight in the process of determining the extent to which change, 
if it is to endure or be endured, must accomodate the prevailing 
cast of activity and mind, was to advance this condition of civil- 
ization. 125, 
The idea of constitutional monarchy constrained by represent- 
ative institutions to conform law to prevailing customs or culture 
was in 18th century Germany the equivalent, held of course in the 
utmost possible contempt by rationalists such as Pufendorf, of the 
classical idea of the status mixtus conservative of the customs of 
the ancient republic 
126. It was possibly from Garve, whom 
'27 Rosenkranz named as Hegel's first mentor in ethics , that Hegel 
learnt to esteem not only constitutional monarchy over political 
and transcentental despotism alike but also the more general ideal 
of the 'state of law' 
128 
which held sway among the peoples of 
republican Greece and Rome. At any rate, if it was not from 
Garve that Hegel first learnt the virtues of this ideal, it was 
probably from him whom Garve presented as its chief classical 
28 
exponent: Cicero. 
Apart from the fact that Hegel is known, at the age of six- 
teen, to have spent at least seven hours a week studying Cicero 
129 
and to have made excerpts from Garve's translation of Adam 
Ferguson's Principles of Moral Philosophy, as well as from 
Garve's 'Remarks and Essays on Cicero's Book of Duties , it is 
reported by Rosenkranz that, at the age of fourteen, the budding 
philosopher chose to take from Cicero the following definition of 
the state: 'councils and groups of men associated by law' 
130. 
It is highly likely that when he came to study Garve, Hegel was 
impressed by his use of Cicero to illuminate Ferguson's moral 
philosophy, and particularly his concept of 'public spirit'. 
The man of public spirit, Garve wrote, is one who has come to 
'regard himself as part of a whole' 
131. And it was to law alone 
that, following Cicero, Garve and, for sure, Hegel, credited the 
capacity to afford men the theoretical insight, necessary to that 
end, that their practical activities alone could not supply. 
It is no less likely, moreover, that when he encountered 
Mendelssohn's warning of the danger to the state in which civil 
enlightenment and culture do not co-operate, Hegel thought immedi- 
ately of the purpose to which Cicero addressed law as a means: to 
arrest the cycle of decay to which living things succumb in which 
everything does not keep to its proper place or take up the place 
appropriate, in the face of changing circumstances, to the end of 
conserving the public good. 
There is reason to suppose that, as early as when he was 
fourteen, Hegel had already arrived at a fairly sophisticated 
understanding of the problem of the relationship between change, 
its agents, its causes and its patients and that it was this 
precocious understanding which guided his reading of his mentors. 
For in his diary, at the beginning of July 1785 he wrote: 'For 
a long time I have pondered, what is pragmatic history; I have 
obtained today 
(but I do not know through whom) an idea of it, 
29. 
albeit a fairly dim and partial one. A. 
history is pragmatic, I 
believe, when one does not merely relate facts but also the 
character of a famous man, a whole nation, itt morals, customs, 
religion etc; when one unfolds the distinctive changes and 
variations of these from other peopleb', traces the ruin and the 
rise of great kingdoms, shows what consequences this or that event, 
or change of government, has had for the constitution of the 
nation, for its character etc., and so forth' 
132. 
From his contemporary interest in Cicero we may infer that 
Hegel was very probably interested in the treatment by Gibbon of 
the idea that Rome suffered the effects of an implacable cycle of 
decay; that he also had in mind Montesquieu's Considerations on 
the Causes of the Grandeur and Decadence of the Romans as a species 
of pragmatic history. It is scarcely credible, however, that he 
would have forgotten from whom he got his definition of 'pragmatic 
history', were it Gibbon or Montesquieu, Voltaire or Hume. Hegel 
may have arrived at his definition in the course of his reading 
one J. M. Schroek's Textbook of World History of which he had 
remarked in his diary, four days earlier, that 'no world history 
has yet pleased me better'. Schroek was said to have avoided 
'the offence of collecting many names, ... 
(he) wisely leaves out 
the many Kings, wars ... and such like others :.. 
best of all, he 
connects the realm of scholarship with history, similarly he takes 
care to refer to the situation of the scholars and of the sciences 
in general' 
133. Schroek's main virtues, as far as Hegel was 
concerned, were that he was interested in the historical role of 
practical scholars and did not care to be a 'collector' (Sammler) 
of insignificant data about kings, queens and 'all that'. This 
was in fact Schroek's own bugbear. In his Portraits and Bio- 
graphies of Famous Scholars he praised as pragmatic that historian 
who sought out the 'origins and conjunctions of events'. This 
interest 'differentiates him from the dull collectors (Sammlern)' 
134 
30. 
A more authoritative definition of pragmatic history than the 
'dim', albeit quite representative, view of it available in 
Schroek is to be found in the work of J. C. Gatterer. That Hegel 
knew of him or his reputation cannot be established with any 
certainty from documents belonging to the period prior to 1802-03. 
It may be supposed that he did on the basis of his own insistence 
in the VSN that his task was to understand the system or spirit 
of events ('System der Begebenheiten' or Geist). For Gatterer 
had made concern with the Geist der Begebenheiten the trademark 
of the pragmatic historian, arguing that 'no event in the world is, 
so to speak, insular. All depend on one another, cause others, 
produce others, are caused, are produced, and again cause and 
produce. The events of the great and the lowly, of the 
individual man and all men. of private life and the big wide 
world ... all are 
involved in and bound up with one another' 
1350 
We shall see that in the JSN, as well as in the VSN, Hegel 
followed the pragmatic method, explaining for instance the history 
of the Jewish people not in the simplistic and monocausal terms 
of the deeds and intentions of the great but according to the 
spirit which they represented; not in terms. of battles and 
migrations, but according to the complex relations in whose 
context these took place, determined by Judaea's situation as a 
'small country, by trade connections, and by the national unific- 
ations brought about by the Romans' 
136. It is not really import- 
ant how long Hegel had been familiar, by the time he wrote these 
words, with the work of the foremost exponents of the pragmatic 
method, such as Gatterer, whose impact cannot be dated, or him 
with whom Gatterer co-operated in the translation and revision 
of the World History 
137, A. L. von Schloezer, from whose 
political Journal Hegel made the first ever of the juvenile notes 
138 
and studies that have come down to us . What is important 
is 
31. 
that, at the age of fourteen Hegel had already made clear to 
himself his interest in the peculiarity of national characters 
and constitutions, the circumstantial and inward causes of changes 
in them and their ascent and descent from the peak of national 
happiness. Like Gatterer and Schloezer, exponents of Gelartheit 
whose interest in the spirit or systematic conjunction of events 
sprang from their zeal to understand the relationship between 
political practice and constraints of the real world 
139, Hegel 
sought to understand the reciprocal action upon one another, the 
involvement and bond with one another, of custom and constitution. 
It was this quest that excited his interest in law as that upon 
which, as we are now in a position to see, he believed, like 
Cicero, depended a people's capacity to maintain itt identity 
in the face of adversity. 
There are throughout Hegel's juvenilia no express statements 
to the effect that the purpose of law is to provide a people a 
criterion whereby it can measure the impact upon its identity 
of changes not of itt own making but due to external influences 
or to variations in the circumstances of its members; that it 
enables this because it is a determinate and authoritative state- 
ment of the ends to which the community is devoted or of the 
social organization which it requires, whether to those ends or 
as an end in itself, a statement according to which such 
influences and variations may be judged serviceable or derogatory; 
that as such a statement it provides the community the means, or 
the basis upon which, deliberately to consider either how to re- 
dress circumstances to conform to law, how to change law in order 
to accoirnodate circumstances, or both; and that in either case it 
is that which enables the community to change itself rather than 
merely be changed. It will become evident, however, that there 
is ample justification for the interpretation not only of Hegel's 
32. 
0ý 
VSN but of the trend of his earliest studies, particularly of 
Nendelssohn, as instinct with the idea that law is a means to the 
self-maintenance, in the face of changing circumstances, of the 
integrity of an ethical entity, a people, not in such a way that 
it remains simply what it was, but so that it becomes, by way of 
active response to events, what it intends to remain during and 
after their course: itself. For something to become what it 
intends to remain may seem an absurd conception, but it is not. 
For if that which would have been changed but for active response 
to circumstantial vicisssitudes remains self-same in the face of 
them it may be said to have become what it would not otherwise 
have been. If its active response is to redress circumstances, 
it has become manifestly but is not simply what it was. It has 
performed, or acted in fidelity to, itt essence. If its 
active response is deliberately to change its law it has become 
manifestly but is not simply other than what it was. For none 
other than what it was has reformed its essence. 
Nothing less determinate and authoritative than the legal 
definition of the customary rights and duties of the occupants 
of all social stations can ensure that in the face of changing 
circumstances individuals and societies can so far change them- 
selves, by performance or reform of their essence, as to escape 
the dangers present to those whose disposition is to respond to 
events habitually or mechanically, that is with intent to stay 
put just as they were; so far shed habit, as if it were, so to 
speak, an old snakeskin, in order to reveal one which though new 
is the same refreshed rather than abashed by experience, that 
custom may continue to hold out against corruption. 
Hegel's conviction was that nothing can maintain itself 
which has no criterion by reference to which .t can make changes 
necessary to the end of becoming the same as it intends to remain. 
33. 
This conviction is the analytic consequence of the view shortly 
to be credited to him, that change is necessarily felt to be 
radical, and their part in it passive, by entities not taught to 
live according to law but which, because they live only according 
to habit, neither knowing nor thinking what they do, do not know 
either what they suffer or what is to be done about it. As Hegel 
was later to argue, a people that 'does not know itt law? is like 
a flock of sheep that can be led at random by the nose 
140. 
Their 
experience is amorphous. Unless what happens to any entity can 
be brought within or located without the compass of itb definite 
criteria of identity it cannot see to what extent and in what 
respects it is liable to be changed and so can certainly not begin 
to rectify its suffering. Hence it must feel itself mechanically 
moved from one condition to another entirely incommensurable and 
as such opposite condition. It cannot but feel itself to be 
passive and can conceive of rectification of its suffering only 
as an exact restitution of its old condition. But though that 
might happen it is not deliberately done: the essence has not 
been performed. 
It must be admitted that there is in his juvenilia no express 
support for this interpretation. But it may be derived from two 
sources of which we may consider the later first. In the essay 
on some of the characteristic differences of ancient (from modern 
poets) Hegel had made very clear his view that among the ancients 
there had survived long only those two forms of dramatic poetry, 
tragedy and comedy, which had acquired, in the course of their 
development away from the spontaneous festivities of the devotees 
of Bacchus and the smutty farces of peasants, strict formal 
qualities which prevented their degeneration into hybrid forms. 
Tragedy especially, whose connection with the ideas of distribu- 
tion and retribution was not lost upon Hegel ('it got the name 
34. 
from recompense') 
141, had been given dramatic form by Aeschylus, 
'the first to introduce two personae and to create a formal 
theatre instead of which had used to serve the shelter of branches' 
142. There had followed the introduction of unity of place, a 
rule which was 'sacrificed only very seldom for the sake of greater 
beauty! 143. Only the possession of regular formal criteria 
enabled Greek tragedy ultimately to attain itt perfection in the 
form of the Chorus and to maintain this perfection. 
An earlier source of confirmation for the interpretation 
given above than this essay of Hegel's eighteenth year, and a less 
technical, is to be found in a definition of which Hegel took note 
at the same time as he had selected Cicero's definition of the 
state. That definition was of change and it was taken from the 
modernized version of the Socratic dialogue, Phaedo, written by 
him in whom Hegel encountered a spirit kindred with Cicero in 
point of his belief in the cycle of decay and the arresting 
capacity of law: Moses Mendelssohn. 
According to Mendelssohn 'a thing is said to have changed 
itself when, of two opposed determinations which can be said to 
belong to it, the one ceases and the other begins to be effective'. 
Hegel adapted this definition in a most significant respect. He 
wrote that it is rather the case that 'a thing is said to be 
changed when, of two opposed determinations which can belong to 
it, the one ceases and the other begins to be effective? 
144. 
The implication of this revision is that it is improper to 
speak of a change in a thing from one condition to another 
exclusicve of itt predecessor as if the thing in question had 
changed itself. Reflexive change may by implication be defined 
as that which a thing performs in order to become what it intends 
to remain: itself and not a quite other thing. When a thing 
changes itself it is rather the case that it does so not with 
35. 
a view to eradicating its former condition, for that would be 
self-contradictory, but to endowing that same 'determination' 
with a form better adapted to its continued affirmation under 
changed circumstances. This it does precisely in order that it 
should not be or feel itself to be the patient, as if it were an 
entity without freedom, of causes of change operative upon it 
from without or of circumstances that move it mechanically, but 
that it should be and feel itself to be an agent throughout its 
experience of events. For if the possible determination or 
condition to which it is converted, whether deliberately by 
another or inadvertently by its own default, is entirely other 
than and opposite to that to which it is used (what Hegel's 
mentors called the prevailing mode of activity or cast of mind) 
and in which it is accustomed to regard itself as an agent, it 
can in no wise regard its new determination as the effect of 
its own deed. Hence it was that Hegel did not allow that 
change is reflexive if it is from one determination to an in- 
commensurable other. That is to say that reflexive change does 
not happen by other means or on an other basis than law, for 
change made in terms of law is precisely that which does not 
admit of the eruption of new determinations not amenable to 
commensuration with the old but seeks to adjust the new to the 
old and the old to the new. 
In truth, Hegel's revision of Mendelssohn's definition, 
unless it was a thoughtless slip of the pen, was probably intended 
as a correction of a faulty expression of what the young 
philosopher may have known his elder's position to be, as it was 
expressed in the article, What is Enlightenment?, that had 
appeared thirty two months before Hegel made notes from it and 
nine months before he made his collection of definitions. It 
may be that Hegel, at the age of fourteen, already knew that 
36. 
Mendelssohn believed that 'civil enlightenment' should articulate 
customary social ethics so that their particular practitioners 
might also have the theoretical insight that enables the maintenance 
of responsiveness to essential civil calling without which the 
constitution 'ceases to be', so that besides the idiocy of merely 
practical life devoted to the service of need and comfort, they 
might avail themselves of the public idiom of law. It may be that 
Hegel already, when he read his Phaedo, knew of Mendelssohn's 
preference that 'human enlightenment' should be subordinated to 
civil, to the end that valid constitutions should not entirely 
cease to be but rather change themselves, in order to endure, on 
the basis of the law already available to them. 
That at any rate was the view which Mendelssohn expressed 
in the work which Hegel certainly did know by the age of fourteen, 
in which he found a view of change inveterately hostile to the 
imposition upon a people of 'determinations' utterly other than 
those to which it is accustomed. 
As a schoolboy, Hegel was greatly exercised by the question 
so popular among seventeenth and eighteenth century rationalists 
as to why Socrates, with whom they identified as a paragon of 
enlightenment born ahead of his time, had on his deathbed offered 
sacrifice to Asc]epius, the Greek god of healing. Contrary to 
those who believed that he was delirious with hemlock 
145 or, 
with Racine, that 'Plato had his teacher die as he had lived, 
with irony on his lips' 
146, Hegel held that Socrates had 
deliberately opted, in order not to offend the masses, to fall 
in with their customs (Sitten). His primary source for this 
opinion, apart from his schoolteachers, Professors Ofterdinger 
and Cless, was Mendelssohn's analysis of Socrates' character as 
a 'virtue living Aufklaerer'.. In order fully to understand the 
import of Hegel's judgement of Socrates, of which a full statement 
37. 
is available only from manuscripts dating from the period after 
he left university, where he wrote, apart from a rehash of his 
ideas on classical poetry 
147 
a few sermons, some fragments and 
one important essay 
148, 
nothing that remains extant, it is 
necessary to essay a provisional analysis of what the idea of 
change, as communicated to him by the Aufklaerers with whom we 
have dealt so far, meant to the young philosopher. 
We have seen that Hegel was inclined, because of his practical 
bent, to the study of law; that his mentors in this and related 
studies were prepared to prefer what is or can be valid for a 
particular cultural or customary environment to what is supposedly 
eternally true but cannot be made to count as such, either in 
theory or in practice, for the subjectivity of participants in any 
given system of social ethics. We have seen that they believed 
accordingly that the civilization of these ethics or customs must 
be Worked up out of the'inner powers' of any prevailing 'cast of 
mind' and must consist in making transparent, intelligible and a 
basis for community despite difference of the relationships 
between its 'inner constituents' rather than in their dismissal 
by one-sided rationalists as unintelligible and ridiculous. We 
have seen that they presupposed the. systematic interdependence of 
custom and constitution in their confrontation with changing 
circumstances and looked more or less explicitly to the ideal 
formulated by Cicero of a state of law conservative of the custom- 
ary condition of things Roman, of rerum publicarum, as the condi- 
tion of the intelligent regard for and practical devotion to the 
whole, the condition of the public spirit without which ruin and 
decay must set into the life of a people and its constitution 
must cease to be. We have seen that they regarded the power of 
law, in short, as that without which a people cannot change itself 
but only be changed and held the articulation of custom into law 
to be the only desirable form of change or enlightenment, on the 
38. 
grounds that no change can endure that cannot be endured by its 
patients. And we have seen that they suspected radical change 
to be unendurable by the individual and collective subjectivity 
of those to whom it happens because it cannot but appear to it 
as utterly opposite to the conditions under which it is accustomed 
to regard itself as active. 
We shall see in the penultimate and final chapters how Hegel 
came to the conclusion, which accords with the view of change set 
out in the foregoing, that the processes of change set in train 
by revolutionary France and enlightened despotic Prussia alike 
were not qualified to be called durable 
149 
and so could not be 
considered species of genuine modernization because they were 
utterly offensive to the customs of their peoples. For the time 
being, however, let us ignore the contradictory myths of the 
radical youth and the ageing reactionary, and attend to the view 
of change which earned Hegel the affectionate soubriquet: the 
'Old Man' 150. 
3. Sinnesaenderung and the conservation of community. 
Hegel was no believer in the possibility that a sense of 
subjectivity, of being at least a member of the collective author 
of changes of which one is individually a patient, a sense which 
as we shall see he credited to citizens of republican Greece and 
Rome 151 and which he thought might be afforded to the citizen of 
the modern representative-cum-monarchical state 
152, 
could survive 
the blinding light of Pauline conversion from the pathetic manners 
of the 'old man' to the apathetic behaviour of the new in strict 
accordance with a law free of pathological incentives. 
The kind of conversion in which he did believe inhered a 
promise that, rather than be negated, the subjectivity of practical, 
39. 
sensible men would be enhanced and affirmed by its being made 
intelligent as well as sentient, is one which consists in the 
persuasion of the disposition of the citizen away from inclina- 
tion to preserve the customary conditions of his own well-being 
at the cost to the community of its loss of the capacity to 
conserve the end with which those customary conditions were 
originally in harmony and to which they were dedicated, namely 
the well-being and happiness of the whole people. This is the 
negative aspect of change in disposition. 
Its positive aspect consists in the conversion of the 
disposition of the citizen towards inclination to adjust his 
habitual or merely practical regard for custom so that the 
community may, rather than have to obliterate it, consecrate 
with the form of law that in custom or culture which remains, 
while men's individual efforts and industry introduce developments 
in social life, consistent with the well being of the whole: people. 
Thereby can be maintained the traditional locus of identity of 
interest between the individual citizen and his polity: the 
customs with which the individual has grown up and become 
familiar as the sanctuary of his personal freedom can be respected 
by the public authority to the extent that they do not derogate 
from the public good as defined by the constitutional law which 
affords theoretical insight into their relation to the end of 
civilization, or to the extent that they can, if serviceable to 
that end, be enacted as law. In those cases, assuming a minimum 
of continuity in this process of adjustment of customary develop- 
ments there is no danger of disaffection of the individual from 
the public authority to which, on the contrary, the advantage 
accrues that it can depend not only on the obedience but also on 
the affection of the individual. There exists, over and above 
this advantage, the benefit to the public that the force of law 
40. 
attaches to customs advantageous to the whole people and hence 
that custom is not liable to be regarded as a convenient resort 
for private parties intent upon abuse of the public good for the 
sake of their private utility. It was a common complaint among 
Hegel's elders, which he too expressed in the VSN 
153, that was 
voiced by J. C. Gatterer: 'I live in a time when Germany, 
according to its laws, is supposed to be a constitutional 
monarchy but according to custom is a state where a powerful 
ruler can usurp the law when he wishes and devour a weaker state. 
Even a weak ruler - be he prince, duke or nobleman - is still 
strong enough to torment and expel ... people whom he calls his 
subjects' 154. It was commonly held, in short, that law ought to 
command the affection due to the custom which it accommodates while 
Custom ought to find protection in that accommodation from abuse. 
The disposition of the citizen would then be to follow custom but 
not from mere habit and to obey the law without grudge. 
None of the change soug1t by Hegel and his contemporaries 
need involve substantive alteration of custom by law 
155, 
except 
in the sense that, once more assuming continuity, enactment as 
law is reserved to customs consistent with the happiness of the 
whole people and that customs inimical to public well being are, 
vis a vis others not so, relatively invalidated, though not 
necessarily prohibited, by virtue of their non-enactment. It 
should be noted that any custom, as such, is potentially inimical 
to public happiness. Whether it is or not depends on the spirit 
in which it is practised. If its practice is insisted upon under 
any and all circumstances, for its own sake or that of its 
practitioner, without intelligent regard for itt relation to the 
end of national happiness, it is likely to cause social ills. 
Change must occur above all in the manner in which customs. are 
observed so that they may, rather than be eradicated, persist 
41. 
along with or in the form of law. 
In what, then, consists the adjustment or conversion of the 
disposition of the citizen which makes this possible? The change 
to which Hegel attaches chief importance does not affect the sub- 
stance of custom but rather the ethical subject himself. It 
involves aversion from habitual or mechanical observance of 
customary and statutory obligations alike. Such observance may 
preserve the good conscience of the individual or even the whole 
people but at the same time subvert the well being of the people 
by inhibiting its capacity, on the one hand, to change custom, 
or rather prevent from becoming such whatever is bad, and, on 
the other hand, to change law should the need for substantive 
change unfortunately arise. It involves conversion to what Hegel 
regards as their active, vital or lively performance of duty. 
Such performance Hegel calls ethical or (perhaps mindful of a pun 
on the German word for ethics and customs - Sitten - and on the 
root of the Greek word for ethics and people) sensitive to the 
customary life of the people, rather than moral or respectful of 
the unusual rules or maxims of universal legislation. Conver- 
sion to inclination to ignore mechanical rules for the sake of 
the life of the people, which may be reduced to a state of distress 
by scrupulous regard for rules and anxiety over their relative 
priorities 
156 is called by Hegel a 'change of disposition' 
(Sinnesaenderung). This term he borrowed from Kant 157but 
turned, as we shall see, to subversive. effect. 
Against the possible objection to this analysis, which is 
abstracted from all of Hegel's JSN, namely that it imputes to him 
an esteem of law as a sure preservative, given Sinnesaenderung, 
of ethically valuable customs and so contradicts the impression 
given by the frequency of an apparent equation by him of both 
custom and law with mechanism or habit, whether in the guise of 
Kantianism or Pharisaism, let it be provisionally defended on this 
42. 
account: he used the concept of Sinnesaenderung to denote a change 
which is adverbial rather than substantive, in that it involves 
conversion from the habitual disposition, according to which 
customs and statutes are observed to the letter so that regardless 
of any ill consequences to the happiness of the whole the individ- 
ual may in strict justice defend himself against reproaches on 
that score, to the ethical disposition, according to which customs 
and statutes are observed with regard to the'spirit of their 
original dedication to and harmony with public well being. This 
shows him to have regarded neither custom nor law as necessarily 
habit forming or mechanical. Hegel, as we shall see 
158, 
never 
subscribed to Kant's prejudice against human law that it treats 
man merely as a phenomenon. 
But before we proceed to the explanation of the JSt1 in terms 
of Hege1's appreciation of the need for the conversion of the 
disposition of individuals to agreement with the purpose of 
conserving things custorary in their original condition of ethical 
vitality and from decline to a position of habitual mechanism, and 
of the need for public law appropriate to and conservative of that 
disposition and condition, we must explain the significance of 
Hegel's early 'Socratologya and indicate its- pertinence to the 
understanding of his 'Christology'. We have to consider how each 
of these studies is in fact an implicit ethnology of law. 
Not until Hegel had left university to become a family tutor 
in Bern did he make any extended effort to analyse Socrates 
behaviour as a 'virtue loving Aufklaerer'. In the first 
manuscript in which he did so, Hegel argued that as an enlightener 
and as a reformer Socrates had to conform his art of instruction 
to the 'genius and manners' of his people 
159. Had he done other- 
wise than attempt to lead his contemporaries subtly to agreement 
with him, on the basis of their own experience, had he decided 
43. 
upon the course (which would have been inconceivable for a Greek 
and have caused anyone to be made an object of derision who took 
it 160) of preaching to the Greeks from the housetops, he would 
certainly not have attracted to but rather would have alienated 
from his cause men of action whose energies could be relied upon, 
in his absence, to promote Sinnesaenderung. He would have 
attracted instead, as did Jesus, only 'petty spirits' 
161 
quite 
unfit to change themselves let alone to promote change in others 
that would be felt as immanent rather than transeunt. 
Socrates felt he could rely upon his method to effect 
reform and enlightenment that would be felt as immanent rather 
than transeunt change and as congenially corrective of rather 
than utterly opposed to custom, because custom in his world was 
already informed by public law. It was because he lived in a 
republican state whose public relationships were such that 'each 
citizen spoke freely with the others and ... polite urbanity was 
162 
pretty well the lot of the lowest masses' as well as of the 
'great generals, statesmen and heroes of all kinds' with whom he 
had to do 163 that Socrates did not feel inclined to impress 
'a 
new shape or 'mould' upon the 'old man'. Whoever became his 
pupil remained his own master, (each in -his own speciality' 
164. 
Greek society, as Hegel had argued in 1788, was such that each 
could play his part and at the same time talk about the whole, 
the better that he might know what must be the relation of his 
particular skill to the good life of the whole. Socrates 
offered his contemporaries changes which simply afforded them 
greater self-knowledge, the ability to review what they were 
doing and what to do about what they suffered, and therewith 
temperance, the means to rededicate their specialized occupations, 
in which each was to remain his own. master, to the service of the 
republic. No fisherman became his fisher of men: 'None had to 
abandon hearth and home. With each he began from his trade and 
guided him thence to the spirit... He developed out of the souls 
44. 
of men concepts that lay therein and needed nothing more than a 
midwife' 165 
We witness in this manuscript the development by Hegel of 
the concept of political genius, the quality of one who is 
sufficiently attuned to the spirit of those whose reform he 
intends to gain their sympathy, yet sufficiently enlightened 
sternly to correct their 'world and its prejudices' 
165a 
Socrates is the model for anyone who intends that his contemp- 
oraties should undergo a change of disposition which they may yet 
not feel to have been imposed upon them ab extra as if they had 
nothing to do with its achievement but all to suffer for it: It 
is of course analytic to the concept of Sinnesaenderung that it 
cannot be achieved if such offence is given to the disposition 
due for change that in order to vindicate its sense of the worth 
of its present existence, its activity and cast of mind, it must 
reject any prospect of change at all. It is of some interest to 
note that, on the back of his manuscript, Hegel excerpted passages 
from an article by W. G. Tennemann 
165bon Socrate's purpose which 
sharply distinguished it from that of Plato, the prototypical 
builder of an uninhabitable Absolute, who had in view not the 
change of his contemporaries but 'the education of the human race 
in general, the perfection of ethics as science and the foundation 
of a philosophic legislation and constitution' 
166 
. Socrates, on 
the contrary, was more interested in civil than in human enlighten- 
ment, more in the adjustment of laws and customs than in the found- 
ation anew of the former without respect to the latter. Socrates 
had no interest in the casting of utterly new 'Mosaic tablets', nor 
in inscribing upon the hearts of his contemporaries an 'ordinem 
salutis' that departed substantially from their republican tradi- 
tion 167* 
What is truly remarkable about his manuscript on Socrates is 
that Hegel imported into its treatment of his political genius 
45. 
terms which so resound with Machiavellian overtones that it can 
scarcely be doubted that he was, as early as 1794, heavily in- 
fluenced by the thought of the florentine secretary. It may 
further be supposed that in his design of the concept of political 
genius, which in the VSN he was to present as that of one whose 
mission is to regenerate the law of the land 
168, he turned to 
the Machiavellian idea that the individual or institutional or 
statutory representative of virtu, by which is to be restored the 
virtu of the people. corrupted by the incremental growth of 
'inconveniences', must be adapted, if the republic is to 'remain 
the same whatever befalls', to the character of the materia to 
whose regeneration it is devoted 
169. 
This idea, if it occured to Hegel, may after all merely have 
confirmed what he had already learned from his mentors and from 
the work of the chief of the pragmatic historians, 'Montesquieu, 
by whose understanding of the relationship between custom and 
constitution Hegel had so early been impressed and which was it- 
self instinct with the views of Machiavelli 
170. In any case, 
the presence of Machiavellian influence upon Hegel's conception 
of Socrates as a political genius intent upon encouraging his 
contemporaries to be active in the cause of reflexive change 
rather than passive, is quite unmistakeable in that passage where 
he wrote that Socrates was not interested in the education of 
heroes in 'martyrdom and suffering' but in heroes 'in action and 
in life' 171. It is also to be detected in another sketch of 
Socrate's character, likewise drawn in 1794, in which Hegel argued 
` that the value of Socrates as a model for the political reformer 
consists in the-fact that 'he fashioned his wisdom in the tumult 
of active life, in the battles where with danger to his life he 
saved his friend; he devoted his life to the improvement of his 
fellow citizen' 172 His example, unlike that of Christ, was 
46. 
therefore not of the kind which incites 'great heroes in suffering, 
great exponents of martyrdom' 
173, the imitation of which virtues 
is, of necessity, conducive to behaviour that has about it 'some- 
thing gauche, something that cannot hold its own against 
experience and progressive acquaintance with the world' 
174, 
something passive in the face of fortune. True virtue, in 
contrast to such behaviour, is that which, though it may need a 
model like Socrates, is something 'self-discovered, self-exerted' 
175. For its model, being human rather than divine, excites 
effort towards an ideal achievable by human means, whereas it is 
only by divine means, in which they are not active, that men 
suppose they can become Christ-like 
176. 
If we attend to the context in which Hegel deployed this 
contrast between the kinds of behaviour to which men are incited 
whose models are Socrates and Christ, the manner of whose imitation 
he believed to be determined by the light in which their contemp- 
orary followers regarded them, we will attain a position from 
which it may be seen quite clearly that he meant to identify as 
the chief point of difference between the Greek and the Jew the 
fact that, unlike the former, the latter addressed himself to men 
whose customs, for want of enlightenment, had become so derogatory 
to the happiness of the whole that the law was not a living force 
in their hearts but an alien order to be observed grudgingly and 
only to the letter. Their law was not something adroit, some- 
thing that can hold its own against experience, but a millstone. 
For the conversion of such men extra-ordinary incentives, 
intellectual and sentimental, such as miracles and the promise of 
personal immortality 
177, had been necessary. The supernatural 
aspects of Christ's teaching were needed 
To storm the fancy of dreamers 
Where the torch of law burns dim 
178. 
47. 
It was just their want of regard for the law that made the 
Jewish people the medium through which was distorted the 'more or 
less pure sense' 
179 in which Christ advocated a life well pleas- 
ing to God into the basis of a superstitious system of ritual 
practices from which is entirely absent any semblance of self- 
discovered and exerted virtue. 
Societies where such practices prevail stand in grave need 
of their correction by law to a greater extent than ought to be 
necessary in the relationship between law and custom: 'The 
history of all ages has shown how depraved is the constitution of 
such states or even classes ... where all natural relationships 
are perverted through these immoral religious Galimatthias. 
Even nowadays, history shows us, the sad picture of states where 
these systems still prevail, e. g. in the Papal States, in Naples, 
where it is only the never quite destructible goodness of human 
nature... and only the force of the civil laws (which have to 
correct those principles in some measure in order that society 
can stick together in emergency) that prevent vices and evil 
inclinations from being the outcome of the doctrines which 
sustain them' 180. 
Hegel clearly regretted that any people should come to such 
a pass that law, the ultimate safeguard against social disinte- 
gration, should have to be called into play against matters of 
Practical subjectivity, with which it should always be able to 
progress in harmony. Superstitious dogmas asserting the depend- 
ence of being well-pleasing to God upon the performance of 
'certain practices ... or certain privations and disciplines of 
the body' and upon the profession bf saving belief in Christ's 
virtue rather than the practice of virtue itself 
181 had perverted 
practical subjectivity to the point at which it is supposed that 




and through indulgences and asylum 'escape the 
arm of justice' 
183. That this had come to pass in modern times 
was due to it8 having been so in Judaea at the crucial time when 
was born the religion which came to be diffused throughout the 
Roman Empire. 
Although Hegel's general objection to the practice of the 
Christian religion was that it had tended to discourage self- 
discovered and acquired virtue because its object had appeared 
to be blessedness in another life rather than supposedly un- 
attainable virtue in this 
184, he was not hostile to the very 
idea of extra-mundane rewards and punishments. He believed 
indeed that it was quite natural and hence the cardinal point of 
all religions, because it is 'grounded in the need of practical 
reason to establish a connection between this and another life, 
185, 
a need which stems from the contingency in this life of the 
consequence of happiness upon virtue. But he believed no less 
that the idea was liable to abuse and that care must be taken 
that only a version of it compatible with mörality (rather than 
one whose system of incentives and disincentives transfixes the 
human agent in a state, whether hopeful of salvation or desperate, 
of utter heteronomy) should be allowed to take place in the faith 
of a people 
186 
and be maintained in that form which is in accord- 
ance'vrith the needs of the whole. 
If we now recur to the manuscript in which we first en- 
countered Hegel's antithesis of Socrates and Christ, and of the 
cultural environments in which they were situated, we find there 
an indication of what Hegel considered a doctrine of the connection 
of this life with another which was rationally and morally accept- 
able ('true'. ) yet culturally or ethically viable ('valid'). 
Socrates died like a Greek, with a sacrifice to the God of 
healing. He conceived his death, in his conversation with his 
49. 
followers about immortality, as a release of his soul into a 
state of health. This state of health, one of elevation above 
the needs of the body which confine the citizen's regard to the 
part rather than the whole, was treated as having an analogue in 
the political life of the city (Socrates preferred death to 
ostracism precisely because the former would estrange him less 
from the laws of Athens, to which he would not be disloyal, than 
would the latter) in which like elevation is to be found. This 
is what Hegel meant by arguing that among Socrates and his 
companions immortality was a hope or postulate whose premisses 
their lives and very beings exhibited 
187. In the midst of life 
itself, Socrates, in contrast to Christ, who 'formed himself in 
advance and in solitude' 
188, 
already inhabited a state of 
intelligent regard for the whole without which, like this life 
in the absence of an'after-life', the activities of practical 
subjectivity would be vacuous. Socrates and his followers had 
lived political lives. They were not 'mean spirits' who needed 
miracles and the incentive of immortality of the person, who did 
not have alive in themselves the premisses, namely the idea of 
'virtue and the highest good t, of a hope of immortality in which 
no 'mortal companion' figures. The hope of true immortality, 
not that of a 'corpse risen from the Grave' 
189, 
was not weak in 
them because, as we may suppose Hegel reasoned, the 'torch of law' 
190 
burnt brightly in their fancy. It was in the city, and its 
law to which they daily rededicated their skills that they imagined 
their immortality consisted. Their imagination made it so. 
As we shall see, Hegel was deeply impressed, probably first 
by Montesquieu, with the view that so heartily did the ancient 
republican citizen believe that his freedom was constituted by 
the laws of his community, the guarantee of the immortality of 
its identity and so of the security of his customs, that he was 
50. 
ready to die for their sake, not looking for eternal life for 
his own individuality because his 'whole soul was in the republic; 
the republic survived him and there hovered before his mind only 
the thought of its- immortality' 
191. In this equation of 
immortality with citizenship resides the essence of Hegel's idea 
of self-wrought Sinnesaenderung, as that which makes no call upon 
supernatural aid but consists (thanks to the confidence of the 
citizen that in the activity of the community inheres the 
significance of his own) in active rather than passive or 
mechanical devotion of his practical subjectivity to the service 
of the whole, a whole made intelligible by the laws which he 
daily co-operates in 'manifesting and maintaining' 
192. This is 
the very sense in which Hegel thought of change, for without vital 
devotion the community would always be liable to be changed in- 
advertently; and it is the sense in which he conceived of it as 
reflexive, as the deed of those to and through whom it happens, 
for except they perform it, it might as well not occur: if 
another perform it in spite of them, their practical interests 
persist regardless, rejecting the change that would revolutionize 
them but can do so, if at all, only momentarily. 
It was the weakness in them of this disinterested 'postulate' 
Of immortality, the dimness of their civil enlightenment, that 
made the Jewish people, unlike the Greek, susceptible to outward 
and inward revolutions not of their own making in the course of 
which they could only suffer and from which they could not but 
retreat on account of the offence which revolution must give to 
the men of habit among whom alone it occurs. 
In a manuscript written immediately but one after the second 
of his antithetical sketches of Socrates and Jesus and immediately 
but one before the last which he, drew in the period before he 
embarked on the writing of his more comprehensive essays, Hegel 
51. 
argued that since the ideas, such as other-worldly reward and 
punishment, which are natural to all religions, make religion, 
because they are grounded in the needs of practical reason, so 
effective in the 'strengthening of the springs of ethical life' 
193, 
religion is a legitimate object to be nurtured by 'the 
lawgiver and administrator of a state' 
194. A right version of 
them may be envisaged by him to be fixed in the faith of a people 
195, Hegel seems to have reasoned, precisely because religion 
belongs to that aspect of civilization, namely culture, which is 
deficient in inherent theoretical self-consciousness. Usually, 
the 'will of a nation for a determinate religion has already long 
since made itself clear before its government could fix its 
objects; a government can only make its purpose the reproduc- 
tion, the maintenance, the perpetual renovation of knowledge of 
the same'. This, as Hegel had already learnt from Garve 
especially 196, presents a material limit to the action of the 
lawgiver but just because this part of culture is so spontaneous 
and haphazard the renovative and conservative function of the 
lawgiver is all the more essential. 
For, as Hegel believed, it has to be asked whether the 
religion which was once appropriate to a people, if it stay put 
in the same form without response to completely changed circum- 
stances, remains equally appropriate. The pragmatic question 
has to be posed of any given religion whether it was 'originally 
so constituted as to be able, with every change in form of 
government, every variation in enlightenment, to maintain its 
dignity, its usefulness as a public as well as a private relig- 
Ion ?' 
197. The people may have sloughed off or changed what 
Was peculiar to the time of its origin. Or, as is generally 
the case in non-republican states 'where the people is seldom in 
a position itself to enquire, itself to choose but passively does 
" 52. 
n( 
as its instructed' 
1' ", those r,: ho have it in their power to 
direct religion ray have had an interest in securing the form 
which they inherited from their forefathers and in passing it on 
unchanged (unchanged, that is, except in the all-important sense 
that everything about it has changed). In the latter case, it 
takes centuries before the whole nation realizes the need for 
change whose object is to stern further inadvertent changes. The 
trouble is, however, that a people used to passivity is usually 
satisfied with a thrust and soon lets the tiller be wrested from 
its hands again, maid ng further progress and improvement imposs- 
ible for centuries' 
199 The reform of such a people can only 
be fitful and involuntary. Precisely because it is so it tends 
to be radical and as such cannot but present a prospect frightful 
to those who would as well as those who would not undergo it. 
Pence it happened, Hegel argued in the last of the pieces in 
which he contrasted Socrates and Christ, that precisely because 
Christ launched a direct attach. upon the 'morally destructive 
statutes of the Jev: s', upon their 'positivity!, a concept which 
We shall soon have occasion to define, he could not but evoke a 
reactionary response fror then... Unlike Socrates, who 'did not 
directly combat the mythology of his people', Christ made direct 
alld subversive attacks on the positive religion of his people, a 
tactic which led back 'eo ipso to a positive religion' 
2000 
Hegel did not, of course, specify what constitutional means 
and 'particular institutions' 
201 he had in mind as those which 
V: ould confer upon any religion the aptitude perpetually to 
renovate itself in order to r'itigate the hazards to its identity, 
and to its relation of appropriateness or utility (Zweckmaessiekeit) 
to the people, of untoward changes in or about it. He went only 
so far as to sugGest that the availability of means to that end 
diminishes in non-republican states for the reason, we may suppose, 
53. 
that their peoples exhibit in general, and not only in religious 
matters, a passivity that does not dispose them to engage in the 
202 perpetual process of adjustment of culture and enlightenment . 
Two manuscripts, one dating from 1792 and one written in 1794 
immediately after Hegel's first piece of extended Socratology, make 
clear what conditions he believed to be prejucicial to the possib- 
ility of reflexive change. He argued in the later of these manu- 
scripts 
203 that of the constitution, legislation and religion of 
of any people it is religion that is the last to be divested of 
the 'childlike spirit' in which all three originate, the spirit 
according to which, as in a family, power is naively entrusted to 
a single man. It is in political matters that, as the feeling 
grouts that their 'childlike trust' is being whimsically abused, 
the people first conceives of the idea of definite laws to limit 
the authority of its rulers. Hence we may infer that Hegel's 
belief was that unless a people has achieved that level of 
civilization where the rule of law prevails, its religion cannot 
but be one whose conception of the connection between this life 
and the next involves an idea of reward and punishment whose 
spirit is the opposite of the republican idea of immortality, the 
analogue of the idea of ready deference of the part to the needs 
of the whole, and depends upon an idea of God, as a mighty lord 
subject to 'inclinations, passions, even moods ... with whom ... 
one can ingratiate oneself' 
204, 
opposite to the proper idea of 
God as a 'moral lawgiver' 
205 to whom nothing but a good way of 
life is well-pleasing. A people that looks to its Gods as 
governors of the 'weather, floods, plagues and so forth' 
206 
is not one in which resides the sense of activity or subjectivity 
essential to reflexive change in religious and political matters 
alike, for its criterion of what it is determined to be is quite 
outside itself and is itself beyond measure:. it is determined to be 
54. 
whatever takes the fancy of its transcendental or mundane masters. 
We shall have occasion, in the third chapter, to see how 
arguments akin to Hegel's criticism of the Judaic conception of 
God as a jealous master have been taken, and that by theorists 
claiming methodological affinity with the mature Hegel, to the 
conclusion that peoples subscribing to such conceptions are in- 
capable of representation. Though we may be sure that Hegel 
would have agreed with this view, we shall see that it does not 
follow as far as he is concerned that the God of a people which 
is representable, if it must have a God, can only be a 'Deist God' 
worshipped by a 'society without aspirations' 
207, though it may 
be unstintingly admitted that a representable society can have no 
Gods that derogate from the constancy of law. 
In the earlier manuscript Hegel had treated this childlike 
spirit, in its manifestation in Judaic law and religion alike, 
as one whose tendency was entirely towards passivity. The Jews 
did not at all regard their law as the intelligible expression of 
the unity in practice of the people, as the immortal measure 
according to which change is evaluated, but as a shibboleth which 
must cease to count upon the mishap of the distruction of the 
Temple, the merely visible representation of its validity. 
Their law was to depend upon what happens rather than to be-that 
upon the basis of which active response is made to what happens. 
Thus, as Hegel noted from Moses Mendelssohn's Jerusalem, 
'According to the rabbinical teachings, all punishments, in so 
far as they are purely national (i. e. matters of human law) had to 
cease to be right with the destruction of the Temple' 
208. With- 
out the reinforcement of theocratic authority, and the appearance 
of providential succour, the Jews had no faith in their laws. 
Not only were the Jewish people prepared to depend'the mainten- 
ance of their law upon good hap but also they voluntarily ceded 
55. 
its administration to a king to whom they submitted rather than 
be 'overburdened every moment' with the business of critical inter- 
pretation of the laws. Their response to the destruction of the 
second Temple was to allow the commonwealth to lapse and to demand 
of their prophets the institution of a perpetual monarchy. The 
Jewish people were less reluctant to put up with the 'frequent 
repression and exactions in great things' than they were to toler- 
ate petty incursions upon their private lives 
209. Their 
punctilious demand for private propriety in trifles was the obverse 
of the absence from their public relationships of a 'spirit of 
community, which sets aside the petty passions and knows action 
210 
on behalf of the whole' This characteristic was a conse- 
quence of the collusion of religious and political despotism, 
which Hegel considered, as we shall see in the next chapter, to 
be a particular affliction of the children of Israel. Among a 
people whose conception of law is that it may be set aside accord- 
ing to the whims of God or nature, the sense of insecurity must 
be at such a pitch that a spirit of community, of regard for any- 
thing but sensible satisfaction, must be impossible to nurture. 
Among such a people, the due priority of law over all else, 
including religion, is inverted so that it is upon a jealous God 
rather than upon'laws conservative of individual autonomy that 
its maintenance as a people depends. 
56. 
Chapter Two 
A Portrait of the 'Old Tian' as a theologian 
'Religion must help man to build his own little house, a home 
which he can call his own' (Hegel, the Tuebingen Essay, 1793) 
1. Religion as an aid to political rejuvenation 
We are now in a position to understand the import for Hegel's 
constitutional thought of the distinction which occurs for the 
first time in his own writings at the beginning of the manuscript 
from which we have just culled his critique of the passivity of 
the Jewish people in the matter of the maintenance, administra- 
tion and interpretation of their laws. This distinction is of 
subjective from objective religion, a distinction which recurs in 
his subsequent theological essays as that of a religion for the 
man of decisive and sensitive wisdom, from the religion of the man 
of calculative Understanding 
1, that of a custom-built religion 
from one built according to plans devised without regard to the 
specification of fitness for habitation by the common man 
2, that 
of a public from a private religion 
3, that of an accessible from 
an arcane religion 
4, that of a religion whose object is to en- 
courage men in joyful and gay devotion to the ethical whole with- 
out which life-lacks significance from one whose effect is so to 
intimidate their intelligence and imagination that they conceive 
of God as an arbitrary judge with whom they must enter into a 
gloomy transaction whose terms of exchange are that the individual 
should suffer in this life in order to attain a blessedness for 
his own person redeemable in the next 
5. In Hegel's most compre- 
hensive terminology it is a distinction between a religion that 
57. 
is and a religion that is not originally so constituted as to be 
capable of adaptation to changing circumstances, a religion that 
does not and a religion that does require that its doctrines and 
practices stay put in the midst of experience, a religion that 
'acts negatively, so to speak' 
7 
and one that is positive. 
As we have seen, that the religion of a people no longer 
bears in itself the traces of the childlike spirit of passivity 
in which it originates presupposes that neither the constitution 
of the people nor its legislation do so. The significance of 
Hegel's interest in the degree to which a religion may be con- 
sidered subjective 
8 is, therefore, that this is anindex of the 
extent to which the political culture in which it is situated is 
capable of maintaining itself by other means than staying put. 
It has now to be shown that Hegel's view is that it is upon a 
people's legal articulation that depends the extent to which its 
religion shares this capacity. This is demonstrable from the 
'Tuebingen Essay'of 1793. 
In this essay, on the Leibnitian premiss, which Hege1's 
reading of Mendelssohn, Garve and Ferguson must have impressed 
upon him, that human sensibility is continuous and pregnant with 
reason 
9, it is argued that the importance of religion consists 
in the fact that through its appeal to the heart men may be led 
to do good deeds to which the appeal of reason to the intellect 
lo is not always sufficient to incite them .A subjective religion 
is one which adapts the theological ideas of God and immortality 
to this end. It is a public religion in so far as it thereby 
influences the 'actions and mode of. thinking' 
11 
of a whole people, 
appealing to the sentiment of love in some men, or of fear in 
12 
others . 
Hegel claimed that his concern was not to detail what theo- 
logical doctrines appeal to what kind of heart, but to enquire 
58. 
what institutions are needed for doctrine effectively to educate the 
disposition of coarse men away from self-interest, 'the pendulum 
whose swinging keeps their machine going' 
13 
and towards the 
'gentler virtues of philanthropy' 
14, the 'seed of beauty'. This 
d'seed of the finer feeling' or moral sensibility is said to be 
15 buried by Nature in every man Subjective religion has to 
help in the process of performance of the essence of man by culti- 
vating his nature rather than by mechanising it, by enacting its 
propensity for the 'gay fulfilment of human joys or ... the doing 
of great deeds' 
16 
rather than by distorting activity into an in- 
hibited clockwork. 
Significantly, Hegel did not yet answer his own enquiry as 
to how a religion must be so'institutionally, rather than doctrin- 
ally, constituted that it is 'active negatively, so to speak', 
that it 'lets the soul express itself freely and openly and does 
not distort its longing for activity, or for the expression of 
human capacities in such a way as to preserve civility 
17 
without 
recourse to repression of practical subjectivity. The signific- 
ance of this omission consists in the fact that Hegel was becom- 
ing increasingly aware that a religion cannot do this through its 
own independent institutions, which, nevertheless, he felt obliged 
to discuss. In fact, Hegel indulged for several pages in reflect- 
ion upon the questions, concern with the first of which at least 
he had disclaimed, what kind of doctrines are inappropriate to a 
subjective religion? What kind of psychological faculties are 
involved by-objective religion? and so on. 
But he returned before long, albeit in metaphor, to the 
problem of institutions, which, as we shall soon see, he regarded 
as dependent or ancillary, with the question, How can religion 
help man to 'build-his own little house, a home which he can call 




inhabits a system of knowledge of God, nature and human obliga- 
tions which has been impressed upon him from without rather than 
built 'in and from his own personality' 
19, Hegel conveyed by means 
of two metaphors the conditions upon which he believed can be set 
up a folk or public religion, accessible to others than the cosmo- 
politan and enlightened. The effect of such a religion is primar- 
ily negative, 'to give as little occasion as possible for cleaving 
to the letter and ceremonial obsQrvance' 
20 
of the law of God and 
so to give as much scope as possible to the capacity of its adher- 
ents for reflexive change: such a religion must help man (its 
role is decidedly ancillary) to build a community that is either 
like a home which each has built for himself or one which he has 
inherited but knows as if he had built it. It must help him to 
put up a custom-built little house or a building dwelled in, 
. rather than a scarcely inhabited palace 
21 
Yet again, Hegel abandoned his institutional line of inquiry, 
contenting himself, as before 
22, 
with an encomium on disinterested 
and altruistic action, Reason in the affectionate or pathological 
guise of love, its monadic analogue. He also expanded upon the 
view, to which we. did not attend when it first. ' occurred 
23, that ob- 
jective religion is adapted for private purposes only, because 
the emphasis of the intellect, to which rather than to the heart 
it appeals, is upon the scrupulous observation of rules rather 
than upon the sensitivity of decision to what is ethical. As he 
had argued that the prudent cleverness of the understanding in 
the deposition of rules concerning how men ought to act produces 
'at the moment of actual decision ... a tangled pattern of be- 
haviour, a pattern of perpetual anxiety and inner conflict' 
24, 
so again he denied that the instruction which objective religion 
gives about cases of conflict of duties 
25 is any more fit than 
moral instruction to influence 'the way we make up our minds at 
60. 
the moment of action'. Where it presumes to do so there arises 
'an endless train of scruples ... which is absolutely opposed to the 
resolution and strength that is requisite for virtue' 
26, 
a gauche 
inflexibility which cannot hold out against progressive experience 
27. 
The question then recurred to Hegel, How must folk-religion 
be constituted? But again he preferred, despite his disclaimer 
of any intention to investigate the doctrinal aspects of this 
question, to examine these and ceremonial rather than institutional 
aspects. Thrice, then, did he avoid this issue. It eventually 
took its place after his treatment of doctrinal and ceremonial 
matters. As for the doctrines of a public religion, Hegel argued 
that they must be 'grounded on universal reason' 
28, 
which is to 
say that they must not so contradict the understanding of natural 
phenomena to which their believers have attained as to oblige 
thinking men to controvert them. For in that case their defence 
would involve such refinement and nicety that they must lose the 
simplicity upon which depends their utility for purposes of 
practical guidance. They 'will play a much greater part in the 
formation of the spirit of a people, than if the commandments 
are piled high and artificially organised, and if precisely for 
that reason they require an ever increasing number of exceptions 
29 to be made' " It is essential for like reasons, that is, to 
avoid liability to controversion, that the doctrines of a public 
religion aim 'to affect the spirit of the people only in great 
matters, partly directly and partly through the wonder of 
profoundly impressive ceremonies that are bound up with them' 
30. 
They must not involve religion in the operation of civil justice 
nor 'presume to become a code of private judgement' 
31. For 
that, as well as the nicety and difficulty of enactment en- 
tailed by their incredibility, would give rise to too much 'strife 
about their interpretation'. This in turn would occasion the 
61. 
establishment of an institutional authority which would by no 
means have the effect of liberating human impulses to free activity - 
required by Hegel of the institutions of a public religion 
32 
- but 
the contrary: it would enhance the satisfaction of the will to 
power of the priesthood 
33. 
We get an idea of the kind of 'institutions' which Hegel had 
in mind from the section in which he argued that the doctrines of 
a public religion must appeal to 'fancy, heart, and sensibility' 
34. For, he argued, rather than depend upon the authority of 
revelation and the historicity of its claims, doctrine should 
appeal to the imagination of the faithful, which may otherwise 
venture upon notions which contradict its essence. It should 
enter a mythic and ceremonious channel. But care should always 
be taken that myths and ceremonies are not regarded, even by the 
vulgar, as the essential ideas and practices of the religion 
35. 
Nevertheless, it is Hegel's opinion, in which he agreed with 
Leibniz that ceremonies are 'likenesses of virtuous actions' 
36, 
that without cermonies and the like 'a public religion is quite 
unthinkable' 
37. Devotional and sacrificial rites have only in 
the Christian church descended to the crass level of a shameless 
transaction with a God debased by the idea that his favour may be 
purchased 
38. But they can take the quite innocent form of, say, 
sacred music, song, folk-festivals and harvest celebrations, all 
of which 'enhance devotion' and give the devotee little opport- 
unity to practise his religion with a mechanical, lifeless or 
habitual disposition 39. The 'institutions' of a public religion 
are, as it were, ministries of fun. 
From Hegel's argument that the doctrines of a public religion 
'must be so constituted that all the needs of life, the public 
affairs of the State, are bound up with it, 
409 it emerges that 
the institutions which ensure that a religion should not have a 
62. 
stultifying effect upon practical and theoretical subjectivity 
are in fact none other than the institutions of the State itself. 
For the festivals and ceremonies of which Hegel wrote so allusively 
in the section of the Tuebingen essay on'fancy, heart and sensi- 
bility' turn out to be nothing other than 'public festivals' for 
which religion ought to furnish mere ring leaders 41. As well 
as these festive occasions, whose business is to promote joy and 
gaiety, courage and resolution 
42, 
public religion should, if it 
is to affect the people, 'go along amicably with them everywhere - 
stand beside them in their business and the more earnest affairs 
of life, 
43. 
It is plain that Hegel meant it to be understood, when he 
averred that public religion 'goss hand in 
that it is the constitutional system whose 
practices lead the way and set the pace ani 
or non-positivity of religion depends upon 
ency of the political order to stay put or 
that it can assimilate advances in culture 
whose spontaneity and subjectivity it must 
hand with freedom' 
44, 
institutions and 
1 that the positivity 
whether it is the tend- 
to be so constituted 
and enlightenment, of 
be permissive, and can 
discourage that from entering into custom whose promotion of super- 
stitious ideas of God and immortality, of 'adventurous rovings of 
fancy', inclines the people to idiotic fear of persons rather than 
respect for law and to private - spiritedness in the pursuit of 
blessedness. 
If it cannot, it must happen that the consequent passivity, 
selfishness and evasive contempt of the law, an evil disposition 
that cannot. change itself and must repulse all attempts to change 
it, becomes the cause in return of increasing incapacity on the 
part of the whole to do anything about the disintegration which 
it suffers. 
It is obvious that the simplicity which Hegel recommended 
63. 
should obtain in the influence of religious doctrines upon action, 
in order that its vitality should as little as possible be 
inhibited while its resolution should nevertheless be induced to 
have regard for the 'rights of others, 
45, is nothing but an 
analogue of the harmony of culture and enlightenment, custom and 
law, and of the intelligibility of civilized public relationships, 
which was argued in the first chapter to be the chief intellectual 
legacy inherited by Hegel from his mentors. 
It is extraordinary that even the longest commentaries on 
the Tuebingen Essay should have failed to take account of its 
significance for the development of Hegel's constitutional thought, 
to the extent that Hegel's latest biographer, H. S. Harris, can 
in all innocence speak, as if their status were equal, of'the 
development of religious consciousness and ... of political 
consciousness at the same time' 
46. It is all the more extra- 
ordinary that no-one has yet brought to attention what Hegel 
obligingly makes so clear at the rather faltering end of the 
essay, by means of a pair of allegories which reinforce his 
metaphorical message that the communities which men inhabit must 
be custom-built while yet their habitation must be intelligent, 
so that of everything that has a place'it is known and it can be 
told, in the words of Lessing's Nathan the Wise, 'how ... and 
why' it got there 
47. Practical and theoretical subjectivity 
must go hand in hand. 
In these allegories, having argued that it is 'in part the 
business of the public religion, in part of political relations' 
48 to form the spirit of the people (in matters, it will be 
remembered, only of great moment, 'so as not to invite disaffection 
of the individual from the laws) Hegel spoke on the one hand of 
'Time', on the other hand of 'fortune', as the 'father' of the 
Genius or. spirit of a people. By this relationship he meant to 
64.. 
signify the dependency of a people upon the contingent conditions 
of time and place for the satisfaction of their physical needs, 
the pursuit of which gives rise to manifold cultural relationships 
whose chief characteristic is their determination by blind fortune 
and unintelligent force 
49. By the second relationship which 
holds between the Genius of a people and another parent, the 
maternal relationship, it is evident that Hegel meant, since he 
spoke of the mother of Genius on the one hand as 'the politeia, 
the constitution', on the other as 'freedom', to convey the idea 
of the civil enlightenment of uncivilized force. For the father of 
Genius is* Force-50. This enlightenment is of a kind that need 
not repress culture for it is a process which is begun at birth 
51 
and is so constant that conflict can scarce arise between the 
constitution and her darling, whose whims she can therefore permit 
more often than repress 
52. Here is a remarkable anticipation 
of the mythopoeic presentation, in Hegel's later lectures on the 
Philosophy of World History, of the idea that Law-constantly 
reviewed - puts a term to the Polybian cycle of decay to which 
irregular peoples are prone: 'it was first Chronos-Time-that 
ruled; the Golden Age, without moral products; what was produced - 
the offspring of thatChronos - was devoured by it. It was Jupiter - 
from whose head Minerva sprang ... that first put a constraint 
upon Time, and set a bound to its principle of decadence' 
53. 
Finally, Hegel related the Genius of a people, in the one 
allegory to religion and in the other to fancy, as it were to a 
midvd. fe, riet-nurse and nanny, all rolled into one, ivr*O- educates 
her charge in all the fine arts, teaching him to adorn his 
relationship to 'the circumstances of the time' and the'fetters' 
or 'brazen bond' of his needs with. roses ... so. that he could 
delight in these fetters as his own work, as a part of himself', 
just as the heir to an ancestral dwelling is helped by religion 
65. 
to get to know his place, to be at borne within his own walls and 
under his own roof no less than he is who builds his own little 
house 54. The wet-nurse does her ancillary work, encouraging 
the soul of her charge to a joyous, gay and gracious 'conscious- 
ness of its power and its freedom' 
55, 
a consciousness which, 
once cognisant of the 'rights of others' 
56, 
contributes as well 
to the capacity of the whole as to that of the individual, to 
resist the vagaries of Time and fortune. That this is achieved 
is due to the fact that she works 'in harmony' with the Constitu- 
tion 57, co-operating to make the spirit of the people so confid- 
ent in its own strength that, unlike the aged genius of the 
western world, it can without trepidation, without the timidity 
of a people that has not imbibed the spirit of the laws with the 
milk of its mother and wet-nurse 
58 
, 'fall ravenously', as Hegel 
had put it early in the Tuebingen Essay, 'upon anything newt, 
working it into its constitution or rejecting it if it would put 
a yoke on its 'proud and free neck', the neck of a free republican 
such as Octavius opposed to caesarisrn past and future 
59. Here 
is the very opposite of the impotence of the 'ageing genius whose 
particular characteristic is its firm adherence to tradition in 
every respect, from which it gets its fetters like an old man 
with the gout, grumbling about it but unable ever to have done 
with it, 
60. 
A knotty problem arises in connection with this character- 
isation and its implications for the interpretation of Hegel's 
youthful attitude to Rousseau. Much has been made of the second- 
ary evidence furnished by C. P. Leutwein, a friend of Hegel at 
University, according to which Hegel believed Rousseau to be a 
thinker devoted to the breaking of all conventional 'fetters, 
61. 
Yet in a manuscript collection of so-called 'Materials for a 
62 
philosophy of subjective spirit', made between 1793 and 1794 , 
66. 
Hegel is to be found berating trousseau as an exponent of an 
impotence (Ohnmacht) which stems from an introverts aversion of 
his soul from the unacceptable: 'He seeks not to receive it - 
the new - into usage and custom' 
63. Hegel appears to suggest 
that if only the lonely dreamer were willing to accept the direction 
of his soul by clear and intelligible criteria or measures of 
identity, that genus of which this study treats particular, as 
opposed to eternal, public laws as species, he would not need to 
adopt this defensive attitude to change, an attitude that pre- 
cludes reflexive change on the part of individual and community 
alike. For it would enable the soul not merely to feel varia- 
tions caused in itself, to the causes of which the natural re- 
action, as to a'devil-you-don't-know', is aversion lest the 
changes be destructive of identity, but so clearly to 'perceive 
variations in affects' 
64, 
on the basis of an intelligible and 
definite criterion of identity, that considered evaluation of the 
service to or derogation from the integrity of the whole done by 
the 'new' may be made and deliberate action taken in response to 
it 
65. 
It is by no means being suggested that Hegel was inclined to 
adjudge Rousseau to a deliberate exponent of the 'moral impotence 
and the feeling of being a machine' which he later argued to be 
that in general which is the basis of the possibility of a positive 
religion 
66. It seems highly probable, however, that Hegel 
faulted Rousseau for the ambiguity in his political philosophy 
with respect to the question upon what basis, other than the 
diametrically opposed alternatives of the withdrawal of the 
individual into solitude or the total alienation by the individual 
of his freedom to the sovereign, could response be made to what 
bas been identified as the chief problem to which Rousseau proposed 
these alternative chimaeric patterns of order. Hegel was equally 
67. 
exercised by the problerls of ' ccr, r. plexity, nobility, Zvnrrality 
and pain of life (ironically called perfectibility) I which Nelly 
has convincingly argued to have motivated 171ousseau 
67. 
But in 
He el's view neither the first chimaera, that of solitude, so 
characteristic of Rousseau, nor the second, that of intensely 
constraining social order, the other Rousseauan solution to which 
Fichte responded so warmly, was fit to furnish the citizen the 
sense of self-determination in the course and cause of change, 
the sense that changes in his disposition are reflexive rather 
than transitive, the sense without which custom and constitution 
must become estranged. Both solutions are too radical for there 
to be this sense of self-determination: the first is reactionary, 
self-determination only in the sense of stubborn arbitrariness in 
the face of the 'new'; the second is revolutionary, determination 
of the self to be entirely other than it has been, self-abnegation 
for the sake of the 'new' in despite of and contempt for the 'old'. 
Either solution proposes a course whose consequences are not at 
all measurable in terms of customary law, for their infinite yard- 
sticks are Nature and the Absolute Ego. 
Between these solutions, or their likes, Hegel proposed to 
steer a middle course. This is apparent from his first extended 
piece of Socratology to which let us return in concluding this 
section. For it was the temperance of Socrates that Hegel 
preferred, on the one hand to the excesses of a scrupulous 
Nathaniel or Diogenes, who, 'in order not to have to do violence 
to his heart, in order to spare himself a dilemma!, totally 
estranges himself from the complex, mobile and'involved relation- 
ships of civil life when the most decided integrity will often 
find itself in an ambivalent clash of duties e. g. frequently 
between justice and sympathy in particular, and between general 




on the other to the excesses, practical in Pythagoras and 
theoretical in Plato 69, whereby it was attempted absolutely to 
remould humanity, once and for all to harmonise the discord of 
civil relationships. 
2. Exchange of present satisfaction for the joy of political 
immortality. 
The relationship between individual and community, custom 
and law, spontaneity and regularity, which Hegel idealised as that 
which obtained in the Athens for which Socrates had fought, 
estrangement from whose laws he deemed tantamount to confinement 
to private personality and forfeit of the joy of immortality, may 
be expressed as a relationship of voluntary or ready exchange. 
The political principle to be descried in Hegel's concept of 
reflexive change, promoted by the genius in his fellow citizens 
so that it may be exhibited by the community as a whole, may be 
stated as follows: change, in its aspect as the Sinnesaenderung 
which permits custom to be rescued from degeneration into self- 
serving habit and made compatible with. a constitution which has 
respect to the conservation of custom in accord with its original 
and, as well as to its spontaneous enrichment, is essentially a 
matter of exchange between the individual and his community whereby 
the individual adapts himself to the demands of an ethical and 
intelligibly designed whole, which is absent in the sense that it 
does not exist for the majority of individuals as the immediate 
object of their activity. But while the individual accepts the 
negation by the community of his private habitat, admitting its 
greater intelligence of the means to enact the original end of 
custom than is available to his primarily practical subjectivity, 
so long as he is pre-occupied with the ever-increasing needs 
69. 
and comforts of life, the community acknowledges that it must 
engage the affections of the citizen so that he feels as if he 
had something to do with its ethical life or activity. Hence it 
must allow him independence, leave him alone in his private 
habitat, so far as his satisfaction of its subordinate needs, 
which is present to him in the sense that it is the immediate 
object of his activity, or the habits that he regards as necess- 
ary, does not tend to derogate from the happiness of the whole. 
There must, in short, be a political division of competence 
according to which, in order that the individual may continue to 
have the sense of his own activity, without which he cannot 
sympathise with but can only feel offended by the autonomy of the 
community in superordinate matters (those 'earnest affairs, 
70 
which touch its very capacity to maintain its identity), he must 
be allowed to use in his own habitual way those things which are 
matters of opinion rather than of great morr-, ent 
71 
as far as the 
integrity, well-being and happiness of the whole is concerned. 
To grant such liberty to the individual at the same time as to 
suppose him to live in the complex and mobile midst of the 
involved relationships 
72 
of civil life was to show a confidence 
in the probability that men trusted by the state to live their 
own lives can yet learn the disposition to have regard for the 
needs of the whole and the rights of others 
73 that was foreign 
to the outlooks of such as Rousseau or Plato and, as Hegel was to 
discover, Fichte. 
Hegel clearly regretted, as nay be seen fron one of the 
essays of 1794, parts of which we have already considered, the 
emergence, of the 'great inequality of classes' which 'simplicity 
of ethics' 
74 had mitigated in republican Greece and Rome. There, 
especially in Athens, had prevailed political community in the 
company of social difference, thanks to which no class pretended, . 
70. 
as did the scribes and pharisees in Judaea, to be the exclusive 
interpreters of the national poets 
75, to be the 'keeper of 
myths' 
76. Rather there was easy intercourse, that was not how- 
ever technical interference, between all classes, so that the sagas, 
the common historical civil and religious tradition of the whole 
people 
77, 
were the 'property of everyone in like measure' 
78. 
This common property was not liable to be appropriated by those 
to whom'time and a manifold apparatus of knowledge' 
79 is avail- 
able as a means to their attainment of a 'control over the public 
faith which can broaden itself until it becomes a very extensive 
(political) power or at least holds sway with regard to the 
doctrines of the public religion' 
80. 
But Hegel's animus towards the erection of political upon 
social difference should not be taken to signify a Rousseauan 
yearning for Spartan solidarity or for the recovery of the 
'uniformity of the earliest condition of mankind'81, either by 
regressive reverie of progressive revolution. The genius of the 
childlike spirit, which, as we have seen 
82, Hegel did not regard 
with unmixed approval, had given way to the pressures of individu- 
ality 
83 
out of whose efforts and industry harmony, rather than 
uniformity, had to be derived if civilisation were to be maint- 
ained. Modern conditions could be made right for political 
community despite manifest and irrevocable social difference 
only if it were constitutionally provided that no elite could 
determine men's behaviour or convictions in matters of opinion, 
such as the doctrines of the public religion, but also in principle 
any such matter of cultural subjectivity, as if they were matters 
of earnest upon which the integrity and happiness of the community 
depends. In that case no social group could by its exclusive 
possession of certain technical skills gain"a political advantage 
whereby to constrain the practical subjectivity of others. 
71. 
Rather all skills would be devoted to the good of the whole. 
None would intemperately intrude upon the business of the whole. 
Only in that case, wherein public law maintains the conditions 
under which the state can be regarded equally by all as consider- 
ate of the present satisfaction of each rather than lose the 
regard for it of the majority because of its preference for the 
objects of the immediate activity of any particular social group, 
could be recovered the readiness of exchange between the individ- 
ual and community, whereby the former makes concessions to but 
one absent or intelligible purpose and the latter to all present 
or sensible purposes, something like which Hegel supposed to obtain 
in the republics of the ancient world, where the state as well as 
all individuals minded its own business rather than that of any 
particular interest. 
As we shall see in the due course of this chapter and beyond, 
Hegel's view was that in the post-classical world political 
exchange must take the form of a system of political representa- 
tion whose purpose would be so to prevent the appropriation by any 
social group of control, through state action, of the subjectivity 
of others, that the deeds of the community, not appearing to be 
more attributable to any other particular social estate than to 
his own, would not appear to the individual as an offensive 
constraint upon his own activity. V7e shall see how there is 
implicit in Hegel's denial that representation is appropriate in 
matters of opinion, i. e. his denial that representative 
ecclesiastical institutions are appropriate to a subjective 
religion, the view that in matters of earnest men ought to be 
represented, for it is only thus that in the modern world they 
can feel themselves to be active not only in the sensible dimen- 
sion of the present but, what is the condition of that feeling, 
also in the intelligible dimension of the absent by which their 
72. 
practical subjectivity - aptitudes, skills, opinions, drives, 
social ethics and customs - has to some extent to be limited. 
But before we deal with representation as a means to the re- 
appearance in the citizen's soul of the 'image of the state as a 
product of his own activity 184, as the immortal animal 
85 in which 
he might imaginatively locate the 'hope' or postulate of immort- 
ality 
86, let us consider the cultural cause of its disappearance. 
That the sense of subjectivity was not utterly dead is evident 
from the penultimate of the pieces which Hegel wrote before he 
embarked upon the first of his major theological essays. There 
he wrote that it was first yin more recent times, when men had 
recovered at least civil rights, those of property and its security, 
that 'activity has begun to express itself, 87. 
In more recent times than the days of the Roman Empire, men 
had begun to recover the sense of activity that had then been so 
stifled, all the 'human life-powers' that had then been arrested 
by Roman imperial despotism. To the 'decay of every virtue, the 
oppression of the freedom and the rights of the Romans, the 
tyranny and ferocity of the kings; to the ruin of genius and all 
the fine arts and sciences, the Christian religion was not able 
to set up a dam - in order to give life again to the mortified 
courage and to every withered branch of national virtue and 
happiness - but was itself consumed by this universal plague, 
poisoned and, in this distorted form a material (resource of) 
despotism, caused the ruin of arts and sciences and (promoted) 
passive forbearance in the trampling under foot of every beautiful 
flower of humanity and freedom, advocated obedience towards 
despotism and the most ardent flattery of its most atrocious 
crimes, 
88. 
These were the consequences of the caesura by which the Roman 
emperors had put. a term to the. freedom of the ancient republican 
73. 
world and in which Christianity had been implicated. But the 
causes of the disappearance of the ancient republican sense of 
activity lay deeper and Hegel held responsible for them the ethos 
of the Jewish people, to the passivity of which the unfortunate 
condition of the Romans only made them-'receptive' 
89. The 
miserable Romans clung to the 'hope of an imminent destruction of 
the world and the appearance of the Messiah, for the joy of one 
day burning their oppressors and seeing themselves rewarded made 
them receptive to the forgetfulness of the present world, where 
they had no interests and lived in hope of a better. This was 
a kind of avarice' 
90. Yessianism was the cause which attracted 
the Romans to their decline. As we shall see, Hegel located the 
essence of Yessianism in the yearning of Christ's disciples, 
representative in this respect of their ethnic environment, after 
the prospect of future compensation for present suffering. 
Future personal compensation is a commodity which the ancient 
republican did not look for, because he so devoted himself, his 
whole life through, to the purpose of his community that he found 
in its activity the imaginative semblance of his own. Because 
he was no patient, the present was the locus of his activity. 
He was no patient because his belief in the subsistence of his 
present world of sensible interests within the absent dimension 
of an intelligible cause immediately brought into existence the 
coherent integration of activities directed upon both present and 
absent objects, neither of which could be conceived to be negative 
of the other. His fancy that this was so made it a reality. 
His imaginative faith in the immortality of his state was what 
animated and maintained that immortal animal. For a believer in 
the Messiah, on the other hand, this sense of present participation 
in an absent cause, the sense of the state as the manifest 
7'+. 
embodiment of his immortality, was not available. Because the 
present did not subsist for him in a dimension of intelligibility 
or absence it could not furnish him an intuition of permanence 
in the'face of misfortune, except in the sensible shape of a 
future different from the present only in point of the moment of 
its occurrence, but the same as it in point of the evaluation of 
it in terms of sensible satisfaction. That is what Hegel meant 
when he spoke of messianic hopes as a 'kind of avarice' in contrast 
with the republican hope or vital postulate of immortality. The 
imperial Romans forgot or forsook the present for the sake of a 
present to come. Because of their structural identity as loci 
of sensible satisfaction these epochs could not coexist: one had 
to be sacrificed for the other. The future-mindedness of the 
Romans, like that of the Jews, was, as we shall see 
91, just 
another-present-mindedness. The absent-mindedness of the ancient 
republican was, on the other hand, not a disposition towards an 
object that might negate, or compete as a like alternative with 
the sensible objects of his present-mindedness but an intelligent 
disposition which informed his sentient disposition with regard 
for a permanent whole beyond the transience of his particularity. 
His intelligent disposition lent to his present life a dimension 
of intentionality towards something absent in virtue of which, 
as not in virtue of something future, it could serve as other 
than merely the scene upon which is, or is to be, played out the 
passionate pursuit of personal satisfaction. It is to Hegel's 
critique of the passive ethos of the Jewish people, which he held 
responsible for the disappearance from the soul of the citizen of 
the sense of activity (and the semblance that his own inhered in 
that of the state) which had obtained in republican times, that 
we must now turn. 
75. 
3. Clean habits, unclean hearts: 'Can these bones live again? ' 
(Ezekiel XXXVII, 3) 
Ilaving examined the fragmentary and pregnant manuscripts of the 
period up to early 1795, we are now in a position to survey, more 
summarily because they are more complete and their meaning is 
more manifest, the theological essays of the period from May 9, 
1795 to some time shortly after September 24,1800, namely the 
'Life of Jesus' 
92, begun on the first date, 'The Positivity of 
the Christian Religion', to the revision of whose introduction 
Hegel returned on the later date, and the intermediate 'Spirit of 
Christianity and its Fate' 
94. In conformity with the archaeol- 
ogical procedure of this study let us depend our treatment of 
these three essays, which will observe a thematic rather than 
chronological order, from their terminus in 1800. 
Towards the end *of the revision of his introduction to the 
Positivity of the Christian Religion (PCP), by way of explaining 
the disparity between the ideas which Christ advanced and the 
outlook of the Jewish people, Hegel argued that Christ's diffi- 
culty consisted in the fact 'Jewish law had become so corrupt that 
a mass of evasions was devised as a means of getting round even 
its better elements' 
95. As we shall' presently see Hegel argue, 
Christ's aim was to 'fulfill' the law. But since its light burned 
dim in the fancy of the Jews, he had, in order to do so, so 
violently to offend their customary ways, that they could do no 
0 
other than *re ject hirn '. 
Because so great a discrepancy had arisen between the 'better 
elements' of the law and the customs of the people, they regarded 
the law as a yoke. When Hegel, ii the Positivity of the Christian 
Religion (PCR), proposed that the negative element in Christ's 
message consisted in 'freedom from the yoke of the law' 
97, it 
is to be understood that he meant that Christ's intention was to 
76. 
free the Jews from their opinion of the law as a yoke. This 
will be mad$ more evident when we come to consider in detail the 
concept of 'fulfillment' 
98. For'the time being we have only to 
attend to the essence of Hegel's argument which is that to re- 
kindle the torch of law would have involved, in the case of the 
Jewish people, nothing other than their persuasion from the view 
that the Kingdom of God is a Kingdom to come, a Kingdom of the 
future, to the view that it is rather a condition whose reality 
consists in imaginative faith in its having come: 'Jesus said 
to them of this Kingdom: It has come; it is now here; faith 
in it makes it real and everyone is a citizen of it' 
99. 
The Jewish people, however, were not content to -walk by 
faith but only by sight and devoted attention only to that in 
respect of which they might be passive rather than active, that 
which is sensible rather than intelligible, a datum rather than 
a factum. They could not believe in the absent. This same 
argument occurs in 'The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate' 
(GCS): 'Had the spark of life lain dormant in the Jews, he would 
have needed only a breath to kindle. it into flame and burn up all 
their petty titles and claims. If, in their unrest and discont- 
ent with things as they were, they had been conscious of the need 
for a purer world, then the call of Jesus would have found belief 
and this belief would have immediately brought into existence the 
thing believed in' 100. Their act of faith would have established 
a new world there and then, whose intelligible articulation and 
communication in words would have liberated them from the bondage 
that consists in being able only to feel the deficiency of the old 
and unable to conceive of its remedy except in terms of another 
more satisfactory sensation., But they had not the confidence 
for. it and would rather remain 'self-satisfied in the pride of 
their servitude' than listen to Christ's message: 'Be ye changed, 
77. 
for the Kingdom of God is night 
101. 
But the most striking criticisms which Hegel made of r'essianism 
occur in 'The Life of Jesus' (LJ). In this, the first of his theo- 
logical essays, Hegel defined the vocation of John the Baptist, and 
of Christ by implication, as 'to make clear to his people a. purpose 
highor than mere self-interest and better aspirations than the 
restoration of the former glory of the Kingdom of the Jews' 
102" 
The Jewish people, whom Hegel called not a Volk but a Volksmenge or 
Landsleute, a multitude 
103, 
signifying thereby their atomic dis- 
integration, clung with great pride, an inert emotion unfit to. 
maintain their unity, to their mere 'name and lineage which in 
their eyes was more glorious and precious than the unique value 
which ethical life or activity (Sittlichkeit) gives man' 
104. 
John called mankind 'to show through practical deeds whether it 
had undergone Sinnesaenderung', and the Jews particularly to 
realize that they 'were in error to be complacent about their 
relation to God on account merely of their descent from Abraham' 
105. 
Christ likewise called men to a 'change of disposition and to 
improvement; he sought to awaken them from their slumber and 
from their fruitless, inactive hope that a Messiah would soon 
appear to restore the glory of the Jewish religion and state. 
Do not wait for another, Jesus called upon them, lay your own 
hands to the task of your betterment' 
106. 
Even among Christ's disciples, despite frequent discourage- 
ment, there was entirely wanting, according to Hegel, an intelli- 
gent rather than sentient conception of the Kingdom of God. 
Hegel inferred from the controversy among them as to what rank 
was due to each when the Kingdom of God 'should one day appear' 
that they were'still bound to the very sensuous ideas of a 
worldly kingdom of which Jewish minds were not yet free' 
107. 
They harboured in their 'Jewish minds' the sanguine hope that 
78. 
Jesus would soon 'step forth publicly as Yinb and restore the 
glory of the Jewish state and its independence of the Romans and 
reward then, as his friends and assistants, with power and honour 
for what they had meanwhile gone without' 
108. After Christ's 
death, their avarice directed itself merely upon an other-worldly 
rather than mundane future. 
In the revised introduction to the PCR and in the correspond- 
ing part of its original version, Hegel blamed upon what we may 
call the accident of authoritarian personality the fact that 
Christianity emerged as a 'positive' religion. That is one which 
contains 'concepts and information transcending understanding and 
reason and requiring feelings and actions which would not come 
naturally to men: the feelings are forcibly and mechanically 
stimulated, the actions are done to order or from obedience with- 
out any spontaneous interest' 
109. Rather than its content, 
however, it is upon its node of authentication that turns the 
question whether it is or is not positive. Christianity was not 
positive ab initio, but in Christ's words and deeds was a purely 
moral religion in which feelings and actions were entirely autono- 
mous. It was only the fact that Christ's disciples and contemp- 
oraries needed to be persuaded of its validity by interpretation 
of his teachings in accordance with 'their expectations of a 
Messiah, their representation of irmortality under the symbol of 
resurrection' 
110 
and so on, sensible representations or signs of 
which Socrates' followers had no need 
111, that caused'it to 
become positive. The authoritarian personality of the Jewish 
people obliged Christ to allow his identification as the 1. essiah 
and with the working of miracles 
112 in order to gain access to 
their hearts. Unlike the followers and contemporaries of 
Socrates', Christ's were 'distinguished neither as, generals nor 
as profound statesmen', but were 'accustomed to a restricted 
79. 
Üphcre of activity' uninforrrcd :; y any po'i ti. cal intoretit in the 
whole. From being fispern-cn, they ccai. e ficl, er of r. e: z whose 
lack of inherent spiritual ener-y inclined them to interpret 
Christ's teaching as mandatory doctrine and to insist upon its 
being kept intact throughout all experience 
113. 
The character of the disciples was representative of the cast 
of rind of the whole Jewish people. They had no vital respect 
for their law because they subjected themselves to it only through 
the compulsion of their fear of punishment and withdrawal of 
reward 
114. In a remarkable critique of Jewish religious and 
political culture first written in 1795 and revised in 1800, there 
may be detected, in the first version, the slightest hints, and 
in the second, an elaborate statement of the relationships analysed 
above between the ideas of custom and law, and of the manner, 
habitual and mechanical or vital and sensitive to the well-being 
of the people, in which they are observed or enacted. In the 
earlier version Hegel asserted that the 'Jews were a nation who 
derived their legislation from the supreme wisdom on high and 
whose spirit was oppressed by a burden of statutory commandments 
which pedantically prescribed a rule for every casual action of 
daily life and gave the whole people the look of a monastic order' 
115. The Jewish people, as vie may surmise Hegel thought, bore 
their law like an uncomfortable habit rather than like a congenial 
text woven of words, of what 'lay undeveloped and unknown in their 
hearts' 116. They prided themselves on their 'mechanical slavery' 
and 'monkish preoccupation with petty, iýiechanical, spiritless and 
trivial usages' 
117. They behaved without intelligence. 
In the later version Hegel's opinion is expressed with like 
imagery but greater clarity. The Jews were said to have wished 
to maintain their own customs* (Sitten) not by accommodating them 
to those of other peoples with whom their geographical situation, 
80. 
trading connections and above all the Roman ir-perial conqucsL 
brought theminto unavoidable contact, not by responding to change 
by changing themselves, their laws and their customs, but by 
clinging 'all the more obstinately to the statutory commands of 
their religion' and their legislation, derived directly from a 
jealous God, by 'slavish obedience to laws not made by themselves' 
118. This response could not but fail to preserve them from the 
fatal decadence and dismemberment of their polity. 
Hegel's view that law or custom mechanically observed rather 
than vitally enacted cannot hold out against progressive experience 
and changing circumstances, that a code of behaviour imitated 
without proper originality or followed to the letter gives rise 
to gauche and indecisive behaviour has already been encountered 
in his fragments and sketöhes. Thy sane critique of this 
'anxious scrupulosity, ... lacking altogether in courage, decision, 
strength and the other virtues which are the essential pre- 
requisites of furthering the individual's and the states weil- 
. 
being'. 119, occurs in tandem with another description, in the 
earlier version of the PC?, of Christ's attempt, to which Christ- 
ianity had preferred the opposite, 'to draw his people's attention 
to the spirit and disposition which had to vitalise their observ- 
ance of their laws if they were to please God' 120. This, Christ's 
attempt to 'fulfill' the laws, was betrayed by a church-Government 
which allowed the degeneration of their lively practice into yet 
121 
another habitual routine . 
The concept of the 'fulfillment' of the laws gets its most 
authoritative statement in the GCS and its most tangible present- 
ation in opposition to the idea of mere habit in the LJ. In the 
former Hegel gave an account of the meaning of the attempted 
discovery to the Jewish people by Christ of the 'new kind of 
righteousness' through which their laws and customs must be kept. 
81. 
The law would be 'fulfilled' by its being complemented in the 
ethical subject by an 'inclination so to act as the laws may 
command'. Its fulfillment (pleroma) would consist in a 
'unification of inclination with the law, whereby the latter loses 
its form as law' 
122. The form of such Mosaic laws as 'Thou 
shalt not kill' and 'Thou shalt not commit adultery', wherein the 
law appears as an objective command opposed to pathological 
subjectivity, a form which Hegel held to persist in Kant's maxims 
of universal legislation, would disappear in the convergent 
synthesis of the mere possibility of the objective idea of duty, 
a universal expressed as what ought to be, and the particular in 
whom the possibility is to be realized, the ethical subject. 
The fulfillment of the law would consist in that actuality, that 
which 'is', would become identical with the possibility of which 
it is the complement. The lave and the ethical subject would be 
as one 
123 
In that case, law would be 'wholly superfluous'. Men would 
do what they ought for the love of it, because they were so 
inclined by the 'genius of reconcilability', which 'has in itself 
a so much richer, more living fullness, that so poor a thing as 
a law is nothing for it at all' 
124. Agreement with the spirit 
of laws against murder and adultery would be so lively that by 
comparison with the disinclination to Murder and commit adultery 
their prohibition would appear to be the least effective factor 
125 in the enactment of that spirit. But Kegel certainly did not 
mean to disparage civil laws of the kind contained in the 
Decalogue.. He interpreted Jesus to have intended 'not that laws 
disappear but that they must be kept through righteousness of a 
new kind' 
126. By arguing, moreover, that fulfillment consisted 
in an identification of lave and inclination, an identification 
which Kant had denied could go beyond a mere 'correspondence of 
. 
82. 
inclination with the (moral) law' and fro:, whose ulti rate i rrpo -, s- 
ibility he had deduced that rerely prohibitive laws would always 
have to be available to curb human animality 
127, Hegel clearly 
meant that civil laws could have a moral content, which they must 
lack if it be granted that the inclinations which they regulate 
are utterly devoid of inherent moral value. If this dualism 
between pathological actuality and moral possibility be broken down, 
then that between mere legality, as Kant would have it, and pure 
morality is likewise overcome. It was the law which is merely 
prohibitive, which Moses had to give to the Jewish people in*that 
form 'because of the hardness of their hearts' 128, that Christ 
sought to make superfluous. In the beginning, their hearts were 
not inclined against the vital or lively ethical spirit of love, 
the actuality which disposed each of them to resist 'any one of 
its rany aspects which may wish to make itself the whole or rear 
its head against the whole' 
129 
. 
Even penal law, the content of which is punishment of trans- 
gression against the whole, was conceivable for Hegel as a mani- 
festation or 'modification' of love. For, he argued, the 
trespasser must be understood to unleash the inexorable fury of 
punishment upon himself 
130. But justice can be said to be 
satisfied only when the transgressor has sensed as injured in 
himself the very sane life that he has injured in another, the 
life of the whole, the ethical life which he shares with his 
victim. If punishment arouses bad conscience in him, his feeling 
for the whole, and so the whole itself, may be said to be restored 
131. He has become sensitive-to the ethical life of the whole. 
Unless love, this 'sensing of a , life similar to one's own' 
132, 
be the spirit in which men enact the law, they are not virtuous 
who serve the law, but are 'positive men' who observe it only in 
respect of that to which they are obliged 
133. He is in general 
83. 
not virtuous but positive who observes the law, be it the 'oral 
Law or civil, with mechanical attention to fixed rules, rather 
than with sensitive regard for the exigencies of the 'whole of 
the given situation' 
134. For if he tries to apply to it the 
plurality of maxims or commands which clamour for his respect 
there must arise a conflict of duties which incapacitates him for 
action and reduces him to distraction. Any virtue can in that 
case become a vice 
135" 
'Vhat is the whole of the given situation is a question that 
should be settled on the basis of love. This love should be no 
universal philanthropy however, but a 'philanthropy towards those 
with whom each one of us comes into contact' 
J6 That is to 
say that it is an ethical principle, a contagious principle among 
those whose life is similar to each other's. The alternative to 
laws mechanically observed are laws enacted with sensitivity to 
the realisation of their purpose in changing situations, namely 
the preservation of the integrity of the people and its ethics. 
No, one can be sensitive towards the life of others than those who 
share his- customs and laws. As wo shall see in subsequent 
chapters, the preservation of ethical vitality depends on a kind 
of neighbourliness. 
The LJ is usually regarded as an experiment by Hegel in the 
attribution to Christ of a Kantian conception of morality, 
especially on account of its declaration that the rule of morality 
Oittlichkeit) is: 'Act upon such a maxim as you can will to be 
regarded as a universal law among Men as well as by yourself. 
This is the basic law of morality - the content of all laws and. 
of the sacred books of all peoples' 
137, There occur in it two 
accounts of the concept of 'fulfillment' of the law, the first of 
which. suggests agreement on Hegel's part with the Kantian idea 
that positive law and, a fortiori, custom is essentially devoid of 
84. 
moral significance, but of which the second and rore comprehensive, 
the version upon which the passages in the GCS are evidently based, 
shows Hegel to have doubted the Kantian equation of positive laws 
as such and in totowith mere legality. This doubt was of course 
the only possible consequence of his implicit acceptance of the 
presupposition of the idea of fulfillment: that the moral need 
not be confined to the sphere of 'possibility' but is susceptible 
of realization in the realm of what is. 
In the first account, Heeel declared that Christ sought, 
'through his example and doctrines, to banish the straitened 
spirit of Jewish superstition and national pride and to fulfill 
them with his spirit which prized virtue alone, that which is not 
bound up with a particular nation or positive institutions' 
138. 
But from this cosmopolitan standpoint, which utterly contradicts 
the later view that love is an ethical principle of virtue, that 
is one the limits of whose scope are coextensive with those of 
the way of life of a people, Tie&el very quickly retreated. He 
did not maintain a position that would have placed in doubt the 
very possibility that positive laws could at all have moral import 
and he did not persist in attributing to Christ a contempt for 
all laws but the moral. Thus did Hegel report the speech of 
Thrist after he had delivered the Sermon on the Mount: 'Do not 
believe that I have come to preach the nullity of the laws: I 
am not come to do away with their binding force, but to make them 
whole, to breathe Spirit into these dead bones ... In order to 
make whole the complete system of laws, be you not content like 
the Pharisees and the Scribes among your people, to regard literal 
observation (Beobachtung des Buchstabens) as the sole object of 
human. justice, but act in the spirit of the laws out of respect 
for duty' 139. The spirit of human laws need not be the spirit 
of mere legality, of merely mechanical observation. It can be 
85. 
the spirit of their sensitive eiactment out of love for the whole 
which they are designed to articulate, but are incompetent to 
preserve without it. 
Hegel had already argued in the TuebinGen Essay, on the 
Leibnitian premiss of the continuity of the rational with the 
irrational, that 'even if it is a pathological principle of action, 
love is disinterested' and to that extent has 'something analogous 
to reason in it ... lave finds itself in other men, puts itself 
outside its own existence and so to speak, lives, feels and acts 
in others' 
140. It does this by 'forgetting itself', the very 
deed which Carve, following Ferguson, had defined as the charact- 
eristic of the man of public spirit. It was the Leibnitian 
principle of universal continuity which underlay this General 
conception of the inherence of moral possibility, what ought to 
be, in pathological actuality, what is, in terms of which had 
originated the concept, whose coherence Kant had so strenuously 
140a 
denied, that the relation of actuality to possibility could be 
one of complermentarity, a concept of which ? 'endelssohn, in whom 
Hegel had found a doughty champion of the potential moral content 
and worth of positive law, one who did not consign it entirely to 
the realm of phenomenal causality and banish it from the sphere 
of nou! r: enal freedom, was one of the chief exponents when Hegel was 
a young man. 
It is not tobe denied that HeCel, though not a Kantian by 
conviction, was not prepared to go so far in giving credit to the 
capacity of human law for ethical fulfillment as was A'endelssohn. 
Hegel's aversion from the mechanical spirit in which the Jews observ- 
ed their laws, maintaining, in accordance with divine commandment, 
that law, for instance, which required that they honour their 
fathers and mothers, as if it what it prohibited, the utterance 
of loveless words against them, exhausted its meaning, so that he 
86. ' 
was reckoned 'a fool who does his father and mother any service' 
beyond this minimal requirement, amounted to a critique of a 
spirit that deems prohibition of certain actions to be permission 
of all others and to touch not at all the disposition underlying 
behaviour in accordance with the law. They may have ever such 
clean habits who eat nothing before they have washed thoroughly, 
who consecrate all crockery and furniture before their meals, but 
their hearts are unclean vessels of a disposition that would fain 
evade the law: 'soulless is their reverence' whose hearts harbour 
evil thoughts while they conform to the prescriptions of their 
forefathers. Doomed are the customs which are kept in this 
spirit 
142. 
In the GCS, Hegel dissented emphatically from Mendelssohn's 
view that there arose from the fact that Judaism was a system of 
mandatory actions the advantage that it did not presume to regulate 
opinion and belief 
143. It was not Hegel's view, as it was 
Mendelssohn's, that the question of the positivity of a religion 
turns on1 on the question whether its adherents are obliged to 
acknowledge as truths what are intended ierely as r: andates to act 
as if their content were true, to treat as propositions what are 
mere statements of law, such as 'There is one God' 
144. Accord- 
ing to that criterion, Judaism could not be called positive, for 
it made no such demands. But according to Hege1's criterion, 
Judaism was positive. The question whether a religion is 
positive turns equally weightily on the question whether 'actions 
are done to order or from obedience without any spontaneous 
interest' 145, -whether deeds are freely done and not with the 
146 'feeling of being a machine, albeit a thinking machine' . 
That this was so in the case of the Jewish people was the 
cause of the failure of Christ's attempt to 'fulfill' their laws. 
For there was left no. more than the 'dead bones' of the law 
1k7. 
87. 
The '?? ord, in such circumstances, could scarcely be made Flesh. 
Hegel read, in the PCR, after his discussion of the failure of 
Christ to fulfill Jewish law and of its consequence, that the 
ecclesiastical laws of the Christian church stood in even greater 
need of fulfillment, conceded, to Nendelssohn's advantage, that 
Christian customs, too, had become mere habits and that what made 
this worse than the Jewish condition was that, moreover, the dis- 
position as well as the behaviour of the Christian was subject to 
regulation 
148. Ultimately, however, he believed that the 
positivity of Judaism and Christianity consisted alike in the means 
which they used'to ensure observance of religious duties: the 
mental terrorisation into a state of heteronomous 'helplessness, 
anxiety and self-distrust' 
149 
of men who had become anomic, in 
whose heart 'the torch of law burns dim' 
150. 
Before we consider the consequences for Christendom of 
Christ's failure, let us treat in depth of its causes in Judaic 
culture, of the reasons why, according to Hegel there had opened 
up the gulf between the laws and customs of the Jewish people and 
their disposition in the observance of them. These reasons are 
most comprehensively set out in the GCR and its preliminary drafts, 
in the context of which occurs his dissent from Mendelssohn's 
rather inconsistent deviation from his argument of 1784 that the 
happiness of any nation depends upon the progress in step of 
culture and enlightenment. 
4, The passivity of the 'outlook upon the present' of the 
Children of Israel. 
Hegel began his account of Judaic culture with speculations 
upon its general character, as disclosed-in the myths, which pass 
into the traditions of a people, that indicate their attitude to 
88. 
the forces of nature. The Jex; ws, like the (Ireeks, described Aran's 
errergence from harmony with nature in terms of the myth of a 
universal Flood. The manner in which a people represents its 
'divorce from nature' and the response which their mythical fore- 
fathers made to it is 'necessarily related to the origin of the 
state' 
151. In a people deficient, unlike the Greeks, in free 
and joyful public relationships, there arise myths in which man 
is represented as having made peace with Nature as with something 
which he needs to use rather than with something whose friendship 
he enjoys: the peace made is a 'peace of need' (Frieden der Not) 
not a 'peace of love' (Frieden der Liebe) 
152. Thus, Noah erected 
a God to which man ceded his autonomy in return for security from 
and use of the forces and resources of Nature; Nimrod, on the 
other hand, to the same end, erected a tower and a 'despotic 
tyranny' 153 by whose means God, identified with Nature, was to be 
resisted. Whether its power was located in God against Nature or 
in man against God and Nature, there was in either case erected a 
Monolith for the repression of 'the manifold of circunstances that 
could disrupt their accustomed condition of equilibrium 
154. 
That is apparent in the cases of Noah and Nimrod is evident 
in the history of Abraham. Abraham alienated himself from all 
enduring connections with men (his father and family) places and 
States, to which relationships and circumstances, all too subject 
to change, all too manifold for him, he opposed the monolith of 
his God. His belief in this God was a faith in 'oneness amidst 
all change of the manifold of events!. It afforded him security, 
the certainty of self-preservation throughout all experience of 
the events and manifold 'circumstances conflicting with it' 
155. 
To his God, a Being quite unlike the local deities of the Greeks 
in that He was quite beyond all measure, to a massive Providence 
89. 
fit to match and resist with sheer force the likewise 'irnn! easur- 
able plain' upon which he wandered and the 'infinite loft' above 
him 156, Abraham abdicated what little power, which yet would have 
been his own and measurable, he might have had himself to maintain 
his identity in the face of manifold change 
157. Because there 
was no other possibility acceptable to him than utter subjugation 
of events and circumstances, no possibility, once he had opted 
for restlessness under the infinite and upon the immeasurable, of 
measured adjustment between himself and the manifold, changeful 
Nature which confronted him, 'he was unable himself to make this 
mastery actual' 
158. It was all or nothing for Abraham, an 
uncompromised issue of the confrontation between mutually exclusive 
totalities, unity and multiplicity, in which the former must remain 
intact. He could not be other than passive. Self-change was 
therefore inconceivable, while the idea of being changed by the 
manifold was of course anathaema. 
Abraham was therefore locked in a merely 'present' world to 
whose staying put he was absolutely committed: to have made any 
concession to the manifold would have been to countenance total 
revolution. Everything, even his idea of his posterity, he sub- 
sumed within his 'outloo'k upon the present' (Hinausblicken ueber 
das Gegenwaertige) 
159. The future must not threaten the present: 
Abraham deluded himself, therefore, into the belief that God could 
determine the future, present him 'realised the very whole of it' 
160. In return for the promise that the future would not disrupt 
his world, Abraham was prepared to go so far as to kill his son, 
a very element of what was to come that appeared to him as such as 
'something not of his kind, as deranging the pure unity'. That 
in which some idea of immortality might have been available to him, 
he would readily annihilate, believing that it might deprive him 
of the security of his merely present world of sensible satisfaction, 
9o. 
might be 'disloyal to hing' 
161. The love through which he might 
have subtended the line of his present existence to encompass 
something absent was not what stayed his hand. It was the 
guarantee which his God gave him that the 'stability, the necessity, 
the eternity and certainty of his whole' was not dependent upon 
the merely particular, accidental and perishable thing that was 
162 Isaac 
Given this character, which Hegel held to be representative 
of the spirit of the Jewish people 
163, 
change, when it ocurred 
as the transition from Abraham's pastoral life to settlement under 
a political form of existence, the State, did not happen 'gradually 
and spontaneously' 
164, but under the stress of'accumulated 
circumstances, and by accident' 
165. From the captivity to which 
Joseph had introduced his people, roses sought to liberate then. 
But because it was never articulate lav; s that had regulated their 
relationship to their circumstances but was at best, apart fron 
the measureless Providence of the Lord to whom they were in sheer 
bondage, custom which had made an uneasy peace with some aspects 
of their condition, they had 'no complete or clear ideal ... 
that right oppose that condition' 
166. They had a vague feeling 
of deficiency, but only Moses could articulate an ideal in reflect- 
ive terms. Yet in these terms he could not appeal to his people. 
He could not find a response to talk of oppression and freedom 
167, 
but only male use of the feeling among the people of its oppression 
and of a 'dim, pretty weak memory of another condition of their 
forefathers' in order to elicit a desire for independence and a 
belief, passive to be sure, in the possibility of exodus' 
168. 
Only Moses was active. A great thing was done for the Jews but 
they did not 'inaugurate it with great deeds of their ov{n' 
169. 
They. nearly all behaved passively during the exodus. The attempts 
of Yose. s to change their way of life, free them from the slavery 
91. 
of inarticulate habit and to fix his ideal in their imagination 
were fruitless. The laws that he imposed upon them show 'that 
there lay in the spirit of his people a contrariness toward the 
whole, much that had to be subdued with force, much that had to 
be transformed into other customs. Their character always 
remained fickle, they were always and repeatedly disloyal to the 
state and only need led them back to it, 
170. Because their need 
was not for freedom but for security, they wanted to return to 
Egypt. Moses had to impose the law upon them as a yoke: 'A 
passive people giving laws to itself would have been a contrad- 
iction' 171. 
Maintenance of their physical existence and security from 
want was all that this thoroughly passive people wanted 
172. 
Apart from their sensible present, they looked to nothing absent 
but a future represented in terms of sensible satisfaction: a 
land flowing with milk and honey 
173. They had no idea of an CID 
intelligible whole in the maintenance and manifestation of which 
they could be active. Their law was the imaGe of a 'physical 
force' by which they were cowed 
174, 
a theocratic command- 
structure which made no appeal to their intelligence but required 
only external conformity. Its keystone, the assertion that 
'There is one God', was not the proposition of a truth to be 
freely examined but a mandate to be obeyed. The Jewish people 
were released from the business of thinking about their public 
relationships and so from the trouble of exodus from their private 
occupations, whether as tmastered or masters'. They had no 
conception of an immortal whole: How could they, 'who never 
enjoyed any life or consciousness lifted above eating and drinking? ' 
175 There being no citizen body, but only a host of private men, 
it followed 'that there could not be anything among the Jews 
resembling a constitutional law nor a legislative power determining 
92. .. 
a constitutional law' 
176. 
The object of the laws of the Jewish people was not, as was 
the case in the Greek republics, to preserve freedom from in- 
cremental and accidental erosion by the variation of its original 
condition which tended to be produced by men's individual industry 
and effort. Their laws were not constitutional in this sense at 
all but were devoted to the nullification of freedom. There was 
thus a world of difference between the Prosaic prohibition of 
accumulation of property and the laws which Solon and Lycurgus 
gave against excessive inequality of wealth: the latter were 
designed to maintain the political equilibrium of the various 
social classes in the face of a spontaneous tendency towards the 
impoverishment of the lower. They placed marginal constraints 
upon freedom of choice. The P-'osaic laws, however, represented 
a gross intrusion into private life: the Jews 'had no freedom 
and no rights, since they held their possessions on loan and not 
as property ... The Greeks were to be equal because all were free, 
self-subsistent, the Jews equal because all were incapable of self- 
subsistence' 
177. Because the Jewish people looked only to the 
present and the present to come, and did not locate in their laws 
the absent ideal of freedom, there was no question for them of a 
political exchange of the present for the absent, of mundane gain 
for the advantage of the whole. And because there was no such 
exchange, the terms upon which their polity afforded them security 
were terms which allowed then no leoitirate independence. Fence, 
of course, they evaded its laws 
178. 
The Jews then, were a host of several'individuals, each of 
whom 'was excluded from active interest in the state; their 
political equality as subjects was the opposite of republican 
equality; it was only the equality of insignificance' 
179. "Phis, 
it will be remenbered was the spirit which invaded-the hearts of 
93. 
the 'Romans under the caesarian ir. merium and only beCan to be 
dispelled in modern tir^es with the recovery of rights of property 
and its security. This was not the passive security of the Jews, 
but something in which activity could express itself, something 
akin to the sense that the ancient republican enjoyed, that in a 
spirit of reciprocal exchange, both he and his community could be 
active at once without prejudice to the independence of each 
other 
180. 
As Hegel had argued in the PC'?, the Greeks and Romans, until 
the time of the Empire, 'obeyed laws laid down by themselves, obeyed 
men whom they had themselves appointed to office, waged wars on 
which they had themselves decided, gave their property, exhausted 
their passions and sacrificed their lives by thousands for an end 
which was their own. In public as in private and domestic life, 
every individual was a free man, one who lived by his own laws. 
The idea of his country or of his state was the invisible and 
higher reality for which he strove ... which he found manifested 
in the realities of his daily life or which he himself co-operated 
in manifesting and maintaining ... It could never or hardly ever 
have struck him to ask or beg for persistence or eternal life for 
his own individuality ... the republican's whole soul was in the 
republic; the republic survived him and there hovered before his 
rind the t. -. ought of its immortality' 
181. In exchange for pride 
in the contribution of his activity to the immortality of the 
republic, the citizen was glad to give up much of what was of 
interest to him in-the present world. The Jewish people, on the 
contrary, had no such concept of immortality because the present 
world was all that they had time for. Theirs was a condition 
analogous to that which supervened in Imperial Rome after the 
growth, for want of vigilant preservation of the laws, of extremes 
bf wealth and political inequality. It had come about that the 
94. 
virtue which 'ontesquieu held to be the principle of the republic 
had disappeared: 'The picture of the state as the product of his 
own activity disappeared from the citizen's soul. The care and 
eversight of the whole rested on the soul of one man or a few ... 
Each man's allotted part in the congeries which formed the whole 
was so inconsiderable in relation to the whole that the individual 
did not need to realise this relation or to keep it in view ... 
All activity and every purpose now had a bearing on something 
individual; activity was no longer for the sake of a whole or an 
ideal. Tither everyone worked for himself or else he was com- 
pelled to work for some other individual' 
182 So among the 
Jews, as vie have seen, everyone was 'either mastered or masters' 
and none enjoyed any 'life or consciousness lifted above eating 
and drinking'. 
This was the kind of political culture in which was grounded 
the vacillation of the Jewish people, after the death of their 
lawgiver, between independence and subjection to foreign powers 
183. It was the seedbed of the messianism, the looking to a 
future in which their sensible satisfaction would be restored 
with the glory of independent statehood, that prevailed during 
the life of Jesus and caused his nessage to be distorted_'841- It 
remains to examine the consequences of these causes for political 
Christendom. 
5, 'epresentation: trust in the subordination of jealous 
sectarians, faith in the image of equal and active citizenship 
Christ's task was to give the Jews a 'sense of their self- 
hood' 185. But out of his call to autonomy, his contemporaries 
and their successors soon fashioned another system of 'slavish 
service of their Lord' !. "e have now to address ourselves to 
186 
95. 
the question hoer Jewish heteronomy was transmitted to Christendom 
and the political systems by which it was acsir.: ilated. Hegel's 
explanation of this process, with which his revised introduction 
to the PCR marches, was completed to his satisfaction by April 
1796. We take it up at the point at which he had just done with 
the contrast between the disciples of Jesus and the friends of 
Socrates. 
The fact that Christ, in contrast to Socrates, fixed the 
number of his disciples at twelve, encouraged his followers to 
suppose that the doctrines which he conjured them to disseminate 
were of a kind to which is appropriate the same means of authori- 
tative statement which is merited in the case of ratters of political 
earnest. Such matters of opinion as religious or philosophical 
doctrine, however, whose content and spontaneous changes thereof 
are of public consequence only in so far as they demonstrably 
derogate from the obligations of the citizen to the state 
187, do 
not admit of legislative pronouncement upon the authority of a 
majority of a determinate number of men 
188. Representation in 
Matters of opinion is inadmissible because, it is Hegels view, 
'it is absolutely contrary to the nature of opinion that an 
individual should subject it, something his own, to a majority 
vote' 
189 
. It is possible, indeed it is necessary, that in a 
political commonwealth determinate position should be given to 
the rights of the individual in person and property 
190, for 
these are matters where the cinematic and idiosyncratic nature 
of opinion would be improper. Put since the church is not 
concerned with such matters, a system of representation, the 
quid pro quo of the individual's subjection of his will to the 
general will and his regard for the latter as his law 
191, is 
entirely inappropriate to it. Quite apart from the question 
whether the conciliar organization of the Roman Catholic Church, 
96. 
the principle of which .,,, as repudiated by the "vangeli cal Church 
in which 'everyone has the right to'settle for himself what is his 
faith'192, is any longer representative in fact as well as in name, 
rather than a sheer bureaucracy closed to the slightest influence 
of the laity 
193, Hegel held that to give officials of the church 
'authority to determine the faith of the congregation on their own 
judgement and to subject it to a majority vote' 
l91 is to confer 
upon the ecclesiastical commonwealth the likeness of a state. 
It matters not at all whether its fora: is republican, monarchical 
or aristocratic, for all these kinds of representation are 'totally 
in contradiction to man's right not to subject his opinions to an 
alien authority' 
195. 
Hegel considered it the mark of what he called a 'positive' 
sect (earlier defined as one which presumes to treat as morally 
culpable not just deviation fror.: its own ethical principles, nor 
yet just attachment to fanciful, though morally neutral, popular 
beliefs, but failure to adhere to the former and renounce the 
latter on exactly the authoritative grounds specified as reasons 
to believe 190) that each of its members is prepared to adopt the 
duty 'as in the social contract, of subjecting his private will 
to a majority vote' 
197, 
of obeying the statutes of the positive 
sect as if they were public laws, rather than the rules of a 
private society, of 'believing something and regarding it as true 
just because the society has commanded belief in it' 
198. 
As far as Hegel was concerned, so long as this analogue of 
the condition of the Jewish people, among whom commands entirely 
took the place of truth, does not extend from such private 
societies to the whole state, positive sectarians should be left 
to their own 'expedient, appropriate and permissible' devices 
1Q'ß. 
But positive sectarians, unlike. philosophical sectarians, of whom 
the followers of Socrates are archetypical, have a propensity, 
97. 
for they find a feeling of safety in nurbers, for proselytic 
expansion Thus the early Christians extended to the whole 
200 
of the societies in which they found themselves characteristics 
which, once extended, could not but suffer the corruption brought 
upon them by their ceasing to be of the kind that is, in the sense 
that it may be repudiated without prejudice to their freedom and 
happiness, voluntarily adopted by its members. Such were the 
ideals of brotherhood, community of goods, equality and frater- 
isation in holy communion 
201. 
The consequence of the expansion of their private society to 
co-exte. nsion with the whole of the peoples whom they proselytised 
was the final cause of the appropriation by the church of political 
practices quite inappropriate to the ends to which its original 
founder intended. For the church came to suppose that it had a 
right to invoke the authority of the state in the defence of 
matters of opinion upon which that authority ought not to be 
expended. Subscribing to the pragmatic arguments of 'endelssohn, 
rather than to the transcententalist principle of rant that 
morality and legality are ever twain, Hegel insisted that it is 
not the business of the state to oblige the individual to honour 
mankind as a whole or to aid associates of the same station and 
202 
calling as his own . If anyone does not wish, for instance, 
to be charitable or to cooperate with any private association, 
the power of the state may not be invoked. In particular, the 
state cannot penalise resignation or exclusion from any church 
by the withdrawal from the individual of his civil rights, for 
in that case the state must admit the existence of a 'status in 
203 
statu' . This is the situation in the 'vast majority of 
countries, Catholic and Protestant alike', where the 'ecclesiastical 
state' (an instance of the 'status in statu', which, 'as we shall 




made its rights prevail against the civil 
state; and in which no dicsenter can obtain civil rights or enjoy 
that protection of the law in civil and criminal cases which a 
citizen enjoys. He cannot acquire real estate of any sort; he 
cannot hold any public office; he is even subject to differential 
treatment in the matter of taxation' 
205 
Where the state has yielded its right even to confer citizen- 
ship, made conditional upon baptism in the prevailing faith 
206, 
to protect the faith and property of 'any nondominant church, 
207, 
to ensure the education of its future citizens so that they feel 
themselves to be no less free to resign from their childhood faith 
than they are to emigrate from their native country 
208, there it 
is no wonder that the state also sacrifices, along with its 
sovereignty, the rights of its citizens in other than religious 
matters. Hegel insisted, as upon a general principle, that any 
corporation, to which category of private association he assigned 
all churches, exceeds its rights as a 'society within the state' 
209 
if, over and above its legitimate exclusion of anyone who does not 
conform to its rules 
210, its exclusion of non-conformists is 
tantamount to their excommunication from the right, which the 
state is obliged to protect, to follow any vocation, spiritual or 
mundane, upon which their subjective choice alights. Thus, if 
a corporation prevents a man from plying his chosen trade in the 
town where it operates a 'closed shop', he is excluded 'in effect 
211 from the whole community at the same time, 
In general, then, it is the duty of the state to enforce the 
obligation of its citizens and corporations to respect the right 
of other members of civil society 
212 to remain other if they so 
choose. It is its duty not to permit its coercive power to be 
so appropriated by any member of civil society (the relationship 
of men to one another in which, Hegel maintained in accordance 
99. 
with the views of the mentors of his youth, especially Nendelssohn, 
Garve and Ferguson 
213 
none is in a position to impose,. as if they 
were perfect obligations, duties to abstract entities such as 
humanity and corporations, whose assumption is quite voluntary) 
that its abstract rights come to be confused with the rights of 
the ethical totality of the people. As we shall see in the 
following chapters, it is upon the representative institutions and 
practices of the state proper that Hegel depended the preservation 
intact of its ius majestatis from adulteration by the ius 
collegiale of the church or, for that matter, of any other body 
whose incorporation proceeds, as Hegel clearly believed the 
foundation of the state does not 
214, from the free association 
by contract of individuals at equal liberty to dissociate 
215. 
It is in order to the preservation of this, liberty that Hegel 
denied the representative and legislative authority of church 
councils and the legitimacy of the constraint which their doctrinal 
pronouncements place upon public policy. Only thus could be 
preserved the freedom in matters of custom and opinion by which 
the state must maintain the feeling of activity on the part of the 
individual without which the activity of the state must appear to 
him as that of another mere member of civil society. This freedom 
is the quid pro quo of the readiness with which present interests 
may be sacrificed for the sake of an absent purpose, distinct by 
definition from the present interest of any particular corporation. 
Freedom in matters of custom and opinion is the condition of its 
surrender in matters of law and earnest, a political exchange 
which is instrumented by means of a representative and legislative 
authority from whose rights against ever] member of civil society 
none other can be permitted to detract, whether by the erection 
of an alternative authority 
216 
or by. the emasculation of the 
rights of majesty by the rights of association, particularly of 
100. 
ius publicum by iuz ecclesiasticur 
217.7epresentation is the 
peculiur of the state. Upon four conditions 
218 
of its proper 
institution, namely that it is 
the citizens are subject, that 
inferior to no principal, that 
and that it is compatible with 
ative government ensures that 







rather than persons to whom 
representative authority is 
action is not interventionist 
plurality of society, represent- 
citizen of the modern state 
ige, so vivid in the soul of 
the ancient republican 'of the state as a product of his own 
activities' 
219. It ensures that he can recover, with the civil 
rights to whose destruction the Judaeo-Christian tradition, 
because of its inveterate hostility to plurality and spontaneity 
in matters of custom and opinion, had made such a fatal contri- 
bution, the sense of activity which had prevailed in the ancient 
220 
world 
Representation was not, of course, the means whereby the 
relation of exchange between the present and the absent had been 
instrumented in the ancient republic. There the 'inage' of the 
state as a product of the citizen's oven activity had far -reater 
substance than it could have in the less intimate and more 
extensive states of the modern world where, of necessity, as we 
shall see in the next chapter, that image has, as it were, to be 
'simulated: it has, tigre may say, to be made to consist in a formal 
rather than substantial sense of activity. That is vouchsafed 
to the individual by the state which ensures that, at least, the 
feeling of activity which the individual may enjoy is not subverted 
by the suspicion that the activity of the state and the force of 
law serve the interests of other members of society at the expense 
of his own. There musts at least, be a degree of such trust 
between the individual and the state. 
As we shall see in the fifth chapter, Hegel regarded 
101. 
representation as the institutional means to the recovery of the 
trust (fides) which he followed Tacitus, Montesquieu and the 
tradition of legal scholarship stemming from Hermann Conring 
221 
in believing to be the characteristic 'political' sentiment 
prevalent in the 'german forests'. The denizens of these forests, 
whose 'public relationships Hegel was later to describe in terms 
222 
almost identical to those in which he eulogised the republican 
Greeks and Romans (as free men who 'obeyed men whom they had 
themselves appointed to office, waged wars on which they had 
themselves decided, gave their property, exhausted their passions, 
and sacrificed their lives by thousands for an end which was their 
own' 
223), stood, as far as Hegel was concerned, for an ideal not 
essentially different from classical republicanism, except in 
point of the fact that it was not at all deserving of description 
as an ideal articulated in constitutional form. Yet it seemed 
to him that they, in whose public relationships representation 
originated, manifested the same readiness to sacrifice present 
interests for an absent ideal which was characteristic of the 
ancient republican. For as early as in one of the manuscripts 
of 1794 he had attributed to the primitive German tribesman, by 
implication, to be sure, but nonetheless undoubtedly, the same 
devotion to the immortality of his community, the same disregard 
for personal advantage in the present and the present to come, as 
he attributed expressly to the citizen of the ancient polis: 
'The free republican, who ... expended his powers and life for 
his fatherland and did this from duty, did not rate his effort 
so highly that he could demand compensation for it ... he expected 
only because he was brave, to live in the company of heroes in 
Elysium or Valhalla, happier there than here only because he 
224 
would be free from the troubles of frail humanity' . 
102. 
It was not the satisfaction of his mortal appetites in whose 
terms the primitive German, any more than the ancient republican, 
envisaged immortality. He was not a member of a 'people of the 
highest depravity' which 'leads a private life and ... needs 
assurances from God that it has a future life' 
225, but of a living 
ethical whole made one and active by the faith in it of its members. 
Here, then, existed for Hegel a bridge of sorts between the 
substantial and participatory republican form of political ex- 
change between the present and the absent and the formal and 
representative version which it was the business of the modern 
state to articulate in a constitutional system as durable as, 
perhaps more so than, that of the ancient world. To put the 
matter crudely, the Germanic political culture which Hegel likened 
in some respects to the republican political culture of Greece, 
was at the same time the source from which stemmed the practice of 
representation. 
The system of representation inherent in the 'german forests' 
was to be accorded by Hegel the dignity of a basis for the recovery 
of something like the readiness with which the ancient republican 
sacrificed his present interests for the absent idea of the state. 
But it could serve as such only on condition that it should not be 
compromised by a practice of representation tainted by the Judaeo- 
Christian view of the state as rightly subservient to the interests 
of a sect, that is, as a means to the imposition of conformity upon 
the. subjectivity of all members of society in matters of mere 
opinion. Political representation must not be constrained by any 
pretence on the part of private associations, whose concern, by 
definition, is with matters of opinion, that their policy has the 
sanction of any truly representative authority. It was the 
positive sectarian spirit of the Christian religion, born of the 
avarice of its Jewish bearers for the security of their interests 
103. 
and opinions, that had first subverted the autonomy of the state 
and its disinterested devotion to purposes quite absent in the 
sense that they are the object of the sensible interests of none 
in particular and so may be the intelligible object of all. The 
state had forfeited the trust of all its citizens that it was the 
product of their politically equal activity, rather than an instru- 
ment at the particular disposal of some, once it permitted religion 
to claim for its private doctrines and regulations the status of 
public laws. Just by virtue of this permission was the state 
deprived of a servant in the process, whose object is such that it 
cannot be produced by commands from the state but, besides the 
imperceptible influence for virtue in the people of its own 
institutions, by the persuasive means available to a religion 
whose content appeals to the heart as well as to the head. That 
object is the creation among the people of trust in their political 
institutions, a 'disposition which gives birth to action in 
correspondence with the civil or the moral laws' 
226. This dis- 
position civil legislation cannot directly produce. It is some- 
thing which the state must arouse by means and use of religion. 
The state forfeited the trust of the people as soon as it permitted 
religion to make of it a means to and servant of its present 
interests, for by that token the people could no longer trust 
that constitutional law rather than force 
227 
could be depended 
upon to arbitrate between the interests of private members of civil 
society. Once the nanny had usurped the authority of the mother, 
their charge could not but suspect that it had lost a wet-nurse 
from whom it might imbibe the wholesome milk of the feelings and 
images which are the diet of the free man and had gained a harsh 
school governess who would always inhibit his sense of activity 
228. 
He could not but cease to trust that his concession of autonomy to 
the state in matters of earnest would be reciprocated by its 
10k. 
permission of his autonomy in matters of opinion. As we shall 
see in the final chapter, Hegel's view was that once a religion 
had so deviated from its proper purpose, that purpose could only 
be served by the representative institutions of the state itself, 
institutions to which he ultimately attached the significance of 
the object of a national cult 
229. And although in the PCR, 
Hegel expressly declined to venture upon a discussion of the means 
to the creation of trust which are internal, rather than external 
to the constitution, it is clear that this matter, 'not here in 
questions 
230, impressed its importance increasingly urgently upon 
his mind. For if religion makes itself unfit as a means to the 
promotion of the disposition thanks to which men's actions, their 
customs and culture, correspond with their laws, their civil and 
human enlightenment, resort must be had to an equivalent means to 
the end that law should dwell in the heart of every man as the 
intelligible expression, to which he readily and without grudge 
adjusts his everyday practical effort and industry, of the ethical 
life or activity of his people. We shall see in the next chapter 
how, for the first time with concentration upon the constitutional 
problems of the German Empire and its territories, . 
Hegel' began to 
seek in the political traditions of modern and aboriginal Europe 
the rudiments of a political condition of reciprocal trust between 
subject and sovereign that would approximate the relation of ready 
exchange that obtained in the ancient republican state between the 




Political Exchange and Communication 
'When virtue vanishes from the republic, ambition enters hearts 
which are capable of it and greed masters everyone ... so that 
the state becomes everyone's booty and its strength now consists 
only in the power of a few citizens and the license of all alike' 
(Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws cited by Hegel, The Philosophy 
of Right, in his Remark to paragraph 273) 
In 1821, having quoted the above passage, Hegel went on to comment 
that, besides the'principeL of virtue, the political sentiment of 
the republic, and according to Montesquieu the 'passion' which 
makes it act, a 'form of rational law' is needed, for the sake 
of action whose 'power to resist disruption' is not liable to be 
compromised by passion. We shall see in this chapter how, in 
one of the most difficult documents of Hegel's early career, he 
appears to anticipate this denial of the power of anything but law 
'to bestow on the powers of particularity, now become mature, both 
their positive and their negative rights' and to argue that, far 
from having to be destroyed by revolution, the legal forms of an 
old regime, a monarchy whose 'principe' is honour, maybe adapted 
in the process of introducing the changes necessitated by its 
crisis of legitimacy. The nature of this adaptation is such 
that a new regime may come into existence which, though it retains 
a monarchical centre, may nevertheless be said to have among its 
'principes' the virtue of its citizens' readiness to sacrifice 
themselves for the Idea of their fatherland. As Hegel was to 
argue in the Philosophy of Right, 'we must remove the misunder- 
standing of supposing that because the sentiment of virtue is the 
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substantial form of a democratic republic, it is evidently super- 
fluous in monarchy ... and finally, we may not suppose that there 
is an opposition and an incompatibility between virtue and the 
legally determinate agency of a state whose organisation is fully 
articulated'. On the contrary, such agency, which puts a term 
to the public effect of the passions of ambition and greed is, in 
the 'mature social conditions' created in the modern world by the 
'powers of particularity', that alone which is capable of effecting 
what we may call the virtual restoration of what cannot be recovered 
in substance. As we shall see, Hegel proposed the monarchical- 
cum-representative state as the means virtually or simulatively 
to restore the constitution of virtue, of readiness to exchange 
the satisfaction of present interests for the love, trust and joy 
of the absent Idea of the fatherland. 
Out of the rent costume of honour Hegel hoped might be 
restored the likeness, made good by law, of the ancient substance 
of virtue. This was to be achieved by way of a sympathetic 
convergence of the few and the many who stand respectively, but 
too exclusively for the sake of community, for the values of 
presence and absence, both of which have, in Hegels view, to be 
integrated in the cause of civilization. Let us turn now to his 
progressive development of these ideas one quarter of a century 
before their presentation in systematic form. 
1. New Myths Tor Old 
By the summer of 1796, Hegel had completed the main part of 
the PCR and'that part (to which reference has already been made 
with respect to the section of it in which he accounted for the 
disappearance from the citizen's soul of the image of the state as 
a product of his own activity) in the first section of which he 
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complained bitterly of the destruction, by the positive sectarian 
spirit of the Judaeo-Christian tradition, of the heritage of 
primitive Germany. From this heritage he hoped might yet be 
salvaged for modern Europe a likeness of the readiness of political 
exchange that had obtained in ancient republican Greece and 
Rome. 
Christianity, by virtue of the same spirit which had inclined 
it to claim for its opinions and regulations a universality that 
derogated from the sovereignty of those states with which it entered 
into intimate relationship, and from the impartiality of their laws, 
had, as Hegel put it, 'emptied Valhalla, felled the sacred groves, 
extirpated the national imagery as so much shameful superstition, 
as a devilish poison, and given us instead the imagery of a nation 
whose climate, laws, culture and interests are strange to us and 
whose history has no connection whatever with our own. A David 
or a Solomon lives in our popular imagination but our country's 
own heroes slumber in learned history books ..., 
1. All that in 
German history upon which might have been founded the freedom of 
its modern citizens, all that through which they might have been 
prmvid8d with a common stock of religious and political imagery 
that would have been the medium for the idiomatic articulation of 
an ethical community transcendent of social difference, was a 
matter of indifference to 'the authorities in church and state' 
2. 
Hegel meant by the concept of 'national imagery' something 
bound up with all kinds of public festivals, national games, 
domestic institutions, foreign affairs, folk songs and festivals 
3. 
Into it were distilled 'the culture and the laws of Athens', for 
instance 4, so that any dweller with her gates could not but have 
lively felt their force, so that she lived in the hearts of every- 
one regardless of social station. But, where Germany was in 
question, such imagery was so culturally exogenous and historically 
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ill-founded that the imagination of its people had to turn to 
myths that were superstitious or precious according as they 
appealed to the common people or the upper classes 
5. It was 
because the culture of the several classes was accessible only to 
their own members that, apart from the deficiencies of religious 
imagery, the people of Germany, 'we who were never a nation' 
6, 
were 'without any political imagery whatever' 7. 
Hegel was quite emphatic that the 'project of restoring to a 
nation an imagery once lost was aiwys doomed to failure' 
8 
However sympathetic he was to the idea that the religious and 
political mythology of a people ought to be 'home-grown' 
9, it is 
clear that he set no store by the restoration of'an old mythology 
originally cultivated amongst a people which had never, in strict- 
ness, constituted a nation, much less a state. We may suppose, 
on the basis of his remark to the effect that the Germans were 
never a nation, that Hegel was already thinking along the lines 
which he would pursue in the VSN: that the Germans, never quite 
organised as a state, would enjoy that form of political existence 
no sooner than they would cease to depend their political unity 
upon the grounds that they were originally a people and would ever 
be so by the grace of Providence 
10. 
Old mythology would not serve the German people in the modern 
world. They would have to have recourse to a new kind of myth- 
ology adapted, as that of 'Achaea' was adapted under other circum- 
stances, to the service of the state. Such a mythology would 
presuppose, Hegel implied in a passage evocative of the opening 
and closing passages of the VST1, that as a matter of fact there 
would have stepped forth someone who 'could be our Theseus, who 
founded a state and was its lawgiver' 
11. We shall see in the 
. fourth chapter what Hegel thought would have to be the character 
of this mythical figure. It is sufficient for the time being to 
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emphasize that he would have to be a genius, as defined above, 
and that his business would be the creation of no other kind of 
expression of ethical life - neither art, nor religion, nor 
philosophy - than the state. 
In May or June of 1796 Hegel had written vehemently of the 
political system of Germany as one in which, on the pretence of 
motivation by a religion in which they claimed to have an identity 
of interest with their subjects 
12, the princes had engulfed 
millions of Germans in wars, waged 'out of ambition or for their 
own independence', in which 'the people were only tools' 
13. 
These wars were, as far as the people were concerned, not at all 
'wars on which they themselves had decided' such as were the wars 
in which ancient republicans and primitive Germans 
14 had staked 
their lives in thousands for an end that was their own. The states 
which engaged in them used their people as tools. They were the 
very opposite of that which the citizen could imagine to be the 
product of his own activity. They were states which, as we shall 
see in the course of this chapter, Hegel believed must be replaced 
by one whose action was so regulated by law, so constituted to 
preclude the misappropriation of its authority by private persons 
or sects, that the citizen could at least regard it as a semblance 
of a product of his own activities, as their shadow vicariously 
cast by the most real of all obstacles to the presumption of 
private persons and associations to impose their will upon others 
at the expense of their feeling of independent activity or free 
subjectivity 
15. 
. That Hegel may be interpreted 
to have thought of the modern 
Rechtsstaat, could it be founded in Germany, as the means by which 
his people could be vouchsafed a feeling, albeit one founded upon 
an appearance less substantial and more formal than that which 
obtained and was maintained in the soul of the ancient republican, 
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that the State serves as a trusty defence, an umbrella so to speak, 
put up against the endeavours of ambitious predators upon civil 
liberties, is an argument whose justification by an explicit 
statement of the meaning of law must await the treatment of the 
fragment to whose exegesis the next section is devoted. A 
preliminary affirmation of this argument may be made, however, 
upon the basis of what has come to be known as the Earliest 
System Programme of German Idealism (Aelteste System-Program 
des deutschen Idealismus or ASP) 
16 
and to be commonly misunder- 
stood as a manifesto for absolute freedom unlimited by any form 
of Spirit lower than aesthetic experience. A great burden of 
misunderstanding of the ASP, which it would be tedious to attribute 
to individual commentators, may be lifted simply by attending, as 
well as to what is written of the Platonic Idea of Beauty as that 
in which truth and goodness inhere, to what is implicit in the 
author's specification of the 'aesthetic expression' of 'the Ideas' 
as their 'mythological expression'. 
In order to elicit the meaning of the author's claim that 
until 'we express the Ideas aesthetically i. e. mythologically, 
they have no interest for the people, and conversely until myth- 
ology is rational the philosopher must be ashamed of it' 
17, two 
assumptions have to be made. The first, whose vindication may 
be postponed until after the explanation of the function of myth- 
ology, is that, notwithstanding the rhetorical denial that there 
can be an Idea of the State, the ASP points to a resolution in 
favour of the Platonic view that the State is an object of free- 
dom rather than the Kantian view that it is not. This resolu- 
tion, as we shall see, is accomplished. in the fragment mentioned 
above, in which the, Rechtsstaat is held to be the object in pursuit 
of whose universality two diverse social groups can converge or 
draw close to one another, as neighbours, so to speak. Law is 
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that which ensures their unanimity in the conviction that the 
particularity, the special interest, of neither can prevail over 
that of the other. This is similar to the function attributed 
to mythology in the ASP. 
The second assumption is that by mythology the author meant 
something related to law not by any means as an alternative but 
as its expression, aesthetic in the sense that it is that whereby 
law is sensibly rather than merely intellectually impressed upon 
the people. In this respect, the views of the author of the ASP 
obviously disclose their kinship with Plato's. It is for this 
reason that use has been made of the notion of the appearance in 
the soul of the citizen of the State as an ima e or semblance of 
the product of his own activity. In fact, of course, it is not. 
But it must seem to be such. The State is the work of another 
than his immediate self but in its activity the citizen must see 
deeds which he can regard as if they could be his own. The myth- 
ology which serves it must contain something like a myth of found- 
ation to settle everyone in their station, in what the author says 
'is peculiar to each'. But, further, there must be something 
like a myth of affiliation so that 'what is common to all' may be 
expressed in a palpable form of familiarity. The author, of 
course, makes no mention of minerals and mating-festivals, for in 
that extreme mythology would be offensive to practical subjectivity. 
But it is clear from the words which follow the sentence last cited 
that he agrees with Plato that unanimity, between as well as within 
18 
classes, is the highest form of justice For he went on: 
'Thus in the end enlightened and unenlightened must clasp 
hands, mythology must becoma philosophical and the people rational; - 
and philosophy must become mythological im order to make the 
philosophers sensible'. Then reigns eternal unity among us ... 
Then first may we expect equal development of all powers, of what 
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is peculiar to each and what is common to all. No power shall 
longer be repressed. Then reigns universal freedom and equality 
of spirits! ' 
19. The achievement of political community in the 
midst of social difference: this is the object that mythology has 
in common with law, the matter which the ASP and the fragment to 
which attention has been drawn treat, respectively, from the point 
of view of the sensible (mythology) and from that of the intell- 
igible (1äw). 
Before we proceed to the discussion of thi8 fragment, the 
Widerspruchsschrift (VISS) 
20, 
we have to meet an objection, apart 
from the fact that Hegel's authorship of the ASP, and so its 
utility as an interpretative resource, may as well be denied as 
21 
maintained 9 that may be raised concerning our first assumption. 
On the basis of the author's declaration of his intention to 
prove, upon the postulate of the self 'as an absolutely free 
entity ... the free, self-conscious essence', in other words upon 
the premiss of the 'Idea of mankind', that this primary postulate 
or Idea 'gives us no Idea of the State, since the State is a 
mechanical thing, any more than it gives us an idea of a machine' 
22, 
it has been supposed, by too many commentators to specify, that 
Hegel, all of a sudden, decided that the State is quite unfit to 
be regarded as an ethical entity. It certainly looks as if the 
author of the ASP was attempting, when he proposed as the defini- 
tive practical postulate the Idea of mankind as absolutely free 
and denied that the dignity of 'something that is an object of free- 
dom' 23I could be attributed to the State any more than to a 
machine, to outdo Kant in the strictness with which he denied 
that civil laws can advance morality. . There appears to be basic 
agreement between the ASP and the view of Kant that, the State is 
'the mechanical product of the union of thQ people by coercive 
laws, 24. Indeed we may say that the author seems to exceed Kant 
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inasmuch as he appears to regard the State not merely as machine- 
like, but as a very machine. For it is written that 'Only some- 
thing that is an object of freedom is called an Idea. So we must 
(go even) beyond the State! - for every State must treat free men 
as cogs in a machine; and this it ought not to do; so it must 
cease, 25. 
Yet we have seen that Hegel'believed in the validity of a 
distinction between the mechanical and the ethical state, expressed, 
only months before he is supposed to have written the ASP, in the 
antithesis between the state that is like a machine whose opera- 
tive parts are mere 'cogs' 
26 (or whose people are mere 'tools' 27) 
and the state that is imaginatively represented not at all as a 
mechanical product of coercion but rather of the citizens' own 
activity. Hegel clearly did not really believe that no state 
can do other than treat free men as cogs in a machine. This is 
evident from the remarks which, following the proposition that 
'every state must treat free men as cogs', contradict its uni- 
versality. Hegel was sufficiently a Kantian to believe that 
'ought implies can'. Vhen, therefore, he wrote that the state 
'ought not' and 'must cease' so to treat men, he implicitly denied 
the Kantian view that the state cannot but be mechanical and that 
its laws cannot but be coercive, and so be deficient in moral 
content. On that view it would have made no sense to demand that 
the state cease to behave mechanically. 
Hegel, then, was quite emphatically hostile to the Kantian 
view of the state as a device needed merely to curb human vice, 
and it was thanks to the fact that he repudiated this conception 
of the state as having only a coercive faculty that, as well-as 
dissenting from Kants relative indifference to the state, he 
rejected the opposite'but cognate attitude of many of Kant's 
followers, who rebelliously considered the putative necessity that 
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the state behave mechanically to be grounds not to suffer it but 
to do away with it. This conclusion, that the ASP is not the un- 
equivocal condemnation of the state for which it has commonly been 
taken is the same as that reached by Hans Maier who has argued 
convincingly, upon other grounds, that the ASP provides no basis 
for the verification of the 'oft-asserted dichotomy' between Hegel's 
view of the State in 1796 and that which is disclosed in his sub- 
sequent constitutional writings. Examining other contemporary 
views of the state, Maier has found an ambivalence even in the 
major work of such a redoubtable antagonist of the modern State 
as Schiller who, though he held that the State is. 'always alien 
to the citizen because feeling is nowhere to be found in it', 
could nevertheless envisage the possibility that the same citizens 
28 
might be 'friends-of-state' (Staatsfreunde) . This ambivalence, 
manifest to some extent in the ASP, Hegel was to resolve in favour 
of the state. 
To decry the state as a machine was not, we may conclude, 
necessarily to deny the potential of the relationship between the 
citizen and the state to be endowed with sympathy. On the 
contrary, to introduce the concept of the machine state was often 
a literary device for the evocation of its polar alternative, the 
state which encourages rather than repress its citizens sense of 
activity, the state by which no power shall longer be repressed'. 
This contrapuntal technique is to be found at work in, for example, 
a passage written by Schleiermacher that almost exactly echoes 
the conclusion of the ASP. In it is postulated 'a new, higher 
concept of the State which, eternally exalted beyond mere mechanism, 
should demand for itself all the innermost powers of men, but 
should also raise and extend these towards the supreme development 
of human existence' 
29. We have already seen Hegel use a similar 
technique in the PCR, where he drew an antithesis between the 
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machine-state and its republican predecessor, and between the 
political sentiments prevalent in each 
30. Since the availability 
of a certain 'image' of the state is what served there to dis- 
tinguish the latter kind of state and political culture from the 
former, and since the concepts of imagery and myth are used in a 
contemporary section of the PCR and in the ASP, respectively, to 
signify the affective cement, so to speak, of the ancient polis, 
and that which in the modern world has to mitigate the appearance 
of mechanism, as opposed to independent activity on the part of 
both, in the relationship between state and citizen, we may be 
sure that the concept of a 'new mythology' has indeed the signi- 
ficance which we have attributed to it: namely, that it is meant 
to convey the idea of that through which the State may appear as if 
it were the product of the activity of its citizens, all being 
equal and free. For it has the same contrapuntal value in anti- 
thesis to the idea of the state which is the product of mechanical 
coercion of its subjects, all being unequal and repressed, as had 
the'concept of the ethical State, the ancient republic of the PCR 
and other JSN. And further, its object is the same as that which, 
in the Widerspruchsschrift (VISS), Hegel was to depend upon the law 
which, in the so-called 'whole state', is equally available to all 
members of civil society 
31: 
namely, eternal unity, universal 
freedom and equality of spirits or the sympathetic convergence or 
neighbourliness, as the ! ''SS has it 
32, 
of social groups, the 
'enlightened' and'unenlightened'of the ASP, both of which, despite 
the divergence of their practical cultures, have a common-interest, 
did they but know it, in the restoration of a state which could 
appear to each as a virtual or simulative product of his own 
activity inasmuch as, in reality, it is neither the product nor the. 
servant of the activity of anyone in particular. 
116. 
This capacity was held by Hegel to be peculiar, in the 
modern world, to the representative-cum-monarchical constitution 
upon which, as we shall see, he conferred the dignity of maiestas 
33, 
sovereign over the rights of all private persons, individual and 
collective alike. It was this constitutional system with which, 
it will be argued with reference to the WSS, Hegel believed his 
times to be pregnant and which he believed, according to 'all the 
signs of the times' 
34, 
would be the issue of their laborious 
stresses. The times were ripe for constitutional reform. 
2. The Wuerrtembergschrift 
In order with greater ease to understand the significance of 
the most difficult fragment among the VSN, the Widerspruchsschrift 
(WSS), in the progress of Hegel's views on custom, law and rep- 
resentation towards their specific development in relation to the 
problems of the German Empire as a whole, it is expedient to 
precede the analysis of the WSS with a treatment of an essay 
written in 1798. In this, the fragmentary essay 'On the recent 
domestic affairs of Wuerttemberg', here to be known as the 
Wuerttembergschrift (WBS) 
35, Hegel argued that it was 'high time 
for the people of Wuerttemberg to give up wobbling between fear 
and hope, and oscillating between expectation and disillusion' 
36. 
Despite the feeling, which shall be explained below 
37 
as one of 
existential commitment to the limits of the present life led by 
the majority of his fellow citizens, despite the timid care of 
the bulk of the Swabian people lest personal or sectional advantage 
should be lost, 'when things were changing or when the past was 
being preserved' 
38, Hegel was confident that a 'picture of better 
and juster times was alive in the souls of men', 
39. Their feel- 
ing of longing, 'a sighing'for purer and freer conditions' 
40, 
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needed only to have its heart-felt, but merely passive emotion of 
contrariness towards the present enacted 
41. The time was ripe 
for 'men of nobler wishes and purer enthusiasm' 
42 than were evident 
in the majority 'to focus their will, so far lacking a definite 
object, on those parts of the constitution which are based on in- 
justice and to direct their energies to the necessary alteration 
of these parts' 
43. 
It is clear from the introduction to his essay, which was but 
one intended contribution to a spate of pamphlets written by Hegel's 
contemporary Swabians with a view to influence the terms upon which 
was " to be recalled the territorial Diet, suspended since 1770, 
that the proper reconstitution of the Estates' Assembly could alone, 
in Hegel's opinion,, prevent the indeterminate dissipation of the 
energetic but inchoate yearning of the people for 'something 
different'44 . That Hegel had obvious reservations about the 
tendency for the emotional urge of his people to pin its hopes 'to 
every event, to every glimmer, and even to violent actions'45 may 
well have been the reason why the anonymous reader to whom he 
referred the WBS for approval or criticism advised against its 
publication as likely to 'do us more harm than good' 
46. Hegel's 
views, as Rosenzweig has convincingly argued, were, so far as can 
be ascertained from that part of his manuscript which is extant 
and that part, extensively cited by Rudolf Haym 
47, which no longer 
survives, closer to those of the distinguished Goettingen historian 
of the pragmatic school, Thomas Spittler, than to those of the 
radicals, amongst whom H. S. Harris, for example, has attempted to 
identify like minds 
48. For like Spittler, -whose conservative- 
reformist influence the Duke of Wuerttemberg imported into his 
Privy Council and whose advice, contained in a pamphlet of his own, 
was influential in shaping the terms upon which the territorial 
Diet was recalled 
49, Hegel was decidedly in favour only of the 
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alteration of such unjust 'parts' of the constitution as was 
'necessary' to ensure that the'fabric of the state' should not 
disintegrate 50. 
Terminology of the kind just cited, and the recurrence of 
Hegel's use of the metaphor of a dwelling place, contribute to 
the impression that the political change which he envisaged was 
reformist rather than revolutionary and that its main effect would 
take place in the dispositions of the citizenry. When he rep- 
resented the state as a 'tottering edifice' in place of which 
'something safe' 
51 had to be produced, when he denied that 
'institutions, constitutions and laws which no longer correspond 
to human manners, needs and opinions ... can subsist any longer' 
52, 
when he repudiated attempts to manufacture confidence in those 
'features and sections of a constitution' in which a people no 
longer has faith 53, Hegel's meaning was clearly that reciprocal 
adjustment had to occur between laws and customs rather than that 
the doxalogical tendencies, among which are to be counted the 
'meagre wishes' and 'petty cares' 54 of his fellow Swabians, and 
indeed all Germans, - for their own advantage, should furnish 
the measure of what should be allowed to come to pass. For 
opinion or custom in se is entirely without measure. The sole 
criterion upon which change must be evaluated, a criterion 
considerate of the need to maintain what is tenable no less than 
it desiderates the rending of an habitual fabric that is found, 
after calm examination, to be 'really untenable', is 'justice' 
55. 
This concept of justice (Peace; those who have attempted to 
interpret it as it occurs here and in Hegel's edition, also in 
1798, of the'Confidential Letters about the former constitutional 
relationship of Wadtland to the City of Bern' 
56, 
as if by 
'justice'Hegel understood something quite at odds with custom 
57. ) 
is simply that of a measure inherent in constitutional laws from 
119. 
which the spirit of correspondence with custom, need and opinion 
has not flown and of a temperance prevalent in the disposition of 
men who 'care for the universal' 
58. 
It depends upon this measure, the objective aspect of the 
subjective disposition not excessively to consult personal interest, 
whether or not 'men will leave it to good luck to decide what is 
to be jettisoned and what retained, what is to stand and what to 
fall' 59. Without such an objective criterion, which Hegel 
manifestly believed serves conservative as well as, or not other 
than, reformist purposes, change is left to chance. The 'collapse 
of the old building' 
60, 
rather than its careful restoration, is 
awaited, quite passively. It is worth quoting in full the passage 
in which Hegel clinches this argument in terms which, it should 
not surprise the attentive reader of the foregoing account of the 
concepts of mythology and justice to learn, are borrowed directly 
from Plato's Republic 
61: 
'If a change is to happen, then something must be changed. 
So obvious a truth needs to be stated, because fear, which suffers, 
is distinguished from courage, which wills, by the fact that men 
driven by fear do feel and grant the necessity of a change, but, 
when a start is to be made, exhibit the weakness of wanting to 
retain everything they have, just as a spendthrift who is under 
the necessity of limiting his expenditure finds indispensable 
every article of his previous needs which he has been told to 
curtail, and so refuses to give up anything, until at last he is 
deprived of indispensable and dispensable alike. An example of 
such weakness a nation, or at least the Germans, may not afford. 
In the cool conviction that a change, is necessary they should not 
now be afraid to examine everything in detail. What they find 
to be unjust, the victim of injustice must demand shall be removed 
and its unjust possessor must freely and willingly sacrifice' 
62. 
120. 
Reflexive change, we may say by way of summary, is possible only 
for men of temperance and moderation, who are not afflicted by 
the viciousness which cannot give up 'unhealthy habits' 
63. 
Hegel required of his people a Sinnesaenderung that would restore 
the fabric of the state. Justice, he argued, begins at home: 
'let every individual, every class, start of its own accord to 
weigh its position and its rights, before beginning to make demands 
on others and before trying to find the cause of the ill outside 
itself, and if it finds itself possessed of inequitable rights, 
let it strive to redress the balance in favour of others' 
64 
Such a path, through which his people might change themselves, 
is to be preferred to revolution without the heart of man. From 
Rudolf Häym's publication of what remained of the WBS 
65 
we learn 
that Hegel was hostile to radical experimentation with the ethical 
life of a people. 'So long', he maintained, 'as one has not in 
his power reform and the reversal of attempted reforms found to 
be harmful, one would do well to content himself to remain the 
same in the midst of all such changes the consequences of which 
can be surveyed and reckoned, and simply to stop up the sources 
of abuse' 
66. To remain self-same, to avoid changes whose con- 
sequences are incalculable the better to effect changes which 
conserve' custom and law from abuse: This is the objective which 
Hegel set his people. 
The abuse which Hegel had above all in mind consisted in the 
fact that, especially since the suspension of the territorial Diet, 
though not of its Select Committee, which perpetuated itself by 
cooption, the influence of the court bureaucracy had been augmented. 
For the Select Committee had renounced the right of the represent- 
atives of the estates (Landschaft) to participate in government 
(Herrschaft). This right of co-government, as Roland Mousnier 
has called it 
67, the means whereby, according to F. L. Carsten, 
". 121. 
through their 'active participation in the work of the state 
the members of the Select Committee proved that the machinery of 
the Estates could be adapted to the needs of a more modern state, 
that the machinery worked efficiently and cheaply, that the 
creation of a large bureaucracy was not the only possible way of 
advance towards the modern state, 
68, 
Hegel believed had been 
virtually surrendered to the ducal bureaucracy. The governmental 
(herrschaftlich) function of the Estates, which had so long been 
promoted by their committees 
69, had since 1770 in Wuerttemberg 
been sacrificed by the Select Committee in return for the maint- 
enance of hallowed corporate (genossenschaftlich) privileges. As 
we shall see in the fourth and fifth chapters, this was a problem 
which Hegel believed -permitted subversive behaviour of the 
territorial Estates towards the Empire. The contribution of 
representative institutions to political modernization, a matter 
which we shall have occasion to deal with in the final chapter 
70, 
had been arrested, as witness the servility of the Select Committee 
to the Duke in financial matters 
71. Hegel's view of the matter 
speaks for itself: 'The committee must have found it very con- 
venient to contain men who speak and write for it and, if need be, 
even think for it. A great part of the membership of the commit- 
tee ... let the difficulties of the country be attended to by 
providence or at the whim of the prince... Thus was the committee 
and with it the country led about by the nose by the officials - 
The committee itself was never arrogant. Its jurisconsults and 
advocates were. . 
It was just lazy'and thoughtlessly gave its name 
to all their machinations. It was they who led the committee into 
complacency towards the court ... It was they whom the court 
sought to win over, because it was certain to get what it wanted 
when it managed to draw the advocates and consults in the train 
of its interests. It was upon them that depended whether regard 
122. 
should be had for the burdens and wishes of particular estates. 
It was they who had control over incoming documents and concealed 
their existence from the committee until it pleased them to bring 
matters before it'7?. Hegel complained angrily that, since 1770, 
it had become usual 'to regard the consults as an essential part 
of the territorial constitution' 
U. The 'monstrous officialdom'74, 
made up of legal scribes coopted by the Select Committee, had 
attained complete independence of their principals, the Committee 
itself. For whereas, before the suspension of the Diet, the 
Committee could, with the authority of the Diet, dismiss its 
consults 'without demur', it had been possible since 1770 for the 
Duke to intercede on behalf of his fifth columnists 
75. Yet the 
status of the consults was small beer by comparison with the power 
of the advocates over the disposal of the Treasury. Not only had 
they the power that consists in control over what information con- 
cerning the mysterious 'operations of the secret chest' 
76 
was 
brought before the representatives of the people, but also, Hegel 
suggested obliquely, they had the means to buy off opposition. 
For it is implicit in Hegel's statement that from the consults, 
who had nothing to do with the Treasury, 'the members of the com- 
mittee had nothing to hope for the satisfaction of their self- 
interest, 
77, that he believed that from the advocates a great 
deal of graft was to be expected. 
The remedy which Hegel proposed for this situation was, 
according to Haym's account, a thorough reform of the 'inherently 
defective representative system'. It is not certain how trust- 
worthy is Haym's account at this point 
78. He probably exaggerated 
the severity of Heöe1's criticism of the system. It may be that 
a 'nachmaerzlich' liberal of Haym's kind was so disappointed that 
the subject of his lectures 'failed' to come to a conclusion whole- 
heartedly in favour of the hind of system of representation sought 
123. 
by the revolutionaries of 1848, that he might have imputed to 
Hegel premisses from which he did not start. Haym's wistful 
judgement of the V. BS, that it is 'so exciting in its premisses and 
so unsatisfactory in its inconclusiveness' 
79, 
must be set aside, 
though its adherents have been legion, if Hegel's attitude to the 
old system of representation in W"Juerttemberg is to be properly 
understood. 
If we look to the title which Hegel himself originally proposed 
for the WBS, rather than to the quite uninformative alternative 
title proposed by some anonymous associate (On the recent domestic 
affairs of Wuerttemberg, especially on the inadequacy of the muni- 
cipal constitution), we shall find a clue to the limits both of 
Hegel's critique of the old system and of his proposed reforms. 
If we appreciate the limits of the former for what they are, we 
shall not fall into the error, of exaggerating those of the latter 
and of deducing from their alleged failure 'to cross the threshold 
from theory to practice' 
80 (which, being translated, means to 
satisfy the requirements of a critical outlook upon the old system 
of representation quite different from Hegels) a general 
despair on his part of the viability of representative government. 
Hegel was certainly not 'vormaerzlich'. But it is quite clear 
from the VIBS that his reformist outlook was conservative rather 
than liberal. This can be inferred from its original title: 
'That the magistrates ought to be elected by the people' or rather, 
according to an amendment made by Hegel himself, 'by the citizens' 
81. 
By this proposition, Hegel certainly did not mean that the 
inhabitants of the towns of ! 'luerrtemberg, let alone the whole people, 
should directly elect their representatives. As we shall see 
below 82 with reference to the question of the composition of the 
Imperial Diet, Hegel's views on electoral rights do not admit of 
any such interpretation, though in the VSN he never actually 
124. 
stated explicitly and in full what system of indirect election he 
would prefer. His meaning was simply that the members of the 
urban magistracy and rural mayoralty should acquire their dignity, 
which carried with it the right to be elected (passive Wahlrecht) 
83 
in turn as members of the territorial Diet, not, as of old, by 
cooption but by popular election. There is nothing in what 
remains of the WBS to suggest that Hegel believed that the right 
to elect magistrates should entail for its possessor a further 
right to elect (aktive Wahlrecht) 
84 
representatives of the cities 
and districts. On the contrary, his view was, as we have seen, 
that rights of any kind should be adjusted to functionally or homo- 
technically distinct social and political stations. Hence, we 
may suppose that it was his general view that no citizen might be 
a direct elector of his representatives as well as of his 
magistrates and that, rather his representatives should be elected 
by his magistrates, or some other intermediary, from their member- 
ship. Each should temperately keep his place in the electoral 
system. In a country which for centuries had had an hereditary 
monarchy, Hegel doubted, Haym reports, whether it would be advis- 
able 'to give the choice of its representatives to an unenlightened 
heap accustomed to blind obedience and dependent upon the impres- 
sions of the moment' 
85 Precisely the objection which Hegel was 
to raise against direct election in his Philosophy of Right 
869 
that it fails to overcome the disintegrated way of life of civil 
society, is expressed here in his doubt of the capacity of a mere 
heap of men to elect their representatives for reasons other than 
fear or present interest. As we shall shortly see with reference 
to the WSS, it is upon the impression of the' law on the hearts of 
the unenlightened that depends their escape from the impressions 
of the moment and their convergence in common cause with the 
enlightened. That political community depends upon the. sovereignty 
125. 
of the law is a point made unambiguously in the WBS' in tandem 
with the rather faltering views on electoral rights, from whose 
uncertainty Haym and others have inferred that, in 1798, Hegel 
was on the point of admitting, somehow in spite of himself 
87, 
the ill-adaptation of the Pechtsstaat and the historical fitness 
of the Machtstaat for survival in the modern world. On the 
contrary, Hegel was quite emphatic that 'so long as the people 
does not know its law, so long is no community available'. He 
went on 'so long as the power of officialdom is not limited, so 
long will popular election serve only to bring about the utter 
destruction of our constitution. The main thing would be to 
place the right of election in the hands of a body of enlightened 
and upright men independent of the court. But I cannot see from 
what mode of election one could expect such an assembly, even if 
one were ever so carefully to determine active and passive elect- 
oral rights' 
88. We must be content to deduce from the main 
objective set by Hegel, namely, the restoration of the truly 
essential parts of the territorial constitution, of the people's 
knowledge of its law, and therewith of its existence as a people 
rather than a mere multitude or heap, and from his fear that 
popular election would reinforce the unconstitutional influence 
of the ducal fifth column, what mode of election Hegel regarded 
as one from which might be expected the opposite of an assembly 
independent of the court. 
Such a mode of election was that which the court had been 
attempting to promote, in the 18th century especially, namely, 
one in. which control of the votes of those with the active right. 
of election of representatives in the territorial diet would be 
extended from the active electorate itself, the magistracy, to 
the whole people. Hegel's view, so far as it can be reconst- 
ructed with certainty, appears to have been hostile to the ducal 
126. 
practice, begun in the 1720's, of encouraging villagers, more 
susceptible to influence than town-dwellers, to presume their 
right to instruct the magistrates, or, after a decree of 1737 
which transferred the active right to district assemblies 
(Amtsversaemmlungen), to instruct them in the matter of their elec- 
tion of representatives 
89. It looks from Hegels original title 
as if, in keeping with his lifelong denial of the political capacity 
of the peasantry 
9o, he wanted the advantage of their docility to 
the Duke to be kept out of political account. Only the citizens, 
in his view, should elect the magistrates from whom representatives 
were to be chosen by district assemblies of enlightened and upright 
men, likewise elected by the citizens. 
Despite the complexity of the problem of electoral rights, 
it is clear that Hegel sought a durable solution to the political 
stresses of the late 18th century in some system that would allow 
the relatively unenlightened only a primary vote. Having been 
primarily elected by the same constituency, magistrates 
and 
district assemblymen would then exercise their rights. The 
former would have the passive right, to be elected as represent- 
atives, while the latter would have the active right, to elect 
them. Such a system would perform a careful act of mediation 
between the interests of the unenlightened and the disinterested- 
ness of their representatives. This act Hegel was to treat 
philosophically in the WSS, as he had lyrically in the ASP. 
3. The Widerspruchsschrift: the politics of neighbourhood 
From the treatment in the foregoing chapters of Hegel's 
theory of the education of humanity by way of the genius-like 
Socrates - whose function is 
to introduce into the present an 
ideal which, while literally absent from the texture of the 
127. 
ingrained customs and traditions of a people, bears sufficient 
relation to them, in virtue of the participation of its spiritual 
vehicle in their civic culture, to effect in them some change for 
the better, it should be clear that Hegel regarded dispositional 
change in society in terms neither of purely spontaneous nor purely 
extraneous agency. In the DS, Hegel was to object to the general 
concept of change implicit in Fichte's theory of practical 
activity that it involves an antithesis, irreducible throughout 
all eternity, between those driven towards the pure freedom of 
'activity for the sake of activity' and those who are subject to 
a 'system of limitations' because they are driven to activity for 
the sake of enjoyment. What Hegel called a 'limited present and 
an infinity extraneous to it' 
91 
must, in Fichte's view, always 
persist. The solution to it cannot be one which changes the dis- 
positions of men subject to the sensible drive of nature (Naturtrieb) 
towards pleasure, but only one whereby a 'community of rational 
beings' dominates a community of 'finite beings' . condemned to 
an impoverished condition of present-minded neediness (of which 
Hegel had treated extensively in the GCR, a condition of unsatis- 
fied 'life' and 'oppressed forces' opposite to that which had been 
92 
demanded in the ASP), a 'state of indigence and necessity' . 
Hegel would have nothing to do with-this contempt of the capacity 
of ordinary men - the bourgeois or burgher of indeterminate 
economic class - to subtend their subjectivity beyond the present. 
Rather could'the elevation of the hearts of men, their Sinnesaen- 
derung, be achieved through an exchange between the majority, 
passionate and unenlightened, and the disinterested and enlightened 
minority. This categorization, which we encountereddnrthe ASP, 
Hegel now attempted to inform with more direct bearing on the 
analysis of German society and politics. 
The central problem of his political thought persisted in 
"128. 
the form defined in Chapter One as the question how it is possible 
to accommodate and integrate the interest - personally and corpor- 
ately determined - of the individual with that of the community. 
The grounds for Hegel's dissatisfaction with Fichte's and Schelling's 
solution to the Rousseauan problem, how each 'while uniting with 
all, still obeys himself and remains as free as before have already 
been indicated: that it consisted in the so radical redefinition 
of the self that the problem must arise whether that self and its 
freedom is felt by their original to be pertinent. With the 
German version of Rousseau's liquidation of the influence of 
personal and corporate interests upon the determination of the 
General Will Hegel could have no sympathy since it did not meet 
the conditions of a definition of sensible freedom: that the 
individual needs to see in the absent idea of community a possible 
locus for the satisfaction of his present interests. If these 
are demolished to make way for the Absolute, a 'kind of avarice' 
for a present to come, hostile to what is here and now intellig- 
ible or absent, must supervene. The individual must, if he is 
to identify himself with the acts of the" community, witness a 
mediation or exchange between its autonomy and his own, such that 
. 
he may continue to regard as worthy of respect the inclinations 
of the sensuous personality which bear the weight of his identity. 
He must have a sense of the value of his present existence as well 
as an intuition of the absent or intelligible purpose of the com- 
munity. He must be conscious, while the community demands of 
him a certain self-abnegation of his pathologically or heterono- 
mously constituted identity or character, that its autonomy is 
yet careful of his interests. On this problem, we shall see 
later, turns the controversy in the modern debate on the entitle- 
vent to representation of persons as such or transcendent entities. 
Before we treat of the question what contribution Hegel's theory 
129. 
of representation has made, on the relative titles of the 'present' 
and the 'absent' to be represented, the terms on which he can be 
said to formulate his contribution had better be defined. This 
purpose is best served by analysis of the WSS, in which Hegel 
developed a theory of political exchange or communication where- 
in it is stressed that the community which demands of the individual 
the negation of his particularity, while it constitutes an absent 
idea that is an 'object of freedom' and is therefore beyond the 
present, is yet equally congenial to it. It must be sensible as 
well as intelligible, this side of the present as well as yon side. 
Men are said, in this fragment, unconsciously to seek the 
'Unknown' 93. By 'unconsciously' Hegel does not mean that they 
are unaware that they seek 'something' 
94, but that their conscious- 
ness, the intention of their theoretical subjectivity towards an 
object, is not called into play to the extent that their object 
takes on a determinate shape as a project evocative for its 
performance of a decisive will 
94. They have a sentiment of 
deficiency 95 but no knowledge of what will make it good. They 
therefore feel an 'ever-increasing contradiction between the 
Unknown ... and the life which is presented and permitted to them, 
which they make their own' 
96. Yet, though they accommodate 
themselves to this given life, they need 'to obtain a conscious- 
ness over what holds them captive, and over the Unknown which they 
demand' 97. Why this is so, Hegel does not say. At any rate, 
their need does not, of its own passionate resources, procure its 
own satisfaction: 'the passion of man is without reflection on 
his fate, without will, because he respects the negative (i. e. 
the given life), regards the limits only, in the form of their 
right and powerful existences, as indomitable, his determinations 
(i. e. the conditions of his given life) and their contradictions 
(i. e. his passionate demands against them) as absolute (i. e. 
130. 
irreconcilable), and sacrifices himself and others to them, even 
98 
though they violate his inpulses' The picture thus drawn 
closely resembles Hegel's description in his letter to Schelling 
of April 1795 of the 'indolence of the sedate people, eternally 
accepting. everything as it is' 
99. At that time the solution was 
said to be the 'spread of ideas as to what should be' 
100 in 
opposition to the dogma of the incapacity of the human race for 
freedom. In 1796, Hegel had called for enlightened and unenlight- 
ened men to join hands and do away with the repression of their 
different 'powers' 101, In 1798, he made much the same 
102 
demand which eventually, in 1800, took the form of an assertion of 
the need for convergence of the unconscious quest of men with 
the yearning after life of those who have elaborated nature into 
the idea in themselves' 
103. The 'need' or deficiency of the 
former 'meets with the need of the latter to enter over into life 
from their idea' 
104. 
It will be recalled that, in the ASP, Hegel had asserted that 
only 'an object of freedom' can be called an idea and that the 
first such object is at the same time the subject of freedom, 
'the representation of my self as an absolutely free entity'. 
Now, in 1800, the import of his conception of the role of the 
enlightened became explicit: the feeling for nature, in rvhibh 
men in general participate at the level of feeling or mere impulse, 
but without the reflective resources to convert her into an object 
of freedom upon which their subjectivity could intend itself as a 
definite project upon which to 'focus their will' 
105, is elaborated 
by the enlightened into an idea on the basis of which conscious- 
ness can construct an 'entire world' 
106 
alternative to the 'given 
life' 107, a creation e nihilo 
108 
analogous to an 'aesthetic 
act' 
109. The'need' of the enlightened differs from the passionate 
need of men in general in that it possesses the cognitive structure 
131. 
which is the prerequisite of action: that there be, on the one 
hand, a representation of the self as an absolutely free entity 
1109 
i. e. subjectivity, and, on the other, an object or project for its 
performance. Yet, Hegel argued, 'to enter over into life from 
their ideal 111 is a need that cannot be satisfied except it 
converge vrith the inarticulate need of men in general, to whom life, 
but not consciousness, or conscious life, is given. 
Freedom must remain in the form of mere subjectivity, and to 
the extent that it is not pursued 'into life' it is not worthy to 
be called an idea, so long as it does not get beyond the point of 
the representation of the self as absolutely free, the standpoint 
of the Absolute Ego. Hegel insisted that the enlightened 'cannot 
live alone, and the man is always alone who only represents his 
nature to himself, even if he has made a display of it to his 
associates and enjoys himself in it; he must also find that which 
112 is displayed as something living' To give life to the idea 
of nature, that is the imperative of the enlightened, for unless 
he do this he is condemned to loneliness. He needs neighbours. 
Such loneliness was imputed to God by Schiller as the motive 
of His condescension: 
'Friendless was the great Lord of the world, 
Want felt he --wherefore made He Spirits, 
Bless'd mirrors of His blessedness' 
113; 
and to the poet by H51derlin. Hblderlin presented the fate of 
Hyperion, the hero of the novel of the same name to whose theme 
Rosenzweig compared, at great length, that of the WBS 114, as being, 
after his failure to liberate the German people, one of lonely 
communion with nature 
115. Hegel, despite his familiarity with 
such feelings 116, determined that loneliness should be overcome 
by the communication of the enlightened with his people by way of 
a 'rational mythology' through which they miCht be educated to 
freedom. 
132. 
To the enlightened, 'yearning after life', life appears not 
as something present and permitted to him from without, not as a 
behavioural imposition, a dead habit, which he must then make his 
own, but as that which is his own in virtue of his inner elabora- 
tion of it, which yet remains utterly absent, for its immanence 
is through and through intellectual and is not felt. The philos- 
opher or intellectual is, so far, not sensible: he thinks, but 
cannot give life to his idea nor dwell in it. He-merely knows 
that his idea contradicts his present existence, and cannot male 
118 
this absent or intelligible 'object of freedom' live in the present " 
The people is not rational: it feels that its present life is 
contradicted by its equally present impulses, but cannot articulate 
its sensible want into an absent idea the making present of which 
could constitute a project of consciousness. Because it only 
feels its nature, because it apprehends it not otherwise than in 
the present, a consciously sought objective, which to be so sought 
must take the form of an absent idea, would, if achieved, appear 
119 
to it as a very mortification of its nature'''- It would have, of 
course, to be the object of another than itself. The people has, 
so far, an existential commitment to the present. It is self- 
interested: yet it has no self, for to have a self implies inten- 
tion towards the absent, ä structural capacity for action, whereas 
the people is passionate. It lacks power to discriminate between 
its nature as impulse and its life as limit to that impulse. 
Change in its way of life must appear to it, while unconsciously 
it wants such change, as an affront to its sentimental nature. 
Yet it is from that nature that, however incoherently, there stems 
an impulse for change. 
The enlightened, however, overcome the sentimental confusion 
of nature with the present life, of impulse with limit, by render- 
ing nature into an idea of life which, absent by virtue of its 
133. 
intelligible design, furnishes subjectivity with a capacity for 
projection fronward the 'existing life' in which it can Ground its 
opposition to that present limit. The enlightened have, so far, 
a commitment to the absent. But so long as their interest is 
centred upon the maintenance of their subjectivity in projection 
towards the absent, while they do not yet act to make the absent 
not merely the locus of their self-projection beyond present limits 
but itself a project for living realisation in the present, so long 
as they do not make live the idea of life, they are condemned to 
loneliness. Their loneliness consists in that their escape from 
vulgar sensibility amounts to a blessed apathy, a too radical 
divorce of the conception of nature as life from affective connec- 
tion with nature sensibly apprehended. The supposition may be 
ventured that Hegel was thinking here not only of the consequences 
of Schelling's demand of 1795 for the 'demolition of our 
personality' but also those of the radical destruction of the 
pathological self, if necessary by force, required by Rousseau. 
Hegel described two alternative positions for 'the man whom 
the age has driven into an inner world' 
117. This social type 
has been taken to signify those without, political power in the 
r 
German Empire, or those simply excluded from it. This is not 
specific enough to illuminate what part is to be played by such 
a class of people in social communication and dispositional 
change. It looks, in fact, as if Hegel wanted to maintain that 
everyone inhabits this 'inner world' who is in any sense restricted 
to 'private life', a concept due for further elaboration below 118. 
The privation of the inner world will, for the time being, be 
taken to mean, on the one hand, the impotence, elsewhere identified 
with positivity 
119, of the unselfconscious quest after the Un- 
known, the sentimental passivity of the people; on the other, the 
impotence of the yearning after life of those conscious of nothing 
134,. 
but self, the intellectual contemplativity of the Absolute Ego. 
This provisional conception corresponds to the character of the 
alternatives through which Hegel maintained the social dichotomy 
of the sensible people and the. philosophical few. A man's position 
can be, 'if he wants to maintain himself there (in his inner world), 
a perpetual death' 
1200 It should be clear, pace Harris 
121, that 
perpetual death means not the routine of 'ordinary life' but the 
lonely apathy of the never present idea. Otherwise his position 
can be, if nature drives him into life, only a striving to over- 
come the negative in the existing world, in order to find and 
122 enjoy himself in it, in order to subsist' . . Isere is clearly 
stated, in the second position, the view of the characteristic 
agitation of the '-bourgeois' which recurs throughout the VSN 123: 
the bourgeois character, precluded by its lack of self-conscious- 
ness from being active in the pursuit of non-sensible 'objectives 
of freedom', strives withal against the existing world in which 
it apprehends a negation of the passional impulses by which it is 
driven. Yet the passive terns - Hegel's use of the appropriate 
voice is deliberate - of this strife to subsist ensure the further 
compression of the bourgeois into a world turned in upon itself 
and inimical to changes in the disposition of the hearts of men 
whereby they might transcend the self-interested, sensible morality 
of private life. His passionate strife against the existing 
world ends in his inward appropriation of its values, serves only 
to enforce the respect of the bourgeois for the limits which it 
imposes on him. These limits become his inner world. Lacking 
the capacity to represent 'himself to himself' 
124 
as free, his 
subjectivity kept, in slumber by his passion, projection towards 
the absent can only appear to him as an existential threat to his 
character. 
Whereas the inner world of the bourgeois binds him to the 
135. 
mere present in spite of his native impulses, that of the intell- 
ectual binds him to the purely absent for the sake of the mainten- 
ance of his precious subjectivity. It is important to stress 
that, despite his identification of potential for action with the 
capacity to distinguish self and world, that is, with consciousness, 
Hegel held the enlightened to be no less passive than the bourgeois. 
He differentiated their passivity not according to its degree but 
according to its kind. Whereas the bourgeois respects the limit- 
ations of the present way of life, the intellectual, on account of 
his scorn for these limitations, disdains to enter into relations 
with the life which they describe and so fails to realise his 
potential to make his idea of life live in the present. The 
passion of the intellectual 'is bound up with consciousness of 
limitation, on account of which he scorns life; as far as he can, 
125 
he wills his passion! " 
It should be clear from the foregoing that Hegel considered 
nature to be the source of the apprehension of contradiction of 
the present, whether it is felt presently or conceived absently, 
by nature itself. This differentiation 
in the mode of represent- 
ation of nature is central to a correct interpretation of what 
Hegel meant by contradiction. Nature was not supposed by Hegel 
to manifest itself in the same mode of apprehension of contradic- 
tion throughout society. Neither nature nor contradiction is to be 
understood as an autonomous force the intuition of which is tanta- 
mount to its existence as a power to change society. ''! e shall 
see in the sixth chapter that the same is true of what he called 
'necessity' 
126. Either is susceptible ofinarticulate as well 
as of self-conscious expression, and of complicity with the status 
quo as much as of hostility to it. Nature is intellectually 
apprehended by the few as totally absent, 
its contradiction of the 
present is absolute. But, as he was to make clear in the DS, such 
136. .. 
absolute contradiction is, of itself, ineffective. For a goal, 
to be sought, must in some sense be'already present ... how else 
could it be sought? '127. It is sensibly apprehended by the many 
as partly present, but its contradiction of the present is there- 
fore equivocal. The intellectual is disposed to endure the lone- 
liness, the perpetual death of the apathetic idea because he can- 
not endure the limitations of the agitated world of the bourgeois 
cave. The bourgeois is inclined to tolerate the confinement of 
his consciousness to the cinematic present because he has made 
its reality his own and he cannot accustom his pathological self 
to direct sunlight. 
Hegel seems - it cannot be decided with certainty on the 
evidence of this fragment - to regard his classification of 
society as being grounded in the 'absolute necessity of the 
ethical', in accordance with which, he was to argue in the NRS 
128 (1802-03), 'two classes are formed' 0 Contradiction must 
first be apprehended by the intellectual as absolute and by the 
bourgeois as partial if dispositional change is to be accomplished. 
For, failing a conviction on the part of the few that nature is 
absent, there can be no intellectual resource for the persuasion 
of the many that their inner world, which they feel at the same 
time to be both violent and indulgent towards their impulses, is 
not merely unsatisfactory but existentially dispensable. Yet 
equally, failing a sentiment on the part of the many that their 
present existence is not utterly bereft of nature, it. must be 
impossible to persuade them of the need for change in accordance 
with the absent idea of nature, since change would then appear to 
them as the mortification of their whole, apparently worthless 
being. 
The possibility of communication between the few and the 
many rests upon the common origin in nature of their apprehension 
137. 
of contradiction. But the possibility that such communication 
be effective of Sinnasaenderung, the elevation of the hearts of 
men above the self-interest with which, Hegel had argued in 1795, 
the spirit of despotic constitutions has made a pact 
129, 
rests 
on the convergence, from their opposite standpoints, of different 
modes of apprehension of contradiction. If the intellectual has 
no information to impart to the bourgeois other than the prescrip- 
tion that he should strive in eternity for an asymptotic approxi- 
mation to the ideal of 'demolition of personality' 130, and if 
the bourgeois is too indolent 131 to articulate the feeling of 
dissatisfaction with the limits of the present into a conscious 
distinction of his pathological personality from the limits of 
the world by which he is conditioned and against which he has been 
merely impulsively agitated, social change is not to be expected. 
Social change depends on the sympathy of the intellectual with the 
personality of the bourgeois, and on the docability of the person- 
ality of the bourgeois in the idea of subjectivity. Failing the 
possibility of communication, change that is neither impulsive 
nor coercive, neither unenduring nor unendurable is utterly 
inconceivable: for, since change must be from something present 
it cannot be effected, except momentarily, only by those for whom 
presence is the exclusive mode in which contradiction is appre- 
hended and without those for whom it is not; nor, since equally 
change must be of something present, can it be effected, except 
by force, only by those for whom absence is the exclusive mode 
in which contradiction is apprehended and without those for whom 
it is not. Change, then, cannot conceivably issue spontaneously 
from the unreflective passion of the people, nor extraneously 
from the self-inflicted,, voluntary passion of the intellectual, 
of whom it will be remembered that he compounds and confirms the 
limitations of the present by disdaining to mix his subjectivity 
X38. 
with it, no less than does the bourgeois by confusing his personality 
with it. Enduring and endurc 78 change can be achieved only by over- 
coming what, in the DS, Hegel was to call the 'antithesis between 
a limited present and an infinity extraneous to it' 
132. 
Having thus characterised the relation of the intellectual and 
the sensible man to their, respective 'fates', Hegel defined these 
fates as what is 'positive from the point of view of Will', i. e. 
to be scorned, and what is to be accepted though it is 'negative 
from the point of view of Nature' 
133, 
and went on to consider how 
they might be overcome. This, he argued, is not to be brought 
about either spontaneously 'through the violence which a man does 
to his own fate' 
134, 
or extraneously, 'through the violence which 
it experiences from without' 
135. For, in both cases, 'Fate 
remains what it is: determinacy, limit, is not parted from life 
by force t 136. In the first case, we seem to encounter the 
bourgeois, or the people, as the doer of violence; in the second, 
the agent of violence seems to be the intellectual, while the 
patient is, proximately, the 'fate' of the bourgeois and, immed- 
iately, the bourgeois identified with it. In the second case, 
then, it can readily be understood what Hegel meant by the term 
'alien force' 
137which 
serves to qualify 'violence': it is alien 
to the fate of the bourgeois, and so to the bourgeois himself. 
This is proved by its failure to part that fate from the life of 
the bourgeois, to persuade him, say, entirely to repudiate his 
natural drive towards enjoyment of merely sensible. pleasures 
138. 
What though, is the sense of regarding as 'alien force' the 
spontaneous violation by the bourgeois of his own fate? Hegel's 
meaning seems to be that it is alien to the bourgeois, not other- 
wise than is the violence of the intellectual, because, though he 
may appear to be its agent, the implication of his personality in 
the fate to which violence is done renders him rather its patient. 
139. 
Its like failure to part the bourgeois from his fate, which would 
be to render him a free agent, disproves any hypothesis in favour 
of the interpretation of the violence of the bourgeois as the act 
of a subject and as such not alien to him but his own free deed. 
Hegel's definition of alien force is that it is 'particular 
versus particular' 
139. Violence 'from without' is ineligible 
to be counted as action effective of change from but also of the 
present. Subjectivity does not alone qualify a deed an action. 
An idea of what ought to be cannot be accomplished without atten- 
tion to what is: it involves knowledge of permissive and pro- 
hibitive conditions. Extraneous violence betokens, for Hegel, 
an ignorance of such conditions. Such ignorance disqualifies a 
deed as an action, since ignorance of conditions entails ignorance 
of consequences and therefore of knowledge whether that deed is 
satisfactory of what is subjectively intended. Such deeds are 
particular in that they neglect, indeed disdain, the mediation of 
what ought to be with what is. No more or less is the ostensible 
action of spontaneous force mere passion, for it is deficient in 
the mediation of what is with what ought to be, in knowledge of 
its intention. Not directed upon an absent idea, it is merely 
an impulsive against a repulsive present. Thus is that which 
seeks by violence to alleviate suffering, violence such as 'the 
robbery of property, a new passion' 
140. Further, the lack of 
mediation with the absent is reinforced by violence since it 
heightens the bourgeois' sense of the existential threat to his 
personality by which he is contronted when ho attacks the fate to 
which-he is bound: 'the animation of one bound is to him a fear- 
ful moment, in which he loses himself, recovering his consciousness 
only in the forgotten but not mortified determinacy' 
141. 
The doer of spontaneous deeds of violence, no less than the 
patient of extraneous attack upon his way of life, clings, after 
140. 
the flush of enthusiasm has passed, all the more obdurately to 
the limits upon which depends his sense of security, to which he 
is so existentially committed that revolution against them is soon 
followed, as we have already seen Hegel argue in the cases of 
spasmodic revolts of the fugitive children of Israel and of 
Christ's direct attacks upon their religious practices, by 
regression to a condition of servitude 
142. This being Hegel's 
long standing view of revolutionary as opposed to regular change, 
there is no justification for the opinion of Harris that Hegel 
held of violence that it enhances 'consciousness' of the 'fate' 
or set of limitations present to the bourgeois. Since Hegel did 
not hold this view, but the opposite, namely that violence brings 
only 'forgetfulness' of the confused emotions formerly felt by the 
bourgeois, there is no need to suppose that, in the passage just 
quoted, Hegel was 'forecasting his own failure' in the attempt, 
wrongly imputed to him, to 'enthuse the bondsman' 
X43. 
None of this should be taken, however, to suggest despair on 
Hegel's part of the possibility of social and political change. 
His point is that change is possible only in terms of a dialogue 
between the sensible present and the intelligible absent, a dialogue 
summarized in the tense concept of the 'sentiment of the contra- 
diction' 144. This concept involves the reciprocity of the 
present feeling of nature as an impulse towards the Unknown and 
the absent representation of nature as an idea fromwards the 
existent: he sentiment of contradiction between Nature and 
existent life is the need that it be transcended; and this happens 
when the existing life has lost all its power and dignity, when it 
has become something purely negative' 
145. 
By the becoming 'purely negative' of the existing life, Hegel 
meant to argue, with regard to the bourgeois from whose point of 
view the existing life is negative,. that change may issue from a 
141. 
crisis of legitimacy. This crisis consisted in the fact that, 
from being not 'purely negative', that is, from being a world whose 
negative aspects could be abided so long as that world, at the 
same time as it limited him, provided the medium for the subsist- 
ence of the bourgeois, the existing life had ceased to serve even 
that minimal purpose. The 'inner world' of the bourgeois, essent- 
ially one, Hegel will be shown to argue 
146, 
of utilitarian calcul- 
ation, is deprived of outer sustenance. The present now poses 
no less an existential threat to him than the absent. It no longer 
affords him security. But disintegration of the present and 
general disorder should not be interpreted as tantamount to a 
liberation in him of his slumbering subjectivity. Hegel regards 
the laying of hands on property consequent upon this crisis not 
as a solution to it but as a 'sign' of it 
147* 
. With regard 
to the intellectual, it is not made clear why the 
loss to the existing life of all its 'power and dignity' should 
disclose to him that his voluntary passivity in the face of what, 
from his point of view, is positive, that his scorn of life, in 
other words, as irredeemable, is the attitude of 'bad conscience' 
148. 
That, at any rate, is Hegel's view: the inner world of the intell- 
ectual, too, loses its stability. 
The inner worlds of both classes became an 'arid life of the 
understanding' where bourgeois acquiescence and aristocratic con- 
tempt could no longer be felt to be legitimate attitudes to the 
present. Hegel proclaimed that 'All the signs of the time show 
that satisfaction is no longer to be found in the old life; the 
old life was one of restriction to an orderly mastery over one's 
property, a contemplation and enjoyment of one's completely sub- 
servient little world and finally, for the sake of reconciliation 
to this limitation, a self-denial and ascension in thought to 
heaven, 149. Their extreme neediness had impelled the bourgeoisie 
142 . 
to extremes of passion, manifest in the robbery of property; and 
the intellectual's realisation of the corruption of his conscience, 
sustained by luxury and privilege, had overcome his scornful other- 
worldliness. The stress of this crisis of legitimacy had 
heightened men's power over reality. This is not visible in any 
'intentional activity' 
150 
on the part of either class, but simply 
in the collapse of the outer world that formerly constrained them 
to their respective commitments exclusively to the present and the 
absent. The passing of this constraint enables the convergence 
of their apprehension of its contradiction of nature. It is only 
after this passage that their latent capacities for action proper 
may emerge. In 1796, it will be recalled, it was to be only after 
'enlightened and unenlightened' would have 'clasped hands' that 
the 'equal development of all powers, of each as well as all? was 
to be expected: 'No power shall longer be suppressed' 151. 
Nourishment of this reciprocal striving after power, which 
striving is, however, not yet power itself, is dependent on 'the 
deed of the great character of single men, on the movement of 
whole peoples, on the representation by poets of nature and fate; 
through metaphysics the limits, and their necessity in the con- 
nexion of the whole, have themselves been limited' 
152. Here 
Hegel expressed the conviction, to be found in the letters of 1795 
and the ASP, that thanks were due to Kant for making room for 
faith in the possibility of moral action; to Schiller for prop- 
agating the belief in human dignity and the ideal of the aesthetic 
education of mankind; to the people of France for, 'not humbled 
in the dust', having themselves taken and appropriated their Rights 
and to the revolutionary armies for depriving the German Constitu- 
tion, or making apparent its privation, of all power and dignity; 
1 53 
and, perhaps, to Napoleon 
But though there are echoes here, which continued to resound 
143. 
in the VSN proper, of an emphasis on the power of great men to 
create out of nothing an entire world, the object of the WSS was 
to define the conditions under which, just as in the ASP, animated 
by a 'spirit sent from Heaven', mankind or the people itself, is 
conceivable as the very agent of its 'last and greatest work' 
154; 
how the articulation of a 'sentiment of contradiction' into an act 
of contradiction of the present by the people, an act of which it 
would not become the unwitting patient, so that it would be an act 
proper, might be possible. 
To this problem Hegel addressed himself with direct reference 
to the problem of the reform of the German Empire. Taking as his 
basic datum its crisis of legitimacy, of which the alienation of 
bourgeois sentiment and the realisation by the intellectual that 
his ideas cannot live in peaceful coexistence with the present 
were evidence, Hegel considered how the need for a better life, on 
which both classes agreed, could be satisfied. 
He denied, first, that from the viewpoint of nature 'in its 
actual life' 
155 there could stem an 'intentional activity' 
directed to the securing in power of the better life, but only a 
'single attack on or refutation of the worse life' 
156. Such 
'particularity against particularity' cannot be 'the object of 
intentional activity' 
157 because, though it is no longer con- 
strained by a commitment to the present, it yet lacks informa- 
tion by an absent idea. Become present as power, the new regime 
is the victim of lack of commitment to it, because it has not 
attempted to irrigate the 'arid life of the understanding' 
158 
with ideas of freedom, dignity, sacrifice of self-interest and 
so on. Taking for granted the mere particularity of the 'limited 
life', the bourgeois revolutionary concerns himself only with seiz- 
ing power in order to attack that of the old regime. To the 
extent that he does this without attending to the problem of his 
144. 
own legitimation, his power in turn is present only as particul- 
arity. His power is liable to be challenged on the same sensible 
grounds as those on which he had challenged that of the old regime: 
that there remains a disjunction between the calculative expecta- 
tions of the 'inner world' of the bourgeoisie and the power of the 
political system to ensure their satisfaction. The 'limited life 
as power can only be attacked with hostility by the better (life) 
when the latter too has come to power. Then it has itself to 
fear force' 159. 
To the thoughtless strategy of the bourgeois revolutionary 
Hegel proposed an alternative which takes seriously the problem 
of legitimation. This alternative is to assume that, though the 
old regime had become purely negative, it had formerly been accepted 
as legitimate, had once possessed power and dignity, inasmuch as 
it could once maintain the appearance of virtual congruity of its 
legal norms with the passions of the 'inner worlds' of its sub- 
jects. This congruity Hegel called its 'truth' or 'universality'160, 
and it is such congruity, different though the figures related 
might be, that he believed the new regime must likewise seek to 
accomplish. All that is required to manifest and maintain this 
'virtual' congruity, what Hegel elsewhere called the republican 
image, is the semblance of non-contradiction between the independ- 
ent activity of state and citizen. As we have seen Hegel argue 
in the WBS, it was abuse of the custom of representation, by means, 
for example of encouragement of the pretended right of the un- 
enlightened to instruct the enlightened and upright, that had made 
such an appearance impossible. In the German Empire as a whole, 
Hegel now argued, the 'prevailing universality, as the source of 
all right, had disappeared because it isolated itself, had been 
made a particular' 
161. By this he surely meant, as shall be 
145. 
shown 
162, that the law had been manipulated in the interest of 
the privileged: 'The universality is therefore available only as 
a thought, no longer as a reality. Concerning that which public 
opinion has decided upon, clearly or dimly, through loss of faith, 
there is little point in making a clearer consciousness more 
universal' 
163. Railing against the illegitimacy of the old 
regime can only serve to excite passions which may be turned 
against a new regime distracted, by its vituperation against the 
old, from establishing its legitimacy on higher ground. It may 
indeed happen unfortunately that the 'partial ideas' 
164 
which 
appeal to the sensible bourgeois, to which indeed Hegel accorded 
the status of being contained in the idea of the 'whole state', 
come to be made 'universal in thought' 
165, that is, to be conceded 
a due which is not proper to them. But 'in actuality' 
166 they 
cannot, even by the professedly bourgeois revolutionary, be 
accorded the universal significance to which he nevertheless 
encourages them to pretend. The opinion of their universal 
precedence cannot but come into 
they be restricted by the right 
new regime will eventually fall 
diction, to the feeling of the 
the old, a particular or merely 
validity against him: 'if such 
conflict with the necessity that 
of the state, in which case the 
prey to the sentiment of contra- 
bourgeois that it is, no less than 
present power without universal 
a Part-Unity appears as a parti- 
cular the contradiction between what it would be, and what it is, 
is very striking' 
167" A revolution due to rising sensible 
expectations is always liable to disappoint. 
When he was on the point of describing the alternative to 
the persistence of the contradiction between what the state is 
and what it ought to be, Hegel broke off. What would have 
followed from 'Or ... ' 
168 
can, however, be deduced from the 
strategy which he had proposed as the best means to the stable 
146. 
institution of the 'better life'. Rather than merely vituperate 
against the illegitimacy of the present and base revolution on 
nothing but affirmation of the bourgeois' passionate sense of 
injustice, Hegel proposed that 'the limited life can, through its 
own truth, which lies in it, be attacked and brought into contra- 
diction with this (its own truth)'. 
169 
. Not the passionate sense 
of being contradicted by the present life would then be animated, 
but the knowledge of the people, which may preserve them from the 
folly of pursuing their passions at the expense of law, that the 
state must contradict itself as soon as it deviates from law.. 
The 'truth' of the limited life, and of any determinate way 
of life, lies in the fact that 'it bases its dominion not on the 
force of particular against particular, but upon universality' 
170. 
But it is in virtue of this very claim to truth that it can be 
contradicted. Its very claim to be law abiding furnishes a 
criterion upon the basis of which it can be criticised and, if 
found wanting, changed. What makes no claim to truth, what is mere 
force, cannot be shown, in virtue of any limitations to which 
sentimental objection may be raised, and on the grounds of which 
conflict may be joined, to contradict itself or its alleged 
universality. For it alleges nothing of the kind and is not 
amenable to criticism on account of its limitations. But, Hegel 
supposed, no political regime subsists on the particularity of 
force alone. It is its very limitedness indeed, which compels 
it, for the sake of its capacity to persuade those upon whom it 
imposes limits that they have an interest in their maintenance, 
that it is not 'purely negative', to claim to be universally 
satisfactory. This truth, or rather the claim which it makes to 
be valid, to universality and right 'must be taken from it and 
given to that part of life which is demanded. This dignity of 
a universality, of a right, is what so intimidates the demand of 
14?. 
the passion of the impulses that they come into conflict with the 
existent, with that honour-clad life, as if they were going against 
conscience' 
171. 
This guilty sense of obligation, this existential timidity 
of the bourgeois, the consequence of the construction of his inner 
world out of the normative material supplied by the present, to 
which he feels such a debt that he is afraid of changing it, can 
be overcome only by 'cladding' 
172 him with the dignity conferred 
by detachment from his particularity. This is the dignity of a 
costume which is no mere habit but has the grace of something 
lively, vital and intelligent. Otherwise the political regime 
will always suffer from the tendency of the bourgeois to make upon 
it demands for the satisfaction above all of his acquisitive 
impulses and to remain ensconced in the fastness of his own 
personal domain, which alone will furnish him a basis, but no 
true criterion, for the judgement how satisfactory to him is the 
performance of the state. It is the timidity of the bourgeois, 
his ultimate unwillingness to sacrifice himself, that renders 
revolution unstable, not only because the bourgeois is inclined 
to retreat from its immediate consequences, but also because he 
must continue to be reluctant to sacrifice himself for the good 
of the whole. Hence, even of the cncien regime, Hegel was prepared 
to concede, even though it is a 'negation of nature, that it 
admits or posits, even if merely formally, the truth 'that Right 
must be' 
173, that the universal must prevail over the particular. 
That it does this only in thought, however, necessitates that it 
be replaced by a regime which does so in reality. To give the 
truth to 'that part of life which is demanded' cannot, if the 
truth so given is not to be betrayed, be construed, as it is by 
Lukacs and, to a lesser extent Harris, as the. project of an 
'ideological champion' of the bourgeoisie 
174. 
148. 
It was not Hegels intention to dignify the bourgeois by 
according him the status of the exclusive fons et origo of 
national sovereignty. It is true indeed that Hegel did not look 
to Sieyes, for lessons on how to effect a revolution. Harris has 
an inkling of this fact but his explanation, that it was due to 
a preference for sans-culottism 
175, 
goes entirely astray. 
Hegel was surely aware that Sieyes demand that the Third Estate 
become 'something' had been corrupted, to some extent by Sieyes 
himself 176, into an insistence that it should be the sole 
repository of an unlimited national sovereignty, that it should 
be 'everything' and be unconstrained by constitutional law 177. 
It is sorely tempting to suppose that Hegel attributed this 
corruption to a necessity, which renders it no corruption at all, 
inherent in Sieyes demand, made from the indeterminate and sensible 
'point of view of Nature'; that the demand to be 'something' is 
what Hegel had in mind when he wrote of the unconscious and to 
that extent passionate or unintentional quest for the Unknown, 
which issues in the mute insignificance of 'alien force' by which 
particularity is not overcome but intensified; and that, therefore, 
Sieyes is not to be distinguished from those for whom Hegel is 
erroneously supposed to have a political preference. 
Hegel, in order to solve the problem of the crisis of legit- 
imacy, made no concession to the idea of the constituent authority 
of popular sovereignty. Rather than legitimate the new regime 
by adjusting it to subserve the private interests of the bourgeois, 
Hegel's intention was, while due should be given to partial 
interests by containing them within the idea of the 'whole state', 
to adjust the public'disposition of the bourgeois to a spirit of 
ready exchange. In this was to consist his new dignity. This 
was not to go so far as to insist upon an identity of public and 
private life by the 'demolition of personality' on the need for 
149. 
which Rousseau and Schelling were in agreement. Insofar as 
Hegel's ideal of the communication between distinct social groups 
and their modes - present and absent - of apprehending the contra- 
diction of nature by the existing way of life, in order to mobilise 
the possibility of change for the better, resembles the ideal of 
discovering a General Will which is no' mere composite expression 
of the passionate commitments and interests of each, but a dial- 
ectical resolution of the essential parts which the sensible and 
the intelligible, the present and the absent, the spontaneous and 
the extraneous, have to play in change, the resemblance is with 
Montesquieuls vision of the volonte generale rather than Rousseau's. 
For the WSS is concerned, like Montesquieuts Esprit des Lois, 
to arrive at a non-coercive conception of the synthesis of passion- 
ate inclinations and rational will. Montesquieu's ideal consti- 
tution is designed to accommodate the naturally conditioned spirit 
of a people, discoverable in their personal interests, while yet 
to educate the citizen of the democratic regime in its 'principe', 
of virtue. Hegel was heavily under the influence of Montesquieu, 
though intent upon using his static categories in the service of 
a belief in the possibility of orderly change from the norms of 
the 'principe' of honour, whose corresponding constitution is 
feudal monarchy, to those of the 'principe' of the ancient repub- 
lican states, whose virtue both thinkers held to be recoverable, 
not indeed substantially but virtually, in the modern represent- 
ative-cum-monarchical state 
178. This is evident from the phrase 
which encapsulates Hegel's argument that the constitutional system 
of the ancien regime need only be adapted rather than overthrown. 
For according to the WSS, it is possible that the 'honour-clad 
life' 179 can be divested of the dignity of universality, the 
truth which its customs as well as its laws used to cooperate in 
maintaining, and that this same dignity, no longer compromised by 
150. 
a disparity between what the state would or pretends to be and 
what it is, can become the costume of the 'better life'. If we 
return our attention to 1795, to Hegel's correspondence with 
Schelling, we find echoed Montesquieu's emphasis on a spirit of 
self-sacrifice and love of fatherland 
180 We find too an 
identification of the 'principe' of despotism as the annihilation 
of self-respect 
181. In the fragment of 1799/1800 there emerges 
Hegel's view that luxury is among the signs of the crisis of 
legitimacy, a view which in Montesquieu took the form of the 
opinion that luxury is a factor in the destruction of a democratic 
state 
182. And again, in the correspondence of 1795, Hegel held in 
contempt the chimaerical conceit of the state which wants 'to 
descend into the holy deeps of morality and to regulate them' 
183, 
This, as we shall see from evidence available elsewhere in the 
VSN 184, signifies agreement with Montesquieu's view that 'we do 
nothing better than what we do freely and in accord with our own 
talents' 185. Finally, that the state is not to be designed to 
subserve the partial interests of the bourgeois but to be regarded 
as an end in itself whose ultimate purpose is the maintenance of 
its singular authority 
186 
and that, withal, this authority cannot 
be united without the identification with its purpose of the wills 
of each individual 
187, 
are convictions of Montesquieu maintained 
by Hegel at least implicitly in the WSS and expressly in other 
VSN. 
Hegel's debt to Montesquieu seems to consist primarily in 
the use he made of the idea of 'raison primitive' 
188 
and its 
passional and rational manifestations. Montesquieu's demand 
was for a system of legislative education which would assimilate 
the passional and the rational to a volonte generale the object 
of which was : essentially conservative of the original 'rapports' 
18 
of any given society 
9 Hegel converted'raison primitive', an 
151. 
essentially static norm, into that of nature unconsciously and 
self-consciously or, as has been the style in this study, presently 
or absently apprehended as a source of contradiction. Hegel's 
demand was for a system of communication analogous, in respect of its 
service to the end that citizens should readily exchange the total 
satisfaction of their present interests for the joy of ethical life, 
to Montesquieu's system of education but different in this respect: 
that the general will which it was designed to generate, while 
respectful of customary ways institutionalised in corporate organ- 
izations, had as its object not the static conservation of the 
rapport or correspondence of legal spirit and popular ethos to 
which Montesquieu's materialist interpretation of the spirit of 
a people ultimately committed him, but dynamic mobilisation of 
contradiction, should the sentiment and knowledge of it attain 
critical proportions, in the cause of the recovery of that rapport. 
It shall be seen in the final chapter, where the NRS is to 
be examined, how Hegel, more explicitly than in the WSS9 deployed 
the idea of contradiction in its two modes of apprehension as the 
idea of 'the negative as the maintenance of difference and the 
negative as its absence' 
190. It shall there become clear that, 
although it expresses much less coherently than the NRS the idea 
of the operation of a force, that of nature or necessity, at the 
same time in potential complicity with the existent 
(because of 
its manifestation in the sensible pursuits of the 'bourgeois', whose 
tendency is to disintegrate society by maintaining the difference of 
present purposes) and in potential contradiction of it (because 
of the tendency of the pursuit of the intelligible to take issue 
with the cinema of the present and to impose the unity of the absent, 
which is just the absence of difference), the WSS constitutes a 
preliminary version of the NRS, in which incidentally Montesquieu, 
though criticised for his static materialism, is explicitly 
acknowledged as a major influence 
191. It should by now be clear 
152. 
too that the WSS was an effort to give philosophical depth to the 
treatment of the problem of representation which he had attempted 
in the WBS. Wanting an elaborate scheme, such as began to emerge 
in 1799/1800 and became explicit in 1802/03, Hegel had despaired 
of his ability to conceive, in 1798, an electoral and represent- 
ative system adequate to the pressing need to effect change in 
Wuerttemberg. 
That the problem of devising a theory capable of determining 
how far and by what means the burghers 'narrow advantage or the 
advantage of his estate' 
192 
should be represented, and how its 
pretensions might yet be contained by the idea of justice, consti- 
tutes the central problem of the WSS, is a conclusion rendered 
inescapable by the likeness between the WBS, the sections of the 
NRS 193 in which a clear theory of representation first emerged, 
and this very obscure fragment of 1799/1800. For all three are, 
in that order, more or less clearly concerned with the problem of 
the dispositional environment of the practice of representation. 
The effect of the French Revolution had been to highlight 
the salience of representative institutions in the process of 
political change, but equally their liability to release the 
passions of the 'unenlightened mass of men' 
194 
without taking 
care to establish a congruence between the new regime and the 
affections of its subjects. It was, according to Hegel in his 
later Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, the fact that 
there was inculcated in France no disposition on the part of 
citizens to regard all their opinions (Meinungen) 
195 
as 'sub- 
ordinate to the substantial interest of the state and to insist 
upon them no further than that interest will allow' 
196 that 
precipitated the French Revolution on its terroristic course. 
All the French constitutions-were 'vitiated by the existence of 
absolute mistrust ... Neither government nor constitution could 
153. 
be maintained on this footing' 
197. The same view, that the 
French Revolution, in the words of Joachim Ritter's path-breaking 
study of Hegel and the French Revolution, effected ono durable 
solutions ... nothing firm in organizational terms$ 
198 is to be 
found in the VSN 199. The same point is elliptically made in 
the WBS, where it is made clear that effective change is not to 
be expected if, 'when things are felt to be tottering', the 
'collapse of the old building' is merely awaited'confidently and 
blindly' 200. If the response to crisis is not so handled that, 
in the process of political change, dispositional change is 
effected so that men will seek justice by virtue of their being 
persuaded to cast aside passionate regard for their own opinion 
and property alone, all change will be in vain. 
As we have seen, it was especially in the WSS that Hegel 
worked out his demand for the elevation of the hearts of men by 
a mediation of the present and the absent which would accomplish 
the annulment of the and life of the understanding in which they 
were held apart as incommunicative opposites. To accomplish this 
feat would be to make men effective agents of their own destinies 
by releasing them from passive commitment to the one-sided inner 
worlds into which they were driven. Since in France, where 
these commitments had been intensified to a striking degreee, where 
neither the character of the mob nor that of the men of virtue 
would brook any opposition, in other words, because the French 
mobilisation of contradiction had been one sided, merely parti- 
cular against particular, it was to the German people that the 
task fell to enact the contradiction of the old regime. The 
German people were considered by Hegel to be fitter to accomplish 
a civilised process of change towards political modernity that 
would yet preserve the virtues of its customs than. were the French. 
It was for the philosopher to disclose to his people their 
154. 
potential for the creation 
but not merely inhabited. 
opher as Hegel had come to 
'To think pure life is the 
which man has been or will 
from activity and excludes 
actions; consciousness of 
would be consciousness of 
of a new world which would be habitable 
This was the business of the philos- 
see it in his theological writings: 
task, to remove all deeds, everything 
be; character is merely an abstraction 
the universal reference of determinate 
pure life, pure self-consciousness, 
what man is, 
201. It is the task 
whose achievement would be tantamount to what was called in the 
ASP the last, the greatest work of mankind, the liberation of the 
202 
repressed powers of all men In this context it means to 
satisfy the need of all men, through self-consciousness and the 
transcendence of their existential limitations, 'to obtain a 
consciousness over what holds them captive', and the need of 
intellectuals 'to enter over into life from their idea': to make 
limited life reflective and unconditioned thought effective. 
The medium who will enable this communication, bringing vitality 
to dessicated characters, is the philosopher in the surprisingly 
pedestrian garb of the constitutional historian. But what has 
been said by Jean Hyppolite of the theological writings applies 
with equal force to the VSN. In both Hegel 'concerned himself 
less with technical philosophy than with history; and again the 
word history (like theology) is ill-adapted to characterise this 
genre of speculation. What interests our thinker is to discover 
the spirit of a religion, or the spirit of a people, to forge new 
concepts fit to express the historical life of man, his existence 
as a people or in history. In this, Hegel is incomparable and, 
in the works of. his youth we have his direct and still naive 
effort to think human life' 
203. 
Hegel had decided that no religion, even a religion of love, 
could now serve the purpose of establishing community among the 
155. 
German people since their religions had not only become the 
pretext for particularistic claims against the sovereignty of the 
state and the conversion, as Hegel put it, of political rights 
into proprietorial rights 
204: they had also been contaminated 
in the service of the 'completely subservient little world' alike 
of the burgher and the intellectual. He therefore turned to a 
concept, which seems at first sight far removed from that of love, 
that could express the historical life of the German people and 
thereby furnish it with a means, suited to its character, to over- 
come the fate with which that character was embroiled. 
This was the concept of representation. Hegel had decided 
in the GCR that, however beautiful was the idea of a 'nation of 
men related to one another by love', however uplifting the idea 
of belonging to a whole which, as a whole, as one, is the spirit 
of God whose sons the individual members are, there was an in- 
completeness in this idea which would give fate a power over it, 
205. 
As far as the German people was concerned, Hegel had to find a 
customary practice capable of completion by law. It is important 
to stress that there was, as far as Hegel was concerned, no bathos 
in this conversion from the ideal of love to that of representation. 
For in his correspondence with Nanette Endel 
206, he had suggested 
that her love for him was the means by which he could be 
'represented' so that, despite his unworthiness, he could draw 
near to holiness by proxy and thereby be assured the benefit of 
divine grace 
207. Furthermore, we shall see in the final 
chapter how Hegel likened the representative system to a religious 
'cult' 208. The system of representation Bas thus looked to by 
Hegel not entirely as a second-best alternative to a religion of 
love, but as that which could, more readily than religion, despite 
its like affliction by the disease. of a particularistic exploita- 
tion of sectarian division, serve the German people as a means to 
15 
its attainment of community. 
In the VSN Hegel wanted to show the German people the 'truth' 
which lay in their constitution; that this could be vindicated 
by the careful cultivation of its representative principle; and 
that in this principle, despite its perversion by religious 
particularism (because of which Hegel thought it important to 
study at close quarters the implication of confessional issues in 
matters of constitutional law), could be found the basis on which 
the burgher might submit to the ideal of community while yet 
preserving the feeling of his freedom in the satisfaction of the 
demands of his personal affections. 
Representation as Integration 
Prior to the detailed treatment of Hegel's ideas on represent- 
ation, it is necessary, in order to establish the reasons upon 
which is based the argument of the next chapter, that Hegel cannot 
be interpreted as an advocate of the Machtstaat simpliciter, 
provisionally to indicate the most salient features of his develop- 
ing theory of representation. These features are four. The 
first is that representation depends upon the existence of an 
absolutely sovereign legal order which enables the state to appear 
as the image in political life of the independent activity of its 
citizens in civil life and so as that to which they would be 
prepared to sacrifice themselves. We may say that it is that 
whereby the customary character of a people, its existential life, 
is articulated in order to enact its essential life, ethical 
activity (Sittlichkeit). It is in exchange for participation in 
this activity that the citizen will be prepared to subordinate 
the much less joyful cares of his calculative and arid life of the 
understanding. 
15?. 
The second feature is that in order to maintain itself as 
such an image of the activity of all, the state can be subject 
to mandatory instruction from no-one, else it were rather in fact 
passive and partial than virtually active on behalf of all. 
Thirdly, its action must not be 'jealous' or interventionist, as 
was the case, in Hegel's opinion, in revolutionary France and in 
Prussia. For if the state engage in activities which are proper 
to its citizens alone, which are not proper to ethical activity, 
it must come to be implicated in civil society as a partisan of 
some of its members in preference to others. The state must, 
no less than the citizen, respect the terms of political exchange. 
Finally, the state must have its basis in 'a society whose manifold 
plurality, with which it does not interfere, is yet guaranteed 
not to derogate from the essential unity of the political 
community. 
It has been argued by Rolf K. Hocevar, in his important work 
on the concepts of Estates and Representation in the political 
thought of the young Hegel 
209, that although the view of 
E. Fraenkel is to be conceded, that Hegel does not belong to the 
class of pioneers in the formulation of coherent theories of 
representation, neverthless he showed himself to have mastered 
all the ancient sources of the idea of representation 
210 That 
so little is evidbnt from his theological writings has already 
been shown, but it is surely a mistake to suppose, as does 
Poeggeler for instance, that we possess the young Hegel's ? ideas 
on political representation in simile only, by way of his ideas 
on representation in the ecclesiastical sphere' 
211" 
In fact it is clear that Hegel approached in the VSN what 
he arrived at in the NRS, a highly sophisticated theory of national 
or political representation far superior to those of Burke and 
Sieyes and capable of holding its own in comparison to theoretical 
158. .. 
work on the problem during the 20th. Not only does Hegel's 
theory anticipate that of the present century, which has a growing, 
albeit dim, awareness of its indirect debt to Hegels presuppos- 
itions, but there is growing recognition of the fact, which however 
has not yet been located early enough in Hegel's development, that 
he confronted specific problems in the theory of representation 
which presently exercise the minds of modern theorists. 
Poeggeler, notwithstanding his express view that the young 
Hegel does not evince an explicit and articulate theory and that 
only in the Philosophy of Right did he develop the view that 
representation serves to 'mediate social spheres with the State'212, 
has borne unwitting witness to this fact. He stops short of the 
thesis here advanced that the WSS is an important piece of document- 
ary evidence of the early emergence of this later view. With 
broad reference to Hegel's criticisms of the course of the French 
Revolution, Poeggeler, employing the locus classicus, the section 
in the Phenomenology of Spirit on Absolute Freedom and Terror, 
likens the purport of Hegel's attack on Rousseau's theory of the 
General Will and Sieyes' opposition of the prescriptions of a 
national representative body to the prescriptive claims of the 
superannuated social structure, with the conclusions of modern 
theorists such as Eberhard Schmitt 
213. According to Poeggeler, 
the 'fate of parliamentary democracy in France, as elsewhere, 
teaches that national representation only works successfully where 
it is able to bind existing Group interests to itself. Eberhard 
Schmitt, from the standpoint of contemporary historical research, 
has indicated the limitations of the concept of national represent. 
ation and argued, in the face of the 'mythos' of the French 
Revolution that in the deficient integration of national represent- 
ation with historically self-articulated group interests lies, 
perhaps, the origin of the crisis which affects parliamentary 
159" 
democracy in many European countries' 
214. 
It should be clear that the present writer has no argument 
with Poeggeler's conclusion that Hegel went straight to the heart 
of what modern theorists consider to be the most urgent problem 
of the representative system of government: quite the contrary. 
What is denied is the conclusion that Hegel demanded accommodation 
of the general will to the several wills of civil society from a 
point of view radically different from and theoretically far 
inferior to that which is discernible in the arguments of the 
Philosophy of Right for the organic integration of the legal system 
with the corporate structures of civil society; from a point of 
view, which Poeggeler wrongly imputes to the young Hegel, having 
affinity with the individualistic or 'moral' spirit of the natural 
law tradition. Poeggeler's suggestion that, for want of a critique 
of the 'mythos' of the French Revolution, based not upon the idea 
of an individualist Moralitaet, but rather upon the notion of 
Sittlichkeit, of an ethos peculiar to the integral or 'whole State', 
capable of comprehending historically developed group interests, 
the young Hegel failed to 'come to a considered presentation of 
the inner public law which can coexist with the differentiation 
of social and political spheres' 
215, is patently false. For we 
have seen at length that not only was Hegel always inclined to be 
suspicious of the French Revolution, but that the reasons for this 
suspicion lay in his perennial demand for the legal confinement of 
rampant subjectivity to its ethically appointed stations. We have 
seen in particular that he criticised the French Revolution 
precisely for its encouragement of the bourgeois to regard rep- 
resentation as a means to serve his partial ideas and interests 
216, 
an encouragement which left unscathed the fundamental timidity of 
character which indisposes him to any kind of sacrifice for the 
whole; and that in the alternative idea of the 'whole state', 
160. 
which is whole in virtue of the integrative function of represent- 
ation, Hegel sought the ideal of the education of the burgher to 
subjective identification with the spirit of law. 
In such identification Hegel sought the possibility that the 
burgher, while he enjoyed in civil society a sense of being an 
agent, but in a manner properly to be regarded as an 'abstraction 
of activity' without 'universal references 
217, 
so determined 
by his particular character that his 'actions' are properly 
speaking passions, could regard himself as an agent by way of 
participation in the deeds of the State. Only thus could be 
realized the strict demand, in respect of which the French 
Revolution was deemed unsatisfactory, for 'equal development of 
all powers, of each as well as of all', the demand that the individ- 
ual should be truly rather than abstractly such, an agent in the 
full sense. In the fragment which constitutes his last reflec- 
tions on the German Constitution, Hegel was to write, in defense 
of the principle Quod omnes tangit ab onmibus approbetur debet, 
and against the principle Princeps legibus solutus est, that the 
'condition of barbarity consists precisely in this, that a multi- 
tude is a people without at the same time being a state, that the 
state and individuals exist in opposition and separation, the 
prince is but a personal state power and the refuge from his 
personality is, again, only opposition of personality. In a 
civilised state there stand, between the personality of the 
monarch and that of individuals, the laws, or universality; the 
single deed of the monarch touches everyone, burdens or hurts 
everyone, or serves everyone. But that. the monarch be at the 
same time the state authority, or that he'have the highest power, 
that, in general, a state be, is one and the same thing. The 
power of the laws solves the contradiction that the state be the 
highest authority and that the individual be not oppressed by it; 
161. 
it is disbelief in the power of the law from whence stems the 
lack of wisdom which dithers between the necessity of giving 
supreme power to the state and the fear that individuals will be 
oppressed by it' . From this statement we see how had developed 
218 
by 1803 the insistence that the state ought not to treat free men 
as 'cogs in a machine', that it ought to be the 'image' of their 
activity. We see also that it is the state in the form of a 
constitutional monarchy in partnership with representative insti- 
tutions which serves, according to Hegel, as the means whereby the 
timid passivity, the dithering, anxious and scrupulous indecisive- 
ness of the 'moral individual$ is capable of conversion into 
ethical activity. 
It is evident, too, that Hegel's views accord with the 
consensus said by Hocevar 
219 to obtain among modern theorists of 
representation such as Leibholz, Carl Schmitt, and Fraenkel that 
the concept presupposes the existence of a legal order, to which 
sovereign and subject are likewise subordinate and that it requires 
that the possessors of supreme public authority be regarded as if 
they unite in themselves all members of the legal community. 
This 'simulative' agent of all makes not a pretence of universality, 
but provides the burgher the only sphere in which he can be an 
agent, that is, can participate in actions having reference to 
universal projects of subjectivity into objectivity, rather than 
in passions involving no distinction between 'character' and the 
present world. It is preserved from the nature of a pretence so 
long as the law is sovereign, for in that case the abdication by 
. the burgher of his power 
to act directly with full political 
autonomy to his representative is no alienation of personal power 
to another, merely particular, personality. If, in accordance 
with the principle of law or universality, burdens and services 
are equally distributed, there can be no appearance of sacrifice 
162. 
of interest susceptible of interpretation as a zero-sum transfer. 
The individual burgher's negation by the community is not, then, 
liable to incite him to calculate what depreciation it inflicts 
on the value of his present interests. Fair exchange is no 
robbery. 
The concept of'simulated agency' is that of a sphere in 
which men may escape the toils of their character. Character 
permits them only an abstraction of activity. That activity 
within the and life of the Understanding is 'abstract' is evident 
from the fact that their proprietorial mastery of their 'little 
world' entails, no less than an affirmation of personality in 
strife with the existing world, a fundamental denial of self. 
This is proven by the indecisiveness of the burgher, from his 
timid care, under the revolutionary as well as under the ancien 
regime, for the preservation above all of the security of his 
personal property, his total identification with which precludes 
his attainment of subjectivity. It is, then, the sphere of 
'enjoyment and contemplation' of one's subservient little world, 
rather than the sphere of simulated agency which Hegel considered 
an- abstract pretence of activity. The latter sphere was for 
Hegel the sole locus of action proper, the mark of which is 
decisiveness and the criterion of which is a subjectivity which 
is free in respect of its self-distinction from the environing 
world and at the same time determinate in its possession of 
intentionality towards that world. This is what Hegel meant 
when, in his final draft of the VSN he wrote that the 'Act of the 
public authority carries in itself a free and general determinacy 
and its execution is at the same time its application, 
220. His 
view, as shall be shown, was that a people has life, as distinct 
from merely passive existence, only if such a sphere of simulative 
agency is available to it. Indeed, only there is it. a people at 
163. 
all, since it is there that is found legal articulation of the 
ethos which constitutes the vitalising project to which the 
individual can commit himself. This is the precise meaning of 
Sittlichkeit which Hegel was to deploy in the NRS. Underlying 
this notion of Sittlichkeit, in its emergence in the VSN, is the 
Aristotelian doctrine of the natural priority of the State over 
the individual given, by Hegel, the form of the view that the 
individual is constituted such, so that he transcends his 
particularity, only by way of his integration with the State. 
To representative institutions this mediative function belongs, 
a view which Hegel expressed in the VSN thus: 'in modern countries 
a state has been developed in which each individual no longer has 
a direct voice himself in any national affair; on the contrary, 
all obey a whole founded by themselves, i. e. a state and its 
branches and part icularisations (the laws), an abiding, fixed 
centre to which each individual has a mediate relation derived 
221 
from representation' . 
Hegel's location of ethical life in this sphere of simulated 
agency and his view that the integrative function of representation 
is the precondition of the attainment by the burgher of free 
individuality and the sine qua non of the constitution of a people 
as a creative agent of its own vocation would appear to suggest 
that Hocevar is right to suppose that Hegel's has a close affinity 
222 
with Rudolf Smend's view of 'representation as integration' 
This supposition requires some qualification. Hegel's is a theory 
of representation as integration, but in terms which, unlike 
S mend's. preserve the identity of the entities integrated at the 
same time as they supersede their differences. Hocevar attempts to 
establish a genealogical relation-between Smend and Hegel, 
arguing that Smend names Theodor Litt as the mentor of his 
integrative theory and that Litt was very much influenced by Hegel. 
164. 
This line of argument is not to be pursued here, for it may be 
circumvented simply by pointing to the fact that, in his 
'Verfassung and Verfassungsgeschichte, Smend responds to the 
view of Hildegard Trescher, that Hegel's Philosophy of Right 
admits of the interpretation that it countenances 'the most 
vigorous penetration of all social spheres by the state for the 
general purpose of winning for the state all the vital energies 
of the people', by claiming Hegel as a forerunner of his views, 
thus: 'This is precisely the integration theory ... *(it puts an) 
end to the principle that the a-political economy is independent 
of the state and that the state is apart from the economyt. 
This is a tendentious interpretation of Trescher and a 
fantastic view of the Philosophy of Right. It would be equally 
fantastic if it were to seek confirmation in the VSN, which agree 
entirely with the Philosophy of Right in denying the propriety of 
subjecting 'to the immediate activity of the supreme public 
authority' all institutions, that is, estates and corporations, 
'implicit in the nature of a society' 
223. The end of integra- 
tion is not the institution of a jealous state but the cultiva- 
tion of a self-respecting people which finds in the state an 
image of itself as a free agent. If this image is to be commun- 
icated, the state must not remove from the heart which is to be 
elevated by it the sensible appreciation, afforded by the abstract 
activity of everyday industry and effort, of what it is to be, 
albeit in a limited and partial sense, an agent. The corollary, 
then, of Hegels denial to the burgher of the right to a direct 
voice, whether by literal presence in the legislative body or by 
the issue of binding instructions to his representative, assured 
of compliance by instruments of terminal responsibility, of his 
denial of the supposed right of the burgher to intrude his 
passional interests in the sphere of simulated agency, is that 
165. 
the state should not become an interested party in spheres of 
abstract activity. 
It is the weight of these two substantive features of Hegel's 
theory of representation which guarantee the possibility of real- 
ising the formal condition, the feature first itemised 224, that 
the representative state, to be such, must be a Rechtsstaat, one 
in which the transfer to it of competence to make provisions 
entailing both burdens and services cannot be construed by the 
citizen as a zero-sum transaction between one particular and 
another but as a fair exchange. It may be ventured that in 
respect of this view Hegel is in agreement with that of Harvey 
C. Mansfield, which corresponds to the views of Leibholz, Carl 
Schmitt and Fraenkel that the possessors of supreme public auth- 
ority must be regarded 'as if' they united in themselves all members 
of the legal community. Mansfield's view is that modern rep- 
resentative government involves, not the mediaeval conception of 
the making of representations on behalf of the subject to the 
sovereign, in the manner of interested litigation, but the 
antithesis of this dualistic orren face relationship: namely, the 
monistic conception that the sovereign is the very people, that 
'the people is a whole having no ruling part, 
225. 
It is this monistic conception which underpins the inherent 
connection between the modern idea of representation and that of 
the Rechtsstaat in which not persons but lays are sovereign. 
According to the dualistic conception, on the other hand, it is 
admitted that since representations are made to the state on 
behalf of particular interests, it may decide in their favour 
and so forfeit the identification with its decisions of interested 
parties which are disadvantaged by such decisions at the same time 
as they are encouraged by the permission, implicitly conceded to 
them by the dualistic view, to regard the state as a potential 
166. 
instrument in the service of their partial demands, a regard in 
which it cannot appear as a simile of universal activity. 
On the common ground of their monistic understanding of 
representative government, Hegel 
226 
and Mansfield 227 establish 
a necessary coordination of the requirements that the state be 
absolutely sovereign and that its competence be limited. This 
is the-proper interpretation to be put on Trescher's view that 
Hegel denied the value of Montesquieu's doctrine of mixed govern- 
ment because it disables vigorous action by the state 
228 
'That which makes it act' (the phrase is Nontesquieu's) is its 
229 winning 'all the vital energies of the people' , That this 
is the purpose of 'vigorous penetration of all social spheres' 
230 
precludes the imputation to Hegel of a favourable attitude to 
economic intervention. For that, in Hegel's view, is, as we 
shall see, nothing but inimical to the very existence of the vital 
energies of a people. The state cannot be active in the depres- 
sion of the powers of particularity if its citizens know nothing 
of independent activity 
231. Penetration is not interference. 
The denial, common to Hegel and Mansfield, that the represent- 
ative state can be a jealous state 
232, 
since it can be such only 
at the expense of its capacity to simulate the activity of all, 
hence of its integrative capacity, stems from their like character- 
isation of modern society as thoroughly plural and secular. For 
both, the jealous state is an analogue of the jealous God of 
Judaism, in whose transcendent character Mansfield, like Hegel in 
his theological writings, finds the explanation of a 'penal and 
highly regulative notion of government by divine imposition' 233, 
It will be recalled that Hegel characterised the relationship of 
the Jew to Jehovah as loveless and as partaking of the nature of 
a passive obedience, reflected in a. lifeless conception of God, 
undertaken in the manner of a transaction, in return for guaranteed 
subsistence. Such a transaction is the equivalent of representation 
167. 
en face, in which is enshrined the assumption that the state 
exists for the sake of the security of the interests of the 
passionate personality, rather than to the end of providing it, 
that in it may be awakened its slumbering subjectivity, directed 
towards great objects 
234, 
an exemplar of activity. 
It must be admitted that the affinity of Hegel's with 
Mansfield's understanding of representation as integration stops 
short of a concurrence on Hegel's part with Mansfield's view that 
modern representative government is 'goverment determined by its 
material rather than government impressing a form' 
235. Hegel, 
given his insistence that communication between the citizen and 
the state depends on a mediation of present interests and the 
absent ideal of community, clearly agrees that 'men cannot be 
represented in that to which they must be compelled or habituated, 
236, 
since representation is designed to render men closer to their 
potential for action. This is incompatible with compulsion or 
habit, for in either case men are passive. But if we are to 
take seriously Mansfield's phrase - 'determined by its material' - 
he means that government must be passive. In that case it would 
furnish men no image of activity and leave them embroiled in a 
compulsive habitude. Such a condition must be that of the society 
which Mansfield describes, for he affirms that modern represent- 
ative government requires a 'representable society consecrated by 
an undemanding (i. e. Deist) God, a society without aspirations, 
237. 
He thus defines as a representable society one of pure presence, 
of complacency and indolence, of subjectivity suffocated by habit. 
But, by his own admission, such a society 'cannot be represented'. 
It might be thought that Mansfield maintains a consistent position 
in that he depends representation upon a condition in which the 
citizen does not feel himself to be passive, and in that. he denies 
168. 
its possibility only where the citizen is rendered passive by 
the extraneous imposition upon him of habits impertinent to his 
hitherto acquired identity; that Mansfield does not object to 
habits spontaneously evolved that they incapacitate men to be 
represented, and is consistent in holding that men may be rep- 
resented in respect of these habits, and that the interests corres- 
ponding to them may 'determine' government, because in them men's 
subjectivity is apparent, in them men feel themselves, and are 
not forced, to be free. 
This would presuppose that Mansfield subscribes to the natur- 
alistic view of subjectivity as inherently native to the individual. 
If that were the case, no exception could be taken to the logic 
of his liberal view of the relation of the individual to govern- 
went; that by way of representation, government is 'determined 
by its material'. Consequently, his subscription to the con- 
ception of representation as integration would have to be so 
qualified that the integration oftthe people' into $a whole, 
238 
is conceivable as a datum, a happy consequence of the harmonious 
interaction, as it were in the first and last instances, of 
apparently contrary wills; or, more precisely, so that the 
individuality is taken as given prior to its engagement in any 
form of social life and that political association is arrived at 
by convention between these individuals with a view to securing 
to them the preservation of the constellation of interests in 
which their individuality is embodied. 
On the contrary, however, Mansfield denies this naturalistic 
view that subjectivity is fully constituted in what, in its 
passional mode, the personality prefers as its interest and that 
government serves only to instrument the accommodation of that 
interest with those of competing personalities. He undermines 
both prgpositions in the course of an argument which concludes 
169. 
that the integration, in his style the 'formation' or 'mediation' 
of 'a people ... into a public' 
239 
cannot be conceived as having 
its basis in the conventions of personalities already individuated 
as agents. Specifically, he denies that the development of 
representative institutions can be explained as the consequence 
of the deliberate invention or convention of such rational agents. 
Rather must they be explained as a gradually evolving 'social 
inheritance' 240 and the 'mobilization of society' 
241 in their 
direction be understood as a process whose genesis is 'objective' 
rather than 'subjective' 
242. Just the same view, that represent- 
ation is no invention, was maintained by Hegel 
243. 
As an alternative to the view that this process is'subjective', 
that is, conceivable as the rational convention of individuals 
upon the adoption of an entirely new or invented political system, 
the view which Mansfield attributes to Thomas Jefferson 
244 
and 
the American revolutionaries but which is equally that of Sieyes 
and the French, is set out the view of post-Rousseauan political 
philosophy, characterised by Mansfield as historical rather than 
naturalistic: the former type of political philosophy is said to 
involve the hypothesis that, since 'man was certainly not made by 
God and was now also not a being of nature the remaining possibility 
was that he made himself' 
245. This hypothesis of human 'self- 
generation or self-creation' 
246 
necessitated the abandonment of 
the assumption of a 'fixed human nature' such as governs the pre- 
supposition of naturalistic political philosophy that a rational 
disposition to live in community or as a public under a sovereign 
is conceivable as given in advance of the constitution of the 
sovereign or public. 
The historical hypothesis favours rather, the view that a 
rational disposition to concur in the institution of a sovereign 
Is not an option available to individuals prior to their engagement 
170. 
in public life, for it is only in this engagement that they cease 
to be merely personalities to whom a disposition agreeable with 
something beyond their personal interests is insensible. It is 
public life which constitutes them subjective individuals capable 
of subtention beyond the present interests from which, in private 
life, their character is inextricable and, to that extent, not 
individual. This gloss explains what Mansfield means by arguing 
that man 'makes himself, but only by stages, for self-creation all 
at once is a superhuman feat. If man could create himself all 
at once, it must be true that he could see himself from the begin- 
ning. But by postulation, there is nothing to see at the begin- 
ning ... Man makes himself, necessarily without self-awareness, 
because there is nothing to survey, no human nature to see, until 
the creation is complete. We can make ourselves only on condition 
that we do not know what we make' 
247. Self-creation is, there- 0 
fore, to be paradoxically understood not as a reflexive but as a 
transitive and fundamentally opaque process. This is not, of 
course, how Hegel regarded the idea of self-creation, either in 
his youth or in his old age, notwithstanding the fact that 
Mansfield is prepared to, claim that the Philosophy of Right 
expressly supports his view, albeit without explanation 
248. 
Mansfield's views merit treatment precisely because, despite his 
claim to affinity with Hegel's anti-naturalistic political philo- 
sophy, he is far from agreement with the theory of relexive change 
advanced by Hegel throughout his pre-systematic writings. That 
theory, as we have seen, certainly emphasises the view that change 
can only be effected in accordance with the customary conditions 
determined by practical subjectivity, whose content is the effort 
and industry of individual men. But this does not mean that it 
is effected by the casual behaviour of practical subjectivity, 
for change is not the mere variation without purposive criteria 
171. 
for its regulation which such 'characters' produce whose pursuits 
are 'abstractions of activity' 
249. To put the matter in terms 
which Hegel was to use in mature years, nothing great was ever 
achieved without passion 
250. But that does not mean that it is 
passion that change is caused. Change is what takes place with 
reference to definite criteria of identity without which it is 
absurd to speak of a self which creates itself or anything else. 
If Mansfield's theory of self-creation, that whereby a people 
becomes a sovereign whole, could be made to agree with Hegel's 
conviction that it is only through law that a customary entity 
can become an ethical totality, it would need to be disembarrassed 
of an argument which, advanced without qualification, is nonsense. 
It makes no sense to argue that men can make themselves on condi- 
tion. that they do not know what it is that they will in the end 
have made, unless it be added that, all the same, the stadial 
process of self-creation is not so fundamentally transitive and 
opaque that it becomes meaningless to speak of it as if it were 
reflexively and perspicuously done. In human matters, it makes 
no more sense to speak of nature as a teleological terminus, at 
which 'creation is complete', than as an archaeological principle. 
And though knowledge of an end is not available to them, men can 
have practical knowledge of a kind, other than the knowledge which 
Mansfield equates with a view of what is 'there to see', namely 
knowledge of what is intended in the mean time. Knowledge of 
what is thus intended is articulated in positive law, which lends 
to custom, without subjecting it to an utterly new determination, 
a dimension of cognitive subjectivity without which self-creation 
or reflexive change is inconceivable. In other words, law is the 
valid, though not necessarily finally true, expression in determin- 
ate and authoritative terms of the will in which the identity of 
the community represents itself to itself as an object of freedom. 
172 
Such knowledge, knowledge of what they intend to become, which 
may be the same as or other than the identity which they have 
achieved, is that which satisfies the condition of reflexive 
change: that though the cause in which it is articulated is an 
absent idea, its effect is not utterly to negate the present. 
Intention towards the absent, an idea which is an'object of 
freedom' 251; contradiction of the 'limited present', not by an 
Absolute Idea which is 'extraneous' 
252, but by an Absolute in 
which absence converges with presence in neighbourly striving of 
opposites (Bestreben der gegenseitige Annaeherung) 
253 for a 
habitable but not merely inhabited dwelling. place: these are the 
themes of the ASP, the WBS, the WSS and, as we shall see, the DS, 
upon which may be grounded not only a more coherent explanation 
of historical change as self-creation (to which a 'representation 
of self' 
254, 
not to be sure an epistemonic, but an intentional 
representation, is necessary), but also consistent reasons, 
lacking in Mansfield's theory, for a rejection of the dualistic 
in favour of the monistic or integrative conception of represent- 
ative govenment. This, being defined as the conception of the 
constitution of a public as a 'whole having no ruling parts 
255, 
requires a theory of self-creation not only as an historical 
hypothesis, but as the ground for the normative definition of the 
, proper relationship 
between government and governed. 
The theory of the self-creation of the people into a 
sovereign entity affirms that the full subjectivity of its members 
is consequential upon rather than prior to its articulation of 
their legal community. This should entail that it makes'no 
sense to prefer 'determination by material' to 'impression of 
formt 256, for that is tantamount to the admission that the 
sovereign ought to be susceptible to disintegration by the deci6ion 
of individuals to dissociate should the condition, the preservation 
173. 
intact of their passional interests, upon which the disposition 
(which would have to be adoptive rather than inherent to their 
subjectivity) to live in community would depend, appear to them 
not to be met. Political exchange requires rather, the approxi- 
mation, convergence or communication of these opposites, matter 
and form. 
Mansfield seems to have been seduced into the espousal of 
the value of 'determination by material', which is inconsistent 
with a theory of self-creation in both its capacities, hypo- 
thetical and normative, because he takes the correct denial of 
the original visibility of self to the incorrect conclusion of 
the impossibility not only of its epistemonic but even of its in- 
tentional representation (Vorstellung). Hegel, on the other 
hand, held impression of form to be the business of an inten- 
tional self, the representation (Vorstellung) of which in the 
cause of 'self-creation' does certainly not require that it be 
visible (if it were it would be superflous to intend it), but 
that it should merely not be thoroughly uncongenial to the life 
of presence. 
Mansfield fails to see that 'impression of form' need not - 
for Hegel it must not - be transeunt with respect to the habit- 
ative environment to which it seeks to impart an image of self- 
creation. To impress form with a view to the consitution of a 
sovereign apt to be regarded 'as if' it united in itself all 
members of the community is to satisfy Mansfield's prohibition 
of the coercive imposition of impertinent habits, since it 
precludes the state from jealous interference in 'abstract 
activities' 
257. Hegel's theory of self-creation, the applica- 
tion of which to the historical explanation of the emergence of 
representative practices will be examined in the fifth and sixth 
chapters, involves the normative requirement that representation 
17k. 
as integration be conformable with a pluralistic social system, 
to be shown in the sixth chapter to be among the major presupp- 
ositions of his concept of the (whole state(. 
While Hegel's theory thus limits state action, it meets, 
better than Mansfield's theory, the latter's obverse stipulation 
that representative government should have absolute sovereignty 
258. 
This is because its theoretical basis, the idea of self-creation, 
lays stress on the intentional perspicuity of action at the expense 
of the opacity of behaviour. Not relying exclusively on this latter 
hypothetical condition of self-creation, Hegel's theory needed 
have no resort to the normative requirement of 'determination by 
material'. Hence its capacity, unlike Mansfield's theory, to 
resist implication in a dualistic conception of representation, 
the corollary of which is a permission of mandatory instruction 
liable to produce either or both of two effects disintegrative of 
sovereignty conceived as the simulative bearer of the identity of 
the whole. The first effect would be that, failing satisfaction 
of its particular demands, any corporation might repudiate the 
sovereign which refuses it satisfaction (Brandenburg-Prussia's 
attitudes will be shown to be a case in point) 
259; the second, that 
satisfaction, if given, would be at the expense of the plural 
distribution of satisfaction. (Hence the need to curb the over- 
exuberant development of the power of particular corporations 
260. ) 
The second would manifestly give rise to the first effect. 
The integrative Rechtsstaat must burden and serve all equitably. 
It cannot do this if it is determined by its material, except on 
the ideal condition that it governs a 'society without aspirationsi261. 
Mansfield's resort to this normative condition exhibits the elenchus 
to which the inconsistency of his theory of self-creation must lead, 
that, representation is at a premium where there is no use for it. 
It is supposed to serve the purpose of integration in a society 
said to achieve integration haphazard or thanks to the happy lack of 
175. 
ambition or greed among its members. 
Hegel's theory of self-creation, on the other hand, evolved 
in the face of the emergence of the 'bourgeois principle' alike 
in relations between territorial estates and social estates 
262, 
systematically relates the demands that the state be absolutely 
sovereign, that it therefore foreswear the. jealous interference 
demanded of it by interested corporations, and that it thus 
maintain a pluralistic society, to the view that it should be a 
legal order whose simulation of intentional activity secures the 
confidence of all that they are themselves active in its regulation 
of their particular and passionate commitments, though that involve 
their very depression. Thus his conception of representation as 
integration insists on pluralism, while it stands opposed to the 
requirement (putatively compatible with, but in fact, by reason 
of contingent 
263 differences of corporate capacities to impress 
their demands, inimical to social plurality 
264) that $the people 
must participate determinatively in the execution of state power 
and undertake the exercise of public sovereign authority by way 
of prior authorization or posterior consent' 
265. 
It is thus clear then how, in terms of his requirement of the 
mediation of present and absent, of passion and action, Hegel 
arrived at a concept of representation as communicative 
exchange intended to instrument the relationship between represent- 
atives and principals so that ethical activity (Sittlichkeit) 
could be derived from abstract activity, or custom (Sitte). 
This would serve the purpose of harmonious integration of the 
personalities involved in the passionate strife, which custom is 
not of its own resources able, in modern society at any rate, to 
contain. On the one hands-it would avoid the extreme of total 
governmental penetration of the sphere of economic activity, which 
does not qualify as integration but as homogenisation. On the 
other, it would avoid recourse to the device prohibitive of the 
171 _ 
freedom of action of the sovereign, and so of integration. 
That device, isomorphic representation 
266, in which there is 
alienated to the representative, as to the attorney, not the 
power to interpret the interests of his principal, but only the 
technical competence to defend them, Hegel repudiated along with 
the mediaeval view of representation as a dualistic confrontation 
between subject and sovereign, wherein the exercise of sovereignty 
is quite distinct from the practice of representation, the rep- 
resentative being merely instrumental in the downward transmission 
of command and the upward transmission of demand. 
Rather, the practice of representation was to be the very 
exercise of sovereignty. Hence the need for a monistic relation- 
ship of sovereign and representative. To this need Hegel addressed 
his peculiar employment of the notion, original to mediaeval 
theory, of the sovereign as vicarious image of the whole 
267, 
whose function was the mobilization of consent as a sentiment of 
constructive commitment to sovereign decisions rather than of 
instructive commission of them. Hegel's theory contrasts with 
the mediaeval notion of mystical embodiment of the community in 
the sovereign, in tandem with that of its cosmic replication via 
the representative. For according to these notions, decision 
is equated with 'finding' rather than 'making' the law, and so 
merely with the passive reconciliation (dictated by custom), of 
the claims of corporate persons against each other and against 
the sovereign. Hegel's concept of simulation, on the other hand, 
involves the idea of the conversion and development of custom, 
for the sake of the conservation of the community of which it is 
the original expression, by way of the enactment of the historical 
'character' of a people, rather than passive adjustment of 
decisions to the demands of the usual habitat to which they refer. 
Such a passive procedure is manifestly inappropriate to an 
S 
177. 
increasingly dynamic society of burghers, for it must permit the 
casual prevalence of the customs of the more powerful over those 
of the less powerful 
268. 
The practice of representation comes thus increasingly to be 
dissociated from corporative (genossenschaftlich) determination, 
though its structure maintains conformity with a civil society 
corporatively differentiated, and increasingly to be identified 
with the exorcise of sovereignty (Herrschaft). Neither represent- 
ation nor the exercise of sovereignty are to be construed as 
activities passive with respect to one another. Representative 
government is not intended merely formally to represent a multi- 
tude of its principals, the members of the community which it 
serves. It is not supposed to personify (and certainly not to 
ossify as habits), either isomorphically or mystically, the 
interests of any one of a variety of customary communities. Such 
a 'representation' has to be distinguished, as merely theoretical 
or passive, from representative government as follows: to the 
former, action on its own account cannot properly be attributed, 
while to the meaning of the latter it is analytic that it act on 
its own account, though on behalf of another of which it is, qua 
agent, a practical rather than merely theoretical or behavioural 
simile. 
If the representative is to be an agent, what he does must 
be attributable to his judgment and intentions. Yet his action 
must be such that his principal, whom it touches not insofar as 
he is passionately interested - for his interests as he interprets 
them do not come into account - but insofar rather as he is con- 
structively committed to it, can identify with it as that which 
he might have done had he but judgment and authority. Active 
identification rather than passive suffrage is the condition of 
the conversion of Sitte into Sittlichkeit. The action of the 
178. 
representative must be 'as if' it were What the principal might 
do if he were in the. privileged position of an ethical agent. 
Only in that case is it an action which he can own. To be such 
an action it must at least, though clearly it may contradict the 
principal's passional interpretation of his interest, not be or 
appear to be in contradiction with his present interests on 
account of its being affirmative of the present interests of any 
other principal, for with these at least some principals cannot 
be expected to identify. 
This is not to say that representative government ought not 
to care for men's interests. In so far as a distinction must be 
made between cases of representation, in which the sovereign acts 
on behalf of the principal, and cases of (e. g. Hobbesian) authori- 
sation in which the sovereign need attend only to extremities of 
interest-, it is not to be maintained by the provision for atten- 
tion to the diurnal interests of the burgher. To act on behalf 
of the principal is rather to communicate to him what is lacking 
from his diurnal behaviour, though it contains an abstract intim- 
ation of action. This lack; the making good of which consti- 
tutes his proper interest is of the dispassionate form of sub- 
jective intention. The tinterestt of the principal for which 
the representative must have regard is that of believing himself 
to participate in action rather than to suffer his own passions 
or those of others. It is important to emphasise that Hegel's 
theory of representation does indeed affirm a conceptual inherence 
in representative practices of attention to the interest of the 
principal. It has lately been-argued by A. P. Griffiths that, 
failing attention to interest it would be pointless to distinguish 
representation from 'gi-ft' or 'abdication' of authority . 
269 
This is not to be disputed. What is questionable, however, is 
the naturalistic assumption that interests fixed in advance of 
1? 9. 
political action are those above all which qualify as the basis 
upon which is to be judged the degree to which political action 
is representative. 
Griffiths' view is that ascription to principals of respons- 
ibility for and commitment to the acts, and their consequences, 
of representatives is justifiable only if the principal has already 
'the right to do or avoid the act so ascribed to him, 
270. The 
function of representation is said to be to make good merely the 
inability of the principal to pursue his own interests 'by his own 
causal activity and will, 
271. It is therefore determined to 
that pursuit on pain of withdrawal of consent. Representation, 
therefore, since consent to it involves the alienation of judgment 
as well as 'causal' power, if it is to permit ascription, must 
conform judgment to interest, since such conformity is the con- 
ventional criterion for the imputation of responsibility for 
actions of all kinds: that is not done responsibly which an agent 
(from which status minors, madmen etc., are accordingly excluded) 
has not premeditated in the light of his interests. 
But we have seen that Hegel's theory of self-creation implies 
the denial of the possibility, conventionally admitted, that a 
principal, in his private capacity, is a fully constituted agent 
capable of perspicuous judgment of his interests. Hegel completely 
subverted the conventional assumption of the precedence of 
interests to action. Denying that persons act in pursuit of 
their passional interests, however they may think that they do, 
he argued that the perception of interest is posterior to parti- 
cipation in collective and projective action. He did not believe 
that it lies deep in human nature to act for that in which one is 
passionately interested, but rather that it is possible 'to interest 
oneself only in something for which one acts, something with which 
one can co-operate in resolve and deed, something in, which the 
180. 
will can be' 
272 
. Human interest 
lies in an escape from passion 
by way of assimilation to that which resembles, but is not, the 
abstract activity of everyday life. The 'passive benefit' 
273 
conferred by the state whose intervention is a reflex, rather 
than a regulation, of the interventionist demands of its citizens, 
furnishes no such escape, evokes no geniune interest, and dis- 
closes no semblance of activity. 
Hegel's position, then, with respect to the mandate-independ- 
ence controversy 
274, is to agree with the 'mandate theorist' that 
independent representation exhibits the form of action but neglects 
the service of present interests 
275, 
with a view, however, to the 
denial that this is reprehensible; and to disagree with the view 
of the 'independence theorist' that instructive delegation exhibits 
the substance of action, but not the form 
276, 
with a view to 
arguing that the substance of action cannot coexist with servility 
to private and present interests and is not separable from, but 
can-only be appreciated through its form. The purity of form of 
action, in turn, is not to be confused with inattention to 
'interest', for it is interest in or identification with the 
action of the 'sovereign' which is its substantial end. 
That interest, as we have seen, consists for Hegel in the 
citizen's faith that sovereign action is virtually or vicariously 
his. This is the esoteric core of Hegel's argument, whereby he 
can be said to agree with the requirement, specified by theorists 
of representation such as Pitkin and Diggs, for example, that 
representatives must be able to act independently but not in such 
a way as to exclude the agency of the represented 
277 
or that, as 
opposed to a theoretical representation, a representative 'in the 
practical sense ... is an agent 
in one sense of persons regarded 
as ... agents 
in another sense'-278. Free scope must be left 
to the abstract activity of persons, so that the same shall be 
181. 
available to the ethical activity of the state, for if they 
suffer undue encroachment by the public authority upon such matters 
of their customary life as are not derogatory to the ethical 
totality of the community, its citizens will neither feel them- 
selves to be active in any sense nor, therefore, be able, much 
less inclined, to regard the state as the image of their activity. 
In that case the passive character of the people will languish 
without active expression and, wanting identity, the people will 
depend on good hap to preserve it from disintegration. 
182. 
Chapter Four 
The Integral State 
'The grand old Holy Roman Empire, how does it hold together' 
(Goethe, Faust) 
1. The Reform Proposals and the concept of genius 
The final chapter of Hegel's Verfassungsschriften sets out 
the terms upon which he thought could be created some 'mode of 
cooperation for the universal' 
1 
whereby the provinces might be 
not merely passive beneficiaries 
2 but active members of the state. 
It is clear that he wanted such cooperation to be, as well as of 
provinces, of lesser persons. For the construction of a 'state 
power directed by an overlord with the cooperation of the parts, 
3 
would be designed to the end of bringing the German people''once 
again into connection with Emperor and Empire' It was clear 
to him, however, that the sense of identification with the activity 
of the state, which he required of the individual, would be con- 
ditional on the participation of the provinces in the same spirit. 
This priority of provincial over individual integration will 
5 
presently be more fully explained . 
Cooperation was to be effected by means of an Imperial Diet 
whose electoral constituencies would be other than the individual 
provinces of old. Since not all of these had their own terri- 
torial assemblies, it would not in any case be possible to consti- 
tute the Imperial Diet of deputations from such bodies. The 
Imperial Diet would, rather, be elected from constituencies based 
upon new subdivisions of the Empire. These, established for 
military purposes, would cut across old territorial jurisdictions. 
183. 
This would at once obviate three problems: first, that of dis- 
proportion in the value of the franchise, which would arise if 
the Imperial Diet were constituted on the basis of the former 
territories, the populations of which were so various. Delegates 
should, rather, 'be chosen in accordance with the number of 
inhabitants' 
6 
of the districts into which these subdivisions 
would be further divided. Thus would be eliminated the dis- 
proportionate representation of the smallest imperial cities, 
analogous to the 'rotten boroughs' in England, of whose problems 
in this matter Hegel was, at this time, doubtless very much aware. 
The second problem, inequity in the financial contributions 
made for the upkeep of the Imperial Army would likewise be resolved, 
so as to avoid excessive expense for the very small estates. 
These military subdivisions would be independent tax districts. 
It is clear that, while in matters said by Hegel to be inessential 
to the necessary character of the state - administration of 
justice, management of revenues 
?, 
religion etc. - he allowed 
that traditional relationships might persist between princes and 
their subjects, there was to be a 'complete revolution, 
8 in 
these relationships so far as they touch what is essential to the 
state, namely its military organization. This revolution would 
consist in the direct payment by the provinces to the Emperor 
and Empire of 'the money which they pay directly to their prince 
and only indirectly to Emperor and Empire' 
9. That the annual 
authorization of such payments was to be the raison d'etre of a 
Diet constituted from functional subdivisions presupposes a 
corresponding redistribution of tax burdens. 
By these means would be resolved the third, chief and all- 
embracing problem, the persistence in the Diet of old territorial 
184. 
loyalties. To fragment the traditional alignments of interest 
between territorial Herrschaft and Landschaft, to divorce the 
interests of the provinces from the personal ambitions of their 
princes, would be to achieve the end of the self-creation of the 
Germans as a people which, in the DS, Hegel asserted to be 'the 
most perfect organization' 
10 that Reason can give itself. These 
alignments, whose sedimentation was the result of religious 
divisions exploited by the princes, had been acknowledged by Hegel 
to be possessed of the most 'alluring charms, 
11. The substance 
of their attraction for the subjects of the provinces, of 
provincial pride in belonging to a particular state in whose 
territorial sovereignty had once lain the guarantee of political 
and religious freedom 
12 
against the proselytic pretensions of 
a 'universal monarchy', was now gone. 
Yet there remained the likelihood of resistance, albeit inert, 
on the part of Germans to the reforms which Hegel proposed. For 
they continued to be encouraged by their several princes to have 
regard above all for their private interests, by way of the identi- 
fication of their confession and conscience, which the princes 
claimed to defend, as the 'inward legitimation' of their burgeon- 
ingtbourgeois sense' 
13. Thus, the political particularism 
14 
of the princes evoked in its support a social particularism so 
reinforced by religious rationalisation that such political 
isolationism had the appearance of a 'mere consequence' 
15 
of 
religious division. It appears to have been Hegel's intention, 
however, to argue that, of themselves, the attention of the 
bourgeois to his own peculiar interests and his cognate infatua- 
tion with the affairs of his 'inmost heart' 
16 
were insufficient 
to explain the perdition of the, German Empire into the abyss of 
its dissolution; They had this effect only because the princes 
'could find no better ally than the conscience of their subjects 
185. 
in their (the princes') endeavour to withdraw from the supremacy 
of the Empire' 
17. For their part, the peoples of the provinces 
contributed only unintentionally to dissolution. But whereas 
their intentions were honourable and honest, whereas they were 
innocent, 'the princes knew what they were doing' 
18. Upon the 
emasculation of the princes, then, depended the Germans' 'self- 
creation as a people'. This would be the perfect self-organiza- 
tion of Reason 
19 
Since, however, they had no recent experience of 'living 
together and common activity' 
20, their exodus from under the 
tyranny of their princes by way of 'common laws' 
21 
could not be 
spontaneous. Hence, according to Hegel, the need arose for a 
conqueror. Hegel described the task of such a conqueror as to 
make 'effective in actions his 'insight into necessity' 
22 The 
meaning of this phrase will be fully explained in the course of 
an analysis 
23 
of the introduction to the VSN, the final draft of 
which he wrote eighteen months later. It suffices here to indi- 
cate that he specified the idea of necessity, or of Reason 
perfectly organized in the shape of a people, as the 'necessary 
principle of the unity of the state' 
24, 
a form of organization 
given to Reason not by itself but by a political genius, such as 
were Theseus and Richelieu 
25. It will be made precisely clear 
in the sixth chapter that, as is apparent from its use here, the 
term 'necessity' refers not to something that cannot but be 
victorious but to that whose victory is sorely needed 
26. 
It may be supposed that by the summer of 1801, Hegel's mind 
was made up on the view, fully articulated only in the last 
paragraph which he wrote on the subject of the German Constitu- 
tion in the winter of 1802/03, that 'all wisdom in the organiza- 
tion of states' rests on the solution of the problem of 'disbelief 
in the power of law' 
27. From such disbelief, he argued, stems 
186. 
'the lack of wisdom which dithers between the necessity of giving 
supreme power to the state and the fear that individuals will be 
oppressed by its 
28. Just such timid and mistrustful dithering 
was the problem to which the 'Thesean solution' of the conclusion 
was addressed. As shall be demonstrated with reference to Hegel's 
debt to the ratio status tradition in German political thought 
29, 
the organization of legal community was conceived as the means to 
the end of mobilizing the ethical life of a multitude to the point 
of its concentration as the decisive ethical activity of a state. 
This was to be achieved via the animation of the ramshackle 
'building of the German constitution' by the 'spirit of the time, 
30 
or, as he later put it, by way of furnishing the vitality of the 
present day with knowledge of 'how to concentrate itself in laws, 
31. 
Only thus could there be a transition from the barbarity which 
consists in the fact that 'a multitude is a people without at the 
same time being a state' or, what ib the same, 'that the state 
and individuals exist in opposition and separation; that the 
regent is but a personal state-power; and that the refuge from 
his personality is, in its turn, only opposition of personality1 
32. 
In a civilized state, on the other hand, a national multitude may 
become truly a people, for in it the laws or universality 'stand 
between the personality of the Monarch and that of individuals ... 
The power of the laws solves the contradiction between the supreme 
authority of the state and the freedom of individuals from 
oppression' 
33. 
From the fact that in the midst of this passage Hegel made 
clear reference to the principle guod omnes tangit, ab omnibus 
approbeturdebet, and that it served as a bridge between his 
discussion of military, financial, and judicial powers and the 
subsequent discussion of representation, it should be quite 
evident what purpose he intended should be served by the conquering 
187. 
genius, whose features he composed in the image of Theseus and 
Richelieu: namely, the institution of a representative Rechtsstaat. 
It has frequently been questioned whether there is a consist- 
ent relation within and between the two aspects of the reform 
proposals contained in the conclusion to the VSN. Quite simply, 
in spite of ample textual evidence to the contrary, it has been 
supposed that Hegel so lacked commitment to the idea of a 
Rechtsstaat in which the power of the monarch would be constitu- 
tionally limited by representative institutions, that he opted 
for a solution to the 'fate of Germany' involving complete 
deference to the idea of the Machtstaat. It has been argued, 
eminently by Haym, that Hegel opted for the Machtstaat by default. 
Haym extended to the explanation of Hegel's stipulation of the 
necessity of a conqueror the view which he elaborated in his 
discussion of the Wuerttemberg fragment: that Hegel's uncert- 
ainty concerning the question from what mode of election an 
electoral college independent of the court was to be expected 
persisted in the Jena period, with the consequence that he viewed 
with despair the prospect of a realisation of his proposals to 
give an effective role to the Imperial Diet 
34. 
On the other hand, it has been argued by Rosenzweig that 
Hegel was in any case quite emphatically and positively on the 
side of the Machtstaat. The final chapter appeared to Rosenzweig 
as the logical rather than delinquent conclusion to the VSN, as 
the finishing touch to the 'tangible' but 'elusive' image of the 
'power-breathing' state impressed upon the pages of the intro- 
ductory chapters 
35. In Hegel's conclusion and introduction we 
are invited to discover, or rather feel, the 'impact of the times' 
upon the 'inner personal history of our hero' 
36 
and thus intuit-, 
ively to realise why Hegel paid such attention to military power 37. 
And the very reason is that Hegel selflessly, because he had 
188. 
'now grasped History', adopted towards his own reform wishes 
(Reformwünschen) 38, a 'hard unfeeling abnegation in the face 
of the previous course of things' 
39, taking the side of the 
'powers who are in a position to enforce the future: History 
itself, and great historical personalities' 
40. These great 
men the many (and in this Hegel differs from former advocates 
41 
of dictatorship and/or enlightened despotism), 'instead of freely 
concluding with one another a civil contract, obey rather against 
their will, because he (the great man) has on his side their 
unconscious will, the will which they will some day have: that 
is Hegel's new solution, 
42. 
Both explanations entirely miss the point of the relations 
between the two aspects of Hegel's reform proposals, and between 
the two dimensions of the first aspect. The first aspect consists, 
on the one hand, of suggestions concerning, as we have seen, what 
kind of constituencies are to be represented and what matters are 
to be devolved from the jurisdiction of the old provinces to the 
newly constituted Imperial Diet; on the other, of the argument 
that only a conqueror can give effect to such a 'revolutionary' 
derogation from some, albeit only some 
43, 
of the traditional 
prerogatives of the old estates. Of this aspect it should be 
noted, and will be shown, that the force of 'conquest' is intended 
to fall not on the 'people' who are innocent of primary guilt, 
but on the princes, and that this is to happen by means of a 
fragmentation of constellations of interest formerly in the control 
of princes 
44. For reasons which Hegel had outlined - to which 
attention will be addressed in the due course of the final 
chapter - their concertation of the interests of their subjects 
with their own was increasingly defective 
45, 
so that this partial 
revolution would itself be only partly revolutionary. 
The second aspect of the proposals consists of a discussion, 
189. 
not of constituencies and of jurisdiction, but of the composition, 
structure, internal relations and procedures of the proposed Diet. 
It is to be noted that Hegel - and here there is some point to 
Haym's criticism of his ambiguity on the question of what 'mode 
of election, 
46 
was to be preferred, though not the point intended 
by Haym - failed to make clear whether delegates to the Diet were 
to be directly elected by the 'people'; whether, if they are to 
be elected indirectly, all citizens are to have any part in the 
nomination of the electors and the eligible; whether, in that 
case, the electors are to be assembled in a body other than the 
traditional territorial Estates or not; and whether, if not, a 
real distinction is tenable between indirect nomination from 
(it is not specified by whom) the new constituencies and the old 
method whereby existing Estates Assemblies used to depute some 
of their members to the Imperial Diet. Failing to elaborate 
upon this issue, it would seem that Hegel left open to question 
the very realisation of his proposals for a Diet truly independ- 
ent of the traditional bastions of provincial sovereignty. The 
necessary pertinence of this issue to that end prohibits it to be 
argued that Hegel thought out the problem whether the new consti- 
tution of the Diet would render unproblematic at the Imperial 
level the question which had so troubled him with respect to the 
territorial level of representation: namely, whether the interests 
of the provinces (qua Landschaft) could be represented independ- 
ently of those of the provincial sovereigns. That he continued 
to be troubled thus in 1801 is evident from his admission that, 
'just as what nourishes a healthy body would only corrupt a sick 
one still further if it were given it, so the true and genuine 
principle that it is a territory (Landschaft) which confers the 
power and right of a"vote (in the Diet) has contributed all the 
more to the dissolution-of the German Empire now that it has been 
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introduced into it, 47 . Hegel may have supposed that his proposed 
reconstitution of the representative body would render it immune 
to the disease - the 'urge for isolation, 
48 
- which had afflicted 
the former Imperial Diet, but the very fact that he depended his 
'revolution' on developments (especially the increasing conscious- 
ness within the provinces of a territorial identity no less 
distinct despite the fact that it was no longer concentrated in 
the person of a prince) already in train renders it questionable 
whether he was right to hope that the contribution to dissolution 
already compounded by such developments would not be still further 
compounded. 
That this was a problem he could not satisfactorily resolve 
is all the more likely in view of the fact that he remained in a 
state of indecision concerning the power of the Cities Bench, 
which was to be the College in which were to be represented the 
new constituencies, to 'turn the scales' in the event of disagree- 
ment among the colleges and in the face of opposition either from 
the College of Princes or from the College of Electors 
49. His 
proposals then, though federalistic in appearance and theory, 
involved an implication of unresolved confederalistic elements. 
What is more, the fact that he countenanced at all the possibility 
that Free Imperial Knights might sit on the Cities Bench 
50 
suggests that he was prepared not to permit this College the kind 
of social homogeneity which, at the territorial level, especially 
in his native Wuerttemberg, had been one of the best guarantees 
of the independence of the Landschaft from territorial Herrschaft 
51 
However, the prohibition of dictation (of prepared statements 
52) 
by representatives in any College implies on Hegel's part a strong 
preference for free debate uninhibited by mandatory instruction. 
Hence it is possible that despite heterogeneity within the College 
of Cities, as between representatives, elected directly or 
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indirectly, and members ostensibly present in their personal 
capacity, but possibly as disguised delegates for some interest 
other than that of the Landschaft, Hegel expected (perhaps too 
ingenuously) no detraction from the free representation of the 
people. 
Be all these criticisms what they may, Hegel's fault here 
is one of omission. The ambiguities within the second aspect, 
and his failure there to resolve the problem of the electoral 
process to which he had failed adequately to attend within the 
terms of the first dimension of the first aspect do not have 
utterly vicious consequences for the general proposal for a re- 
constitution of Imperial representation. Hence there is no 
need to regard the second dimension of the first aspect as an 
alternative resort. He was rather too optimistic of the effect 
of his proposals for devolution than, as has been suggested by 
Haym and Rosenzweig, so riven by doubt or so merely wishful that 
he gave himself up, as to an end in itself alternative to his 
general proposals, to a solution of the decline of Germany in- 
volving resort to the ideal of a conquistadorial Nachtstaatsmann. 
Haym was correct to draw attention to Hegel's reservations about 
the possibility of an autonomous instrumentation of electoral 
practices to the end of instituting a representative body. 
Rosenzweig, too, was right to argue that Hegel rejected the poss- 
ibility of a free option on the part of competent authors, either 
for their spontaneous self-creation as a people by way of rational 
invention of a representative organisation or for their willing 
submission to a leviathan. But they both, because of their 
failure properly to understand that the purpose of the political 
genius whom Hegel considered indispensable was to overcome the 
'dithering' of a people afflicted by a spirit of 'disbelief in 
the power of the laws' to solve the contradiction between the 
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personalities of the sovereign and the subject, construed Hegel's 
argument to mean that he preferred, as a means to German recovery, 
a community of subjection to power over a 'living together' 53 of 
citizens (including the monarch) equally subject to legal commun- 
ity; and to mean that his scepticism concerning the spontaneous 
'capacity of the Germans to institute a common social life depend- 
ent upon the practice of representation caused him to despair of, 
or to dispense with, the proposed end of a constitution devoted 
to representative government. 
Their misconstruction of his argument turns on their equal 
misunderstanding of what Hegel meant to convey in the final 
sentence of the VSN: 'The concept and the insight (of and into 
necessity) carries (sic) against itself something so mistrustful 
that it (sic) must be validated by force and only then does man 
submit to it (sic)' 
54. The mere idea of necessity, even when 
acknowledged, is not in itself enough to cause men to give it 
effect. Hegel here deployed the idea of mistrust in the same 
way as he had that of timidity in the seminal fragment, the WSS. 
There he wrote of diffidence in the face of change as of a con- 
science intimidated, or, its corollary, a cupidity seduced, into 
commitment to the present, or respect for the restrictive limits 
of the old life. Just as he had attributed this timidity to 
passionate devotion to property and to passive contemplation and 
enjoyment of a servile little world, so in 1801 he yoked the idea 
of servile subjection to that of ignorance of the idea of common 
laws as a means to living together and common activity 
55. So, 
in his conclusion, he wrote of popular mistrust of the idea of 
necessity as of a consequence of compulsive attention to self- 
interest. This mistrust he later called disbelief in the power 
of law 
56, which disbelief was said, as in 1799/1800, to disable 
men from accomplishing anything against the prevailing regime, to 
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confine them to the particularity against particularity 57 of 
ephemeral violence and to taking refuge, as he was to put it in 
1803, in opposition of personality to personal state-power 
58, the 
effect of which was to compound both timidity and cupidity. And 
just as in the WSS Hegel had positively affirmed that spontaneous 
revolt must relapse into timidity, and that no purpose but the 
enhancement of "loss of faith' 
59 in law as such could be served 
by popular sedition, so in his conclusion to the VSN he denied 
that, without a conqueror, the necessary foundation for his ideal 
of the Rechtsstaat could be laid. 
To make 'a clearer consciousness more universal, 
60 
among 
the masses of the invalidity of the pretensions of the prevailing 
regime would be counterproductive. It has been true, Hegel 
insisted, even when the idea of unification 'has accorded with 
the general culture of the day, 
61 (as purveyed by poets and 
philosophers or as instinctively felt by whole peoples 
62), that 
its coming to pass 'has never been the fruit of deliberation but 
only of force' 
63. For the idea of a national union was so alien 
to the 'common people of Germany, together with their Estates 
Assemblies, which know of nothing at all but the division of the 
German people, 
64, that they 'would have to be collected together 
into one mass by the power of a conqueror; they would have to be 
compelled to regard themselves as belonging to Germany, 
65; that, 
indeed, the deliberations of Estates Assemblies as presently con- 
stituted might achieve no more than the very aggravation of their 
self-interest, sectarian opinion and faithlessness to the law. 
It was because of the vacillation of the Germans between 
tiinidity and cupidity that Hegel stipulated the need for a single 
man sufficiently disinterested, like Theseus, to 'have the mag- 
nammity to grant to the people he would have had to shape out of 




like Richelieu, sufficiently resolute 'to bear the hatred with 
which ... great men have been laden who have wrecked men's private 
and particular interests' 
67. In Germany the spirit of self- 
interest, or social particularism, compounded and exploited by 
separatism, or political particularism 
68, had so distorted man's 
social nature and compelled him to throw himself into idiocy 
69, 
that this nature, become so deeply inverted, dissipated its 
strength upon this repudiation of others and in the affirmation 
of its characteristic seclusion sank into madness. This madness 
is 'nothing other than the total alienation of the individual 
from his kind' 70. This bondage to idiotic interests had not 
gone so far in Germany as it had, in Hegel's view, among the 
Jewish nation in which he had descried the same tendency. But 
it had preempted the individuation of self as 'absolutely free 
being' 71 , intent upon its realisation in the idea of a state, 
sufficiently to deprive the personality of capacity for 'living 
together' 72 or 'common social life' 
73 deliberately and self- 
consciously concentrated in 'common laws' 
74. Particulate 
'character' and its abstract activity had become so intimately 
bound up with the personality that insight into the necessary 
principle of the unity of the state and of legal community was 
too weak in itself, too timid, despite the distinct feeling that 
violence was being done to social nature, to become 'effective in 
action' 
75 
against the lawless dominion of the old life. 
To make the idea of legal community effective in action, 
which is ideally the self-creative deed enactive of the emotion 
of 'whole peoples' 
76 is, under the circumstance that the people 
has no individuality, a task which must devolve on the single agent 
of 'great character' 
77, to whom it falls to validate the 'truth- 
claim' of the better life by force. But this force cannot be 
supposed to be alien to the life to which it is intended to give 
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organisation and law. To effect necessity is to bring life to 
thought in law and thought to life 
78 in the organisation of 
Reason as a people 
79. It is to make the present and the absent 
converge in actuality, to make the ethical effective (wirklich) 
or valid. The law in which ethical life becomes ethical activity, 
though not susceptible of spontaneous creation, cannot be merely 
extraneous to the present, for life could not in that case respond 
to it. The goal is to be achieved by 'freeing consciousness from 
its limitations' 80 so that the sensible quest, the need deeply 
and distinctly felt 
81, 
may become intelligent. Else this happen, 
there shall emerge a machine state, not one of communion between 
intelligence and sensibility, but of coercion by a 'community of 
rational beings' of a 'life impoverished multitude' 
82. 
Seen thus, from the point of view of the closely contemporary 
DS, the stipulation of the need for a conqueror is not made as of 
a need for an alternative to law. Nor is conquest exactly a 
means to law, -as we shall shortly see. Rather it is law itself, 
'vindicative' 
83 for ethical life of the truth with which it is 
instinct. It is the activity which life has not yet attained, 
but with which it is pregnant. 
The limitations from which consciousness is to be freed are 
those imposed upon the latent universality of the Empire by its 
princes. It is against princes, as Hegel was to make clear in 
his introduction, and in his interpretation of Machiavelli's 
'Prince', that conquest by the power of law was to be directed. 
Their undoing would be the making of their tribes, whose capacity 
. 
for self-creation as an organized people would thereby be liberated. 
This is what Hegel meant by the requirement that the conqueror, in 
order to effect unification, should give his people what it could 
not, give itself, 'a share in matters that affect everyone' (quod 
omnes, tangit) 
84, 
which would have to be by way of 'some form of 
organization' 
85. Though he called him who could grant this 
196.. 
share a 'Theseus' (and though he invited comparison of the 
Germans with primitive tribes) 
86, he immediately implied that 
mere martial heroism was not to be looked for. Since the 
Germans, prey to the spirit of social particularism, lacked the 
naive sense of community which stood for the tribal Greeks in 
the stead of individuality self-consciously intent upon the idea 
of community, they needed, not charismatic leadership, but genius 
of quite another kind. The nature of this genius resembled much 
more closely that of Richelieu than that of Theseus. 'Since a 
democratic constitution like the one Theseus gave to his own 
people is self-contradictory in modern times and in large states' 
87, 
the form of organisation granted must be of the representative 
kind designed to deal with a political and social particularism 
not encountered by Theseus. Representation is fitted, according 
to Hegel's conception of it, to negate the political effect of 
the spirit of privacy in a manner otherwise impossible in the 
modern world. And it was to Richelieu that Hegel gave credit 
for such an achievement. The weight of Hegel's concept of genius 
rests, therefore, on the ideal-type, not of Theseus, but of 
Richelieu. 
This has significant implications for the question whether 
the 'force' exerted by the genius is supposed to be directed 
against the people as such. Hegel seems always to have thought, 
with respect to the synoecism effected among the warring tribes 
of Attica, that Theseus had simply to transpose their sense of 
natural community to Athens. This entailed coercion of the very 
national identity of these tribes, already peoples at heart. It 
was not that the tribal folk felt a sense of belonging to a 
community other than that of a prospective Athens but that they 
were other, for they participated immediately in communal deeds 
88 
Theseus had actually, by devising a religious pantheon, to make 
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of them a new people who would likewise not belong to, but would 
be Athens. Athens had to be small enough to permit this trans- 
position of natural community. It had to be a direct democracy. 
This achieved, Theseus could be dispensed with, repaid with in- 
gratitude, the spirit (which arises in company with the substan- 
tial kind of republican sentiment) some simile of which, such as 
faith in and respect for the law, Hegel hoped could be breathed 
into the Germans 89 
Precisely because a German conqueror would have to deal with 
persons who felt that they belonged to their provinces rather than 
with peoples already extant who felt that they were their provinces, 
the obstacles in his way were political rather than primarily 
communal. Hence it was that the creation of the Germans into a 
people would not involve their assumption of a radically new 
identity. They would, in matters of religion, for instance, 
remain what they had been. The plurality which prevailed in such 
matters of custom need not be effaced, so long as law could give 
intelligibility to the long abused custom of representation 
900 
For the Germans to be 'compelled to regard themselves as belonging 
to Germany' would not be a total revolution, except for those who 
regarded their patria as indivisible from their being, namely the 
princes. Of course for these, the revolution in political rela- 
tions would be felt as total. The same would apply, to be sure, 
to those interests which felt that the state belonged to them, not 
they to the state. But it was this feeling that representative 
government was intended to deny them, of whatever estate they 
might be. Bourgeois self-interest was considered by Hegel to be 
tolerable, nay even virtuous, so long as it did not become the 
principle of the constitution. That it should not, that none 
should think themselves to be or to own the state as if it were 
a patrimony was the condition upon which the Germans, from first 
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regarding themselves as belonging to one state, would find in its 
law and organization a mediate simulacrum of their freedom and a 
recovery in its deeds of the sense of activity supposedly vouch- 
safed immediately to the Athenians. For its deeds in matters 
that affect all would have to be approved by all, so that none 
would feel them to be exclusively done by some. Among the 
Germans, too, particular persons were to be made to count for 
nothing beside their legal organisation, to be treated ungratefully. 
What we have so far called social particularism, as distinct 
from political particularism, might better be distinguished, as 
an inevitable consequence of modern economic life with which 
Hegel did not think it realistic or meaningful to take issue, by 
the less opprobrious team, social individualism. For in itself, 
the inclination of the burgher to pursue his own interest need not 
take him so far as idiotically to seclude himself. On the 
contrary, Hegel was to write of it as of something conducive to 
vitality, a contented mind, free and self-respecting self- 
awareness, ease, welfare and honesty 
91. Whether social individ- 
ualism was effective in economic life, as what Carl Schmitt had 
contemptuously called 'possessive individualism', against which 
he mistakenly supposed Hegel's NRS to be the first major polemic 
of modern political theory 
92, 
or in such private matters of 
opinion as religion, Hegel had no axe to grind against it so long 
as it was not exploited for purposes inimical to the integrity of 
the state. So long as the spirit of the bourgeoisie is 'kept to 
one side', as Hegel put it in the NRS 
939 it can be regarded as 
innocuous. But should it be used, as Hegel believed it had been, 
particularly in its religious aspect, by the German princes, who 
pretended that their withdrawal from the sovereignty of the 
Empire was for the sake of the liberty of their subjects, social 
individualism is harmful. It passes over, in that case, into 
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the form of what it is appropriate, because, as we shall see, 
Hegel characterised the autarkic behaviour of certain princes as 
motivated by a 'bourgeois principle' 
94, to call 'possessive 
particularism'. Only when intruded, writ large, in political 
affairs does the pursuit of self-interest deserve to be deni- 
grated as particularist. It is so far from being the case that 
Hegel wished to polemicise against possessive individualism that, 
in a part of the VSN composed after the NRS, he was to attempt, 
as we may suppose, to persuade possessive individualists to be 
on their guard against possessive particularists for this reason: 
that 'if the state lose all its authority, while yet the individ- 
ual's ownership rests on the power of the state, the ownership of 
those who have no support but the state's power - which is 
equally null - must be very shaky' 
95. 
There is, to be sure, a sense in which Hegel regarded the 
removal of political obstacles to German unity as involving a 
fundamental revolution in the hearts of German burghers, a change 
in their personalities such that their potentially utter social 
particularism, or alienation from their kind, would be held in 
check in order to fit them for common social life. But what 
really mattered to him was to ensure that so far as men were 
private-spirited, this weakness would not contaminate their 
public life; that social individualism, especially as manipulated 
by political separatists, would not issue in faithlessness to the 
idea of public law, in the abuse of the state-power for private 
purposes. His intention was, simply, that the bourgeois sense 
should be kept in its proper place. It figured for him primarily 
as an aspect of political culture which was certainly pernicious 
to community but whose effect to this consequence depended upon 
another variable, the ambitions of princes. This being so, it 
is understandable why in his specification of the nature of 
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the nature of political genius, he attended, as far as concerned 
Germany, to statesmen whose work had consisted only incidentally 
in the reconstitution of social character but primarily in the 
emasculation of political parties which took advantage of that 
in the political culture of citizens which was weak and mistrust- 
ful. Hence the priority of Richelieu over Theseus. Hence too, 
Hegels remarkable reinterpretation of the role of Machiavelli's 
'Cesare Borgia' in the political life of Italy. 
2. The Vicar of the Whole 
Hegel's interpretation of Machiavelli differed substantially 
from the view of Herder, at that time commonplace, that the 
Florentine Secretary'pictured the prince as a creature of his 
species, according to the inclinations, drives and the whole 
habitat in which he dwelt' 
96. In the VSN Machiavelli is said 
to have 'grasped with cool circumspection the necessary idea of 
the salvation of Italy through its unification in one state' 
97. 
Hegel followed Herder in repudiating the trite opinion that 
Machiavelli was either a 'satirist' or a 'damnable doctor' to 
princes or a 'weak-minded something-in-between' 
98. Thus he 
praised Machiavelli as having had a 'genuinely political head 
endowed with an intellect of the highest and noblest kind', 
discharged him of any fault of 'baseness of heart' and 'frivolity 
of mind' and scoffed at the well-intentioned wish of his moral- 
istic and 'wily public' to regard Machiavelli's works, 'the whole 
thing', as 'ingenious persiflage and irony' 
99. His judgments, 
based not only on the Prince, differed from those of Herder in 
that he appears to have been deliberately intent on distinguish- 
ing his from the behavioural-historicist interpretation by Herder 
of Machiavelli's intentions: 'With strict logic he (Machiavelli) 
pointed out the way necessitated more by this salvation than by 
3m 
the corruption and blind folly_ of the time' 
100 Hegel took it 
that Machiavelli, like himself, regarded the ill-effect of personal 
or moral culture as dependent upon the intentions of perfectly 
responsible political agents, whom he dubbed 'criminals' or 
exalted as men of political genius. Their culpable or laudable 
responsibility was not allowed by Hegel to be obscured by historical 
circumstances, and it was to salvation from attributable crimin- 
ality, not from habitual and general corruption as such, that 
Machiavelli's genius and that of his heroes was addressed. 
Despite his admission that it is 'utterly senseless to treat 
the execution of an idea directly created out of an insight into 
the Italian situation as a compendium of moral and political 
principles applicable indifferently to any and every situation 
i. e. to none' 
101, Hegel saw a close analogy between the contemp- 
orary German condition and the former situation of Italy which 
'has had the same course of fate as Germany,, except that Italy, 
since development had gone further there at an earlier period, 
brought its fate earlier to the complete fulfilment which Germany 
is now encountering' 
102. Although, in Hegel's opinion, the 
analogues are not symmetrical, mere temporal distance furnishes 
insufficient grounds to deny their commensurability. Germany's 
was not 'any' situation. Apart from the superficial aspect of 
the similarity between Machiavelli's 'Italy' and Hegel's 'Germany', 
that each had become a 'battlefield for the wars which foreign 
princes waged on its soil' 
103, Hegel grounded his analogy on 
their like exhibition of a constitutional inertia stemming from 
their participation in a common Imperial tradition. This was the 
tradition of distribution of sovereignty according to principles 
of private rather than public law, in such a way as to make it an 
object, qua heritable patrimony, of partisan litigation. His 
intention was to show that the submission to the Imperial Courts 
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of disputes over territorial succession and accession was bound 
to give rise to civil wars and so to involve foreign powers in 
the making of decisions proper to the sovereignty of the Emperor 
and Diet, because it encouraged interested parties to regard the 
outcome, since litigation over a matter implies the indifference 
to one another of the issue and the public interest, as an affair 
upon which it was legitimate to exercise their influence 'accord- 
ing to their own understanding and good intentions' 
104. Such 
matters come, in that case, necessarily to be played 'out of the 
judicial into the political sphere' 
105 
and to be submitted to 
the contingencies of greater and lesser power. This being so, 
if the coercive power of the Empire, i. e. the Emperor and Diet, 
is inferior to that of one or more of its member estates the 
unacknowledged fact is manifest that 'the whole principle of the 
constitution is overturned' 
106. 
The proper institution and maintenance of the state depends 
upon preservation of the distinction between its authority and 
objects of rights, i. e. private property. For, in Hegel's view, 
private property and the power of private persons (a category 
including estates such as Brandenburg, the chief target of his 
strictures) are, or rather their increase is, a matter of chance, 
of arbitrariness 
107, If it leaves matters affecting its 
sovereignty to the contingency of judicial decision and execution, 
the state gives notice that it has foregone its otherwise tenable 
independence of chance, its quality of being an 'abiding, fixed 
centre' 
108. Germany was no state because its fixed centre had 
been disturbed by subjection to 'forensic treatment' 
109 
of 
matters touching state sovereignty. So too Machiavelli's Italy 
was no state: 'As little were two states considered as one whose 
monarchs used occasionally to select a third as arbiter to settle 
their disputes, or in general had a common justice at the papal 
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throne, just as little can what is called imperial justice, and 
the related financial organization, be held to constitute Germany 
one state' 
110. What Hegel wanted to make of this analogy may 
be inferred from his argument that it was inappropriate to call 
Italy's situation 'anarchy'. This was framed in terms 111 so 
similar to those which he used elsewhere to repudiate Voltaire's 
application of that word to Germany, namely that its epithet is 
predicable only of one state, rather than of relations between 
several estates which had achieved effective sovereignty by 
taking advantage of the arbitrative procedures of private law, 
that it cannot but be supposed that he attributed 'Italy's sit- 
uation' to the same cause as had given rise to that of Germany. 
This cause was the 'criminality' of ambitious princes. 
The criminality of one prince in particular, Frederick the Great, 
was argued by Hegel to be the motive of his hostility to him 
whom Hegel enlisted in his defence of public law against the 
solvent effects of private interests. According to Hegel, it 
is worth noting that a'modern monarch, whose whole life and 
actions have expressed most clearly the dissolution of the 
German state into independent states, made this Machiavelli 
the subject of his academic exercise' 
112 The duplicity of 
Brandenburg was permitted, in Hegel's view, by the fact that, 
though in theory Imperial laws had established the principle 
that disputes over accession of and succession to territorial 
sovereignty 'should be hailed before the Emperor and Empire, 
therefore must be decided through the legislature, not the 
judicial authority' 
113, the effective principle of the consti- 
tution, Praxis, i. e. expediency had always decided otherwise. 
Praxis had applied likewise in the negation of public authority 
by the entry of member-estates, in the prosecution of their 
patrimonial interests, into alliances with foreign states. 
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This happened regardless of the reservation in the Peace of 
Westphalia, which permitted this intrusion of international law 
into the proper sphere of public law, that such treaties should 
not 'contradict duties towards the Emperor and Empire' 
114. 
Thus, the German Empire had 'no guarantee against several German 
territories becoming unified in the hands of a single house, with 
complete legality, through inheritance' 
115 
and its sovereignty 
was mocked by the cunning politics of the artful dodger. 
The condition to which Germany had been brought Hegel expressed 
in the concept of a 'Gedankenstaat' 
116. Hegel employed this 
concept to specify a fiction, that the Empire is indeed a state, 
which confers upon the power of the prince in his territory the 
authority stemming from his ostensible allegiance to the public 
authority, yet is powerless really to enforce that allegiance. 
The fact is that 'Germany' was not a state, for purposes of 
princely Praxis, while yet it was a state - again, for purposes 
of princely Praxis. It was, to be precise, an ideological 
structure providing for the security of private property - that 
of the princes - and the legitimation of the power politics of 
'parties' constituted as states within the state. While Hegel 
declined, in the cases of Italy and Germany, to call this 
situation 'anarchy', because there ins in reality no state in 
either, he was prepared to castigate its manifestations - 
territorial consolidation at the expense of imperial sovereignty, 
alliances with foreign powers etc. - as the 'greatest crime$ 
117 
against the 'state', chiefly perpetrated by Brandenburg, though 
the 'Austrian party' was not without blemish either. These 
'parties', the German and the Austrian, Hegel compared, 'with 
modifications arising from altered circumstances' 
118 to the 
Guelphs and Ghebellines. The problem is, to determine why, in 
the very absence of a state, Hegel was prepared to speak of what, 
205. 
on his own terms, presupposes the existence of a state, namely 
the crime of 'engineering anarchy' 
119. 
Of this apparent anomaly, which Hegel did not think he needed 
to explain, between the propositions that neither of Italy nor of 
Germany is the epithet 'anarchic' predicable and that, neverthe- 
less, parties to disputes who call on foreign powers are yet to 
be spoken of as parties to civil wars, the 'fate of being the 
theatre' 120 of which was common to Italy and Germany, and are 
guilty in this of the 'worst of crimes', of the height of 
malevolence' 
121 towards the state, the explanation lies in 
Hegel's assumption that it is meaningful to speak of the state 
sub specie futuritatis. It is in view of a prospective legal 
order, an organization of ethical activity to be vindicated for 
the present, that it may be said, not that a deed is, but that it 
is like, a crime. The said anomaly is thus merely apparent. 
For what Hegel argued was that the heinous deed in question has 
in all ages been regarded 'as a crime' 
122, 'if there could still 
be any question of punishment when the state was in its death 
throes' 123. The 'crime' is against what the 'state' could be, 
but, in consequence of it, is not. It is likewise against what 
the 'state' will be, i. e. a legal order. In this tense period 
in the pathology of the 'state', when 'life is on the brink of 
decay, it can be reorganized only by a procedure involving the 
maximum of force' 
124 
In this light, what Neinecke has called Hegel's 'high handed 
juridical argument' 
125 in secondment of Machiavelli's. justifica- 
tion of Cesare Borgia seems perfectly intelligible. Dismissing 
platitudes such as 'that the end does not justify the means126, 
Hegel argued that to 'engineer anarchy is the supreme or perhaps 
the only crime against the state, because all crimes of which the 
state has to take account are concentrated in this. Those who 
assail the state directly, and not indirectly as other criminals 
206. 
I 
do, are the greatest criminals, and the state has no higher duty 
than to maintain itself and crush the power of those criminals 
in the surest way it can' 
127. There can, in such circumstances, 
'be no question of any choice of means' 
128. 
The state's 
execution of this supreme duty is 'not a means; it is punishment; 
or if punishment were itself a means, then every infliction of 
punishment on any and every criminal would have to be called 
detestable and every state would be in the position of using 
detestable means, death or long imprisonment, for the sake of 
129 its own maintenance' 
If this interpretation is problematic, in that the equation 
of conquistadorial violence with penal justice presupposes a 
source of obligation upon the prince which renders his election 
of means rather a duty - albeit perfect only in the future - than 
a choice, that is because Hegel explicitly depended his argument on 
'The Prince' alone. The concern of that book, being above all 
with the conduct of the new prince, is not to justify his action 
by the allegation of criminality against his state on the part of 
opponents. Since Hegel can scarcely have been ignorant of the 
fact that 'The Prince'was largely concerned with the foundation of 
the state ab initio, it must be supposed that his interpretation 
of Borgia as a vicar of what once was and is to come was guided 
by an assimilation of the overt purpose and historical specifi- 
city of that work to the broader meaning of Machiavelli's 'other 
genuinely idealistic demands' 
130. Borgia is described, consist- 
ently with what Machiavelli wrote in Book XI of'The Prince', as 
being 'merely an instrument for the founding of a state' 
131. 
Such foundation has the significance not of origination but of 
performing for the necessary idea of the state a task for which 
it had been rendered incompetent by the power of factions. 
This estimation of the role of Borgia, as being instrumental 
207. 
in the salvation of statehood, rather than original in its 
foundation, and as marking an epoch in its pathological history 
in which it depends on vicarious action on its behalf in the 
matter of punishment, is indicative of Hegel's intention to 
interpret 'The Prince' in the light of the fundamental problem 
of the 'Discourses', the restoration of the state to its original 
principle in the face of the ambition of private citizens to 
attain a standing, with the backing of sects, 'akin to that of 
a prince' 
132, but without the legitimation of constitutional 
law. Borgia was a 'genius' 
133 
capable of averting 'the fate 
of a people which hastens to its political downfall' 
134. By 
political genius, Hegel meant a quality of inexorable decisive- 
ness that manifests itself when the state, which ought to sustain 
and be sustained by a people's ethical activity is no longer its 
fit vehicle but is merely a legal monument to its past life, 
power, development and activity 
135. The genius is the vicarious 
embodiment-of a people's ethos and is, by virtue of the linkage 
of his personality with the principle, necessary to the existence 
of any multitude as a people, of the 'unity of the state' 
136, 
alone able to reintegrate it as a legal 'whole' 
137in 
which the 
vitality of the present can know 'how to concentrate itself' 
138. 
To this end he is ready to endure the hatred with which they have 
been saddled who have 'wrecked men's private and particular 
interests' 139. 
We have already, in the first chapter, seen what a strong 
influence of Machiavelli upon Hegel's early concept of genius may 
be detected in his theological writings 
140. The possibility 
that Hegel depended heavily upon the 'Discourses' is more certain 
as regards the JSN than in the case of the VSN 
141. However, the 
argument of the WSS that change, to be effective, must be adapted 
to the character of the people among whom it would be introduced, 
208. 
while yet it must so affront that character that its introduction 
involves the use of force, is close to Machiavelli's views concern- 
ing the capacity of composite bodies to change. Their capacity 
is inhibited by the predisposition of their 'material to ignore 
the warnings, concerning the gradual rise of 'inconveniences', of 
even their most perspicuous members 
142. The need therefore 
arises for saving genius, be it in the form of the virtue of some 
individual or of an institution or of laws given by some individual, 
while yet that individual must adapt his conduct to the times 
143. 
The resemblance is sufficiently close to permit it to be supposed 
that Hegel's purpose in invoking the name of Machiavelli in the 
VSN was to yoke the image of the genius to the concept of ethical 
activity, meaning the standing of the state in harmonious relation 
to the customary life of its subjects but, no less, the with- 
standing of their inclination to make the public authority sub- 
servient to private interests and, thus, of their fatal impulse 
to dissociate. 
To the end of solving the dilemma involved in this posture, it 
was necessary to express the purpose of genius as that, not of a 
lawless conquistador, but of a vindicator or validator of legal order. 
It was his espousal of the principle, ignored in practice by his 
detractors, that 'freedom is possible only when a people is united 
into a state by legal bonds' 
144, 
which attracted Hegel to Machiavelli 
and guided his understanding of Borgia. To derive legal concentri- 
city from polycentric customary life was the objective which Hegel 
believed he had in common with Machiavelli. 
Though Hegel invited identification with the tradition of 
ratio status, with the*German variant of which his general 
conception of legally bound ethical activity will shortly be 
shown to be in conformity,. his image of genius, even in associa- 
tion with the figure of Cesare Borgia, is not to be taken to 
209. 
signify sympathy on his part with a 'power-breathing' image of 
statesmanship inimical to the interests of the subject 
145. 
This is all the more evident from his concluding reference 
to Richelieu as the ideal-type of his statesman, and from the 
appraisal of Richelieu which immediately preceded and conditioned 
his appreciation of Machiavelli's 'Borgia'. Following one of 
his favourite pragmatic historians, Johannes von Mueller 
146, 
Hegel discounted from his 'Richelieu-portrait' any suspicion of 
libido dominandi and sought the impersonal causes that made him 
effective in his pursuit of the end of attaining for France 'a 
centre in which all power is concentrated and which is bound by 
laws freely determined' 
147. Richelieu did not, and this made 
his example particularly relevant to the salvation of a confess- 
ionally divided community for which no Thesean pantheon could be 
devised, direct his energies towards the coercion of social 
character. Rather, he attacked political obstacles to the unity 
of the state. Just as Borgia's genius was to be argued to 
consist in punitive action against criminal factions, out of a 
sense of obligation to the absent ideal of the state, so the 
genius of Richelieu's character was located in his dispassionate 
devotion to the principle of the unity of the state, the necessity 
of which enabled him to prevail over the passional antagonism of 
his opponents to the idea of public law 
148. The nobility and 
the Huguenots were, innocently or wittingly, criminals, inasmuch 
as each impugned the authority of the law. The former sought to 
make themselves 'immediate subjects of the monarchy', to be 
preferred, above the laws, as a medium between the monarch and 
the individual 
149. The latter simply 'formed a sort of 
sovereign state' complete with armies, fortified towns and 
independent foreign relations 
150: they threatened to achieve 
the kind of independence which was to render Germany a 'Staat aus 
210. 
Staaten' 151 and, precisely because they did so, incited the 
innocent insubordination of the nobility towards the law. 
These guilty and primarily innocent parties were vanquished by 
Richelieu's destruction of the public effect of their private 
interests. But Richelieu's genius did not assault private 
interest as such: 'Though he annihilated the Huguenots' state, 
he left them freedom of conscience, worship, civil and political 
rights ... From this epoch ... there dates the period of the 
power and the wealth of the state and the free and lawful prosp- 
erity of the individual' 
152 
. 
Hegel delighted in the irony, though certainly not in the 
consequences, of Richelieu's raisons dletat, whereby he depressed 
the principe of autarky in France and elevated it in Germany. 
By the Peace of Westphalia (1648), Richelieu's policy, carried 
out by Mazarin, embodied in the German Constitution the principles 
of cuiusregio, eius religio 
153, 
according to which the personal 
religion of the prince was deemed to be that of his Landschaft, 
so that the. confessional interests of the latter failed to be 
distinctly represented in the Imperial Diet, and of itio in partes 
154, 
This principle legalised the procedure whereby the corpora 
155 
eyan elicorum et catholicorum 9 to which the princes affiliated 
themselves, and likewise their territories from which they were 
not legally distinct, henceforth settled disputes, not by sub- 
mitting them to the majority decision of the legislature 
156, but 
to the arbitrative processes of the judicial authorities and thus,. 
ultimately, to diplomatic negotiations whose outcome depended 
upon the power of de facto sovereign estates rather than upon the 
public authority of the 'Emperor and Empire'. Power-politics, 
and suspicion of the hegemonic pretensions of the House of 
Hapsburg, conspired to extend the application of the principle 
of itio in partes beyond its proper limitation to 'questions in 
211. 
which religion was involved' 
157, 
and so to extend, to all 
manner of affairs other than religious, the effect of the lack of 
distinction, in the Imperial Diet, between the confessional 
interest of the prince and that of his subjects. 
The greater irony is, however, that Hegel tacitly turned 
against the political outlook of von Mueller, one of his mentors 
in the pragmatic practice of historical explanation, the very 
idea of the genius which Richelieu had displayed. Von Mueller 
was among the protagonists of the League of Princes, formed by 
Frederick II of Prussia to resist the allegedly hegemonic 
aspirations of Joseph II. Accordingly, he could consistently 
regard Richelieu as the benefactor not only of France, in that 
he had secured the unity of the state in that country, but also 
of Germany, precisely because he had made prevail there the 
eutarkic principle which he had suppressed in France 158. Hegel 
was convinced that Mueller's fundamental presuppositions, that 
Prussia was the natural guardian of religious freedom and that 
Austria's ambition for universal monarchy rendered her the 
natural enemy of freedom of conscience, were not tenable and 
that, therefore, without danger to the customary life of the 
estates, the same work of genius done in France by Richelieu 
could be done in Germany by a statesman of the same kind: a 
conqueror whose person would be identified with the necessary 
principle of the unity of a state in which all power is concent- 
rated and which is bound by laws freely determined 
159. This 
would be the whole or integral state to whose genuine legality 
and universality Hegel had looked forward in the WSS. Austria's 
candidacy for the title to be acclaimed as the integral state 
would, to, be sure, be inimical to the political particularism 
which Hegel argued to be the cause of the perdition of the 
'original character' 
160 
of the Germans in the abysmal fate of 
212. 
their dissolution as a people 
161 
. But it would, by that very 
token, be congenial to the proper development of the 'german 
character' 
162 to the true conception of freedom with which 
'public opinion' 
163 
or 'general culture' 
164 
was increasingly 
instinct. Before we come to consider the grounds upon which 
Hegel gave the palm to Austria, claiming to show the 'necessity' 
of the 'system of events' which the pragmatic historian was 
committed to discover, rather than to complain of arbitrariness 
and victimisation by libido dominandi, it would be well to lay 
the ghost of the identity of the genius whose 'necessity' Hegel 
stipulated. On this matter turns the question whether Hegel's 
claim to have analysed scientifically or philosophically the 
course of German history can be sustained. 
A great deal of ink has been wastefully spilt, ever since 
Rosenkranz averred that Hegel wanted to become a 'German 
Machiavelli' 
165, 
on the spurious question, To whom was Hegel 
addressing his 'appeal'? Dilthey was the first to be seduced: 
he nominated Napoleon Bonaparte 
166. Rosenzweig thought it 
implausible, in view of the evidence that Hegel looked to Austria 
for the regeneration of the Holy Roman Empire, that an enemy of 
that country could have been in his mind 
167: 
so far, so good. 
But to suggest what has subsequently been generally accepted 
168, 
that Archduke Charles of Austria was the 'addressee' is to make 
an equally unwarranted guess. For, in 1801, in the course of 
the critique, already referred to, of the assumption that abiding 
authority can be founded upon the submission to 'forensic treat- 
ment' . 
169 of matters affecting the sovereignty of the state, 
Hegel had referred to the 'summons' 
170 
of the Estates to the 
defence of the Empire, issued by Archduke Charles in 1799 and 
1800, wherein he had depended the union of the Empire upon the 
hope of its achievement through the good offices of the Imperial 
.. 213. 
Courts. Hegel, of course, could have no truck with such hopes 171. 
He may have admired the Archduke's military prowess, but he 
clearly doubted his political sense. The fact is that Hegel 
thought the uttering of exhortations, whether to or by great 
patriots, a sign of 'zeal, to be sure, but at the same time 
1? 2 (of) the folly of unnecessary effort' . As for Hegel's 
supposed wish to play a 'Machiavelli' to the Archduke's-'Lorenzo', 
it must be said that Hegel did not want his own voice to die 
away 'without effect' 
173, like the final chapter of 'The Prince'. 
So far as he emulated Machiavelli, it was not his 'genuine 
sincerity' 
174 
or patriotic zeal that he particularly admired 
but the 'strict logic' 175 with which he pointed out the 
necessary - meaning the only possible - way to sorely needed 
salvation 
176. It was his 'political science', not his 
'patriotism' that Hegel sought to follow. Hegel nowhere 
addressed an appeal to any putative conqueror. Unlike the final 
chapter of Machiavelli's 'Prince', his conclusion is not in the 
vocative case. Nor does it have the illocutionary force of an 
invocation. It contains no more and, what is more important, 
no less, than the formulation of a conditional prediction - not 
a prophecy -, based upon a 'universal statement of non-existence' 
prohibitive of an'existential statement' 
177 
such as, 'Germany 
has the capacity to be unified without force'. Thus: no event 
of kind (u), where (u) stands for unification of a people that 
knows of nothing but division, has ever been the fruit of delib- 
eration, but only of force. Therefore, if Germany, whose 
'people' is in such a condition, is to be united, the power of 
a conqueror is indispensable 
178. 
None of this should be taken to suggest that Hegel intended 
to adopt the stance of an indifferent social scientist. The 
point is simply that, on his assumption that the Germans lacked 
214. 
the capacity deliberately and spontaneously to enact their latent 
potential for common social life, a project which he undoubtedly 
thought worthy, the capacity to give it effect in action had to 
be - could only be - that of a genius. Hegel surely always 
believed that 'ought' implies 'can'. To stipulate the need for 
'power' was not, therefore, as Haym gratuitously supposed, an 
'intimation of despair' 
179 
on his part of the 'value' of the 
legal organisation which he proposed but, on the contrary, a 
condition of belief in its validity. It should never be forgotten 
that he had taken care to argue that the 'power' of any conqueror, 
to be such at all, has to be congenial with the life of the 
customary material which it is to inform, that alien force has 
no capacity to 'free consciousness from its limitations' 
180 
or 
to satisfy the felt need of the common people for 'consciousness 
181 
over what holds them captive' To make law prevail without 
force of some kind, in circumstances such as those which confronted 
Hegel and his contemporaries, is an ideal which it would have 
behoved a liberal of Haym's times not to presume to preach. To accuse 
Hegel of despair of right and faith in might is quite unwarranted. 
3. Maiestas and its political system 
Richelieu's achievement for France of the pre-eminence of 
law alongside freedom of conscience and property 
182 
could be 
reproduced, nay even outdone in Germany. For there Hegel hoped 
it might take the form not merely of the Enlightenment's assertion 
of the values of toleration, civil and political equality of 
rights, and free and lawful prosperity of individuals 
182 but, 
more fundamentally, of an integration, rather than mere juxta- 
position to one another, of the. ethical activity of the community 
and the customary life of its members in devotion to the wholeness 
215. 
or concentricity of the Rechtsstaat. The conception of freedom 
in contrast to communal activity would not, in Hegel's view, 
serve the need for political unity. It is necessary now to 
consider to whom Hegel attributed the confusion of freedom with 
negative individualism, as we may call the particularist perver- 
sion of social individualism. 
Strictly speaking, he had in mind the 'Germans' as a whole. 
But, as we have seen, he was not inclined to blame them for the 
limitations of their consciousness, for their lack of a positive 
individualism or collective subjectivity intent upon common social 
life. Fated 'character' could not be argued to bear responsibility. 
Responsibility belonged rather to those who mobilised the impulses 
of the 'German character' towards the practice of political 
isolationism. The princes in the first instance, especially 
the Elector of Brandenburg, their ideologues, particularly 
'Berlin journalists' but also constitutional historians 
183, 
those in general who raise the cry of 'freedom' calling. 'Fight 
for German freedom' 
184, 
and at last the oligarchic 'city 
councillors' , whose advantage too lay in deriving passive 
185 
benefit from the Empire while doing nothing whatever for it, 
were those who had seduced the Germans into their idiosyncratic 
hostility to the public interest, which they mistook for freedom. 
In the 'endeavour towards the complete independence of the 
members ... the provinces stood 
by their princes and were at one 
with them, but they were bound to find that, in that sovereignty 
of the princes, German freedom was not achieved: on the contrary' 
186 
41 
Among the ideologues of 'German freedom' was von Mueller, 
whose account of the history of the League of Princes clearly 
represented the point of view which imported into 'German freedom' 
the negative meaning of 'striving against universal monarchy' 
187. 
Mueller, cited in the chapter (8) immediately preceding that in 
216. 
which Hegel eulogized the French genius who destroyed the League 
'which had brought the French state to the brink of the abyss' 
188 
and the Italian thinker against whom the criminal Prussian had 
raised empty moral cries, was not attacked explicitly. But the 
chapter (10) immediately following is designed to debunk Mueller's 
presuppositions. 
The obsession with the danger of Austria's hegemonic aspira- 
tions was dismissed as never realistic: 'The idea of a universal 
monarchy has always been an empty word. The fact that, when it 
was planned, it never was actualised, shows the impossibility of 
its actualization and also the emptiness of this concept' 
189. 
This judgment certainly applies to the aspirations of the romantic 
Maximilian II. Hegel appears to have been ready to concede, in 
part, that this inductive generalization does not save the 
appearances in the case of Austrian power during the Counter- 
Reformation. Ferdinand the Jesuit 
190, 
after all, served by the 
military genius of Wallenstein, relentlessly pursued the idea 
191 
and implacably persecuted Protestantism But Hegel's view 
was that, since the days of Charles V, thanks to the division of 
the Hapsburg imperium, a system of balance of power in Europe had 
operated 
192, in such a way that it was spurious to regard any 
one power, be it Sweden or Prussia, as the sole bastion of free- 
dom of conscience 
193. He was, no doubt, aware that in 1552, 
the French king had assumed the title of 'Protector' of German 
Libertaet. As for Maria Theresa's oppression of Protestants 194, 
Hegel was convinced that her flirtation with the Jesuits had been 
irrevocably reversed by the policy of toleration pursued by her 
son, Joseph II 
195. His principles, no mere 'whim of a single 
monarch' had 'passed over into the firm universal structure of 
196 
civilisation and the basis of politics' " 
German religious liberties, then, were in no danger from 
217. 
Austria and required no defence by Prussia. The pretence that 
such defence was necessary itself constituted a danger to freedom. 
The Protestant party exagerrated the proselytic intentions of 
Austria in order to discredit any belief among the faithful that 
this aspect of their customary life could coexist with the law, 
by arousing the suspicion of Jesuit influence upon the legislature 
and by keeping alive such speculation on the possibility of hell- 
fire for non-Catholics, as to deprive them of the 'assurance that 
they are in possession of the truth' 
198 that would free them 
from neurotic doubt of the capacity of their churches to subsist 
independently of secular protection from cunning seduction by 
Jesuits. Thus was fostered a general 'sort of mistrust' 
199 
of 
the imperial authorities. Thus thrown into the arms of their 
princes, they put their faith in powers which, unlike that of the 
Emperor in respect of political and civil liberties as well as 
religious, were unconstrained by 'the weight of infinitely 
numerous rights' 
200. Hegel's argument was, in effect, that the 
people had been duped into jumping out of what was made to appear 
to be a frying pan, in which private religious activities were 
alleged to be in danger of going up in smoke, into a fiery 
furnace in which such spiritual matters would be preserved, but 
which was, at any rate, not guaranteed to preserve their civil 
and political rights and would, as likely as not, consume their 
customary independence in their abstract economic activities. 
The contrast was, in his opinion, most strikingly apparent in 




These were presented by Hegel in the first place as, 
essentially, systems of inter-provincial relations 
202 But, 
as his argument progresses from a discussion of diplomatic 
relations to an examination of the political principles which 
218: ' 
govern them and finally, in the subsequent chapter, to a treat- 
ment of the internal aspect of these principles, it becomes clear 
that he took it that the relation which held between the central 
power and the provinces within their political systems, held 
likewise between the central power and subjects, in their 
capacity as individuals and as citizens. Whereas in the Austrian 
system, these relations were held to be integral or concentrated 
in legal authority, in the Prussian, they were said to be 
#rational' or susceptible to regulation only according to the 
whims of political power. The Austrian system was that of a 
whole; the Prussian, that of a sum. 
The distinction between Austrian power and Prussian 
politics 
203, 
as Hegel put_ it, was drawn as follows: in its 
dealings with other states and Estates, Prussia enjoyed consider- 
able freedom of movement because, unencumbered by a corpus of 
customary duties enshrined in public law, international or 
municipal, it could act according to its calculations of its own 
power and interests. In this respect it had the advantage, 
though it was a great state, of appearing in the diplomatic 
sphere as if it were a 'moderately sized state' 
204. Its 
ambitions in that sphere seemed to be incrementalistic rather 
than globalistic 
205. Despite the peculiarity of inter-state 
relations within Germany, that lesser estates feared Prussia less 
than Austria when either moved against them, that each construed 
Prussian mobilisation against one of them as just that, whereas 
Austrian mobilisation against one was, because it appeared to 
constitute an erosion of the rights in se of the estates vie a 
vis the Emperor, liable to be construed as an attack on all 
206, 
Hegel maintained that, in fact, Prussia was more to be feared 
than Austria, in respect of the actual. erosion of the rights and 
207 
interests of the lesser estates Precisely because of the 
219. 
construction that would be put on imperialistic adventures by 
Austria, if would tend not to engage in them and to confine 
itself to keeping the peace. 
It was precisely because of the greater fear of Austria, 
based upon apprehension that attacks upon the interests of one 
are equivalent to the dissolution of the rights of all, that 
Austria was to be feared less by 'petty abbots, prelates and 
princes, 
208 than Prussia. Less was to be feared from the great 
potential power of Austria, because its diplomatic and military 
appearance corresponded to, or was if anything more fearsome 
than, its real power, than from the moderate actual power of 
Prussia, whose appearance was less fearsome than its reality. 
Austria was constrained to act according to the law, Prussia was 
freed by its moderate status for purely real-political action. 
Underlying the skillful dialectic of this argument, by which 
Hegel intended to show that dependence on Austria was in fact 
tentamount to relative independence from her, and that the quest 
for religious and political independence achieves exactly its 
contrary, is an ethical judgment of the distinct nature of the 
political systems of Austria and Prussia, or, rather a judgment 
that their ethical natures were quite distinct. Each stood as 
a state in a completely different relation to the ethical life 
of its peoples, a relation conceived by Hegel in terms of an 
economic characterization. Austria was the kind of great power 
that it was because it was what it was like, a free nobleman 
whose wealth is entailed 
209. This wealth was regarded by it 
as an integral whole which does not suffer loss or diminution by 
concessions to its parts 
210. In the Austrian system - not to 
be sure, in the degenerate imperial system - there prevailed a 
211 
principle of 'royalty or majesty' on the strength of which 
it might be regarded as an example of 'legal concentration' 
212. 
220. 
This concentricity consists in the fact that nothing is 
recognized to be 'more sacrosanct than law' 
213. But this 
recognition of law involves the peculiar characteristic of the 
ethical activity of the state: that the interpretation of law 
is congenial to the customary life whose centrifugal forces it 
withstands in order that such life may be expressed in its 
direction towards community, without which it must be dissipated 
in the passionate striving after private satisfaction. To this 
end, the power of law must be informed by a quality, equivalent 
to majesty, which Hegel called grace 
214. Grace is not higher 
or more sacrosanct than public law. But it is that quality in 
the exertion of legal authority which, precisely because it is 
more sacrosanct than private rights, enables public law to be 
enforced with discretion in respect of such rights, so that its 
concessions to them are not derogatory to legal authority. 
Thanks to grace, the public authority can 'forgo its right' 
215. 
Thus it was the sensitive and gracious interpretation of 
customary rights, mindful of the needs of the people, of the 
'whole situation' as Hegel had put it in the GCR 
216, 
not the 
mere weight of their very corpse, which rendered Austria the 
kind of power that it was. Accordingly and likewise, as we 
have seen Hegel assert, its incursions upon private rights were 
not to be construed, however they might appear, as derogatory 
to these rights as such, but only to their excessive assertion. 
In its limitation of the political claims of the provinces, 
whose princes pretended these to be of a piece with all private 
rights as such, the public authority simply drew to attention 
the contradictory presupposition not, for reasons of Praxis, 
explicitly admitted by the princes, namely, that if there were 
such an identity, it could not but be premissed on the existence 
of a sovereign by definition capable of constraining private 
221. 
rights from the excess of limit in virtue of which they tend to 
dissolve the very concept of right. The princes wanted, in their 
genuflection to the idea of the state, to have their cake, and in 
their deflection of its effective existence, to eat it. But 
Hegel pressed their pretence of proprietorial right to its con- 
clusive self, -contradiction: 'if it is to exist, the State cannot 
possibly allow private rights in their whole range and implica- 
tion: taxes, which the state must exact, are already a negation 
of the right of property. If political rights are supposed to 
have the force of private rights, then they carry in themselves 
a contradicition' 
217 
of the sort just explained. 
This renders precise the meaning elsewhere attached to grace: 
in the instance of toleration, namely, which contradicted the 
instruments whereby Richelieu designed the Peace of Westphalia to 
undermine in Germany the principle of equality under the law, 
there was manifested accordance of the law with 'the higher 
natural rights of freedom of conscience and the independence of 
218 
civil rights from (matters of) faith' . Here was a concrete 
example of the contradiction, by the grace inherent in the public 
law of a state, of one of the chief devices by which it had been 
attempted to reduce Germany to a 'Staat aus Staaten' whose 
internal relations must be conducted on the principles of private 
219 
international law 
This, one of the few places in the VSN in which Hegel 
deployed the concept of 'natural rights', does not imply any 
absolute indefeasibility of the rights of private persons. 
Rights must never be maintained to the extent that, regardless 
of the good of the whole people, senseless of their ethical 
community, the authority of the State, by which alone, after all, 
they are upheld, is undermined. Though we shall see that Hegel 
argued the independence of the individual in his habitative 
222. 
environment to be sacrosanct, this sanctity entails not only 
the forbearance of the state from interference in abstract 
activity but the prohibition of what is at the root of such 
interference, the demand of private interests for public service. 
The quid pro quo of their relative insignificance in the face of 
the public interest is, however, that the state should act in a 
spirit of gracious respect for the independence of the private 
person. 
Grace inheres, therefore, in a spirit of genial accommoda- 
tion or exchange between law and the economic or private habitat. 
Although, at this point, Hegel conceded that Frederick II 
of Brandenburg- Prussia exhibited grace and even, at another, 
described that monarch as a 'genius' 
220, he was at pains to 
stress, in the latter case, that his genius was merely 'personal? 
and did not claim for his 'grace', as he did for that of Joseph II, 
that it inhered in the legal or 'universal structure' 
221 
of 
Prussian civilization: on the contrary. Austria exhibited an 
'abiding, fixed centre' 
222 
, because it attended to a distinction - 
which in its articulation of a lawful and not merely personal 
relationship between public law and private rights is an ethical 
and no merel; - moral distinction 
223 
- between its interests and 
its constitutional position 
224. To that extent, it had an 
ethos of which it would not be proper to speak in the case of 
Prussia. Austria had to be what it appeared to be, it had to 
attend to the ethical limitation placed by its authoritative 
position upon its disposition in each and every one of its 
exertions of power. Prussia, on the other hand, was guided 
not by its constitutional position but by the whims of power in 
motion. In strictness, Hegel denied that it was proper to 
speak of Prussia as having any fixed centre or position at all. 
For, as he complained, 'Even a guarantee treaty it can renounce 
223. 
at once) 
225. Austria, therefore, was in a better position 
than Prussia, which indeed was in no position at all and lacked 
the noble magnanimity conferred by position, or structural grace, 
to guarantee the independence of the small estates. Prussia 
necessarily lacked the 'capacity and inclination' 
226 to do that 
which its ideologues claimed to be its intention: to maintain 
so-called German freedom. It could no longer, if ever it could, 
be regarded as 'the natural centre for maintaining the independ- 
ence of the estates' 
227. It did not act on behalf of the 
228 
'Integrity of the Empire' 9 that is, of the body of the 
estates, because it did not exhibit the 'concentration of life 
into laws' 229 but behaved in accordance with its rational 
calculations of its passional interests and power, regardless 
of the need for their integral adjustment with the idea of a legal 
community. In short, Prussia was an uncivilised state. 
This is what Hegel meant by his argument that not majesty - 
the grace and magnanimity of authoritative position - but the 
character of the bourgeoisie - ever mobile in the pursuit of the 
satisfaction of its passion - was the principle from which the 
'new' 230 (not, be it noted, modern 
231) 
politics of Prussia have 
proceeded. His comparison of Prussia with a bourgeois, whose 
wealth is a sum accumulated 'penny by laborious penny' 
232 
signifies three ideas: first, that when Prussia mobilized against 
another estate, its limitation of that estate's rights was 
actually negative of their very substance which it appropriated 
without gracious concession to its continued independence, and 
that it would suffer no diminution of its gains; second, that 
it attended to no distinction between its right and its might; 
third, that it was existentially avaricious, making no distinc- 
tion between its existence and its purpose, its self and its 
every act of accumulation. This last is the worst manifestation 
77 I. 
of the fact that the wealth and the power of the Prussian State 
was not an integral but a rational number. It was not, to use 
a mathematical metaphor, the legal square of a customary root. 
Rather its legal existence as a political agent on the international 
and municipal scenes was in a relation of mere continence to 
quantums of economic passion from which it cannot be qualitatively 
distinguished. 
In Prussia's relation to the Empire, as to that of which it 
demanded service for its proprietorial claims, it is quite clear 
that there was justification for Hegel's argument, whose proven- 
ance seems to have been aristotelian, that the 'bourgeois principle' 
dictated its behaviour in such a way as to derogate from the funda- 
mental requirement upon which his idea of representation was based. 
This was, that private interests should not make the state descend 
from ethical into abstract activities. Because of pressures, 
above all, Hegel believed, from Prussia, the State had been made 
to serve as an 'order of justice' 
233 devoted to the resolution 
of conflicts of private interest, rather than as a represent- 
ative organization. 
As an 'order of justice', the State was depressed from its 
fixed centre, from which it could pursue its telos, namely the 
wholeness of disinterested law, and was compelled to serve that 
which constitutes only the condition of the existence of the state, 
rather than the purpose - the autonomy of a people - to the sake 
of which that of its economic conditions should be subordinated. 
Hegel had put this point in a fragment written in February or 
March 1801, to which reference has already been made, A propos 
the question of litigation 
234: 'the distinction between State - 
authority and objects of rights is very important; an object of 
rights is a private property: State-authority cannot be private 
property; it flows from the State; there is no right to it but 
225. 
that of the State; its ambit and possession depend on the State, 
and count only in relation to it; (it can be) no object of 
forensic treatment. Gain of private property (is) is matter of 
chance, of arbitrariness. State authority must stand in the 
closest connexion with the whole; the State is the highest 
command - even if only in respect of the defence of the laws, 
especially against foreigners. Therefore all right proceeds 
from it; it alone, not chance, not charters and other claims, 
has to decide' 235. 
Like Aristotle, Hegel insisted that the intrusion of matters 
of chance, to which is subject the bourgeois endeavour of penny 
after penny, upon the sphere of necessity (teleological rather 
than archaeological necessity), is disruptive of the self- 
sufficiency or autonomy of the State. It is noticeable that from 
the criticism of this intrusion, primarily exhibited by Prussian 
diplomacy, Hegel passed immediately in his earlier draft to a 
partial critique, by way of mere allusion to be sure, of two key 
figures, Hermann Conring and Hippolytus A Lapide (i. e. Bogislaw 
Philipp von Chemnitz) in the ratio status tradition. Of these 
two, Chemnitz emphatically shared the antipathy to Austria later 
expressed by von Mueller. In his quest for a ratio status, by 
which in common with other German theorists of Staatsraeson. 
Chemnitz meant a principle of political organisation precisely 
adapted to the historical development and way of life of any 
people 
236, this thinker, according to Hegel, $gave precise 
expression to the inner character and tendency of the nation, 
237. 
But Hegel wanted, as we shall shortly see, to rescue that part 
of the ratio status tradition, with which he sympathised on the 
whole, from confusion with a political outlook favourable to 
the 'extirpation of the House of Austria, an outlook whose 
ideal of adaptation (to rather than of the customs of the Germans) 
226. 
was passive rather than active. That part of the ratio status 
tradition with which Hegel sympathised was its advocacy, 
especially as expounded by Conring, of the priority of public 
law over private right. Hegels abiding interest was to show, 
in the face of Chemnitz's arguments to the contrary, that Austria 
alone could maintain this priority, whether within the Empire as 
a whole, or within its several provinces. 
Hegel's view was that Chemnitz's main fault consisted in 
his failure to see that the naive spirit which he himself inhaled, 
the 'spirit of integrity', was quite simply inadequate to maintain 
the Empire in despite of the centrifugal forces to which it was 
subject. 
The demand of the tradition to which Conring and Chemnitz 
belonged, that there should prevail a public law rooted in 
German customs, and careful of German liberties, made sense only 
within an imperial order. The latter expressed his confidence 
that the 'general welfare of Germany' 
238 
could rest On the free 
will of its parts, a confidence which stemmed from 'the spirit 
of integrity on which the German nation prides itself so much' 
239 
and which made the provisions of the Peace of Westphalia, whose 
effect was the renunciation of central authority, quite agreeable 
to him. Chemnitz sincerely expected that the individual estates 
would 'freely co-operate' for the 'general interest' 
240. Hegel 
perhaps excused Chemnitz, whose 'De ratio status in Imperio 
nostro Romano Germanico' was generally taken to have influenced 
the peace-makers of Westphalia, for his assumption that Austria 
harboured absolutist and hegemonic pretensions, an assumption 
which could not be condoned when made over a century later by 
von Mueller, to whom he had referred immediately before his 
mention of Chemnitz in the definitive text 
241. The six-point 
'ratio status' proposed by Chemnitz was that: 
227. 
a. the Hapsburgs should be expelled 
P. their lands should be confiscated 
c. the Emperor should be elected from a weak family 
d. dynastic perpetuation of the imperial dignity beyond three 
generations should be prohibited 
e. the Roman Catholic Church should be expropriated 
f. a standing army should be established 
242. 
His work, whose vituperation against Austria Hermann Conring 
said Chemnitz later regarded as inordinate, was given the seal 
of Prussian approval through the commissioning by the ministry 
of foreign affairs of Brandenburg of a German translation. 
But Chemnitz was conceded by his translator, J. P. Carrach, to 
be no Prussianist 
243. For he was hostile almost no less to 
the power of the Electors than to that of the Emperor. There 
can, what is more, be little doubt, though Hegel disapproved of 
Chemnitz's desire to render the Empire a constitutional 
aristocracy of princes, co-equal with the Electors in terms of 
their right to determine the terms of the Electoral Capitulation 
to which each new Emperor had to submit, that Hegel agreed 
with Chemnitz's radical view of the proper sovereignty of the 
Diet and with his location in that body of the true maiestas of 
the Empire 244. 
However, the unintended consequence of Chemnitz's ratio 
status could only be, in Hegel's view, the achievement of secure 
state-power not via public law for all Germany, but only within 
its several parts. The attack by Chemnitz and later Conring on 
the resort to litigation within the terms of Roman law was taken up 
guardedly in the draft of February-March 1801: 'Conring and 
Hippolytus a Lapide made this distinction (corresponding to that 
which Hegel maintained between public authority and objects of 
private rights) between public law and Roman law but, as it seems, 
228. 
rather (in terms conducive) to the dissolution than to the 
unification of the state; they constituted the estates as 
states in which, to be sure, private right was inapplicable; 
but in that case Germany was no state' 
215. Here it is implied 
that the object was defeated. For the whole rationale of seeking 
to deprive Roman law, private in form but public in function, 
bf its transcendental dignity as the only valid ius caesarium' 
246 
, 
was the preference for a public law rooted in indigenous customs 
common to all Germany, in so-called 'German liberty? (Libertaet). 
The chief principle of German liberties was the idea that 
in imperial representation there was to be found a maiestas, the 
replica of which Hegel located in Austria, which was distributed 
between the Emperor and the Diet. This distribution on the 
Imperial level was supposed to be ideally effected by means of 
an Electoral Capitulation the chief purpose of which was to 
secure from the Emperor, upon his election, a commitment to 
refrain from the pursuit of dynastic perpetuation of his office 
among his heirs. Hegel clearly denied the feasibility of 
depending the sovereignty of the state upon the principle of 
the election of its monarch. He could not agree with the 
aspiration of Chemnitz that, in virtue of a reformed system 
of election, the Diet should become the sole source of maiestas. 
His preference for hereditary monarchy 
247 
was probably due to 
doubt that the privilege of election could be wrested from the 
oligarchic grasp of the College of the seven Electors and to 
his reluctance to see it in the hands of the College of Princes, 
since in the former case the effect was, and in the latter would 
be no less, an erosion of the maiestas of the-Emperor. But his 
affirmation of the maiestas of the Emperor, as of an impersonal 
maiestas bound by law and complemented by the 'cooperation of 
the people through its representatives, 
248 does not amount to 
229. 
a negation of the maiestas of the Diet. Hegel's concept of 
majesty rather affirmed a belief in the value of a constitutional 
distribution of sovereignty between 'Emperor and Empire', that is, 
between the Emperor and the Diet. 
It may be, though it cannot be proved, that Hegel had in 
mind, in his development of the theory of representation as the 
organisation of a people's 'living together' under 'common laws' 
249, 
the origins of the theory of distributed maiestas in the 'Politics' 
of Althusius, to whose theory of representation was central the 
idea of the Empire as a monarchical polity in which, by way of 
representation, were organised a hierarchy of civil 'consociations'. 
These, analogous to the corporations of civil society of Hegel's 
mature political philosophy, embodied the 'living together' (con- 
sociatio) of like individuals and enabled their mediate represent- 
ation in the public authority 
250. Althusius' attempt to 
establish the social basis of the relationship between legal and 
customary communities, to the end of liberating political science 
from the straits of Romanist jurisprudence and 'establishing it 
as a separate discipline founded on sociological principles' 
251, 
seems to have been taken up without acknowledgement even of a 
terminological debt, with a view to showing the compatibility, 
within the framework of gracious majesty, of monarchical and 
representative elements; and with a view to showing that the 
habitat of old German freedoms could be integrated with the 
activity of a modern state. 
Although the evidence of the Althusian provenance of this 
essentially 'sociological' project is indirect, it is clear that 
Hegel was familiar with the work of one, namely Hermann Conring, 
who was about the same business. 
230. 
k. The modernization of 'German freedom' 
As. we shall see in the next chapter, Hegel attempted the 
reconciliation of Libertaet with modern freedom under the 'egis 
of the tradition of ratio status as it was developed by Conring, 
with the sole reservation that this tradition tended to obscure 
the fact that Austria bore the necessary principle of majesty, 
whereas bourgeois Prussia neglected it in such a way that, while 
it might within its kingdom have established the priority of 
public law over private right 
252, it had done so without regard 
for the independence of the sphere in which the claims of private 
right were proper, and therefore without regard for the liberties 
of which it had been allowed to appear as the most formidable 
defender, Its disregard was due to its neglect of the principle 
of representation in its own estate. This disregard was the 
inward manifestation of its bourgeois character. For without 
representation, its laws, while public in form, were private in 
function. Its ratio status was, in truth, a ratio economicus 
253, 
the rationale of the patrimonial state. It lacked the 'integrity', 
within as well as without, which Chemnitz took for granted 
254. 
This deficiency prevented it not only from 'assuming equal obliga- 
tions with other estates' 
255 but from acknowledging its obliga- 
tion to maintain the liberties of its subjects. 
If liberties were to be maintained in the modern world, the 
understanding of freedom itself had to be modernised. There had, 
to this end, to be brought to the forefront of public opinion 
that in the idea of old German freedom, namely the principle of 
representation, which had suffered precisely because of the 
emphasis of the provinces upon their freedom from the true 
vehicle of modern German freedom. This had happened. Ten 
years of revolutionary war, and especially the spectacle of 
231. 
Prussia's separate conclusion of peace (Basel, 1795), had changed 
the German people's concepts of freedom, had purged them of 'their 
former emptiness and vagueness' 
256. This had been achieved not 
by the theoretical instruction of the Germans in any Machiavellian 
or other manual but by the 'might of the age' 
257. Public 
opinion, thanksto a new 'constellation of circumstances' 
258 
opposing its acquiescence in the wish of the princes for independ- 
ence, and in their assumption of the identity of interests between 
Herrschaft and Landschaft, had reverted to the identification of 
the 'interest of German freedom' 
259 
with its true source, the 
principle of majesty. Its clamour has given way to the notion 
that 'firm government is indispensable for freedom, 
260. But 
no less deeply engraved on men's minds was the 'notion that the 
people must share in the making of laws and the management of 
the most important affairs of state. The guarantee that the 
government will proceed in accordance with the law, and the 
cooperation of the general will in the most important affairs, 
those which touch all, the people has in the organisation of, a 
body representing it, which has to sanction payment to the 
monarch of one part of the national taxes, but expecially extra- 
ordinary taxes. Just as in former days the most important 
matter, i. e. personal services, depended on free agreement, so 
nowadays does money, which comprises influence of every kind. 
Without such a representative body, freedom is no longer thinkable. 
Once freedom is so defined, all vague ideas vanish, along with all 
the emptiness of the clamour for freedom, 
261. 
If greater proof were needed of the argument that only 
Austria'can guarantee modern freedom, than the fact that its 
territories thus freely agreed to extraordinary contributions 
for the war against France 
262, it would be that Austria had 
long been thus cooperatively disposed towards its hereditary 
232. 
estates and to the Empire as a whole. For in 1672, the Emperor 
refrained from taking advantage of the offer by the Council of 
Princes that, so long as they could determine their own tax- 
liability without reference to their subjects, he could depend on 
them not to interfere with such like behaviour on his part towards 
other estates, including his own 
263. Similarly, the Emperor 
helped the cities to free themselves of the 'German freedom of 
the city councillors' 
264 to raise taxation without representation. 
Nor had he taken advantage, against his own territories, of their 
exclusion from participation in the control of the Reichshofrat 
to which, apart from their right to representation, they could 
have recourse in the event of misappropriation by him 
265. 
As for Prussia, it had defended German freedoms by institut- 
ing, in its estates and conquered territories 'which had privileges 
and taxes determined in accordance with ancient rights and customs', 
a 'new and artful tax-system' 
266 
which deprived their Estates of 
all their significance. By withdrawing itself, moreover, from 
the jurisdiction of the Imperial Courts, in 1781 and 1782, 
Prussia ensured that 'its' German subjects could not avail them- 
selves of the common law of the Empire. The Geheimes Obertribunal 
ordinance of 1782 expressly denied the jurisdiction of the 
Reichskammergericht 
267. Such were the 'new politics' 
268 
of the 
'bourgeois' system. They could not qualify as the politics of 
a 'modern' state fit to effect the modernisation of old German 
freedom. The old politics of the Austrian system were so qualified 
and to that extent they were, indeed, said to be politics against 
which 'what used to be called German freedom would have to be on 
its guard' 
269. But whereas the danger to such freedom, as it 
came from Prussia, was the danger of perversion, the threat posed 
them by Austria was rather the threat of improvement, the threat 
that customs long observed in a deadly spirit of mere habit would be 
animated by active performance of the ethical life of all Germans. 
233. 
5" The voice of an optimistic heart 
We come now to consider those sections of the VSN in which 
Hegel opposed to the solvent ratio status of Chemnitz his own 
view that there could be recovered for the Empire the feudal 
resources - military, monetary and territorial - which had been 
decisively laid waste by the Peace of Westphalia, upon whose 
negotiation it was generally supposed that Chemnitz's work had 
had great influence. It is these sections, more than any other, 
which seem to present Hegel in a somewhat utopian mood. This 
mood is well captured in words which Hegel struck out as soon as 
he had written them, sometime in February or March 1801: 'The 
following pages are the voice of a heart that is unwilling to bid 
farewell to its hope to see the German state raised up from its 
insignificance, that would like, before being absolutely parted 
from its hopes, once more to recall to life its gradually failing 
wishes, once more to nourish with a mental image its willing faith 
in the fulfillment of its hopes' 
270. Though clearly alive to 
the scientific inadequacy of hopes and images, Hegel could not 
efface from his reflections on the military, financial and terri- 
torial reqources of the Empire a certain tendency to attempt, by 
indulging in nostalgia for their ancestors, to compensate for the 
despair and misery of war - weary Germans who sought 'nothing but 
peace for the nonce, at any price and without regard for the 
future' 271. Hegel seems to have had a soft spot for the 
encouraging imagery of the Ritterzeit, and the distant times of 
Tacitus, though he never went so far as to extol Hermann the 
German as the embodiment of the martial virtues that would make 
up for bad organisation and the treachery of Prussia 
272. 
It was not, Hegel believed, lack of valour among the Germans 
which had contributed to the incapacity of the Empire to defend 
234. 
itself. In one of the fragments from the February-March 1801 
cycle of composition of the VSN, he referred to 'what has been 
said' 
273 
on this subject. Vihether he meant what he himself 
had said in some fragment, not any longer extant, cannot be 
determined except on the uncertain grounds of the possibility 
that Rosenkranz's summary, which refers to the replacement of 
personal by impersonal combat involving gunpowder and 'disciplined 
movement' 
274, is based upon an argument which may have led to 
the conclusion that the Germans 'are not an unwarlike nation 
unfamiliar with the skills which in modern times are just as 
conducive to victory as courage; even in these unhappy wars 
(i. e. the French revolutionary wars) the imperial contingents 
have shown themselves worthy of their ancestors' 
275. 
It is not inconceivable that Rosenkranz was in fact depend- 
ing on materials which are available to us from the same cycle of 
composition 
276, 
where Hegel wrote of how, before the imperial 
peace, 'the (mailed) fist and wild audacity, personal power' 
277 
had settled 'what is now decided through politics ... In the 
place of sudden attack has emerged calculation of the consequences; 
of personal courage, calculation of the forces of the opponent; 
of the fist, calculation of all powers which are for or against 
an interest. The difference is like that between the chess 
games of children and old men; or. between a tournament and the 
campaigns of a Fabius' 
278. If this were his source, it may be 
that Rosenkranz inadvertently spoke of the gunpowder revolution, 
nowhere mentioned in the VSN, relying on his memory of the 
Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, where Hegel spoke 
of the effect of gunpowder upon the replacement of 'chivalric 
encounters' by the 'rational bravery of abstract enemies' 
279. 
Both in the fragment in question and in. the Lectures talk of the 
decline of chivalry is preceded by mention, of the rise to power 
235. 
of confederations of cities, and of the Hanseatic League 
280. 
Rosenkranz, however, was clearly true to the spirit of the VSN 
in arguing that it was Hegel's view that the Germans were not 
deficient in native resources out of which ethical activity 
might arise 
281, but in its organisation to the end of self- 
defence. It need not be supposed that nostalgia went very deep 
in Hegel's own heart, nor that he felt unqualified hostility to 
the bourgeois spirit of the cities(as social rather than as 
political entities), to appreciate that he might have believed 
that a carefully administered dose of German mythology might do 
something for the capacity of his less enlightened contemporaries 
to contribute more to the enactment of ethical life. His funda- 
mental point, however, concerns the effect upon military organisa- 
tion caused by the particularist variant of the bourgeois spirit. 
The imperial contingents had such resources, but their failure 
in deed was ensured, not by excess of calculative skills as such 
but by their unethical application in the opposite of their proper 
direction by none other than the master of self-interested calcula- 
tion, Prussia. Once such calculation is made, it is argued in 
each cycle of composition and in the definitive text, it would be 
unnatural and absurd 
282 to expect the estates to behave as if 
they really did 'work together as a whole' 
283. The fundamental 
fault that rendered the shield of the five-fold contingents of 
Hanover, Brandenburg, Saxony, Bavaria and Hesse an untrustworthy 
escutcheon, was the clause in the Peace of Westphalia which 
permitted estates to make treaties and alliances with foreign 
powers' in so far as such alliances do not conflict with-duties 
to the Emperor and the Empire' 
284. 
In June - July 1801 
285, 
as not in 1802-03 286, this fold 
of five included a sixth, the Austrian, contingent. This 
indicates that it was for Hegel a real issue whether in these 
236. 
matters, as not in strictly constitutional affairs, Austria's 
relation to the Empire was not, like Prussia's, also calculative. 
Could Austria, too, be accused of neglecting its duty to the 
Empire? Even in the early draft Hegel withdrew from confirming 
any such suggestion by pointing to the military exertions of 
Austria in excess of its constitutional obligations 
287. The 
same point is made in the definitive text 
288, but it is less 
clear there than in the draft that the difference between Austria 
and two of the other five - Hanover and Brandenburg - was 
supposedly that Austria thus deployed the forces of its territories 
because it was an integral member of the Empire, whereas they did 
not because they were de facto foreign powers, 'members of the 
Empire, but such only in name because of the independence and 
self-centredness of their interest' 
289. Hence foreign interests 
must be brought 'into collision with the interest of Germany' 290. 
It was not merely, as in the definitive text, that the coopera- 
tion of the five for the defence of the Empire was 'as unreliable 
and accidental as the cooperation of some foreign power' 
291, 
but that it was necessarily unreliable because it would be such 
foreign cooperation. 'Foreign cooperation' was manifest as the 
absurdity that it is in the Seven Years' War of which, rather 
than of the Thirty Years' War, given the post-Westphalian context 
of his argument, Hegel must primarily have been thinking when he 
wrote that the formidability of Germany's potential strength was 
directed to its tearing the flesh from its bones 292 
It was this legal absurdity = dejure membership in tandem 
with de jure and de facto foreignness - that completely 
emasculated the Westphalian proviso 
293 
and justified, not only 
refusals to make war contributions, but also actual withdrawals - 
notably by Prussia in 1795 -. from the war with France. Thus 
was Germany legally abandoned to the devastating ascendancy of 
237. 
the enemy 
294. Very obligations could be adduced for this 
infidelity to the 'holy obligation' 
295 to defend the Empire. 
Herein Germany's 'ceasing to be a state' 
296, its dissolution 
into 'independent states' showed itself most visibly. 
Praxis, the 'all powerful principle' 
297 
of the German 
constitution was operative with the effect not only that 
military service was not rendered, but also that 'other obliga- 
tions' 298 could be adduced in apology for the non-payment as 
well of ordinary as of extraordinary or war-taxes. In February - 
March 1801, Hegel had written down a series of jottings or notes 
299 
on military and judicial taxes (Kriegssteuern und Kammerzieler) 
He was not at that time sure in what context, military or judicial, 
to deal with the question of imperial finances and gave himself 
over to musings: if only the state, as in feudal days, depended 
only an personal services from the estates, it would be untroubled 
by their neglect of their duty, under the superannuated system of 
the Imperial Quota, to pay and provision their contingents; if 
only there were not a natural reluctance to suffer necessary 
imposts, if only 'self-interest' understood itself properly and 
realised that it is only to be secured through common activity 
300. 
No sooner had Hegel written this, which nevertheless remained his 
ideal definition of interest, than he recognised the need that 
'first must the power to that end be provided for' 
301. What 
kind of power was that to be? Hegel's answer to that question 
is very confused. 
In another fragment in this cycle, to part of which reference 
has already been made 
302, though Hegel recoghised that the 
fuedal constitution had been destroyed by the independence of 
the vassals 
303, his heart seems still to have been affected by 
nostalgia for the Ritterzeit and by the wishful thought that the 
personal service aspect of the feudal system might be retained 
238. 
without its embarrassing consequences in ancillary matters. The 
'pure feudal constitution' in which 'the feudal lord had domains 
for the defrayal of those costs which suzerainty caused him, in 
which each vassal had personally to defray war expenditure, in which 
state revenue was very abundant', was admitted to be an 'old heir- 
loom' 304. Accordingly, the German state had 'no finances to in- 
herit and in modern times one does not encounter financial insti- 
tutions' 305. If only this 'financeless system' of the feudal 
constitution could be retained in matters concerning the universal, 
'regulation of that of which the laws speak and security from 
foreign enemies' 
306. In the matter of defrayal of these, the 
only expenses which ought to interest the state 
307, if only here- 
ditary income were enough, the Empire would be spared the embarr- 
assment, by which it did itself no service at all, of meddling in 
other than universal matters. 
But its 'financeless' dependence of yore on personal service 
and reliance upon immediate but casual intervention by the public 
authority in everyday affairs threatened to turn, from what had 
been no liability when hereditary revenues were available, into the 
burden of an opposite extreme of 'financelessness', in which 'state 
direction of the finances has become a mania' 
308, in which control 
was all physical and not at all fiscal. There was danger of 
excessive regulation even in every 'small as can be aspect of the 
public service of small as can be states, 
309. There was a mania 
abroad to let no village take care, for example, of the payment of 
its bailliff 310. In the German Empire, Hegel complained, the 
immediate estates and the provincial Estates stake care of the 
finances which immediately concern them - in principalities as a 
whole, even in villages - and care for the payment of their magistr- 
ates, courts etc., but all under oversight from above ... Every ex- 
pense of officials, down to village justices of the peace and lowlier 
still is shuttled to and fro, as impost and expenditure, between the 
239. 
highest state power and the pettiest branch of the public service'311. 
The persistence of feudal habits of public service in the 
absence of the hereditary resources which, under the pure feudal 
constitution, rendered them innocuous to the liberty of the 
estates, both 'immediate', i. e. occupational, and provincial, 
was deprecated by Hegel as a cause of the conversion of the 
Empire into a hybrid system of undependable personal services and 
illiberal, no longer casual, physical intervention. Some 
distance had to be put between state power and the diurnal 
regulation of social affairs. That could only be achieved 
through the fiscal independence of the public authority which 
would disembarrass it of the need to encroach upon the independ- 
ence of the estates. Hegel had to conceive of a means whereby 
the fiscal independence of the Emperor, the 'greatest feudal 
lord, 312, could be maintained in the absence of hereditary 
income, thanks to which feudal 'financelessness' had been possible, 
but without encountering the danger of degeneration, because of 
modern 'financelessness', into immediate supervision of what 
would be better left to the estates. 
But he avoided the pain of this necessity by the rather 
curious expedient of changing his mind about the dangers to the 
Empire as a whole of its modern financelessness. By June - 
July 1801, Hegel had come to the conclusion that as least one 
advantage accrued from the absence of state in the Empire: that 
there could not happen in it what he had deprecated in February - 
March. After all, then, in Germany 'public intervention-of the 
state in every petty public cost does not take place, the 
immediate estates, the provincial cities in them and villages 
themselves care for the finances which immediately concern them, 
under general supervision but not according to orders from the 
state power, 
313. The model of modern financelessness, then, 
2i 0. 
did not apply to the Empire as a whole. In another fragment of 
the February - March cycle, Hegel argued that 'it is even conceiv- 
able that the power of the state, insofar as it requires money, 
could be nourished through no contributions at all from private 
property; in the feudal constitution it so happened that the state 
as such had no need of money and was very powerful; or, when it 
needs money, it is conceivable that it should defray state expenses 
through its domains and not be a tax-centre' 
314. Feudal finance- 
lessness would, he argued in the June - July cycle, not hinder 
Germany's being a state, $if only, insofar as in modern times 
financial institutions are necessary for common defense through a 
war-power, (such financial institutions) were available, 
315. 
It is clear that, even in the definitive text, Hegel had not 
managed to overcome his confusion on this matter. There too the 
distinction between feudal financelessness and modern financeless- 
ness is drawn 
316. And, as in the June - July cycle, it is 
argued that European states, though not, as in June - July 1801, 
all 
317 European states, had 'more or less, 
318 departed from 
the feudal constitution, so that 'in modern times finances have 
become an essential or prominent (only prominent? ) part of state 
power, 
319. As we shall see in greater detail in the sixth 
chapter, with reference to Hegel's arguments that the 'feudal 
system' could be regarded as the basis of the modern state, 
whereas apparently modern states such as revolutionary France 
and Prussia are in fact to be regarded as anti-modern, Hegel 
wanted to believe that between feudal and modern financelessness 
there existed a via media towards viability in the modern world 
for the state whose sources of revenue were essentially feudal - 
crown lands etc. - but which at the same time enjoyed 'financial 
institutions'. Quite apart from the fact that he knew 'financial 
institutions' had arisen in European states in consequence of 
241. 
the inadequacy of feudal resources, it is clear that he contra- 
dicted, or rather ignored, his earlier view that modern Germany 
had neither. If only Germany could have the best of both 
worlds - the financial independence of the greatest feudal lord 
and the security of income of those states where the feudal 
relationship had been so to the advantage of the monarch that 
it had been possible to establish institutional instead of 
personal sources of revenue - there would be nothing, in respect 
of its money power, to hinder Germany's becoming a state. 
But Hegel himself admitted, both in the fragment of the 
cycle of June - July 1801 
320 
and in the definitive text 321, 
that there had only been false dawns in the matter of restoring 
the preeminence of the monarchy as it stood in relation to the 
vassals within the 'pure feudal constitution' from the impotence 
to which it had degenerated in the actual historical development 
of the increasingly impure 'feudal system, 
322 
of Germany. In 
Germany, military service had ceased to be purely personal, the 
system had become impure, precisely because Imperial crown 
revenues had declined thahks to the profligacy of such Emperors 
as Maximilian. Such restoration of the power available to the 
monarch in virtue of 'pure' feudal relationships, though of course 
it would not be of these relationships as such, might have been 
effActed by way of financial rather than personal contributions 
to a common centre. During the revolutionary wars, reversion 
to 'pure' feudalism, as Hegel appears to have been prepared to 
conceive it, on a monetary rather than personal foundation, had 
seemed to be in prospect via the expedient of a common military 
commissariat. But this modern financial-cum-'pure' feudal 
relationship had 'affected only petty estates and was a matter 
of passing chance' 
323. 
Quite apart from the fact that Hegel played fast and loose 
242. 
with the concept of feudalism, isolating the power of the Emperor 
from its structural matrix, it is probably the weakest aspect of 
the VSN that Hegel attempted to make a virtue out of the weakness 
of Germany in financial matters. He appears to have been content 
to argue that but for the development of the political power of the 
vassals, the feudal want of financial organization could be compat- 
ible with German modernization. If only that power could be 
diminished 'pure feudal' financial arrangements would be an advant- 
age to the emergence of Germany as a modern state, even if not to 
its sure foundation as such. That Germany 'is not harassed by 
cares arising from the great political questions and problems about 
the sort of taxes, state debts and credits which will be fairest, 
least extravagant and not inequitably onerous' 
324 
permitted it to 
dispense with the talents for management of these, in other states, 
'enormously important matters' 
325 in which mistakes could have the 
most fearful consequences. But the very simplicity of its money- 
matters, thanks to which Germany needed 'no Pitt' 
326, the very fact 
that Germany's 'regular finances' 
327 
were constituted only by 
Kammersteuern (taxes for the upkeep of the Reichskammergericht) and 
not Kriegssteuern was precisely the cause of the military weakness 
which Hegel bemoaned and the consequence of the power of the vassals, 
which he abominated 
328. Hegel's 'solution', so far as it can be 
drawn intact from the multiple folds of the draft and definitive 
VSN, can scarcely be regarded as more than an elaborate conjuring 
trick no better than those, symbolised by the minting of magic 
mountains or catching of elusive bears 
329, 
which he derided in 
others. Hegel deserves credit only for his analysis of the causes 
of Germany's financial plight. Here he ventured upon firmer ground. 
Hegel's analysis turns on the provisions of the Peace of 
Westphalia. The principle, he argued, upon which estates such 
243. 
as Brandenburg refused to make contributions even to Germany's 
regular finances, the Kammersteuern, was that the minority in the 
Diet could not be bound by majority decision, on condition, that 
is, that the minority be Protestant 
330. On the principle of 
itio in partes, adventitious confessional justifications could 
be adduced for subverting 'that which alone constitutes a state', 
namely, the national solidarity which depends upon majority 
decision 331. If Germany were a state, the principle of itio 
in partes would be utterly impossible 
332. Because of this 
principle there had emerged first the Corpus Evangelicorum (1653), 
then the Corpus Catholicorum. Thus, quite according to law, 
albeit not home-made law, the Emperor, at the head of the latter, 
declined to the status of a mere party. The consequent 'anarchy', 
made thus the lawful relation between the monarch and lesser 
parties 
333, 
made it superfluous to speak of foreign factors in 
the destruction of Germany since independent states, foreign de 
facto, had been imported into its midst 
334. 
Germany had become incapable of defending itself 
335. It 
had lost many provinces to foreign powers. But what was much 
worse, what in February - March 1801 Hegel argued to be the 
'deepest cut for the state, 
336 
was a loss of quite another kind 
than the straightforward 'subjection of German territories to 
foreign control and their utter sequestration from all rights 
of and duties towards the Empire, 
337. There had been a 
'revolution which, without needing to change the constitution 
one iota. has overturned and completely subverted it, 
338. This 
consisted in the fact that so many territories 'have remained, 
to be sure, in all their erstwhile legal relation to Emperor 
and Empire, but retain princes who are at the same time monarchs 
339 
of independent kingdoms' Though no apparent loss, because it 
seemed to leave everything'as it was of old, this had 'undermined 
244. 
the cohesion of the state in its foundations, because these 
territories have thus become independent of the practical 
authority of the German state' 
340. The most obvious example 
of this constitutional anomaly was to be found in the relationship 
of the Elector of Hanover to the Empire. But thanks to the power 
of the British parliament to dispose over the administration of 
the treasury, the foreign and military policies of Britain could 
scarcely be strictly coordinated with Hanoverian interests. 
Besides, English hostility to France had united its interests 
with those of Austria 
341. Prussia, on the other hand, had 
become 'an imperial power in part of Germany' 
342 
whose interests, 
upon the pursuit of which there was not the possible constraint 
of'ministerial separation' and parliamentary power, were hostile 
to those of Austria 
343. The law was entirely compromised. 
Prussia had attained a position in Germany legally and 
practically tantamount to that of a foreign power. Expansion of 
military forces and lawful pacts with foreign powers, which were 
insignificant elsewhere, made Prussiats subjection to Imperial 
law impossible. Given its two hundred thousand regular troops 
how could the ban of the Empire be effectively executed against 
it? 344 Prussia owed its independence not to any change in the 
'pure feudal constitution' - after all, as Hegel pointed out 
later, the Margrave of Brandenburg still, just as when he had 
only two thousand troops, presented the Emperor at his coronation 
the oats with which Charlemagne had been presented 
345 
- but to 
the historical development, regardless of public law, of the 
feudal system. What had once been in the gift of the supreme 
feudal lord had now assumed the character of a private right: 
'The principle of the feudal constitution, that the right of 
sovereignty over territory and people stems from princely, ducal, 
noble lineage has been largely transcended through the introduction 
245. 
of the right of primogeniture in the princely houses ... and so it 
is that one of its most important consequences, namely the harm- 
lessness of the vassals for the whole, has been lost, 
346. The 
private right of primogenitary inheritance had led, in Germany, 
to the legal consolidation of territories which would otherwise 
have remained separate. 
There had been a reversion to the situation of Germany 
before the Imperial Peace (1495), in which the estates could 
'behave towards one another as sovereigns, wage war and make 
peace' 
347. But, before 1495, there had at least 'held sway 
over all a superior power which is now no longer to be found' 
348. 
Thus, not the principle of law but power and cunning prevailed 
in the modern relations of the estates. Accordingly, the smaller 
ones were encircled 
349, the stronger grew stronger and the weaker 
were swallowed up 
350 
and anarchic behaviour, of the estates as 
sovereigns became the powerful and cunning tyranny of genuinely 
sovereign international actors against which the laws of the 
public authority were powerless to speak 
351. Judicial pro- 
nouncement might, perchance, be given against them, 'but where 
is the power which upholds the law against the powerful estate, 
the executive authority which really sets against a powerful 
one the right of the weaker recognized by the judge?, 
352. 
Throughout these sections on military power, finances and 
territorial status, Hegel's purpose was to inveigh against the 
pretences contained in constitutional but not home-made law - 
for example in the proviso 'in so far as such alliances do not 
conflict with duty to the Emperor and Empires 
353 
_9 in moribund 
financial arrangements - such as the unpaid Roman Months 
354 
_V - 
in resolutions of the Diet - notably that which earmarked as a 
budgetary resource the value of territories held by foreign 
powers, to be realised when they should be regained 
355 
- and in 
246. 
the fatuous expositions by German professors of constitutional 
law, of the claims and titles of the Empire to lost territories 
in Hungary, Poland, Prussia, Naples, Lombardy, the United 
356 
Provinces, Switzerland, Burgundy etc. Hegel compared the 
constitutional lawyers who rejoiced in all these (empty and now 
meaningless symbols or insignia of the past and its claims' 
357 
to impoverished noblemen who comfort themselves by dusting, in 
order to preserve them against rot, the relicts and portraits of 
their ancestors 
358. All their pretences concerning the military, 
financial and territorial reality of German power were comprised 
in makeshift expressions 
3590 
often taken for concepts to which 
some reality is supposed to correspond, but which in fact express 
nothing. Such were the empty titles 'Head of Christendom', 
'Lord of the World' and 'Roman Emperor and King of the Germans, 
360. 
Having dealt with Hegel's explicit arguments concerning the 
necessity that there be available to the state adequate power to 
enforce the principle of its unity and considered, albeit in the 
case of representation not yet exhaustively, his views on the 
relative importance of representative and judicial bodies, and 
of military and financial resources; and having treated of his 
attitude to practitioners and apologists, witting or unwitting, 
of behaviour inimical to the integration of the Germans as a 
people and examined his views on additions and qualifications that 
compromise the coherence of constitutional law and its capacity 
to control the vicissitudes in the history and pathological 
system of the whole whose identity it is supposed to conserve, 
we have now-to endeavour an explanation of Hegel's complicated 
relationship, already adverted to for the purpose of defining 
his posture with respect to the political alternatives represented 
by Austria and Prussia, to systematic trends in German constitu- 
tional thought since the 17th century. 
247. 
Chapter Five 
Fromward the Political Theory of Possessive Particularism 
'Fiat iustitia, pereat Germania' 
1. Ratio status and the impropriety of Roman Law 
Hegel's relationship to German constitutional thought since 
the 17th century is extremely difficult to determine because of 
his curious reticence concerning its influence upon him. It is 
proposed in this and the following chapter to pursue the steps 
whose traces he kicked over as he began to approach the empyrean 
reaches where he would tread for the rest of his career. It 
will be argued that having assimilated unacknowledged views 
hostile to the isolationist tendencies of territorial princes, 
and favourable rather to a political life of familiar cohabita- 
tion under the common law of the ethical totality of the German 
people, Hegel directed his energies to the task, performed like- 
wise without naming names, of demolishing paradigmatic conceptual 
edifices whose tendency was to support the illusion, so very 
advantageous to the princes, that what they knew to be an ens 
rationis, a Gedankenstaat, was in fact an ens realis, which 
conferred upon their privileged sovereignty a certain legitimacy, 
but constrained them not at all. A great deal of attention will 
be devoted to the demonstration of Hegel's attitude towards 
thinkers such as Samuel Pufendorf and Gottfried Achenwall. 
Though Hegel never mentioned them by name in the VSN, or 
for that matter, in any other of his writings, it can be shown 
that he was hostile to the former, whose work on the German 
Empire could not but have compelled Hegel, as, since 1667, it 
248. 
had compelled other theorists, to take into account the terms 
in which it explained the evolution of Germany's political system. 
While it can only be argued, with the aid of allusions that make 
sense only if interpreted as references to Pufendorf, that Hegel 
intended to discredit the entire system of presuppositions that 
persisted without critical reappraisal in the work of constitu- 
tional historians such as Johann Stephan Puetter, it can be shown 
with much less reconstruction of the evidence from what tradition 
Hegel derived a preferable system of presuppositions to which he 
proceeded to give a philosophical dimension. This was the tradi- 
tion of 'political statistics' begun by Conring, whom Hegel did 
name, and perfected by Achenwall, whom he did not, but of whom it 
may be said that he helped at a decisive time to shape Hegel's 
understanding of the relationship between civil society and the 
state-, as well as to reinforce Hegel's determination to consider 
political life as it is rather than as it ought to be. 
But before we attend to Hegel's relationship to the desiderate 
constitutional theory of Pufendorf and the considerate treatment 
of political systems which Hegel met with in Achenwall, whose 
work he probably first encountered when, in 1798, he made his no 
longer extant commentary on Kants 'Metaphysik der Sitten', let 
us deal with one of the few theorists whom he did name in the 
VSN, Hermann Conring, and examine the wealth of contribution 
which he made to Hegel's ability to slough off the dead weight 
of conventional constitutional dogma that bore down on German 
political thought at the end of the 18th century. 
It is of fundamental importance to the understanding of 
what Hegel was about to appreciate that his derision of the 
expressions cited at the end of the last chapter was nothing new. 
As we have seen, there is evidence in the February - March 1801 
cycle of fragments that Hegel was in general agreement with the 
249. 
attempts of Hermann Conring and B. P. von Chemnitz to defend the 
claims of public law against private right 
1. This attempt 
involved an assault on the prescriptive basis of Roman law upon 
which the defence of private right was founded. The quest for 
a ratio status in imperio nostro Romano-Germanico had'explicitly 
set itself the task of founding the priority of German public 
law upon the allegation of its radical relationship with German 
customary life and of the impertinence of the procedures and 
values of Roman law to the German habitat. German public law 
was intended to be conceived as a 'native growth' 
2 
out of this 
customary environment and there had, to that end, to be a divorce 
of the idea of the German Empire from the presumption of its 
continuity with the Roman Empire. This presumption had been 
most lately criticised by Puetter, one of Hegel's chief sources 
of information relative to the development of the German consti- 
tution. But there are compelling reasons, which we shall examine 
in due course, but merely adumbrate here, for serious doubt that 
Hegel's opinion that the union of Hungary, Poland, Prussia, Naples 
etc. under the Roman Emperor in his 'capacity as head of 
Christendom ... has nothing to do with the German state, 
3 had 
anything to do with Puetter's superficially identical view. It 
is not evident from the notes which Hegel made during his reading 
4 
of Puetter that it was his debunking of the theory of the trans- 
lation of the Roman into the German Empire that had any influence 
upon the argument of the VSN. Yet it is certain that Hegel too, 
for different reasons than Puetter's, was determined to argue the 
fatuity of the translation myth. Hegel's argument was that the 
claims and titles still expounded by professors of constitutional 
law such as Carl Friedrich Haeberlin 
5 depended upon the absurd 
presupposition of the equivalence of the contemporary German to 
the Roman Empire, and involved the cognate attempt to present 
250. 
the public law of the Empire as if it, like that of the Roman 
Empire, were so substantially guaranteed by central power and 
authority that it could equally abide the centrifugal tendencies 
of private right, to the extent even that ius publicum could be 
permitted to be regarded as legitimate in virtue of a contractual 
relation between subjects and rulers 
6. It is of some interest 
that Haeberlin could maintain these views without feeling that 
they prejudiced at all his allegiance to Puetter. Puetter, after 
all, attacked the romanist myth on the mere grounds of its proven 
falsity, rather than because of its adherents' complacency, 
because it exaggerated the strength of the Empire, in the face of 
political dissolution. 
Puetter's 'Staats und Fuerstenrechtlamounted to a legitimation 
of the 'results of the historical developments that were event- 
ually to lead to the dissolution of the Empire, 
7, because it 
advocated no more than the systematisation of the profuse growth 
of aggregated territorial rights. It was his 'optimistic view 
of the constitution' 
8, born of an 'almost total absence of 
political consciousness' 
9 
of the pernicious consequences of 
private right for public law which, as we shall see, Hegel 
castigated as a dependence of the maintenance of the state upon 
'a most special divine providence' 
10. It would seem, then, that 
even if Hegel were aware of Puetter's critique of the translation 
theory, he would have regarded it as empty of the political 
implications with which he would have it invested. These were 
concentrated in the view that if the dissolution of the state 
were to be reversed it would have to be by means of founding 
public law upon'a source of legitimacy quite distinct from Roman 
tradition, since that was incompetent to mobilise the political 
vitality of a people to which it was foreign and irrelevant. 
The end of such mobilisation was the modernisation of the 
251. 
conception of freedom rather than, what he regarded as the 
consequence of the romanist myth, its restriction to the meaning 
attached to it by the princes, the 'German freedom, if you like 
to call it so' 
11, 
of private right. 
The maintenance of such a restricted meaning, justified by 
the pretence that the German Empire had, like the 'Roman imperial 
dominion', the interest, will and power to maintain supremacy 
over an 'unnatural union of territories separated both by geo- 
graphical situation and by national individuality' 
12 in spite 
of large concessions to private ius civil. e, had been precisely 
the motive which had inspired the princes to foster the transla- 
tion myth, with a view to making private right the principle on 
which the union of the Empire should be based. Professors of 
constitutional law like Haeberlin, duped by the myth, might very 
well suppose that the Reichskammergericht, whose institution in 
1495 formalised, though it did not cause, the regulation of 
imperial relations according to Roman private law, was the 'high 
palladium' 
13 in which German liberties were maintained against 
the princes. But Hegel was convinced that it had performed and 
could perform no such service 
14. 
In controverting the translation myth, Hegel stood upon 
ground already prepared by Hermann Conring, who had been the 
first German legal historian to explain and to criticise the 
sway of Roman law in the Empire. With a view to establishing 
the autonomy of German law with respect to Roman law, Conring 
denied the relevance of scriptural doctrine and attacked the 
prejudices of the natural universality of Roman law so far as 
these were adduced in justification of the Reception of Roman 
law in Germany 15. He deprived it of this justification by 
explaining it entirely by way of a primitive 'sociology of 
knowledge' or social etiology of legal practice. The Reception 
252. 
had been due, in the first instance, to the fact that from the 
12th century the sons of the German nobility and urban patriciate 
began to join the ranks of the 'natio Germanici' of legal 
scholars in the universities of Bologna and Padua. The impact 
of Roman law ceased to be felt only in the sphere of canon law 
and its practice began to be regarded as a means of social and 
political advancement, rather than merely a part of clerical 
education. By the end of the 15th century there had been 
established in Germany two chairs of Roman law (Basel 1460, 
Thbingen 1477) 16, Henceforth, especially after the 
Reichskammergericht Ordnung of 1495 had admitted the validity of 
the Corpus Iuris as the common law of the Empire and had 
depended upon its application the princes' jurisdictional 
privileges - de non evocando and de non ap ellando 
17 
-, there 
existed a demand, from the side of the princes, but also on the 
part of common litigants and petitioners, for the services of 
professional academic advocates in preference to the increasingly 
redundant people's judges (Volksrichtern) and courts of jurors 
(Schoffengerichte), the traditional instruments of customary law 
(Gewohnheitsrecht). Except in some provinces, notably Saxony, 
the resistance of the Diets to the supersession of the principle 
of 'communal finding', and to the departure from customary laws 
and legal process, was unavailing in the face of increasing 
18 
concentration of the power of the territorial princes 
It was against the opportunity presented to the princes 
for privileged jurisdiction (the standing of the prince was held 
to count 'tantum ... in suo territoria, quantum Caesarii. in suo 
imperio') and absolute authority (according to the principles 
'princeps legibus solutus est' and 'quod principe placuit, 
vis legis habet) that Conring set his face in his 'De origine 
iuris germanici' 
19. In his tDe germanorum imperio romano' 
253. 
and 'De finibus imperil P-ermanici', he deprived the principles 
of Roman law of the putative legitimacy of their application by 
demonstrating the utter distinctness of the Roman and Carolingian 
Empires 20. It was, therefore, not at all the logical conclusion 
of his apgument that concepts such as 'Emperor and Empire' were 
products of 'moral religious and natural law considerations which 
were invalid for politics' that he should exalt 'in their stead 
the particular territorial principality as the real creation of 
the rational will of the ruler and as the valid exercise of his 
Libertaet' 21 
That Hegel seems to have been aware of those of Conring's 
arguments in 'De origine iuris Rermanici', 'De germanorum imperio 
romano' and 'De finibus imperio romano' and 'De finibus imperii 
germanici' is attested not only by his like criticism of anachro- 
nistic concepts in the VSN, but by his much earlier advertisement 
of his knowledge of Conring's social etiology of legal practice, 
in which he too argued, in effect, that the Reception of Roman 
law in Germany was promoted by the ideological assumption of the 
pure rationality of Roman law, notwithstanding the fact that it 
had, in any case, been perverted by its adaptation to mediaeval 
Italian circumstances . For, in 1798, Hegel had noted that 
22 
'In Italy, where political freedom had presented itself in pure 
forms and beautiful characteristics, but declined somewhat 
earlier than in Germany, legal scholarship arose in Bologna ... 
the noblest of the peoples streamed there from all quarters and 
were happy to return to their fatherlands as learned and strict 
judges, in the belief that on the seat of justice they could be 
servants of an idea, servants of law rather than just servants 
of a man' 
23. But they learnt their law in a period of Italian 
history when there was no people but only a 'crowd of individuals ... 
All conflicts touched the rights of individual families and of 
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men who could never be brought or reconciled to the best social 
union of their rights. Living together in cities was rather 
coexistence in the same space, within the same walls, than sub- 
jection to the same laws. The power of the state was weak, 
there prevailed absolutely no ideas. The countryside was be- 
decked with countless castles, which each built for his security, 
and every palace of city families was secured with fortifications 
etc. ... Enforcement of justice was only the victory of one 
faction over another' 
24. As we have seen, Hegel was greatly 
interested in the like affliction of Italy and Germany, each in 
their own time, by the misconception of the state as an 'order of 
justice' where the laws lacked force against the tyrannical 
pretensions of the princes because they lacked radical relation 
to a customary foundation from which alone, whether in a city- 
state or in an empire, the public authority could derive its 
power. We have seen also that it was upon the deterioration of 
the feudal relationship he blamed the decline of the laws from 
their status as the embodiment of the ethical life of a people 
to that of a fairweather instrument, to be abandoned in favour 
of force if necessary, of the pursuit of personal interest. We 
shall shortly see. that there seems to have been expressed in the 
idea of 'living together' under the same laws a strong affinity 
between the arguments of Althusius, Conring and Hegel for a 
repudiation of the competence of foreign legal and political forms 
to assure the stability of the German Empire. We have first, 
however, to clear Conring of any suspicion of partiality to the 
cause of territorial particularism. 
It is a far from negligible fact that, though in the 
February - March cycle, Hegel guardedly criticised Conring, along 
with Chemnitz, for seeming to allow that the good principle of 
the depression of private right might ultimately be realised not 
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within the German Empire as a whole, but only within the terri- 
torial state 
25, he did not in the definitive text think it 
appropriate to criticise Conring but only Chemnitz. For Conring 
was not open to the criticisms to which Hegel subjected Chemnitz. 
Indeed, as we have seen, Conring had an interest, because of his 
close association with the work of Chemnitz, in minimising the 
extent to which the latter was taken for an outright antagonist 
of the Imperial dynasty. Chemnitz's six-point ratio status, not 
endorsed by Conring, was susceptible to criticism precisely 
because it sought to undermine the principles of the habitat of 
the feudal constitution from which, Hegel believed, Germany might 
derive strength. It did so particularly on account of its 
recommendation, contrary to Hegel's admittedly rather confused 
and utopian sympathies for aspects of the feudal order, that the 
Hapsburgs should be expelled, that the emperor should be elected 
(and that for no more than three consecutive generations from, 
to boot, a weak family) and that the Austrian Crown Lands, its 
feudal resources, should be confiscated. 
Moreover, not only did Hegel not criticise Conring with the 
force which he would have deployed against him, as against 
Chemnitz, if he had deemed him to be essentially an advocate of 
the territorial interest, but also he showed himself to be a 
follower of Conring particularly in the manner in which he, unlike 
Chemnitz, developed and rehabilitated the tradition of ratio 
status. For there appears to be a systematic correlation between 
Hegel's views and Conring's assault on the 'translation theory', 
his establishment of*the possibility of a comparative study of 
political development, his reevaluation of Machiavelli and his 
argument that any solution to the emasculation of the sovereignty 
of the German Empire could not be achieved except by way of the 
foundation of public law upon the notion of customary German 
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freedom, purged of implications in favour of the post feudal 
Libertaet of the German princes and independent of the inadequate 
services of the Imperial courts 
26. All these concerns, dispersed 
throughout Conring's works, Hegel concentrated in his assumption 
of the likeness of the fates of Germany and Italy, his comparison 
of the Guelphs and Ghebellines with the corpora evangelicorum et 
catholicorum, his consequent rehabilitation of Machiavelli as an 
antagonist of 'criminal' factions, his interpretation of Borgia 
as a duty bound saviour of public law from litigious predators 
upon the liberty of the people, and finally, of course, his own 
assault on the translation theory. 
A brief review of Conring's achievements will serve to 
confirm this surely not accidental congruity between his work 
and that of Hegel. Firstly, it was Conring whose debunking of 
the idea of the Holy Roman Empire as continuous with the last of 
the 'four monarchies' 
27 instituted by God's Providence and in 
accordance with eternal law was the propaedeutic to the study 
of the German Empire by means of the same methods and criteria 
as were thought to be appropriate to the study of other, secular 
states. On his appointment to the chair of politics at the 
University of Helmstedt in 1650, Conring introduced a course 
entitled notitia rerumpublicarum totius orbis 
28. This was the 
foundation of the incipient comparative practice of political 
science and history, which came to be developed by the 'political 
statisticians' 
29 
and pragmatic historians of 18th century Germany, 
particularly Gottfried Achenwall and August Ludwig von Schloezer 
of Goettingen, who constituted one of the bridges between the 
work of Conring and Hegel. For they collected data, under the 
heading of 'notable political statistics' (Staatsmerkwuerdig- 
keiten) 30, with a view to studying states 'as. they really are', 
rather than 'as they ought to be' 
31, 
or as Natural Law 
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jurisprudence would have it that they ought to be. It was to 
this secular tradition of political science that, as we shall see 
in greater detail in the sixth chapter, Hegel nailed his colours, 
giving it a philosophical depth which it had hitherto neglected 
to develop. In his assault on the schematism of the natural law 
tradition, Hegel did no more than affiliate himself to the 
'father of German jurisprudence' 
32. 
Secondly, Conring was the first German political theorist of 
any note to essay a fundamental re-evaluation of the work of 
Machiavelli. His efforts in this direction were the counterpart 
of his attempt to free political science of the stultifying effect 
of natural jurisprudence upon its capacity to explain the 
characteristic as well as the comparative development of law and 
political institutions. He regarded Machiavelli exclusively as 
a political scientist who, like himself, worked 'not in the fields 
of moral philosophy or sacred theology but in the political arena 
alone' 
33. This virtue rendered Machiavelli immune, like himself, 
to the illusion of an eternal order capable of sustaining the 
reality to which imperial concepts used to apply and a providence 
capable of translating that reality from one Empire to another. 
Both his admiration for Machiavelli and his contempt for the 
myth by which the princes promoted the appearance that their 
power did not derogate from that of the Empire mark Conring out 
as a genuine antagonist of political particularism. 
Rather than upon its conformity with eternal law, the sway 
of public law was seen by Machiavelli and Conring to depend upon 
its radical relation to 'the times', to its customary materia. . 
So it was with Hegel. That this was not the case in Germany was' 
the cause of the dissipation of the sovereign power of the Empire. 
Its restoration called for a ratio status, a policy promoting 
custom-built public law fit to depress the rights of princes as 
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territorial sovereigns and to oblige them as imperial subjects 
34. 
This was the nub of Conring's re-evaluation of Machiavelli and of 
the very idea of ratio status. His interpretation of Machiavelli 
as a theorist of ratio status turned, not on any intention to 
criticise him from the standpoint of questions concerning the 
'best form of state', but rather upon the view that he was to be 
appraised as one who appreciated that that state is best which is 
adapted to the character of a people. This was what Conring 
brought from his aristotelian education 
35 to the interpretation 
of Machiavelli, rather than the strictures of a pedantic school- 
man 
36. Conring was not at all the protagonist of natural law 
which some have taken him for 
37. Yet his hostility to the moral, 
religious and natural law considerations implicit in concepts 
which he held to be invalid for the politics of contemporary 
Germany, and his taste for Machiavelli and ratio status do not, 
pace Krieger 
38, 
qualify him a theorist of the territorial 
Machtstaat. On the contrary, both attituc stemmed from sus- 
picion of the authoritarian designs of the princes. For his 
attack on the translation myth and Roman law amounted to an 
assault on princely privilege, while his view of Machiavelli, 
after all, was that his spirit was a spirit 'alien to tyranny 
and congenial, rather, to the study of popular states, 
39. 
Thus yoked to the cause of opposing freedom to the Libertaet 
of the princes, the idea of ratio status as radical public law 
was freed from the disrepute into which it had been brought by 
its earlier devotees. The sense given to ratio status by its 
first German exponent, Arnold Clapmarius, that the prince should 
compensate his subjects for their. actual oppression with'semblances 
of power or liberty, 
40 
and that only by such means could the 
Germans, jealous of their old liberties, be kept under control, 
was not at all the sense in which Conring understood the idea. 
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Public law was not to be a tissue of Tura inania; the ius commune 
seu ordinarium, whose object was the bonum publicum, was not, 
as Clapmarius held that it ought, to be subordinate to the 
Privilegium dominationis. That was not Conring's understanding 
of ratio status 
41. Nor, of course, though it appears to have 
some affinity with the view, attributed in this work to Hegel, 
that the state must furnish the citizen a simulative image of 
his own activity, while yet it must actually be the product of 
the activity of no-one in particular, did the Clapmarian concept 
of 'compensation' bear any relation to the idea of political 
exchange in Hegel's pre-systematic writings. It may be that in 
the WSS, when Hegel acknowledged the fact that it is not simply 
upon its coercive capacity, as 'particular against particular' , 
42 
that any regime bases its dominion, but upon the appearance it 
can give to be universal, and when he argued that this appearance 
of the 'dignity of universality, 
43, become dissimulative, must 
be appropriated by an order that is genuinely lawful, whose 
simulation of common activity is not to the advantage or privilege 
of the powerful, our hero had it in mind to attack Clapmarius' 
assertion that 'It is necessity and power that have dignity so 
that often a thing not lawful acquires the attributes of law and 
justice' 44. If so, it may be, further, that Hegel came across this 
claim, so useful to the 'forces of particularity, 
45, 
and made 
without any view to criticise the possession and attribution of 
dignity, in the work of Chemnitz 
46. At any rate, the dis- 
simulation of responsiveness to the demands of subjects for satis- 
faction, as enjoined by Clapmarius, has a nicely matched opponent 
in Hegel's principle of the simulation, through representation, 
of every citizens'responsibility for the activity of the 'whole 
state's 
Rather than perpetrate the dissimulative emasculation of 
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German liberties, the law had, according to Coni'ing's conception 
of ratio status, genuinely to harness to the service of the 
sovereign state the natural striving of a people for liberty 
47. 
In this way effect could be given, without deception, to the 
Clapmarian principle, with which Conring did agree, that a state 
requires not only the form of legality but that there should be 
an opinion of correspondence between the acts of the state and 
the character of its people 
48. But despite this agreement on 
the fundamental meaning of ratio status, its connotation had, for 
Conring, to be of that which is lawful rather than arbitrary and 
deceptive. 
In this respect, Conring was at one with Clapmarius' critic 
and immediate successor as the chief interpreter of ratio status, 
Christoph Besold 
49. Though he stood in the natura] law tradition 
and might therefore have been expected to be inveterately hostile 
to Machiavelli, Besold could admit that the teachings of 
Machiavelli were abused by those'new politicians returning from 
Italy convinced that a prince is entitled to squeeze money from 
his subjects by any fraud' 
50 
and was peculiar also in that he 
admitted what the natural law tradition had long denied, namely 
that the absolute sovereignty of the state could coexist with 
the liberties of its members. Taking the standard ratio status 
view that it depends on national character what constitution best 
suits a people 
51, Besold broke with the dogma, which had stifled 
constructive discussion of the character and development of the 
Empire, that constitutional forms could only be judged disjunct- 
ively, as either monarchical, or aristocratic, or democratic. 
In the face of Jean Bodin's'denial of the capacity for stability 
and survival of mixed forms of constitution, indeed of any form 
but that of pure monarchy, Besold made the German Constitution 
intelligible in terms of the idea of a status mixtus 
52. Once 
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this assault upon the sterile constraints of natural law and the 
neo-aristotelian categories had been made, it became possible 
for German constitutional theorists to look for a solution to the 
competition of the Emperor and princes for sovereign power, 
rather than to the Courts, to the representative institutions of 
the Empire in which was embodied the principle of the status mixtus, 
that is of maiestas constitutionally distributed between the 
Empire and Diet. 
This process of the disembarrassment of political theory of 
scholastic burdens had begun with the work of Althusius. 
Althusius was the first to refute Bodin's application to Germany 
of the view that where there are representative institutions - 
aristocratic or democratic - there can be no monarchy, except in 
the mode of administration. In respect of constitutional form, 
Bodin's view was that representation is incompatible with 
monarchy. But Althusius argued that the Empire was, just as 
much as France after 1614, a monarchy 
53. Bodin's categories 
did not equip him to understand the native coexistence of Emperor 
and Empire and that this mixture was not necessarily conducive to 
instability. The contrary view, that a . status mixtus 
is more 
likely than a pure form of state to be stable, a view which 
Machiavelli encouraged in his sympathisers, was, in fact, gaining 
increasing ground in 17th century German political theory. 
Status mixtus was the ratio status for Germany. 
It is of some interest that, not accidentally, the designa- 
tion of advocates of absolute princely power as Imachiavelliani 
was criticized by protagonists of status mixtus, like Besold and 
Conring, as illicit, while Bodin attacked Machiavelli for his 
admiration of the mixed constitution of Polybian theory 
54. No 
doubt' Bodin would have had a low opinion of Machiavellis first 
19th century follower, and on the same grounds. It can be shown, 
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conversely, in what contempt, though he mentioned no names, Hegel 
held Bodin's deduction of the necessary incompetence of the 
German constitution to be adapted in the service of political 
stability. Though Hegel admitted its historical instability, he 
blamed this on the corruption of the 'pure feudal constitution' 
by the attempts of princely potentates to secure themselves in 
their territories on the strength of the principles of Roman Law. 
Moreover, he went much further in criticising the standpoint of 
Bodin than Althusius. For Hegel held not only that Germany had 
in its traditions the potential for the modernisation of freedom, 
but that it had more potential for modernity, and for stability 
too, than France. 
For in 1801, though he allowed that after the 'harsh arrange- 
ment' whereby from 161L., France had no Estates General, she remain- 
ed a state, Hegel argued that she ceased to qualify as a modern 
state, for 'all modern states subsist by representation, and its 
degeneration alone, i. e. the loss of its true essence, 
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destroyed France's constitution and led it eventually upon the 
course which ended in the French Revolution. Bodin, wrong about 
the superiority of French absolutism, was equally wrong about the 
inferiority of German representation. 
Bodin's fault was that he abstracted the German constitution 
from its indigenous customary foundation. Althusius (and follow- 
ing him, Hegel), on the other hand, saw that the German Empire 
could only be securely founded upon the representative institutions 
which invested the life of the community with the majesty of the 
laws 56. We have seen what a remarkable congruence there is 
between the concepts of living together, law and representation 
as they appeared in the work of Althusius and Hegel. It is on 
the grounds that Aithusius attempted to establish the function of 
representation as mediation between the material of communal life 
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and the form of common laws that he has been recognized as the 
founder of political science 'on sociological principles' 
57, 
who enabled its liberation from the abstract straits of natural 
jurisprudence. That Hegel likewise regarded representation as 
fundamental to maiestas indicates that he was as indebted to the 
tradition stemming from Althusius, the hallmark of which was the 
concept of distributed maiestas and the quest for the social or 
ethnic foundations of representation, as to Montw i eu, who 
similarly sought to discover the origins of representation in 
the customary life of the 'German forests' 
58. As we saw in 
the second chapter, the notion of trust (fides), the spirit of 
fealty of the German forests described by Tacitus, interested 
Hegel on account of the possibility of discovering in it the 
basis for the virtual republicanism of the status mixtus. So 
it was with the early protagonists, such as Conring, of the value 
of distributed maiestas, which depended on the idea, inherent in 
the notion of trusty living together, of freedom as reciprocal 
obligation 
59, 
and whose advocacy was nothing but an attempt to 
promote an indigenous system of constitutional status mixtus. 
It was Conring who, turning to Tacitus, took up and developed 
the idea of discovering the social and ethnic (in the sense of 
customarily rather than racially characteristic)basis upon which 
that cause could be advanced, from the culture in which an un- 
civilized or unconstituted version of distributed majesty had 
first occurred, the cohabitat of the 'German forests'. 
It is, of course, well known that ? ontesquieu, also an 
advocate of status mixtus depended heavily, for his views on the 
German forests, upon Tacitus' 'Germania'. This was indeed the 
main source of the image of the Germans as 'whole men', whom, 
Hegel noted, the French call 'hommes entiers, 
60. 
But 
Montesquieu's chief object was to explain the origins in this 
ethno-social matrix of English representative institutions and to 
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justify the idea of division of powers rather than distributed maies- 
tas. For the explanation of German representative practices in 
61 terms of the 'striving for freedom' of the old Germans there 
were much better resources at Hegel's disposal than the 'Spirit 
of the Laws'. 
What is less well known is that it was Hermann Conring who, 
not content to document the modern history of the acts of the 
Imperial Diet 62, inquired into the political culture of the old 
Germans which was credited as the precondition of the represent- 
ative system. It was Conring who, to this end, reoearched beyond 
Carolingian times 
63 
and, particularly, discovered in Tacitus 
64 
the putative origins of 'iuris germanici'. 
This third aspect of Conring's achievement clearly influenced 
Hegel. It may be said that they shared an interest in the 
ethnology of the 'pure forms and beautiful characteristics, 
65 
of 
German freedom and in the urgent task of adapting the German 
striving for liberty to the circumstances of the modern world, in 
order to the accomplishment of a modern constitution of freedom. 
Though there is wanting direct evidence, such as is available 
respecting Hegel's knowledge of Conring's explanation of the 
Reception and debunking of the translation myth, that he was 
interested in this Tacitist aspect of Conring's 'De origine iuris 
germanici', it is clear that, where Hegel referred to anonymous 
'modern professors' 
66, he had in mind, at the very least, scholars - 
whether of public law or political statistics - whose work would 
have been inconceivable but for the pioneering efforts of Conring. 
One such, though not one whom it is intended 
67 
to consider as a 
candidate for the status of 'modern professor', was D. F. C. Majer, 
whom Rosenzweig identifies as one to whom Hegel was probably 
referring when he wrote of professors who had given up the attempt 
to classify the constitution in abstraction from its characteristic 
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development 
680 This Majer followed Conring not only, in his 
'Teutsche Staatskonstitution' (1800), by doing what had become 
commonplace, namely deriding 'school questions' concerning the 
form of the constitution and dismissing the empty titles paraded 
by the likes of Haeberlin, but also by delivering, in Tubingen, 
frequent lectures on Tacitus' Germania and, from this outlook 
upon the customary roots of German law, attacking the 'romanising 
publicists who applied principles from Roman private law to matters 
of state in a manner completely inappropriate' 
69. 
Whether it 
was through Majer that Hegel first heard of Conring cannot be 
ascertained. The same is true of the question whether Hegel 
ever attended Majer's lectures. But it will become clear from 
what follows in this and the final chapter that Hegel was un- 
doubtedly a self-conscious participant, if not a very frank one, 
in the tradition of legal ethnology begun by Conring and his 
repudiation, to the end that the state might be disembarrassed 
of debilitating myths, of all kinds of scholastic constitutional 
theory. 
We are now in a position, with the benefit of hindsight from 
all the materials composed in 1801 and dealt with in the last 
chapter, and of insight derived from them into the original 
sources of Hegel's preoccupations, in a position to turn to his 
treatment of 'old German freedom', of law and representation in 
their aspect as the means to its modernization and to his attitudes, 
positive and negative, to traditions in German political science 
which, by and large, stemmed respectively f-om the influences of 
Machiavelli, Althusius, Conring and Montesquieu, and from that 
of Bodin. These attitudes, as well as Hegel's treatment of 
custom, law and representation, are disclosed in the materials, 
now due for consideration, which span'the period 1? 98 to 1803. 
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2. From a people of whole men to its stead 
By June or July 1801 
70, Hegel had given definitive ex- 
pression to his views on $old German freedom', which he first 
began to formulate in 1798 71. These views are crucial inasmuch 
as depends upon the clarification of their apparent ambivalence 
the proper understanding of how Hegel could maintain that 'old 
German freedom' had been the cause of the dissolution of the 
German Empire, while yet there stemmed from it the principle of 
representation upon which every modern European state was based 
and which had to be reappropriated by the Germans if that people 
was to exist in the modern world as a state 
72. 
This paradox, that Germany gave to the world a principle 
which it failed to develop for itself 
73, 
a principle which did 
not exist in the forests of Germany but arose from them 
74, 
will 
be more fully explained when the time comes to consider Hegel's 
incipient philosophy of history. Let these statements be 
provisionally taken to mean, in accordance with the theory out- 
lined in chapter three, that the development of political 
practices and sentiments - in this case, those of the 'feudal 
system' - if it takes place not in response to deliberate design 
but entirely casually, renders them more liable than they would 
be if they were consciously instituted and enacted, to be 
perverted from its proper course. 
That Hegel thought of the 'period of the old German freedom, 
75 
as a period which was instinct with the principle of representa- 
tion, and thus as one in which was inherent the potential for, 
or. the precondition of, the formation of a modern state, puts in 
grave doubt the common assumption that he attached a single and 
opprobrious meaning to the term. For, as we have already seen, 
Hegel could speak with approval of the 'great popular interest 
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(of German freedom)' 
? 6, 
an interest the reversion of which to 
its source 
77 
expressed a need for the reconstitution of the 
principle of the German forests, in contemporary Germany only 
formally extant in the Diet, the principle of the monarcho- 
representative system. Some aspect, then, of the old german 
freedom, by association, qua source, with the new 'sound common 
sense' notion of freedom 
78, 
and hence by dissociation from the 
'German freedom of the city councillors' and princes 
79, 
was 
accorded by Hegel a degree of respect which he withheld from 
that aspect of old German freedom which was the primitive source 
of contemporary particularism. 
The one aspect is that of a nation which was held by Hegel 
to be innocent, or, it might be truer to his meaning to say, the 
cause of Germany's decline only by reason of the peoples' irre- 
sponsibility. It was Hegel's view that though their confessional 
divisions had contributed to the downfall of Germany, the 
religious side of their social individualism was 'honourable and 
honest', and had been the cause only of 'unintentional dissolu- 
tion' 80. For this, after all, the peoples were not culpable. 
The other aspect is that of a part of the nation which Hegel did 
hold morally responsible: the princes 'knew what they were doing' 
when they exploited religious sentiment 
81. They took advantage, 
to the end of imposing their 'tyranny' 
82, 
of a situation that 
might be described as 'anarchy' 
83 but for the fact that, at the 
critical time, there was no state of which that epithet could be 
predicated, or, what is the same, no statutory law against which 
they could be said to have acted criminally. Nevertheless, the 
princes were to be 'regarded as criminals' 
84 in that they caused 
the arrest of the development, which Hegel clearly believed could 
conceivably have taken place, of the legal order implicit in the 
'feudal constitution'. 
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By no means, then, can Hegel be supposed to have confounded 
the 'drive for freedom' of the primitive German Volk 
85 
with the 
striving of the Estates for Libertaet. That, after all, was a 
confusion to which Chemnitz had been fabourable 
86, for it lent 
to his aristocratist ratio status the prescriptive justification 
of aboriginal sentiment which it would otherwise have lacked. 
It appears, rather, to have been Hegel's view that 'old 
German freedom', in its guise as political particularism, had 
been the cause of the disintegration of the Empire at the expense 
of 'old German freedom' in its aspect as what he called an 'inner 
togetherness of dispositions' (Zusammenhang der Gemueter) 
87. 
Even during the Fehdezeit, 'amidst all the storms of the lawless 
situation in the days before the Imperial Peace, there still 
persisted, in respect of the relation of the estates to one 
another and to the general interest, a certain togetherness of 
the whole (Zusammenhang des Ganzen)' 
88, 
which served in place 
of legal togetherness or integration (gesetzliche Zusammenhang) 
890 
It is of great interest that Hegel argued that, thanks to the 
growth of the imperial cities, there came about the political 
spread of the bourgeois spirit (buergerliche Sinn), in consequence 
of which was finally destroyed, by individualisation or particular- 
isation of dispositions (Vereinzelung der Gemueter) 
90, the 
familial political culture described by Tacitus. This argument, 
to be more fully discussed in its immediate context, came to the 
conclusion that though the primitive German disposition or 
character was such that its individual members 'were always will- 
ing to let themselves and their power coexist in a state' 
91, the 
admixture of such politically articulated bourgeois interests 
reinforced the public effect of a social stratification that did 
not matter in the sylvan German family and caused a conversion of 
the 'original German character' 
92 towards unwillingness to permit 
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the existence of a universal state. From having - despite its 
'unruliness' -a potential to acquiesce to the law, the original 
German character and its drive for freedom took, under circum- 
stances of embourgeoisement, the contrary direction of actual 
breach 93. 
It was because the bourgeois spirit drove the German character 
inward, to 'man's inmost heart' 94, that its originally communal 
disposition was destroyed. It could appear that separation into 
particular states was 'but a consequence' 
95 
of the German 
character whereas, in truth, it was merely 'in accordance' with 
it 96. There appears to be some justification for the inter- 
pretation of Hegel's understanding of the 'drive for freedom' as 
if he regarded it as an homogeneous phenomenon, in that he averred, 
after this analysis of the factors and stages of its appearance 
in the modern world, that the 'original unruly character of the 
German nation determined the iron. necessity of its fate' 
97. 
Yet, on the whole, it is clear that it was in the 'bourgeois 
spirit', only once it was invested with the 'inner and outer 
legitimation' 98 which it sought from a privatised religion for 
the politics of 'possessive particularism' that Hegel found the 
essential cause of the decline of Germany. It is for this 
reason that it is impossible to agree with Hans Maier that, while 
Hegel 'knew how to describe it lyrically' 99, he made 'old German 
freedom' the basis of his allegedly 'monocausal explanation' of 
the destruction of the German constitution 
100 
Hegel may be said to have regarded the German character 
itself as a cause of political particularism only in the extended 
sense of a circumstance permissive of what politics conducted 
according to the bourgeois principle 
101 induced: 'great numbers 
of states and the dominance of trade and commercial wealth had 
developed; the unruliness of the German character could not of 
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itself (unmittelbar) cause the emergence of independent states' 
102 
hostile to the principle of majesty. It is clear from the above 
statement that his meaning was not at all determinist wren Hegel 
wrot. p that the peculiar form or principle of German constitutional 
law 'is deeply grounded in that for which the Germans have made 
themselves most famous, namely in their drive for freedom' 103, 
and that it 'stands in unsundered connexion with the condition of 
Europe in which the nations participated in the supreme power, 
not indirectly through laws, but immediately' 
104. There was no 
determinist implication either, when he argued that their drive 
'never allowed the Germans to become a people subjecting itself 
to a common public authority even after every other Europian 
people had become subject to the dominion of a state of its own 
making' 105. Equally, if more obviously, free of determinist 
overtones is his view that the Germans differed from the other 
peoples of Europe, with whom originally they had in common a 
form of 'universal authority in which each individual had a sort 
of free and personal share ... dependent on an arbitrary will' 
106, 
in that they 'have not wished to transform this ... share into a 
free share, independent of arbitrary will and consisting in the 
universality and power of laws' 
107. 
It was not of necessity that the Germans' constitutional 
history took the course that it did. To have adopted such a 
unilaterally determinist argument would have begged the question: 
Why, from the same situation, had not other European peoples 
followed suit? To have supposed the Germans to have been 
necessarily predisposed against legal togetherness would have 
undermined Hegel's general view that it, was out of Germanic 
political culture, out of the customary environment or ethical 
habitat in which dispositional togetherness prevailed, that there 
had emerged among other European peoples the legal and stately 
order of modern representative government 108, For in that view 
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was involved the presupposition that law was implicit, though 
not extant, in the german forests, just as representation arose 
from whence it did not exist. Thus, elsewhere, it had been 
willingly that the arbitrary and personal had been transformed 
into deliberate, universal and indirect political participation, 
whereas the Germans were unwilling, whibh is to imply that they 
were able, to construct another situation than that which is 
founded upon and perpetuates 'arbitrary will'. They would have 
been so able to construct a political edifice like that of other 
Europeans, which would have been no less deeply grounded in or 
directly connected with their old familial dwelling-place, 
because, like other European peoples, their fundamental disposi- 
tion was originally not antinomian (gesetzwidrig) but merely law- 
less (gesetzlos) 109 . 
That, as it happened, they were unwilling, is a fault which 
Hegel seems, at a superficial glance, to have intended to impute 
indiscriminately to the German character and as its necessary 
consequence. But it is clear that the contrariness to law which 
supervened upon mere lawlessness was held by him to be rather the 
fault of the 'individual parts' which would not sacrifice their 
particularities 
110, 
and to have arisen rather as a matter of 
chance, effective only because of the lack of the authority of 
public law and because of the character of a few, not all, 
Germans. The German character became a significant factor in 
the dissolution of Germany only insofar as its original environ- 
ment was distorted by possessive particularism. As is clear by cross- 
reference to the fragment in which Hegel made mention of Conring, 
where it-was argued that 'gain of private property (is) a matter 
of chance', wherefore ! state authority cannot be private property"", 
Hegel'a view was that it was in consequence of the fortuitous 
112 
achievement by some of tpower over others' , and so because of 
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eminent rather than common character, that the togetherness of 
the whole had been destroyed. 
What then, if Hegel did not attribute the fate of Germany 
to the indiscriminate and necessary effect of national character, 
is the significance of his views on old German freedom? It 
would seem that he derived from the Tacitist tradition, within 
which Conring and Montesquieu were probably his chief mentors, 
the model of a community that, without need for public law, had 
been ethically integrated or, what is the same, had been a people 
(ethon). Upon this model, perhaps the 'mental image' of the 
first draft of the Introduction to the VSN, Sollte das Resultat ... 
(SdR) 113, Hegel hoped could be founded the recovery of Germany, 
with the all-important difference that ethical integration could 
now be accomplished not independently of public law, not by 
simple virtue of binding manners (Sitten), but only by means of 
the enactment of those manners as an ethical activity (Sittlich- 
keit) concentrated in public law and so directed against the 
particularist tendencies by which, because of its lack of self- 
conscious articulation, the German character had been perverted. 
It is essential to a clear appreciation of the sense in which 
Hegel believed that the old togetherness of the whole could and 
should be recovered that it be understood that his attitude was 
not one of yearning, like many of his contemporaries and near- 
contemporaries for the restoration of the old way of lice. In 
a marginal note in SdR, where Hegel first expounded his views on 
old German freedom, he was quite emphatically of the opinion that 
it would be 'childish and absurd to yearn for such a condition 
(as that of the primitive Volk bound not by laws but by manners) 
as if it alone were natural, and not to respect the condition in 
which laws prevail as necessary and as a condition of freedom' 
114, 
Hegel's position here may be compared to that which he took in the 
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Philosophy of Right where he was to criticise those who un- 
conditionally prefer the 'holy chain of friendship' to the 
rational bonds of law 
115. 
At the same time as he made this his first very explicit 
statement in 1798 of the later view that the togetherness of 
custom is not abrogated but enhanced by its legal enactment 
116, 
Hegel averred, equally emphatically, that it was shallow and weak- 
minded to hold that the primitive Germans were 'loathsome, un- 
fortunate and stupid' whereas the moderns were 'infinitely more 
excellent, more fortunate and more civilized' 
117. This un- 
sympathetic and rationalist view, of which Voltaire was the fore- 
most exponent, was one with which Hegel could have no truck. 
For it took no account of the possibility that, in their own time, 
the-manners of the Germans and the dependence of their relations 
of mutual obligation upon customary usage were adequate to the 
maintenace of the community as a whole. So little could Voltaire 
believe this that he actually ventured to accuse Tacitus of fab- 
ricating his account of the communal life of the German tribes 
and derided Montesquieu for believing it 
118. Hegel, on the 
contrary, took the political capacities of the primitive Germans, 
and their achievement of uncivilized community, quite seriously. 
So much is evident from the definitive text of 1802/03 where, 
just as in the corresponding part of its first draft, SdR (1798/99), 
Hegel argued that a 'living soul' had once' - in 1799 for more 
that a millenium'119-, as the congenial Fate of 'generations long 
dead, dwelt in and supported the 'building' known as the German 
constitution. Indeed, in the definitive text he went even so 
far as to write, perhaps under the influence of his rhetorical 
leitmotif, 'Germany is no longer a state' 
120, 
as if he actually 
believed that the primitive Germans enjoyed what he knew tech- 
nically as statehood, i. e. that they lived as a people in virtue 
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of their common subjection to laws: for he wrote of olden laws 
that have lost their former life, in contrast with modern life 
that knows not how to concentrate its vitality in public law 
121" 
This is a deviation, which occurs nowhere else in the definitive 
text and the drafts of the VSAT, from their usual argument that, 
whereas the German people had not formerly needed laws, it could 
not now, without a state, be a people again. Hegel deviated here 
from the view, brought out by additional clauses entered in the 
revision of SdR in February or March 1801, that, in the period 
when, 'without subjection to a state, the individual, unbowed 
before the universal, stood for himself and when his honour and 
fate depended on himself alone ... there was-not yet a state' 
122 
This view Hegel took care, in the definitive text, to reiterate 
only shortly after, and in contradiction of, his lapse from the 
strict view that the primitive Germans knew no law 
123, that, in 
the words of Sollte das politische Resultat (SdpR) 'not laws but 
manners bound a host into a people, similar interests not a 
universal command gave the people the likeness of a state (das 
Volk als Staat darstellten)'124 
The point of the foregoing is that, while Hegel paid due 
respect to the manners which were the basis of the effective 
political integration of the German tribes, he was, excepting ono 
occasion, careful not to confuse the primitive condition, even 
though it 'deserved well to be called German freedom' (Wohl hiess 
diese Zustand die deutsche Freyheit)' 
125, 
with the modern con- 
dition of freedom 'in which laws prevail' 
126 
Had he usually confused the two conditions, he would have 
seen no absurdity in yearning for the former condition since 
there would, on the view that it was already stately, be no reason 
to doubt that it had the capacity to restrain the centrifugal 
effect of the bourgeois spirit upon the togetherness of the whole. 
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Indeed, from that point of view, it would be unlikely that the 
'advance of culture and industry' 
127 
would have been regarded 
as a problem of political integration in the first place for, as 
was argued in the first chapter, the nostalgic political outlook 
depends upon neglect to consider the constraints of present 
reality. The political effect of the bourgeois spirit would 
simply not have occurred to Hegels mind, had it not been educated 
by such of his mentors as Garve to doubt the possibility of 
regression to childhood 
128, had he been disposed to wax nostalgic, 
as a problem. He would have-ignored it. Such was the case, 
for example, with Justus Moeser, who yearned for the communalism 
of the tribes and for the direct participation of the Volk in 
council 
129 
regardless of the fact that economic development had 
made such a political system impossible. 
Hegel was quite sure that it would be impossible to recover 
the pristine forms of that system. Under that system 'every free 
man's arm was counted on and his will had its share in his nation's 
deeds. Princes were chosen by the people and so were war and 
peace and all acts of the whole. Anyone who wished participated 
in council; anyone who did not so wish forebore of his own will 
and relied on a similarity of interest with the others' 
130. 
Where once there had been no classes disruptive of the common 
interest 131, when the 'bourgeois had not introduced a great 
132 heterogeneity into the whole' 9 those not present in council 
could, albeit without the formal assurance vouchsafed to the 
modern principal by his representative, likewise trust that those 
present would not prefer their own interests-to those of the 
people not present. Here and now, in Hegel's view of contemp- 
orary affairs, neither that trust nor that formal assurance was 
to be had and, hence, there was not available, either immediately 
or by simulation, the sense of the participation of . each man's will 
2? 6. 
in the deeds of the nation 
133 
of a common interest 
134. 
from which stems the emergence 
Yet the fact that such a sense of participation and common 
interest was regarded by Hegel as the ne plus ultra of political 
life suggests that he sought to discover something that the modern 
condition should have in common with the primitive. This was 
the element of trust. Since the basis of the trust exhibited 
by primitive representative practices had been disintegrated, 
the old forms were unworkable. They had depended on the sense 
of mutually trusty, rather than mandatory, obligation that had 
obtained in olden times thanks to the dispositional togetherness 
that served instead of legal togetherness. Trust could now be 
had only on the basis of a formal assurance that the private 
interests of the bourgeois, who 'cares only for anlndividual and 
not self subsistent end and has no regard for the whole' 
135, 
would not have public effect. For want of the letal institution 
of the practice of representation, whose casual undertaking in 
the German forests was not adapted to inhibit the centrifugal 
effect upon the whole of a bourgeois class of men who 'look 
exclusively to their own necessities and their own living' 
136, 
that trust had gone. The project of its restoration by way of 
laws and constituted representative institutions would have been 
meaningless if the extent to which primitive representation had 
become formal, and so practicable independently of the pressure 
of social and political particularism, were so exaggerated that 
the autonomy of the public authority would have to be discounted 
as an effective restraint upon disintegrative tendencies. For 
if there had been a state when the disintegration of the German 
people set in, what good would a state be now, what contribution 
could statehood now make to its re-integration? 
It will readily be understood, then, why it was not without 
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reservations and qualifications that Hegel agreed with Montesquieu, 
whose belief that representation was to be 'found in the woods' 
137 
implied that it existed as a fairly coherent and regular or law- 
bound system. By way of qualification, Hegel argued that rep- 
resentation did not exist as a constituted system in the forests 
of Germany though it did arise from them 
138. He argued that 
trust existed informally there, but inasmuch as it was casual, 
could readily be betrayed. What amounts to the essence of these 
arguments, he asserted that, though there was a disposition which, 
under the favourable circumstance of social homogeneity, was the 
equivalent of a state in which individuals were willing to let 
themselves and their power coexist, there was, withal, not yet a 
state proper. 
There was, however, in that the individual belonged to the 
whole in character, manners and religion, an invisible living 
spirit and some few large interests 
139, 
what may be called, in 
conformity with Hegel's repudiation of those who regarded the 
primitive condition 'as if it alone were natural' 
140, the larval 
form of the state: for manners and similar interests 'gave the 
people the likeness of a state (das Volk als Staat darstellten)' 
141 
at a time when 'the nation constituted a people without being a 
state (die Nation, ohne ein Staat zu sein, ein Volk ausmachte)' 
142. 
Inasmuch as Hegel wanted to be recovered, as was argued at the 
end of chapter three and the beginning of chapter four, the sense 
of common interest stemming from cooperation in resolve and deed 
143, 
he sought in the stately form of representation the 'imago' of 
its customary material. Out of primitive representation in the 
shape of the mystical embodiment of the individual in his people 
and of the, people in the prince, ritually attested by the magical 
11+4 deed of election , Hegel sought. the imago of trust in the 
stately form of representation. 
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It may be said by way of summary that, in order to depress 
th' bourgeois principle, Pegel looked, not to the form of the 
caterpillar (the stage representing the period of old German 
freedom), nor to that of the cocoon (the feudal period from which 
the alternative to the bourgeois principle might have emerged), 
but to the form of the butterfly which would realise the dynamic 
and serviceable 'potencies' implicit in the larva and chrysalis, 
would make the German nation a people once again. This is to 
say, in effect, what lends a remarkable significance to Hegel's 
mature definition of the corporation, that which, with the 
guidance of the State, leads its members beyond civil society and 
prepares them for membership of the State, as a 'second family' 
in whose bosom refuge could be taken against the pressures of 
the civil society whose effect was to 'negate' the first family 
145 
, 
that here, within a diachronic rather than the synchronic scheme 
of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel sought the recovery, or, better, 
the re-validation for the political commurity of the bonds of 
trusty kinship characteristic of the familial political culture 
of the German forests. 
Lent this seem fanciful attempt to intrude into the VSN a 
relationship between the family and the state (wherein familiarity 
of a primary or secondary kind is supposed to be at the 'ethical 
root of the state' 
146). 
which occurs explicitly only elsewhere 
in Hegel's political philosophy, and to do to that relationship 
the violence of placing it in an historical rather than a time- 
less perspective, let it be noted, first, that Hegel used 
language, in a manner to which attention has been paid throughout 
this work, to signify the nature of the community bound by manners, 
which strongly sug-ests that he, thought of the 'building' of the 
primitive German customary whole as having been, as it were, a 
home: for in- the definitive text he wrote that the old Germans' 
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fate 'inhabited' the constitution (worin jenes Schicksal hauste) 
147 
and in the two earlier drafts that the 'justice and power, courage, 
cowardice, honour and blood, the neediness and well-being of long 
past days, long perished generations'(Geschlechte) 'dwelt' in it 
148. 
It cannot but be that the implication in one another of the ideas 
of dwelling (Wohnung)and custom (Sitten or Gewohnheit) was not 
far from his mind. 
What is more significant of an identity, in Hegel's theory, 
between the idea of family bonds and custom and, further, what 
is compelling evidence of Hegel's conviction of the necessity 
that family or customary togetherness be sublated (aufgehoben) 
in stately or legal togetherness, is that, secondly, he not only 
exploited collocutionary implications, but also made clear, in 
the DS of August 1801 and in SdR/SdpR, though not quite clear in 
the definitive text of the VSN, that he was already thinking in 
general terms of the disruption of the family by civil society 
and of the necessity, consequent upon the incompetence of the 
family to preserve the intimate community'of kinship, that the 
state vindicate the integrity of its 'first nature' 
149. It is 
evident, therefore, that he was thinking of a kind of Aufhebung 
of custom (or old German freedom). 
This was not wishful thinking but, precisely because it took 
full account of the irrevocability of economic development and of 
the fact that modern men had to look exclusively to their own 
needs and livelihood 
150, 
an aspiration limited to the hope of 
recovering by other means than custom something like the cohesion 
of political 'structure' and. individual member that had once 
prevailed, something like the-trust, joy and love 
151 
which Hegel 
regarded as the fruits of the old customary life and, later, as 
the binding affections of the family. These affections consti- 
tuted not a finished model to be imitated in political society but 
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the armature of the familial model which had, out of materials 
dessicated by the 'arid life of the Understanding' under which 
property and affairs had been made absolutes 
152, to be reshaped, 
to be given articulate and legal rather than ineffable and 
customary form. 
What the bourgeois principle had put asunder, the 'pure 
forms and beautiful characteristics' 
153 
of German freedom, the 
kindred feeling of which the bourgeois was now bereft, the state 
had to join together. It had to accomplish or 'fulfill' 154 
what Hegel called in the DS the 'potencies' (trust, joy and love) 
of a genuinely ethical identity, i. e. a people, what have here 
been termed the archaic larval materials of a telic form 155. 
The DS has long been accorded significance chiefly for its 
claim that 'philosophy issues from its time, and if one wants to 
call the fragmentation of the time its ethical corruption, then 
philosophy issues from that corruption; but it does so in order 
to re-establish man from within himself, against the confusion of 
the time and in order to restore the totality which the time has 
rent' 
156. To specify the meaning of this claim with respect 
to the idea of the State and its constitutional or public law is 
the sole object of the following analysis of the DR, of which it 
will be argued that a significant part constitutes simply a 
formal elaboration of an argument to be found in more concrete 
terms in the VSN. The business of the State, and a fortiori 
of the philosopher of the State, is to encourage the restoration 
of the rent costume of ethical life, by clothing men in dress in 
which they can feel their wholeness and integration with the 
community to be virtually recovered. 
The member of bourgeois society was inwardly disrupted in 
so far as th*e community was no longer a familial union of what 
Hegel called 'whole' men independent of class, reliant on their 
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own brains and brawn 
157 
or mind and character 
158 for their 
power or failure to please themselves. No longer could the 
individual whimsically 
159 
and without fear or self-doubt 
160 
impose upon his industry and activity only such limits as he 
chose and not such as he had to suffer from without 
161. (It 
is in SdR, let it be noted in passing, that the antithesis 
between acting and suffering is most clearly drawn. ) The 
bourgeois was no longer a true agent, for it was not true of 
him, as it was of the 'sons of the (old German) condition (of 
freedom)' 162, that 'what lay within his sphere was so much, so 
entirely, himself that we could not even call it his troperty; 
on the contrary, for what belonged in his eyes to his sphere, 
i. e. for what we would call a part only and for which therefore 
we would risk only a part of ourselves, he risked life and limb 
soul and salvation. He knew nothing of the division and calcula- 
tion on which our law depends ... he was completely and entirely 
involved in anything his own (in French entier means both entire 
and self-willed)' 
163. 
This description of the primitive German gives the impression 
that there is about the behaviour of the child of the old German 
forests, the quality of existential commitment to the present 
life which was argued to be the attitude that, in the VJSS, Herel 
held to be pernicious of Nature and community. The difference 
is, however, that the 'invisible living spirit' 
164 
of community 
so pervaded existence in the forests that there arose no question 
of, or quest for, an alternative living idea or natural life: 
unlike the existential commitment to the present of the bourgeois, 
that of the primitive German to what was present to him was so 
informed by something 'invisible' that it was at the same time 
the locus of an absent (if not quite intelligent) intuition of 
community, in virtue of which he sensed an immortality quite 
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devoid of the promise of sensible satisfaction in a present to 
come. It was no 'kind of avarice' and was not maintained in 
spite of the violation of his impulses 
165. It was not a 
calculative and timid, but rather was a so whole-hearted and 
fearless commitment that there could occur no thought of limita- 
tion by another, no concept of accommodation of artificially 
defined spheres of proprietorial interest, and hence no notion 
of privacy or of its corollary, a notion of society standing to 
it, of necessity, in a relation of constraint. 
The old Germans did indeed, Hegel wrote in SdR, though after 
its revision in 1801 he struck the passage out, 'beat unmerci- 
fully upon one another, yet at the same time, while they fought 
with one another, their needs and individuality converged, they 
became similar to one another like all enemies' 
166. The 
explanation for this convergence lies perhaps in the absence of 
what Hegel argued enables, in bourgeois society, the reconcilia- 
tion of contrary interests 'with the least possible sacrifice, in 
order that each can coexist with the other regardless of conflict'167, 
namely of a concept of private property which, though from one 
legal point of view it is the basis of universal relationships, 
'remains in fact something isolated and without relations' 
168. 
From the private law regulative of property relations only super- 
ficial reconciliation is to be expected, for by its erection of 
a sphere of privacy, by its reduction of communal relations to a 
traffic in alienable properties and by its mollification of 
social contact, it deprives men of the opportunity for the devel- 
opment of the deep kinship available from the risk of life and 
limb, soul and salvation. It was just this risk, involved, 
before the Imperial Peace and the decline of feudalism, in the 
'clash of born equals' 
169, that used to generate dispositional 
togetherness. Bourgeois society on the other hand is free of 
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fundamental risk, demands only marginal sacrifices and provides 
for no deep living relationship among its members. (It cannot 
but be noticed that here is a palpable anticipation of the 
sections of the 'Phenomenology of Spirit' on the struggle for 
recognition and the dialectic of Herr und Knecht). 
In the DS, more formally than in SdR/SdpR, Hegel criticised, 
by way of an attack upon Fichte, the understanding of freedom as 
'self-limitation' 170 with a view to coexistence with others whose 
freedom would otherwise be encroached upon. This, in Hegel's 
view, can only be achieved by what was called in the WSS 
'restriction to an orderly mastery over one's property, a contem- 
plation and enjoyment of one's completely subservient little 
world and finally, for the sake of reconciliation to this limita- 
tion, a self denial and ascension in thought to heaven' 
171. In 
the DS, the conception of freedom as self-limitation is said to 
have the effect that 'every truly free, reciprocal relation of 
life, every relation that is infinite and unlimited for itself, 
that is to say every beautiful relation, is nullified' 
172. 
Rather than be universal 'for itself' 
173, 
every social relation- 
ship acquires the character of universality only in its reference 
to an external criterion, something 'ideal and opposite' 
174 in 
respect to the affections of the 'living being' 
175. 
Though Hegel did not, in the DS, specify what sort of 
criterion he had in mind, the likeness to his argument here of 
that which, in SdR, he elaborated concerninc private property, 
namely that' the relations which derive from it are, as it were, 
relations of. isolation and that private property is 'a universal 
only from the legal point of view' 
176, 
suggests that he was 
thinking of the criterion of private personality by which are 
regulated all contacts in the community governed by 'rational 
beings' 177. These, rational beings resemble those whose legal 
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relationships are said in the VST1 to depend on 'division and 
calculation' 
178. In order to sacrifice as little as possible 
of the proprietorial parts into which they parcel themselves out, 
they sacrifice their entirety, or the openness of their hearts 
to unreserved involvement in the rich variety of what, in the 
DS, Hegel called 'living connections' 
179, that is, relationships 
not hedged about by the understanding of free individuality as 
private-legal personality. This understanding they try to 
impress on their subjects, ignoring their potential to be elevated, 
by way of their membership of the social and territorial estates 
through which they ought to be vouchsafed mediate participation 
in public affairs, from an abstraction of activity 
180 to 
181 devotion to 'great objects' 
No community can be based on the 'unsatisfied life' and 
182 'oppressed forces' of such persons . Among them there can 
not emerge their self-organisation as a true people which is 
'the organic body of a communal and rich life' 
183. For as 
merely private persons they can constitute only an 'atomistic, 
life-impoverished multitude' 
184 
whose coexistence, like that of 
the 'crowd of individuals' 
185 
of whom Hegel wrote in the frag- 
ment on political freedom in Italy that its 'living together in 
cities was rather coexistence in the same space, within the same 
walls, than subjection to the same laws' 
185, is superficial, 
designed to involve the least possible sacrifice. Such a multi- 
tude lives by the law, to be sure, but it does not by that token 
constitute itself as a people. For the law by which it lives 
is a law of privation, of limitation of interests with a view to 
mere 'spatial' or punctually tactless coexistence, whereas the 
law of a true state must have community of customs and assimila- 
tion of interests as its model though not, as we shall see 
186, 
its necessary content. This cannot, of course, be its actual 
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economic foundation in the modern world, for such community and 
similarity are things of the past. 
It is necessary only that law perform the task which custom 
as such used to perform adequately, but for which its irregular 
development had rendered it useless. Law must assume this 
responsibility, not by restoring uniformity of custom and interest, 
but by enacting such customs as can be useful to the maintenance 
of community, thus defusing the derogatory effect of habits 
pernicious of it, and, within the terms of political exchange, 
by leaving to themselves, keeping withal a watchful eye upon 
their development 187, customs whose content is matter of opinion 
to which the state can afford to be indifferent, but whose 
autonomy must be preserved so that citizens should, as agents 
only in abstraction to be sure, have some idea of action upon 
the basis of which they can appreciate the truly ethical action 
of the State as similar to their own and in similar need of 
autonomy. The political vocation of the State is to furnish 
the citizen a refuge from the atomistic isolation of bourgeois 
society, in order that the 'heart' of man might be preserved 
188 from exclusive involvement in its 'mechanical interaction' 
But to offer modern man such a refuge it is necessary not so to 
offend his present sense of his worth that he cannot but 
repudiate it. 
Such a refuge is the people. But its self-creation, 
precisely because of the anti-ethical tendencies of the bourr'eois 
principle, cannot occur except by way of legal organization or 
validation of its primitive customary larva, the kin-group, from 
the standpoint of which Hegel thought it possible to speak to 
the childhood experience of all. It is certain that when Hegel 
wrote of the state as the 'true infinity of a beautiful community, 
where laws are made superfluous by customs, 
189 he wanted so to 
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speak. He did not believe, however, that customs could of 
themselves maintain the pure forms and beautiful characteristics 
of primitive freedom, the freedom of a carefree child absorbed 
in trusty, loving and joyful relationships, but that the beauty 
of a community founded on the reciprocity of relations between 
the 'enlightened and unenlightened' 
190, the intellectual and 
sensible vectors of nature 
191, 
could be restored only by the 
State which he regarded by no means as necessarily a 'mechanical 
thing' 192, as many interpreters of the ASP, so close in many 
respects to the DS 
193, have supposed, but as a necessary condi- 
tion of freedom. Still more than that, by inference from the 
fact that he denied the customary condition to be 'alone natural', 
Hegel clearly held the State to be also natural, in the manner of 
a telos or 'true infinity' 
194 
of custom. 
It would not be quite just, therefore, to agree with 
Rosenzweig that, in the DS, any more than in the contemporary VSG', 
Hegel was in pursuit of the ideal of a 'meta-legal' organisation 
of freedom 
195. For when, in the DS, he preferred to laws the 
customs which would render them superfluous 
196, just as in the 
ASP he had appeared to argue that the State must be superseded 
197, 
Hegel can have intended to deprecate only private law and the 
attitude that its parties adhere to, namely, Fiat iustitia, 
pereat mundus 
198. (This, be it noted, was the attitude of the 
most lofty of the exponents of the view that, after all, the State 
cannot but be a machine operative upon that principle: Kant. ) 
He criticized only that law which, because it lacks the grace of 
the principle of majesty, the embodiment of the customary 
unanimity of individual, people and prince 
199, involves the 
mechanical application of the characteristic bourgeois principle 
that 'right must be done., even though for its sake all trust, joy 
and love, all the potencies of a genuinely ethical identity, must be 
? R7 
eradicated root and branch' 
2000 This need not at all be true 
of the State whose civilization is structurally, through and 
201 through, gracious or majestic . 
Private law disinherits the world of these potential roots 
of a modern Volk. It is only by way of the public law of an 
abiding, concentric, structurally gracious, political authority 
that these 'potencies', once the actualities of customary kinship, 
can become the actualities of lawful peoplehood. No such State 
is held to be one which treats 'free men as cogs in a machine' 
202. 
Rather there is devolved upon it the task of making life enjoyable 
rather than unsatisfied, and of releasing forces hitherto oppressed 
into their natural channel, that of activity directed towards 
great objects 
203. In the face of those who would confine the 
political community to the functions of a 'system of justice' 
preservative, not of deep communal relationships, but only of 
the privacy which is the means to superficial coexistence, 
nothing less authoritative than the public law of an integral 
state can validate 'hallowed joys' 
204 
of living together in 
intimate relationship. For these are constantly under threat 
from the bourgeois spirit, whether in its aspect as 'possessive 
individualism', in which case its motto is 'Fiat iustitia, pereat 
mundus', or in its more immediately political aspect as 'possessive 
particularism', for whose 'system of justice' there is, accord- 
ing to Hegel, 'perhaps no more appropriate superscription than 
Fiat iustitia, pereat Germania' 
205: Right must be done, even 
though for its sake the State of the whole people, the actuality 
of its trusty, joyful and loving disposition must be destroyed. 
Such an idea of justice is no fit criterion upon which to attempt 
to maintain the identity of a people. 
288. 
3. The political practice and theory of possessive particularism 
As we have just seen, Hegel believed that private property 
had been attributed by law a capacity to serve as the basis of 
universal relations which its character, operative as privation 
of all but the most formal of human contact, utterly belies. 
Having dealt with the alternative way of life of the old Germans, 
he proceeded to argue conversely, that the State, which would 
ideally perfect, as its 'true infinity', that natural condition 
of freedom in such a way as to establish not merely universal, 
but also deeply seated and felt universal relationships, had been 
denied by 'law' the power to make these operative once more as 
the refuge from 'abstract activity' of which the bourgeois might 
avail himself. Private law had eradicated the 'potencies of 
genuine ethical identity', among them the joy of unlimited free 
activity of the whole for great objects, before ever they could 
be established as the actuality of a people given effect as a 
state. 
This is what Hegel meant when he declared that 'German 
constitutional law is private law' or 'German constitutional law 
is really private law and political rights a legal possession, 
a property' 
206, 
rather than the basis of a sense of belonging 
to a people, to be defended at all costs. These statements 
contain the technical meaning unfortunately expressed quite 
rhetorically in the definitive text by the misleading assertion 
that 'Germany is no longer a state' 
207. By this Hegel implied, 
what he had no intention of maintaining, that the German Empire 
had once been a State, in the proper sense of an abiding, fixed 
centre of public authority and source of public law. He meant 
no more than that the Germans had once been such a people that 
the public domain was prevalent and all-pervasive and that private 
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interest was insignificant by comparison with the joy of parti- 
cipation in the life - imagined by its members to be immortal,. 
but not intelligently so maintained - of the people. The lack 
of statehood did not occur as an event or as a process. What 
happened was that its lack became significant as its erstwhile 
equivalent and alternative, customary community, disintegrated 
under the growing weight of private interest. That is why Hegel 
phrased the above-quoted, more technically designed statements 
in such a way as not to imply procession from a public form. of 
constitutional law to a private. Apart from the phrase already 
, criticised , 'While these laws have lost their former life ... '209 
208 
there is only one other instance, outweighed by every other state- 
ment concerning the relationship of constitutional to private law, 
of 'a lapse from the strict view that Germany never was a state, 
never, except potentially, constituted a source of public law. 
That instance occurs only in the so-called 'Plant 
210 
of May, 
June or July 1801, where Hegel noted 'Constitutional law has 
become. private law (Staatsrecht ist in Privatrecht uebergegangen)'211. 
Hegel's recognition of the fact that 'Germany could never be 
regarded as a state' 
212 
marks an all-important difference'between 
him and J. S. Puetter, of whom it may be remarked that he was a 
close friend of Justus Moeser 
213: both believed that German 
'customary law' (Gewohnheitsrecht), so-called, was a tenable 
condition of freedom. Hegel denied this article of their reverent 
faith in the capacity of manners to maintain their integrity in 
actuality. It accords with Hegel's view, as expressed in the 
Philosophy of Right 
214, that custom can become law without 
ceasing to be custom, to speak of law that is customary. But 
it is not admissible to speak of custom as if, as such, it were 
law. Because of his growing inclination to contradict the likes 
of Puetter 
215, it may seem that Hegel came increasingly to 
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countenance the possibility of discounting the value to the end 
of community of the content of all custom. But this is not the 
case. Hegel simply assigned such custom as was not to be 
embodied in law, on account of the uselessness of much of it to 
assure ethical identity, and in some cases of its derogation from 
such identity, to the sphere to which, in the modern world, it 
must belong, the sphere of opinion. As we shall see, he held 
such customary matters as language to be useless or of no moment, 
and such as religion to be harmful to ethical identity 
216. But 
it is equally important that useful customs, such as represent- 
ative practices, were intended by Hegel to be constitutionally 
enacted. Only a state, only statutory public law could enact 
the passive material of Sitten into Sittlichkeit. Though it was 
probably from Puetter that Hegel derived his account of how there 
arose upon the basis of chance and eminent power and character, 
up to the beginning of the 16th century when stabilization set 
in, an embarrassment of incremental aggregates of territorial 
rights 
217, 
which 'became fixed as time passed, 
218 
constituting 
'not a system but a collection of rights without principle' 
219, 
he had, unlike Puetter, no hesitation in holding this confusion 
to be tantamount to the non-existence of the state. Convinced 
that superior power, a necessary but without public authority 
and legal constitution insufficient condition for the existence 
of statehood, had been lacking since 1495, while yet it was 
needed to reconcile disputes of private right between territorial 
estates, Hegel denied that since the beginning of the 16th century 
22O 
there had even been anything like a state 
Puetter, on the other hand, as usual with Hegel by implica- 
tion rather than by identification, was one of the kind of 
constitutional lawyer who, though he 'cannot any longer call 
Germany a state because he would have to grant many inferences 
291. 
which follow from the concept of a state' 
221 
was still not 
prepared to call Germany a 'non-state' 
222, This was a reflec- 
tion of his confusion of custom with law and of nationhood with 
statehood. It was not, as far as Puetter was concerned, to the 
point that Germany had not the coercive or authoritative equip- 
ment whose organisation, Hegel insisted, must not be 'confused, 
divided and conjoined in the most irregular way, and into the 
most disparate proportions just as multiplex as the property of 
private individuals' 
223 if Germany were to be a state. Rather 
than look for the secular equipment of the self-maintenance of 
public authority, this mystical positivist, who was naive 
enough to take the Imperial Diet to be already a modern 
Parliament representative not of individual territorial rulers 
but of the very 'nation'224, took the fact that Germany had 
survived so far as evidence that the continuance of its putative 
statehood could ever be depended upon Providence. Just as the 
vitality of the olden times had been maintained by divine provi- 
dence, so would the same 'continue to keep watch over our nation 
ýý5. ' 
Puetter was prepared to hold that upon the foundation of 'customs 
or traditions, ... unwritten law that is observed in one way and 
not in another because it has always been done that way' 
226, 
could continue to be based the 'binding power of common law' 
227 
Not by any means did Hegel accept that despite the 'advance 
of culture and industry' 
228, despite the cognate concentration 
of territorial supremacy, Providence would ensure that Germany 
could persist as something in between a state and non-state, what 
Puetter called a 'Staat aus Staaten', a state of states, a 
'Kingdom divided into several republics of divers kinds which are 
united in the manner of a composite republic' 
229 
or, even more 
pretentiously, a 'body politic of several coexistent states, 
particular to be sure, but nevertheless still constituting 
292. 
together one state' 
2300 
Puetter's optimism was regarded by Hegel as an absurd 
renunciation, in favour of other than human agency, of the need 
for a ratio status integer, that is, for a policy designed to 
mobilise human power, regulated by laws rooted to be sure in 
customary potencies, but directed against the bad habits into 
which they had degenerated. The need for such power could not 
be net by what Hegel sarcastically called 'a most special divine 
providence to maintain the whole, 
231 ('in Ruecksicht aufs Ganze 
232, 
der speziellsten goettlichen Providinz, um es notdurftig zu 
erhalten'). He felt nothing but contempt for Puetter's reverence 
for the way in which 'unwritten laws' had allegedly always been 
observed; nothing but hostility for this happy 'Praxis' 
233 
which supposedly served, where peace treaties, electoral 
capitulations, family settlements, judicial mandates, decrees 
of the Diet etc. 
234 
might not quite exhaustively and authorit- 
atively define the 'political property' and independence of the 
estates, to make good this omission; nothing but impatience 
with the mystical gloss of venerability conferred by the 
connoisseur of the infinite details of the law upon a 'system of 
justice' devoted, not to the public interest, but to the puncti- 
lious preservation of rights not awarded by Providence and 
certainly not by the so-called edifice of the state, but acquired 
thanks to the accidents of bygone times; nothing but disrespect, 
not to be sure for the ingenuous attachment of the Empire itself 
to what dignity and succour it could still find in claiming to 
be a 'body politic' standing under a 'common imperial head' in 
an 'imperial union', but for the constitutional lawyers filled 
with 'wonder and amazement in the face of the sacredness of this 
German body politic' 
235. 
As to the last, Puetter's presentation of Germany as a 'body 
293. . 
politic', destined to be preserved by divine providence on 
account of its sacredness, was regarded by Hegel as a dishonest 
pretence that Germany was as good as a state, still as ever. 
That dishonesty was outstandingly manifest in the conjury 
of his famous definition of the Staat aus Staaten: 'a body 
politic of several coexistent states, particular to be sure, but 
nevertheless still contituting together one state'. The word 
'nevertheless' excused a multitude of sins of particularism and, 
by its alchemy, 'body politic' was made to stand for 'one state' 
the plain assertion of whose existence was, of course, out of 
the question. Just this kind of academic deceit, perhaps even 
this very definition, was what Hegel had in mind when he wrote 
that 'in the scientific and historical field we must fight shy 
of such meaningless expressions' and scathingly added: 'grant 
separate and irreconcilable state interests in the political field, 
but suppose that for other important reasons, a unity there must 
nonetheless be, both in civil and political life: to that end 
there is no better means than to find some general expression 
which satisfies both sides and which yet leaves both sides at 
home with their own will' 
236. 
No-one, of course, was any longer, Hegel was to write in 
1802, as an abortive introduction to the chapter which he intended 
should follow the sections on old German freedom and the private 
character of German constitutional law, 'happy about calling 
Germany one state; yet they (the publicists) allow that it is 
an Empire, a body politic; but even these names are still too 
portentous for the slight relations in which the German estates 
237 
stand to one another' Hegel well knew that the constitu- 
tional lawyers of his day were up to nothing more than what 
contemporary and earlier 'publicists' intended, namely the 
justification of the status quo, when, like these, they used such 
294. 
portentous terms as 'body politic' and 'composite republic'. 
There had, by means of such terms, been kept up 'for centuries 
a show of union in which in fact no member has yielded up one jot 
of its claims to independence' 
238. Political and legal thinkers 
of the highest order had contributed to this fiction, this show, 
still maintained by the likes of the naive Puetter. The chief 
of these contributors was Samuel Pufendorf. 
As official publicist or propagandist, 'whether of the 
Elector of the Palatinate or of the Elector of Brandenburg- 
Prussia, Pufendorf, it has been said, sought always 'to express 
the sentiments of the master' 
239. Even apart from his work as 
an apologetic historiographer 
240, his contributions to scientific 
jurisprudence, because of their import for the development of a 
body of rules to regulate the relations and intercourse of the 
Estates, were understandably coloured by the Electoral interest. 
It may have been the effect of this interest upon Pufendorf's 
explanation of relations between the Estates and the Empire in 
terms of the concept of territorial sovereignty (Landeshoheit) 
that Hegel had in mind when he wrote, in the Entstehungsschrift 
(ES), of enquiries into the 'origins and legal foundation' of 
territorial sovereignty, that they 'usually have the end, the 
result, of finding (in favour of) what interest has already 
decided upon' 
241. 
Though in this piece, written early in 1799, not the slightest 
hint was given that Hegel may have been thinking of Pufendorf, 
stronger grounds for supposing that this is the case are to be 
found in SdR and its second version, SdpR. " In the first, that 
is at the turn of 1798 into 1799, just before the writing of the 
ES, Hegel wrote the pregnant but undelivered phrase 'Every 
judgment of speculative philosophers on constitutional law 
in the second, in February or March 1801, at the once more 
242. 
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fragmentary end of his draft of the definitive section in which 
he criticised the indulgence of constitutional lawyers towards 
private law and its 'Praxis' 
243, this phrase came closer to 
delivery, thus: 'From the concept and essence of the state every 
judgment ... 
244 ( ... of speculative philosophers on consti- 
tutional law ... '). It would not, of course, be legitimate on 
the strength of a reconstruction of Hegel's meaning from the ES, 
SdR and SdpR alone, to identify Pufendorf as him whom Hegel had 
in mind as one of the speculative philosophers who were intent, 
In the interest of territorial princes, upon Judging deductively 
. the rightful foundation of Landeshoheit from its hypothetical 
origin in the decisions of a perfectly constituted and sovereign 
state. But, as we shall see, Pufendorf's judgments did proceed 
from the premiss that constitutional law has to be appraised in 
the light of the supposed advantage of purity of form, whether 
this be monarchy, aristocracy or democracy. Of this paradig- 
matic assumption Hegel was highly critical 
245. But he also 
seemed to be concerned that such judgments might have the same 
'end or result', though their basis were deductive, as accounts 
that were merely descriptive and uncritical of the implications 
of statehood imported by expressions such as 'body politic'. 
Unless we assume that Hegel was bent upon the criticism of the 
paradigmatic structure of jurisprudential concepts erected by 
Pufendorf and inherited, with a show of methodological independ- 
ence 
246, by Puetter, very little sense can be made of Hegel's 
view of the history of German constitutional thought since the 
17th century 
247. 
We are therefore entitled to wonder whether Hegel meant 
that, in accordance with the Electoral interest, such deductive 
judgments deliberately subserved an anti-Imperial evaluation of 
territorial sovereignty, whereas the positivism of writers like 
296. 
a 
Puetter merely did so unintelligently, inasmuch as the former 
consisted of speculative hypotheses to justify the private 
character of constitutional law, whereas the latter accepted 
territorial sovereignty as a politically innocuous fact and felt 
no need at all to justify it. (On the contrary, Puetter rejoiced 
in the confusion of German constitutional law 
248. ) 
The conjecture will presently be shown to be very likely true 
that, in the last three places cited from the VSN, Hegel had in 
mind, first the Electoral interest, and second philosophers like 
Pufendorf and perhaps Leibniz, whose bread and butter it was 
249 
to issue a speculative version of what was otherwise merely a 
naive genuflection towards *iustitial, which Hegel sarcastically 
called the 'soul of the constitution, 
250. In short it will be 
shown that Hegel was alert to the danger that scientific and 
historical work on the constitution should be dominated by 
philosophers or jurists who, wittingly or unwittingly, contributed 
to the exoneration of responsibility for the destruction of 
imperial sovereignty of those who pursued policies of possessive 
particularism. 
Such suitors were much more dangerous to the whole than mere 
possessive individualists with whom, as we shall see 
251, Hegel 
believed the state could and should come to terms, despite the 
fact that it was their spirit, writ large as the principle of 
the 'new politics' of territorial estates such as Prussia, which 
had precipitated the destruction of the whole. In the ES, Hegel 
likened the pursuit by the Estates, qua Landschaefter, of their 
private rights, to the behaviour 'of a crowd which supports itself 
on a frozen river, of whose ice each struggles to rip up as much 
as possible, unaware that the more he enriches himself the more 
he hastens his and the others' downfall' 
252 He was convinced 
that the bourgeois principle of Fiat iustitia, if it were made, 
297. 
by its adoption by territorial as well as individual and lesser 
corporate subjects of the Empire, the 'only moving principle' of 
German politics, to the exclusion of the principle of majesty, 
must ensure Germany's decline into the abyss of its dissolution 253. 
He wanted to make clear that the territorial sovereignty of the 
princes and the cities was quite simply incompatible with the 
maintenance of the whole, that despite the traditional constella- 
tion, or appearance of identity of the interests of territorial 
sovereigns with the interest of their peoples in political and 
religious freedom 
254, this alignment had to be broken 255, and 
that despite the traditional constellation, or appearance of 
identity of the interests of territorial sovereigns with the 
interest of their peoples in political and religious freedom 254, 
this alignment had to be broken 
255, 
and that the sophistical or 
naive presentation of Germany as a 'body politic'- could neither 
render acceptable nor disguise the fact that it was not, and naver 
had been, a state. 
It could only become a state, as we have seen Hegel argued 
when he denied that the freedom of the peoples was compatible 
with the T, ibertaet of the princes and city councillors, once 
constitutional effect had been riven to the new awareness among 
the German people, due above all to the lesson in the meaning of 
Libertaet taught by war with France, that their freedom depended 
upon recourse to its true source 
256, the majestic principle 
inherent in Imperial sovereignty, whose structural graciousness 
was no longer compromised by hegemonic aspirations to impose 
cultural uniformity in matters of faith. This is the signifi- 
cance of Hegel's readiness, declared in the ES, to put his trust 
in two circumstances whose tendency was contrary to the 'principle 
of dissolution'. Those two circumstances, thanks to which 





that religious persecution was a thing of the past and that 
territorial sovereignty had been exposed by war for what it was, 
the whited sepulchre of German statelessness. No doubt Hegel 
did not believe that the zealous warnings of patriots like him- 
self could arrest the decline of Germany 
258, but he did, we may 
be sure, believe that the views of those who attempted to legiti- 
mise Landeshoheit could accelerate it: hence his hostility to 
Pufendorf and Puetter. 
There was between Pufendorf and Puetter this likeness, that 
both took it for granted that Germariy was, in a significant sense, 
a state. For Puetter, it was such 'still' or 'nevertheless'; 
for Pufendorf it was, though not endowed with true sovereignty, 
at least a descendant, legitimate if not as well bred as its fore- 
bear, of a true state. 
Puetter could believe in Germany's statehood because he 
attached no rigorous meaning to the word. To Puetter, for whose 
kind of constitutional lawyer, Hegel believed, civil and political 
unity were a necessary datum, that which simply must be (statt- 
finden soll) 
259, 
rather than that which must be constituted, 
Germany seemed just as capable as ever of persisting as what 
Hegel thought was untenable in the face of the brute facts of 
social and territorial disintegration, namely as a customary 
entity. 
Pufendorf on the other hand, from whom Puetter evidently 
learnt the equivocal terms for 'statehood, 'composite republic' 
or composite 'body politic', could believe that Germany was some- 
what a state in spite of his formal concept of statehood. For 
while Pufendorf clung, good Bodinian that he was, to the view that 
true sovereignty can reside only in a simple form of public 
authority, whether this be monarchic, aristocratic, or democratic 
260, 
he was-prepared to-admit that a state might either be thus regular 
299. 
and simple or it might not 
261 
. In other words, what he called 
an irregular republic was nonetheless a state or, as he put it 
more sophistically, a systema civitatum of sovereign states 
compounded in one 'body politic' which amounted to somewhat more 
than a merefederation 
262. Indeed, not merely was he prepared 
to accord the dignity of statehood to a systema civitatum of the 
kind typified for him, and later for Puetter 263, by the Swiss 
Confederation and the United Provinces, but he was quite happy 
to regard the condition of Germany as being even closer to state- 
hood, in that it was located midway between the regular and simple 
form of monarchy and the compound form of a systema civitatum 
264. 
Germany had an irregular constitution, according to Pufendorf, in- 
asmuch as it was neither exactly a systema civitatum, since in 
his opinion there could be attributed to the Imperial Courts, the 
Diet and the Emperor some coercive power over the Estates rather 
than none 
265, 
nor exactly a monarchical state since the Estates 
enjoyed the privilege of territorial sovereignty 
266. It was in 
his explanation of how it had become irregular or hybrid that 
Pufendorf demonstrated his capacity for eristic deductivism, for 
the discovery of a speculative justification for what the 
Electoral interest in territorial sovereignty had already decided 
upon. It accorded with that interest that the emergence of 
territorial sovereignty should be given an appearance of regularity 
and rationality which, as a matter of historical fact, it certainly 
lacked. This service Pufendorf performed in his 'Severini de 
Monzambano' (1667) or, as it was known in English translation 
(1670) 'The Constitution of the German Empire' 
267. 
Since Pufendorf argued in this work that the Imperium of the 
principle of maiestas 'no longer exists' 
268, it might be supposed 
that there is a family resemblance between his views on the 
German Constitution and Hegels. For Hegel opened his definitive 
300. 
introduction, partly written around December 1802, with the 
famous rhetorical pronouncement that 'Germany is no longer a 
state' 
269 Likewise did he close the section written in 1802 
with the words: 'The state exists no longer' 
270. But we have 
seen that, and why, he argued more carefully in his draft of 1801 
that Germany could never be regarded as a state 
271 because there 
was still no state 
272, though there was still a feudal power 
273, 
at the time when the possibility of its development as a state 
was precluded by the emergence of territorial sovereignty as the 
private law basis of constitutional law. Hegel's pronouncement, 
when its meaning is thus properly and strictly interpreted, imports, 
against him who had previously said something ostensibly similar, 
severe if ironic criticism for trying to make obscure how and why 
the emergence of territorial sovereignty had taken place and for 
propounding a speculative myth which served to condone it. 
According to Pufendorf, the Imperium which once attached to 
the principle of majesty did so in the only way in which, accord- 
ing to the presupposition which he inherited from Bodin, that 
maiestas or sovereignty is indivisible, it is possible to conceive 
of the existence of true sovereignty. Only a simple state, he 
had argued in 'De republica irregulari', whether the form of its 
constitution be monarchic, aristocratic or democratic, can be 
truly sovereign 
274. The imnerium which 'no longer existed' was 
that of the pure form of monarchy. Rather than abandon the 
Bodinian dogma, rather than recognize the uselessness for the 
explanation of German constitutional history of the neo-aristotelian 
taxonomic scheme, Pufendorf made an explicit virtue out of the 
necessity, since the paradigmatic categories of his political 
science were not to be permitted to suffer denial of their 
eternal validity, that history should be made 'auxiliary to 
political science' 
275. Faced with the thorny question of how 
301. 
the absolute sovereignty of a putatively pure monarchy could have 
come to be lost, Pufendorf resorted to the speculative hypothesis 
that it had been contractually ceded to the post-Carolingian stem- 
dukes, who later gained the dignity of Electors 
276. Thus, in 
order to save the categories, did Pufendorf abandon the phenomena. 
By recourse to the idea of a contract among distinctly formed 
parties, within a pre-existent legal order, he falsified what was 
in fact a highly irregular process of evolution towards the 
principle of the territorial sovereignty which arrested the develop- 
ment of feudalism and accelerated the tendency towards 'patrim- 
onial or personal rule based on a bundle of separate rights rooted 
1 277 either in local custom or in private law. 
This process, whereby the possibility of the emergence of a 
common German public law was ruled out, was confirmed in 1356, 
when there was not yet a state, by the Golden Bull of Charles IV 
which conceded the principle of primogenitary succession within 
the seven great principalities (excepting Bohemia) 
278, 
which 
thereupon became Electoral territories. Thus, as we have seen 
Hegel argue, the feudal constitution or power (not 'state') was 
destroyed 279. It was not a 'contract' which performed this 
process even though the issue was a contractual relation between 
Electors and the Emperor - the device of Electoral Capitulation 
(iahlkapitulation). The effect was not a decline from pure 
monarchy, for the feudal system was only prospectively law- 
governed and stately. Pufendorf's judgments, therefore, con- 
stituted a speculative elaboration upon history and tended, for 
the very reason that they took the original sovereignty of the 
feudal Emperor for granted, and so the stateliness of the feudal 
system, to confer upon the growth of the privilege of territorial 
sovereignty a legitimising derivation from public law which belied 
the fact that at that time there was nothing which the neo- 
302. 
aristotelian categories could be said to describe. This 
irregular growth then acquired, through private Roman law, the 
appearance of rationality. 
Hegel appears to have had Pufendorf's myth in mind when, in 
SdpR, he denied that the principles of German constitutional law 
were derivable from 'the unity of a constitutional concept like, 
perhaps, that of monarchy, aristocracy, democracy etc. ' 
280. 
This is the more apparent in the definitive parallel text of 
281 
1801, where he ignored aristocracy and democracy But there 
is unfortunately absent from that version Hegel's alternative 
explanation of the rise of territorial sovereignty, which quite 
emphatically denied the Electoral interest the legitimising 
excuse proferred by Pufendorf. Hegel's explanation withheld 
from the principle by which the 'whole' was destroyed the sanction 
of descent from a voluntary act of a public authority. According 
to Hegel, the principles of German constitutional law were mere 
'pictures of realities' 
2$z. Such legalised realities were the 
result of the conquest by private persons of discrete spheres of 
possession. This possession was 'earlier than law, did not 
originate from laws, but was independently acquired and has become 
a legal right. According to its original legal basis, therefore, 
German constitutional law is really private law and political 
rights a legal possession, a property' 
283, Unlike Pufendorf, 
who was well aware that the principle of territorial sovereignty 
arose in order to the private justification rather than public 
permission of territorial possession, in force as early as the 
11th century, Hegel was not prepared to dignify the resultant 
irregularity of the German constitution by the pretence of legit- 
imate descent. He had no intention of allowing history to be 
made a mere auxiliary to 'political science', nor political 
science to become the handmaiden of anti-imperial interests. 
303: 
For all his pious complaints that Germany was a political 
'monstrosity', complaints which Pufendorf toned down with 
the qualification in the edition of 1668 to the effect that its 
body politic was 'all but monstruous (tantum non monstro simile) 1284, 
and which in any case did not appear at all in the posthumous and 
accredited edition of 1706 
285, Pufendorf, in that he engaged in 
the elaboration of a 'science' of something that did not exist, 
nor ever had, reinforced the pretence of his masters that they 
could teat their state' and have the public authority with which 
its theoretical existence as an historical source of authority 
endowed them. His work was merely a theoretical reflex of the 
Praxis whose interest it served that Germany should be a state 
in theory, a Gedankenstaat. 
In his attempt to come to terms with the irregularity of the 
German constitution, an irregularity said to consist in its 
deviation from the constitutional form of absolutely sovereign 
monarchy, Pufendorf had attempted to salvage at least the 
vestigial appearance of sovereignty without conceding, what 
would have been anathaema to his Bodinian conviction of the in- 
coherence of the status mixtus, that this could be maintained by 
way of a distribution of maiestas between the Emperor and the 
Diet. The problem of distribution was transposed from the 
dimension of the 'whole' (to follow Hegel's usage) to a semi- 
international dimension in which the pretended essence of Imperial 
sovereignty could remain, if only formally, intact. Agreeing 
with the premiss of Bodin, that if the Imperial Diet have 
maiestas the Empire could not beat all monarchical, but not 
286 
wishing to go so far as to endorse Bodin' conclusion, 
Pufendorf argued that the independence of the princes fortunately 
negated the sovereignty of the Diet while it did not quite destroy 
that bf the Emperor 
287. In other words, the problem of the 
304. 
Estates, which in reality was the more intractable the more it 
took the form of the struggle of territorial units for independ- 
ence, was held to be less destructive of imperial sovereignty 
than it would be, according to Pufendorf's theory, if an attempt 
were made to resolve it by allowing expression to be given by 
means of imperial representative institutions to the urge for 
freedom and a share in the exercise of sovereignty. It would 
be better that the several provinces should inherit the substance 
of maiestas than that the people should be permitted to be 
involved in its recovery for the whole. That way could be 
preserved at least the shadow of pure monarchy. 
The contentment of Pufendorf, and later of Puetter, with a 
situation in which the sovereignty of the German Empire led the 
shadowy existence of a 'body politic', their complacent readiness 
to accept that it could not (Pufendorf) or need not (Puetter) be 
otherwise is evidently the object of Hegel's scathing criticism, 
in-the definitive version of his introductory chapter, at its 
beginning (1802/03) 
288 
as at its end (1801) 
289. Hegel derided 
those who keep up with 'general expressions' 
290 
a 'show of union 1291 
in the slight relations between the German estates. Both 
Pufendorf and Puetter, as we have seen, contributed to this show 
by depending the present dignity of the Empire upon a mythical 
past statehood of one kind or another. Neither claimed that 
the supposed union was preserved by 'a bond which exists now' but 
both were prepared to allow that it could subsist on 'the memory 
(Erinnerung) of an old one' 
292. As far as Hegel was concerned, 
however, although fallen fruit 'is recognized as having belonged 
to its tree by the fact that it lies under the tree top ... 
neither its position below the tree nor the tree's shadow which 
falls on it can save it from rotting or from the power of the 
293 
elements to which it now belongs' . 
305. 
An extremely condensed historical survey of German juris- 
prudence occurs in the definitive version of 1802-03 just before 
the last-cited passage in which Hegel probably meant to tar 
Pufendorf and Puetter, as far as concerns the ideological import 
of their work, with the same brush. Though neither of these 
authors was named, it cannot but be assumed, for none other fit 
better the descriptions given, that it was they whom Hegel had 
in mind 
294. In SdpR, the version of 1801, his draft historical 
survey was less well turned (though, as we shall see 
295, it is 
in one respect more informative) in that it was not followed by 
any ideological equation of Pufendorf and Puetter, nor did it 
contain in itself any attempt to distinguish them from a method- 
ological point of view. In his definitive survey, however, 
Hegel managed to convey that their methods were distinct but 
that they served the same interest. We have seen how Hegel, all 
but by name, attacked Puetter. We now see him assault Pufendorf, 
to whom, it cannot but be supposed, Hegel was alluding when he 
wrote of the 'older professors of constitutional law' that they 
'had the idea of a science before their minds when they were 
handling German constitutional law and consequently set out to 
establish a concept of the German constitution' 
296. 
For Pufendorf did set out to show that the irregular body 
of the German political system, rotten state though it might be, 
was rightfully descended, by virtue, we may say, of a contract in 
favour of territorial sovereignty (Landeshoheitsvertrag) subsequent 
to the original sequence of social contract (Gesellschaftsvertrag) 
and compact of government (Herrschaftsvertrag) 
297 
, from a state 
which once conformed to the supposed conditions of true sovereignty. 
-Thus had he accomplished a noteable feat, the elaboration of a 
science of something non-existent that was speculatively derived 
from an ens rationis, a unitary constitutional form. 
306. 
As might well have been expected of such a scholastic quest, 
its great discovery, the derivative irregular body politic became 
the object of much fraternal disagreement 
298 
concerning the degree 
of dissipation which maiestas could endure before it ceased to be 
the attribute of a state. It may have been this controversy to 
which Hegel was referring when he noted that the older professors 
'could not reach unanimity about this concept before the modern 
professors save up trying to fird it, 
290, TTe may also have had 
in mind the more fundamental dispute between Pufendorf and Chemnitz 
concerning the question, stemming from an absolute presupposition 
common to them, namely the Bodinian dogma that true sovereignty 
is indivisible as between the aristotelian forms, whether the 
Empire was originally a pure aristocracy, as Chemnitz held it was, 
rather than a pure monarchy 
300. Be that as it may, let us 
consider the upshot of the great taxonomic confusion into which 
Pufendorf had brought the understanding of the German Constitution 
in his attempt to resolve his perplexity in the face of the 
problem of the constitutional status of the imperial estates, 
Bodinians like Pufendorf felt, despite their conviction that 
monarchy is not only the best but almost the only form of true 
statehood, not disposed to declare deviants to be absolutely 
bereft of it 
301. The consequence of their semantic confusion 
was that positivist thinkers of the 18th century, such as 
J. J. Mosrr and Puetter, abandoned the attempt to establish a 
deductive relationship between hypothetically pure forms of 
maiestas and the historically hybrid development of the Empire. 
They continued to use the nomenclature devised by Pufendorf, but 
for the purpose of mere description rather than with a view to 
systematic classification of the kind and extent of sovereignty 
pertaining to the Empire or to the rationalisation of the relation 
between imperial and territorial sovereignty. 
307. 
As Hegel put the matter, they now 'no longer treat consti- 
tutional law as a science, but only as a description of what 
exists empirically and not conformably with a rational idea, and 
they believe that they can ascribe to the German state no more 
than the name of an empire or a body politic, 
302. Moser, 
believed that it would be 'fair to describe the Empire as consist- 
ing of a head and its members' 
303 
and, feeling no compunction to 
qualify his faith in the unity of this body politic, derided out- 
right the scholasticism of previous thinkers in their discussion 
of maiestas 
304. Moser, according to Gross, 'liked the consti- 
tution as it was, 
305, if only it were observed. So did the 
optimistic Puetter who, having dismissed the aristotelian scheme 
from which Pufendorf had proceeded to his definition of Germany 
as an irregular body politic, felt free to use the name while 
ignoring its meaning 
306. 
We saw in the first chapter how, as a boy, Hegel had 
benefited from the healthy empiricism of the tradition of 
Gelartheit to which Moser belonged. But it is to be doubted 
that, as a man who had given much thought to the problems of 
Germany, he continued to be as impressed by the direction taken 
by some members of that tradition, a direction which was merely 
positivist and, insofar as it carelessly took over the 'general 
expressions' which Hegel regarded as quite vacuous 
307, 
quite 
eclectic, as he had been impressed by their voluminous research 
into the customary sources of German constitiitional law 
308. 
Hegel was inclined to follow the much Yore rigorous conceptual 
path open, once scholasticism had been discredited, to those 
with a taste for the empiricism, and the interest in ethically and 
historically specific conditions of place and time, of the tradi- 
tion of practical legal scholarship. We shall see in the next 
chapter to whom it was that Hegel was indebted for the further 
308. 
opening of the path which Hermann Conring had broken by means of 
the idea of a ratio status integer, the idea of a positive policy 
of erecting the power of the Rechtsstaat upon the basis of a 
public law radically related to custom, or integrated with it as 
a square is to its root 
309. Such a policy, as opposed to a 
disintegrative ratio status like that espoused, in favour of 
aristocracy, by Chemnitz, was the only viable alternative to the 
pretence of Pufendorf, in favour of the Electoral elite, that 
nothing could be done about the condition of Germany, and of 
Puetter and, to a lesser extent Moser, that nothing need be done 
but depend on Providence that, for the sake of the whole people, 
customary union would be preserved. 
Hegel's attitude to these schools of thought was that of one 
who would call down a plague on all their houses. It is evident 
from SdpR that he could not abide the scholasticism of Pufendorf, 
for all its ostensibly critical invective; from the ES, that he 
, disagreed with Pufendorf's diagnosis of the inevitability 
310 
once territorial sovereignty had been conceded, of the decline 
of Germany into a condition of acephalous monstrosity. This was 
not solely because Hegel rejected the implicit eronero. tion of the 
princes, but because he would not accept Pufendorf'c supposition 
that territorial sovereignty must be the 'only moving principle' 
in the German Empire' 311. , Hegel simply did not share Pufendorf's 
view that, failing the purity of the sovereignty of the Emperor, 
there could not exist another principle, an other kind of sover- 
eignty than that which was a one and indivisible miniature re- 
production of an hypothetical original. Hegel did not regard 
sovereignty as distributable only between alternative centres for 
he had not been blinded by Bodin to the possibility that it could 
remain, or rather first become, concentrated at the same time as 
there came to be established the principle of its internal 
309. 
distribution, its distribution between arcs of authoritative 
decision having the same centre. For Hegel, as not for Pufendorf, 
of whom it has been said that he regarded the relation of the 
representative institutions to the sovereign authority as that of 
a peripheral conditio rather than that of a radix 
312, the means 
to the resolution of the great surd, the status of the Imperial 
Estates, which confronted those who sought to convert the 
'plurality of mediaeval German liberties into one internally 
conditioned authority' 
313, 
were not to be found by way of Bodin's 
abstract concept of maiestas. A sovereign authority erected in 
accordance with the stipulation that it be pure and unmixed, upon 
which the conditions placed must be external rather than radical, 
would be quite foreign to the principle of distributed maiestas 
which, in Hegels view, was implicit in the customs of the German 
people. It was to this principle that life had to be given if 
Germany, 'still at the crossroads between the fate of Italy and 
unification into one state, 
314, 
was to be 'raised up from its 
insignificance, 315. 
As for the political fideism or optimism of Puetter, who 
took Germany's representative institutions to be already a sound 
basis for its existence as a nation 
316, Hegel showed it nothing 
but contempt, since it took for granted a vitality in the principle 
of representation which had in fact yet to be mobilised. Only 
in a reformed Imperial Diet disembarrassed of traditional terri- 
torial particularism could the customary principle of mai estas be 
made a living alternative to the abstract idea of sovereignty. 
It is, therefore, not at all possible to agree with Maier, 
who fails 'to identify those thinkers to whom Hegel was referring 
in his introduction, beyond classifying their positions as, on 
the one. hand, that of 'contemporary schematism', and on the other, 
that of 'empiricism', that Hegel can be said to have preferred the 
310. 
latter to the former 'with the caveat that interest should be 
directed to definite concepts rather than positive claims' -317. 
Hegel preferred neither those who, like Puetter, attempted only 
a 'description of what is empirically to hand (Beschreibung von 
dem, was empirische Weise ... vorhanden ist') 
318, 
nor those who, 
like Pufendorf, erected a taxonomic apparatus to the end of 
explaining why Germany was not what, according to the eternal 
principles of his 'political science', it 'ought to be'. Their 
procedures prevented either from looking to what, of its own 
custorary resources, Germany could be, for the one attended only, 
to the ? now' (was vorhanden ist) and depended on Providence to 
maintain it as ever, while the other attended to the 'never', 
from whose conformity with a rational idea (einer vernuenftigen 
Idee) 319 the present and future, since that idea had nothing 
to do with the past, could not but decline. 
311. 
Chapter Six 
The New Method and the modernisation of German freedom 
'To recognise reason as the rose in the cross of the present ... 
this is the rational insight which reconciles us to the actual, 
the reconciliation which philosophy affords to those in whom 
there has once arisen an inner voice bidding them to comprehend, 
not only to dwell in what is substantive while still retaining 
subjective freedom, but also to possess subjective freedom while 
standing not in anything particular and accidental, but in what 
exists absolutely' (Hegel, Preface to the Philosophy of Right) 
1. The Factors of Necessity 
For the discovery of what Germany could be, rather than for 
the complacent pretence that social and political unity there 
must be ('Vereinigung stattfinden soll') 
1 
or for the stipulation 
of unattainable and impertinent conditions, a new method was 
necessary. It appears from Hegel's definitive text that he 
wished to credit no-one but himself with the invention of such a 
method of treating German constitutional law. For, in his 
survey of his predecessors he alluded only to 'older professors' 
and contemporary positivists or empiricists. But it is clear 
from the second draft of the introduction that he knew of other 
thinkers to whom he should properly have attributed the un- 
equivocal abandonment of Pufendorf's taxonomic enterprise, and 
of. whom it could not be said that they shared the uncritical 
outlook of Puetter. In the definitive text only the difference 
of tenses betrays Hegel's misappropriation of the kudos: the 
modern professors 'gave up' (abgaben) the taxonomic quest, whereas 
312. 
the positivists, who actually continued to use some of the 
categories devised by Pufendorf, except without their architectonic 
context, 'no longer treat' (behandeln) constitutional law as a 
science 
2 The positivists achieved nothing by their abandon- 
ment of the neo-aristotelian schematism. The genuinely modern 
professors, whose identity will shortly be revealed 
3, 
and Hegel 
after them, put their freedom from its constraints to good use. 
In SdpR, having posed the question whether there must be no 
. other 
'public' (struck out) 
4 
or political result of the war 
against France than the loss of some of Germany's fairest lands 
and of some millions of its children, the compensation of its 
dispossessed princes by the annihilation of its spiritual 
members 
5 
and the prolongation into peace time, in the form of 
a heavy burden of debt, of the misery of war 
6; 
and having made 
his declaration (though he struck it out) of his heart's desire, 
nay determination, to 'nourish with a mental image its willing 
faith in the fulfillment of its hopes' 
7, Hegel had proceeded 
to identify those who had genuinely broken the spell of Pufendorf's 
schematism. It was the 'professorial statisticians' (Katheder- 
Statistiker) 
8 
who had given up the hopeless task of adjusting 
the superannuated categories of natural law in order to ration- 
alize the problem of territorial sovereignty. It was they who 
first realised the incompatibility of their 'official task of 
classifying the constitution and bringing it under the aristotelian 
0 
classes of monarchy, aristocracy etc. ' ' with the scientific task 
of explaining the constitutional status, and its consequences, 
of the German Imperial ]Estates. Unlike Pufendorf, who dutifully 
performed his official task (Amtspflicht) in spite of his admitted 
misgivings 
10, these 'statisticians' acknowledged that they could 
not thus 'come to terms' with territorial sovereignty. 
Though, as usual, Hegel did not name those to whom he alluded, 
313. 
it cannot but be that he was thinking, above all, of Gottfreid 
Achenwall and August Ludwig von Schloezer. Achenwall, Professor 
of Political Statistics at the University of Goettingen from 
1748 to 1772 and Schloezer, its foremost professor of history, 
jointly conducted there a course on what, pursuing Hermann Conring's 
interest in notitia rerumpublicarum, they called 'political 
notabilities' (Staatsmerkwuerdigkeiten) Like Conring, they 
12 
interested themselves in the intimate relationship between con- 
stitutional law and customary practices not only in religious, 
cultural and political but also in economic life. Indeed, in 
their guise of political economists, they were the first to 
seek to explain the constitutional relations of the Imperial 
Estates in economic terms. By that means was to be accomplished 
the supersession of the scholastic approach, which had evinced 
no appreciation of the mundane causes of territorial particularism. 
The shift in emphasis from the morphological to the 'statis- 
ticalt (sometimes regarded as proto-sociological 
13) 
explanation 
of the German Empire had more than scientific significance. 
It made a difference to the question whether Germany had any 
prospect of political vitality. Only if appraised independently 
of the neo-classical paradigms of political perfection, and apart 
from impertinent and abstract criteria of sovereignty, could it 
be maintained that Germany might yet emerge from its parlous 
condition of decomposition. For in those terms, what the 
'statisticians' regarded as its peculiar, and perhaps only, 
source of vitality (albeit potential rather than actual), could 
not but appear as a weakness. The appreciation of the virtues 
of a representative-cum-monarchical constitution, status mixtus 
14, 
depended entirely on the invention of a new method. It was this 
method, and the values which informed it, that attracted Hegel. 
Hence it was that Achenwall, in his 'Staatsklucheit1, had 
314. 
insisted that 'the idea of the state used throughout this work 
is not an abstract conception containing nothing more than 
general characteristics ... In short, I shall look at the state 
as our states really are' 
15. From the consideration of states 
as they really are and in terms of their peculiar historical 
development, rather than from the impertinent and a-historical 
desideration, albeit in tandem with the speculative geneaology 
of their claims to legitimacy, of what, in abstract terms, they 
ought to be, was to be expected a more positive view of contemp- 
orary political reality. Just such a view, involving not only 
acknowledgement of reality 'as it is' 
16 but also its acceptance 
'as pretty much what it is in its own actual inherent strength' 
17, 
was what Hegel intended the publication of the VSN to promote: 
'The thoughts contained in this essay can have no other air or 
effect ... than to promote the understanding of what is and there- 
with a calmer outlook and a moderate tolerance of it both in deed 
and word. For it is not what is that makes us vehement and 
passionate (ungestuem und leidend), but that it is not as it 
ought to be; but if we recognize that it is as it must be, i. e. 
that it is not due to arbitrariness and chance, then we recognize 
also that it ought to be so' 
18. This might appear to he tanta- 
mount to a 'positivist' manifesto of contentment with the 'now'. 
We shall see t'. -^t it is nothing of the kind. 
Just like the alliance of political statisticians and nrag- 
matic historians, who, as we saw in the first chapter, made it 
their chief object to discover the spirit, system or inner 
relationship of events 
19, Hegel insisted that it was the business. 
of the political commentator 'to recognize necessity and to think 
it, 20 by interpreting it 'as a system of events ruled by a single 
spirit' . By that means 
it could be impressed upon the German 
21 
people that, as Hegel had first argued in 1798/99, they 'had to 
315. 
be completely subjected to political degradation' 
22 in the 
service of a 'higher end' 
23, 
namely the raising up of Germany 
from its 'insignificance' 
2/f. The 'now', then, was to be located 
as a punctuation, qualified as such by the modal verb 'must, 
25, 
of an historical dimension of meaningful spiritual development, 
ethical inasmuch as the end to be attained was the existence of 
the Germans as a people, whose customary community is enacted in 
the form of statehood. 
But it is to be noted that while Hegel qualified 'what is' 
as necessary, and also the events conducive to it, he did not 
imply that the fuller development of the spirit of peoplehood or 
statehood must (in the sense of cannot but) take place whatever 
the disposition of the Germans. He had more hope than Pufendorf, 
who saw no more than the decline of the present from what ought 
to be and ignored the 'actual inherent strength' vouchsafed to 
the Germans by their ethos and the political practices bound up 
with it. But he did not believe with Puetter that mere 
historical connection with their aboriginal forebears, the 
'Urvolk' 26, would afford the Germans certain life as a people. 
'Necessity' did not mean for Hegel an ineluctable force with 
independent ontological status. It meant, rather, the limita- 
tion, imposed by the irreversibility of events, upon political 
possibility 
27. This was its objective bearing. But the term 
had also a subjective bearing conveyed by the qualification to 
what 'is as it must be', that, further, it 'ought to be' so. 
Interpreted in accordance with this qualification, limitation 
of possibility appears, so long as insight into its necessity 
sub specie praeteritatis is maintained, as opportunity sub specie 
futuritatis. For the adept in the ways of necessity can 'derive 
28 
advantage' from his insight 
Hegel's introductory manifesto, then, is not to be construed 
316. 
as a call for political quietism or passivity. On the contrary, 
he regarded the recognition of necessity as the cognitive counter- 
part of the practical outlook of 'anyone who does not surrender 
to what happens' 
29, 
and so as the only means of escape from the 
helplessness of those who, however vehement they may be in their 
denunciation of them, continue to 'suffer under events' 
30. 
When the people itself should become by this means an agent with 
the advantage over events, rather than a patient, its ethos is 
active for the first time. Its spirit exists no longer merely 
as objective necessity or 'fate', that is as custom whose lack 
of articulation disables it from preventing its perversion, but 
as necessity made subjectively meaningful, to every member of the 
people, as the ethical 'activity' in which, for the sake of 
immortal ethical 'life', each participates as if it were his own, 
without presuming to make his own affairs the measure of the 
service which it does him. 
That Hegel probably had such an end in mind, that he hoped 
the 'people' could become as those very few who 'so act in the 
midst of great affairs that they could themselves direct them, 
31, 
may be inferred from the affinity with that part of the intro- 
duction written de novo in 1802-03 of the cognate arguments of 
the only two strictly philosophical essays which he wrote before 
1803 and in the midst of his composition of the VSN. For in 
the NRS, completed immediately before his revision of this intro- 
duction, he deployed an argument which contains the view of the 
VSN that the vice of the Germans consisted in the fact that their 
laws (meaning, in strictness, the civic enlightenment with which 
the Praxis of their civil culture ought to be in harmony) and 
lives are dissonant 
32, but which goes further in the development 
of the view that the consequent disintegration of the Germans is 
remediable by the therapeutic interpretation of the fatal 
_317. 
limitations of a people as implicative of its vital moment of 
opportunity. That the Germans were not at*the peak of national 
happiness was a circumstance which presented them with an oppor- 
tunity for the pursuit of virtue 
33. 
In the NRS, the German nation is said to be disintegrated 
in that ethical identity no longer pervades its laws 
34. 
Conversely, any period in which ethos and laws are one, when the 
relationship between the life of the individual and that of the 
people is such that the former is 'one pulse beat of the whole 
system and is itself the whole system' 
35, Hegel defined as one 
in which'the ethos of the people is lent by the form of law 
'the appearance of something inherently necessary' 
36. The self- 
maintenance of the whole, the persistence of 'living unity binding 
the members together, 
37, depends on the articulation of the 
vital or lively elements with which, no less than with its fatal 
or deadly elements, is instinct the objective necessity of the 
people, i. e. its past. It depends on the articulation of 
necessity so that the individual can, while occupied with his 
own projects, identify with it prospectively as well as acknow- 
ledge it retrospectively. His public environment, if it is to 
remain such in the face of stresses which do not impinge on 
natural environments, must not only be a necessity, as water is 
to fish and air is to birds 
38, but appear to consciousness as 
such, so that the individual may be ethically rather than merely 
naturally adapted to the limitations and opportunities of his 
necessity. Thus to recognize necessity is to raise it to the 
higher power of virtue. 
Hegel's overall meaning, in the complementary terms of the 
NRS and the VSN, may be expressed as follows: in order to achieve 
ethical agency or identity a people must, since any action must 
proceed from what is, first have confidence that there is inherent 
3180- 
in what it has been some capacity for action. If its past 
dieclose manifest incapacity, let it be shown that this stems 
from a negative aspect of its character or spirit in weich is 
latent a positive aspect 
39. By his analogy with the animal 
world, prescinding from the fact that the flight of a bird, for 
instance, exhibits an immediate experience of the reciprocation 
of the negative and the positive, flight being possible because 
of the resistance to exertion offered by the atmosphere, whereas 
in the action of a people the experience of reciprocation must 
be historically disjoined and consciously apprehended in terms of 
a causal rather than reciprocal relation, Hegel made clear that 
he meant by necessity that which contains opponent principles 
whose interaction, not at once but over time, nor immediately 
but on reflection, does not 'hinder life, 
40, but gives it shape 
or direction. 
In concrete terms, the opponent principles that Hegel had 
in mind were the principles of 'bourgeois' or civil heterogeneity 
and tnon-bourgeoist or civic togetherness, the principles 
respectively of territorial sovereignty and imperial majesty. 
From the exhaustion of the one, if only Germany's degradation 
were not regarded as merely fortuitously related to the'urge for 
isolation'. since in that case restoration would not appear to 
depend on repression of particularism, could proceed the re- 
generation of the other. The 'inner causes' of degradation had 
to be so starkly apprehended that no pretence could any longer be 
sustained that their public effect might coexist with the cause 
of ethical integration. Their results had to be impressed with- 
out mitigation upon the conscience of the Germans. Recognition 
that the past could not, given the ascendancy of the bourgeois 
principle, have been otherwise and that, if that principle persist, 
its consequences were irreversible, would be the propaedeutic to 
319. 
Fi 
the determination of the German people to enact the positive 
aspect of their spirit. 
A people can only attain ethical life if it 'confronts the 
negative as objective and as fate and by consciously conceding 
to the negative a power and a realm, at the sacrifice of a part 
of itself, it maintains its own life purified of the negative' 
41 
or 'cleansed of the past, 
42. To recognise that what has been 
and is are as they must be is to be strengthened in resolve to 
shape what is to come. The most significant sense of such 
resolve is that of its embodiment in laws and organization 
adapted to the maintenance of ethical life against the derogatory 
stresses of the particularism by which it is negated. The 
business of law is to confer the appearance of necessity upon the 
positive, the customary roots of ethical activity, so that the 
negative, which Hegel equated with that in German law which 
permitted privilege to prevail against public law 
43, 
may be 
held in check 
44. 
By its identification with the idea of law, the idea of 
necessity assumes, then, the significance of a job of maintenance 
to be done - at least virtually or simulatively - by a people, 
rather than merely a course of disrepair suffered by an unethical 
crowd which ascribes necessity to the dissimulation or pretence 
of lawful right 
45. Only from obedience to necessity in its 
aspect as an ethical imperative was to be expected the satisfaction 
of the need which, in the DS, Hegel announced as the cause in 
which his philosophy was enlisted: 'to re-establish man from 
within himself, against the confusion of the time and to restore 
the totality which the time has sundered, 
46. To restore the 
togetherness of the German people and to save their hearts 
(Gemüether) from seclusion 
47 from truly universal public rela- 




systems of 'justice' 
49 
or 'absolute possession' 
50: these were the 
concerns which Hegel had in common, as a philospher, with the poli- 
tical scientists who had first posed the question upon what basis 
but the resources of their past, refashioned in order to resist con- 
tinued dissipation, could Germany and the Germans come to resemble 
again the 'wholes' that they had used to be. 
None of these political scientists had devised, in the course 
of their methodological self-liberation from desiderate conceptions 
of what ought to be, a concept of necessity designed, like Hegels, 
to express the coexistence, in the individuality of any historical 
entity, of factors of limitation and opportunity, of the negative 
and positive, the consciousness of whose contradiction 
51 
generates 
the advance of individuality through metamorphoses 
52 
and the pro- 
gressive liberation of consciousness from its limitations 
53. Yet 
it was surely by their work, pervaded by the belief that native pol- 
itical characteristics, seen by Bodin and Pufendorf as barren of 
constitutional viability, were the only and so the best basis for 
national civilisation, modernisation or development (Bildung), that 
Hegel was assured that it was reasonable to consider the principle 
of representative-cum-monarchical government, the positive aspect of 
German political culture, as a vital 'moving principle' 
54 
alterna- 
tive to its negative aspect, the Landeshoheit by which that cultur- 
al or customary inheritance had been dissipated. 
2. The idea of a 'compound society' 
This is most likely in view of that which is of greatest 
interest in the matter of Hegel's knowledge of Achenwall and 
Schloezer. The former, in particular, combined with the object- 
ions of his mentor, Hermann Conring, to the treatment of states 
according to the 'permanent and unchangeable principles, 
55 of* 
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neo-aristotelian method, a positive evaluation of Gorman, -'s 
capacity, given the mobilisation of the principle of representa- 
tion latent in the familial political culture of the German 
forests, for genuine statehood as opposed to the merely second- 
best political limbo to which Pufendorf supposed it to be condemned. 
The statisticians recognized, without any equivocation, that 
Germany was presently not a state at all. Both Achenwall and 
Schloezer attributed this fact to the public effect of private 
interest. Germany was rather and consequently what Schloezer 
called, in a sense very close to Hegel's own use of the term, a 
'civil society' or what Achenwall termed a 'societa aegualis' 
56. 
The epithet aegualis was applied to civil society to signify, 
not actual social equality, but equality of rights. In such a 
society, actual social inequality is not mitigated by any idea of 
community. In it, according to Achenwall, there is no internal 
unity beyond the aggregation of its members on the basis of 
private law 
57. To this kind of society, whose members are 
individuals associated by mere contractual relations for their 
more or less successful pursuit of private interests, Achenwall 
opposed a kind which he dubbed a 'compound society' 
(zusammengesetzte Gesellschaft) or societa innequalis 
58. The 
epithet inaequalis was applied to such a society to signif: ' 
effective political depression of the power of more successful 
civilians to gain political advantage from their eminent social 
position, in other words to disintegrate the community b; ' explöit- 
ing its universal authority in the service of particular ends. 
The members of such a society, of whic' the family was trp 'edel, 
were held to enjoy a mystical relationship stemming from action 
in conjunction for common rather than several ends. Thanks to 
the factor of their representation by animperium to which all 
are equally inferior, there belongs to the. compound society alone 
322. 
the full and entire sovereirnty which can contain the independ- 
ence of the members of the societa aegualis, the order of which 
can therefore persist without detriment to the interests of all 
59. 
It is remarkable how close is Hegel's 'mental image', to 
which he adverted in SdR just before his mention of the statist- 
icians, to Achenwall's vision of the possibility that although, 
in accordance with Schloezer's general hypothesis of an historical 
succession of three basic types of social organization, the familial 
(hauslich) the civil (buergerlich) and the stately 
(staatsgesellschaftlich) 60, Germany could not revert to the 
first condition, it might yet become once more, as a state, like 
the kind of compound society which, as a family or kin-group, it 
had been before the rise of civil society. 
For, if we compose Hegel's'image' from its various appear- 
ances throughout the VSN and contemporary texts, it is evident 
first, that he too looked to the principle of a representative 
Imperium for the legal validation of the relations of together- 
ness disrupted by the bourgeois spirit 
61; 
second that, as we 
saw at the end of the third chapter and the beginning of the 
fourth, he held that only from the cooperative action of rep- 
resentative government could emerge a more than superficial 
sense of identification, merbership and interest the depth and 
strength of which permits, as we shall shortly see more fully, 
a degree of independence in the politically 'inessential' sphere 
of civil society or societa aeaualis 
6? 
and third, as we are 
now in a position to see with reference to the NRS, that he 
shared with Achenwall the idea that there subsists in legal 
compound or togetherness a mystical sense of membership of a 
whole to which the individual devotes himself, as to the locus 
of his interest in cooperative action, rather than confine him- 
self to the pursuit only of private interest. 
323. 
In the NRS, having criticised at length the 'empirical' and 
'formal' ways of treating natural law for their tendency, 
arbitrarily in the case of the former 
63 
and surreptitiously in 
the case of the latter 
64, to confer the status of absolute 
validity 
65 
upon the merely hypothetical or circumstantial dis- 
position of the moral individual 
66, Hegel proceeded to argue 
that principles, laws, ends, duties and rights are determinable 
only with reference to the specific historical context in which 
they are operative. This context Hegel called 'absolute ethical 
totality', which he defined as 'nothing other than a people' 
67. 
It is at this point in the argument of the NRS, and this is 
all the more striking because much the same view recurs in the 
third paragraph of the definitive version of the VSN, that is 
just after what would have been, if he had been faithful to his 
second draft, the right place to refer to the statisticians, 
that Hegel took his stand against the Kantian doctrine of 
'perpetual peace' 
68. 
This is striking because he did so from 
a standpoint already occupied by Achenwall. Just as Achenwall 
had argued that a compound society best accomplishes the feat of 
joining its members in mystical communion when it is acting 
externally, in confrontation with another society, and that only 
then is it an 'unum morale' 
69, 
so Hegel insisted in the NRS that 
'ethical totalities, such as peoples, take form and constitute 
themselves as individuals; and thus, peoples, as individuals, 
take their position against individual peoples ... In war 
there 
is the free possibility that not only certain individual things 
but the whole of them, as life, will be annihilated and destroyed 
for the Absolute itself and for the people; and therefore war 
preserves the ethical health of peoples in their indifference to 
specific institutions, preserves it from habituation to such 
institutions and their hardening ... Corruption would result for 
324. 
peoples under continual or indeed 'perpetual' peace ... The 
shape of ethical totality and its individuality is fixed as an 
individuality facing outwards and the movement of this individ- 
uality is fixed as courage ..., 
70" 
It will be remembered from the treatment of the 1801 cycles 
of composition of the VSN that it was Hegel's view that represent- 
ative institutions come into their own especially in the making 
of decisions upon war and peace 
71 
and that the wars with revo- 
lutionary France had occasioned in public opinion an aversion from 
the'bourgeois principle' and a reversion, out of the objective 
necessity with which the Germans were confronted in war, to the 
principle of majesty as a subjective necessity, that is to the 
source of genuine freedom 'as a need' 
72. A people is preserved 
in a healthy state of activity and from a corrupt state of habit- 
uation to its institutions by the negation, posed by the danger 
of death, of its individual members' inclination to look only to 
their own present interests. It is this inclination which, if 
given free play, negates the vitality of the public and so under- 
mines that which alone can ensure the satisfaction of such 
interests. War, then, is a case of the 'negation of negation' 
73, 
or Dublic opposition to the opposition by the individual, against 
the ethical totality, of his merely present world - the 'manifold 
reality, 
74, 
of physical needs and pleasures, work and the 
amassing of wealth . for these needs. 
The 'so-called political economy' 
75 is nothing of the kind 
for it cannot preserve its own order. The system of the political 
economy must be prevented from becoming a 'self-constituting and 
independent power' 
76, 
must be impressed with an 'awareness of 
its inner nullity, 
?7 
and impeded in its tendency to promote 
social heterogeneity 
78 to the detriment of 'positive ethical'life'79. 
This means that the legal relations peculiar to the economic 
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system, once it accomplishes, in the passage from mere possession 
to property 
80, 
a unity of external relations of formal equality 
or of aggregation (Sammlung) 
81, 
must not be allowed to be a 
criterion for the determination of what is just. What Hegel 
called 'true total justice' 
82, ethical justice rather than the 
justice of private law, cannot, as we have seen with reference 
to the DS, be done if for its sake all trust, joy and love, the 
potencies of genuinety ethical identity, are eradicated 
83. It 
is the business of 'immediate ethical perception' 
84, 
which cannot 
but be identified with what Hegel was later to regard as the 
imperative of duty to her kin obeyed by Antigone 
85, to realize 
'true total justice and ethical life' 
86 
Hegel did not, to be sure, call in the NRS upon the shades 
of such exponents of custom-built public law as Conring and 
Achenwall. For the consumption of his philosophical public, he 
cited the authority of Plato in support of his argument that the 
administration of ethical justice is a practical art 
87, 
rather 
than what Conring had deprecated as a 'science with permanent and 
unchangeable principles' 
88. But this does not matter, since 
that was exactly the attitude which he had come across in his 
encounter with the tradition in German jurisprudence extending 
from Conring to Achenwall. 
What does matter is that he was at one with Achenwall's 
intention to show that only in a societa inaequali, meaning not 
an unequal society but a political system negative of the merely 
fortuitous power of actually unequal members'of modern civil 
society, could the' irreversible heterogeneity and individualism 
of societa aeaualis, meaning not an actually egalitarian society 
but an aggregate of personae only formally equal, be made consistent 
with the political togetherness or composition of its members. 
Only in a societa inaegualis could possessive individualism be 
32A - 
contained in its proper snrere and prevented from passinE over 
into possessive particularism. The political structure of the 
state, as set out in the NRF, is that of a societa i. naequalis and 
its object is the creation of a compound society compatible with 
civil society but not subservient to its order. 
Hegel did insist that 'absolute ethical life' must negate 
the system of economic reality 
89. But this meant only that 
the state must prevent the occlusion of the public interest by 
private interests. If, he had argued in that part of the 
definitive introduction of the VSN written in 1801, political 
offices and rights are shared out in accordance not with the needs. 
of the whole, but in accordance with the power of private persons, 
if, that is, 'the state loses all authority, while yet the indiv- 
idual's ownership rests on the power of the state, the ownership 
of those who have no support but the state's power - which is 
straightway null - must necessarily be very shaky' 
90. In other 
words, the seclusion of political authority from the pressure of 
private interest is the condition, the degrees of power of 
private persons being, in reality and because of mere chance 
91, 
very different, of the security of the private interests of all. 
This was what Hegel meant, in the NRS, when he maintained that 
the 'cancellation' by absolute ethical life of the independence 
of the real economic system amounts at the same time to its 
'endurance': 'the cancelling posits something that it cancels, 
the real' Unless the real inequality of fortune within the 
92 
economic system be prevented from intruding upon political life, 
even the formal equality of rights in civil society is at risk. 
As has been argued throughout this work, the great strength 
of Hegel's political theory is that it takes into account the 
need, if the denizens of the modern economy are to be persuaded 
to be good citizens, that the community, for the, sake of which 
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they must sacrifice the relentless pursuit of their private 
interest, must assure their present interests a substantial degree 
of security and independence. This is not to be done by the 
indulgence of the state itself in abstract economic activity. 
It is not enough 'to set up the propositions that everyone has a 
right to live, that in a people the commonweal has to see to it 
that every citizen shall have a sufficiency and that there be 
perfect security of ease and gain' 
93. On the contrary such 
principles would allow the economic system 'full sway to entrench 
itself absolutely' 
94. Rather the negative particularism of the 
economic system, whether its dominant members are territorial 
Estates or social classes, must be 'kept to one side' 
95. Only 
then can 'ethical organization remain pure in the real world' 
96. 
To this end, society must be divided into three classes: 
the first is 'wholly devoted to the public interest' 
97 
and its 
work must involve it in exposure to death; the second, because 
it is engrossed in economic pursuits, is not called upon to be 
thus apathetic 
98; the third, because its economic function does 
not engender in it the individualism of the second class, is 
elementally atone with its customary and natural environment and, 
like the primitive 'whole man' 
99, 
will risk everything for it. 
Its force lends itself, therefore, to the service of the political 
function of the first clas^ 
100. While the first and third 
classes contribute to the individuality of the whole, the second 
class, which is'both timid and intemperate 
101,, 
must be given a 
realm of its own 'where it can, make itself secure and develop its 
whole activity in its own muddle' so that it will feel its 
'political nullity' to be compensated by the 'fruits of the system'102. 
The civilian is allowed his 'justice'. But it is to be 
constrained by the ethical totality to operate only within what 
Hegel termed the sphere of inorganic nature, control over which 
328. 
the people foregoes. Each individual is capable of taking up the 
relation of a bourgeois to the community 
103. So long as he wants 
to enjoy execption from the apathetic life he must respect the con- 
ditions on which he does so: 'this relation is only this relation. 
If you are in this relation, then be in it with reference thereto'104. 
But while the bourgeois may not solicit the State to serve his int- 
erests, he can, in virtue of the fact that he was not born a bourg- 
eois but a child, in no way in his turn avoid being impressed by the 
majesty of the State. Though he cannot touch the State, he can look 
upon 
105 
and be touched by it. It can arouse in him alter-religious 
feelings of fear, trust and obedience 
106, for as a child he was 
'suckled at the breast of universal ethical life' 
107. The people 
is originally and ultimately his family. Thanks to his education 
in its care it is vain for him to 'strive after a private, positive 
108 
ethical life' " The individual's consciousness is pervaded by 
the ethos of his country. The height of this organic embodiment 
of the ethical in the individual is attained when custom is 
109 
perfectly expressed in a system of legislation . Such a system 
must be not merely universal on its own account but be made visible 
to the nation in the 'form of particularity' 
110. Having such a 
form it 'must be regarded and worshipped as the nation's God; and 
this view must in turn have its own vivacity and joyful movement in 
a cult' 
111. 
3. A cult of representation 
Wanting definition in the NRS, the nature of this cult, 
devoted to the sensible manifestation of the intelligible, must 
be inferred from other writings. It may be ventured, to begin 
with the NRS, that by a cult Hegel meant a celebration within 
the nation of its outward facing individuality, an inward 
329. 
expression (through bodies which come into their own, and are 
preserved from habituation or from being regarded as instruments 
of private interest, in the making of decisions upon war and peace) 
of the mystical sense of membership vouchsafed to the whole by 
the outward action of the first class. Rather less hazardously, 
it may be supposed that, as the 'form of universality' inheres 
'in the laws' 112, the 'form of particularity' inheres in custom, 
and that their perfect union is the object of the cult. Just 
so, as we saw in the first and third chapters, was it the 
purpose of the genius and a mythology of reason to promote the 
convergence of intelligent subjectivity and the merely practical 
subjectivity of the customary life of diurnal effort and industry. 
But the semantic problem remains concerning what is this 
'God' or 'shape' to which the enlightened and the unenlightened 
must devote themselves. What is it that is both an intelligible 
and sensible instantiation of community, that is both absent and 
present? What constitutes a union of legal universality and 
customary particularity? If our text were the Philosophy of 
Right, it might be declared without hesitation that shape or 
individuality of this kind is the peculiar characteristic of the 
representative body whose function is that of a 'middle term 
preventing both the extreme isolation of the power of the crown, 
which otherwise might seem a mere arbitrary tyranny, and also thA 
isolation of the particular interests of persons, associations 
and corporations' 
113. Eighteen years after writing the NRS, 
Hegel maintained that only through. the Estates is there 'a 
genuine link between the particular which is effective in the 
state and the universal' 
114 
and that mediation between the 
customary configurations of civil society and the legal structures 
of the state is most vividly impressed upon the public by the 





the pretentiousness of the bourgeois, just as in the NRS he had 
argued that education 
116, 
and so, by inference, perhaps rep- 
resentation, serves to cancel the negative. But we cannot adduce 
these imperfect parallels as evidence that in the ITRS Hegel was 
thinking of representation as the cult-object, for the treatment 
of representation in the Philosophy of Right does not even 
remotely suggest that representation is a cultic practice. Yet 
we can trace a line of genealogy between the section of the 
Philosophy of Right dealing with representation, through the 
VSN and DS, to the passages of the NRS in question, in such a 
way as, at least, to give the palm to the hypotheses that Hegel 
was proposing a cult of representation over hypotheses such as 
that he had in mind a cult of religious or even racial identity. 
In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel assigned to representation 
the function of a 'middle term preventing both the extreme isola- 
tion of the power of the crown, which otherwise might seem a mere 
arbitrary tyranny, and also the isolation of the particular 
interests of persons, associations and corporations, 
117. We 
have already encountered the argument of the VSN that representa- 
tion alone affords the guarantee that 'overnment will 'proceed in 
accordance with law' 
118, that 'barbarity' consists in the fact 
that law does not stand between the personality of monarch and 
individuals 119, and that 'lack of confidence' in representation 
and law begets a 'lack of wisdom' which dithers between the 
sentiments of trust and fear of the supreme authority of the state 
12C 
There occurs in the NRS the same equation of 'barbarism' and its 
sign, 'lack of skill in formulating the true ethical principles 
(i. e. customs serviceable"in the pursuit of ethical identity) as 
laws' 121, with want of faith, that is, of a cult 
122 Hence, 
by means of a textual algebra., it can be established that to have 
a cult is to be civilized, that is to practise the faith of law 
331. 
and representation in such a way as to do away with the dis- 
affection from authority which leads to the extremism and 
barbarity of particularism. 
Thus, through the cult of that which is both rooted in 
custom and the foundation of law, namely the practice of rep- 
resentation, is to be established an inward as well as outward- 
facing individuality with which every member of the people can 
vivaciously and joyfully identify. Only thus is barbarity, or 
the condition of a multitude that is a 'people without at the 
same time being a state' 
123 
to be avoided. Otherwise a people, 
said in the DS to be, so long as its political order is 'organic' 
rather than mechanical, the most perfect organization into which 
Reason can shape itself 
124, is reduced from a state of legal 
composition or togetherness to that of a multitude of individuals, 
merely externally or atomistically related 
125, 
against the 
negativity or particularism of whom custom cannot of itself hold 
out. Allow to be proven this further equation of a multitudinous 
or atomistic society with barbarity, and so with a society lacking 
the organic shape sustained by a cult of some kind(X). Such an 
equation is significant in that, if in 1802 there was in Hegel's 
mind even the germ of the argument of the Philosophy of Right, 
namely that representation serves to prevent the reproduction in 
the state of the mechanical atomism of civil society, then it is 
justifiable to import to the term cult, in place of the indeterm- 
inate (X), the value 'of representation'. But even if this 
algebraic proof be accepted, it is essential to establish, upon 
a less conjectural basis than that of the overlop-in terminology 
and meaning of passage in the Philosophy of Right, the NRS the 
VSN and the DS, that Hegel did indeed mean by a cult (X) a cult 
of representation.. A more secure basis is to be found in the 
VSN alone. 
332. 
In the NRS Hegel wrote so vaCuely of a cult as to permit 
the view that he might have meant something literally not 
different from a system of religious devotion, so that the 
practice in virtue of which alone a people is credited with being 
a state rather than a multitude might be taken to he nothing 
other than the practice of a religion, presumably one religion 
since in the I1RS he speaks of 'the God of the community' 
126. 
But, besides the fact that, as we have seen, this would be in- 
compatible with his own critique of positivity, in the most 
politically specific sense of the word 
127, the advocacy of such 
a cult would fly in the face of the facts of religious life as 
Hegel had already described them in the VSIN. For in the section 
on religion, written in June - July 1801, in a passage which 
Hegel was to develop fully only in the section on the essence of 
the state 
128, he maintained, in effect, that in post-Reformation 
Europe at any rate, religion was no longer fit to perform the 
function of a. cult, namely, to bind its devotees in the together- 
ness mystically vouchsafed to members of the same communion, to 
afford them a sense of participation in or identification with 
the deeds of an individuality not immediately their own. It was 
through religion that men ha^1 once been able to regard one another 
as partnrrs within a whole 
129. But with the confessional schism 
this 'most inward' of links between men was ruptured ) and in 
0 
Germany, where there was no state to raintain a deep sense of 
partnership, the superficirl rartnership of economic activity 
became the dominant mode of relationship. 
It is at this point in his argument that it becomes clear 
that Iiegel's intention was to aver that in representation is to 
be found the object of a cult in devotion to which men might find 
again the togetherness and sense of ethical totality which the 
cult of the divine used to maintain. For the very disruption 
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of the religinus bony upon which political 1tthol4ness used to 
depend actually gave rise to the practice of representation and, we 
may say, to the object of the cult of representation, the nation. 
Here emerges most clearly and simply an answer to the question, 
begged in the NRS, What is the 'nation't God'? The answer is 
evidently that it is the very nation itself, given the shape of 
individuality by representation. 
What Hegel was arguing in the section of the VSN presently 
under consideration is, in effect, that religion had, by its 
division, lost the cultic or mythic force, which it had possessed 
in the German forests, by means of vital and joyful ritual 
practices to bind men to one another in mutual trust. But he 
was also arguing that the vacuum left by the division of religion 
could, at least in principle, begin to be filled by a system of 
devotion whose object is a secular rather than other-worldly deity: 
rather than God, the nation. The nation, as of course he was 
aware, came into play as a political factor only after the 
Reformation and as an object of popular interest only after the 
rise, which in Hegel's view would have been inconceivable but for 
the Reformation, of a monistic system in which sovereignty is 
131 
inseparable from representation : sovereignty resides in the 
nation and the nation exists only 
Without representative government 
can know what it wills or intends 
rent is the sine qua nor of the ii 
civilized identity of a people as 
natural, nation. 
in virtue of its representation. 
no nation can create itself, 
to be. Representative govern- 
ltellir. ent constitution of the 
a political, rather than merely 
Let us see, then, row Here1 came to argue, in June - July 1801, 
that though a people could no longer depend upon religion for its 
cult, it could have recourse to an alternative made possible by 
the very dereliction-of the religious communion of the nation. 
334 
Accordin7 to the VSN, 'while religion has completely rent the 
state asunder, it has yet ^. fforded an inkling, in a remarkable 
way, of certain principles on which a state can rest' 
132. Hegel 
wrote later, in the 1802-1803 cycle, that in themselves similarity 
and dissimilarity of religion have neither united peoples into 
states not rent states asunder 
133, 
and earlier, in the February- 
March 1801 draft of the section in question, that religious schism 
had been an'important determinant? or contributor to political 
rupture only insofar as or because, first, there was no express 
distinction 134 between the interests of territorial princes and 
their subjects, and second, the time was not ripe for what could 
have ensured the absence of a pretext for rupture, the separation 
of church and state 
135. From these later and earlier elabora- 
tions upon the theme of his argument in June or July 1801, it is 
clear that his meaning in its first clause is that the princes, 
animated by the spirit of possessive particularism, were the 
culprits of the mobilisation of conscience against the Empire 
136. 
Not religion of itself or of necessity, but the exploitation by 
princes of its division, in order that they might withdraw from 
the supremacy of the Empire, without constraint by it or by the 
interest of their subjects, for that was not in a position to gain 
expression, was what negated the individuality of the people. 
This emasculation of ethical totality by the 'negative and 
restricting attitude' 
137 
of possessive particularism took place 
by means of the pre-emption of the possibility of the emergence 
of a source of public law through the guarantee by the Peace of 
Westphalia of the private right of. itio in partes, 'the right of 
this or that religious party not to submit to a majority vote' 
138. 
If only this private right were invoked in private matters, to 
which category, in Hegel's view, affairs of religion and conscience 
clearly belong, for they have tin the last. resort, nothing to do 
335. .I 
with the state' 
139, 
all would be well. On the contrary, 
however, as Her; el argued, at greater length and in greater detail 
in the draft version of February-1-larch than in the definitive 
text of June-July 1801, the right of itio in partes had been so 
abused as to bring to nothing matters which are entirely affairs 
of state and to make them 'ecclesiastical affairs, affairs of a 
state within a state ... But what is still more important, the 
activity of the state can be completely hemmed in, and that in 
every general matter of state which has no relation at all to 
religion: war and peace, taxes. What little remains to the 
state can be trod under foot by religion and everything be 
hindered which ought to be decided by the majority. (For 
example) Brandenburg does not, because of this (right), pay the 
increased cameral taxes (Kammersteuern). 
What Hegel bemoaned here is the annihilation of the potential 
of the German people to achieve, by way of the essential principle 
of majoritarian decision, the inward individuality upon which 
alone outward-facing individuality can be based. Yet while 
religion had been invoked in order to prevent the constitution 
of the whole as a decisive individual it had, at least in some 
parts of Germany, 'helped to promote another separation ... and 
thus given force to some principles which are necessary conditions 
of the existence of a state' 
141. It is noticeable that in 
three respects this statement exceeds its definitive parallel 
142 
cited above 
143, in the weight of its import. For, first, the 
division of religion, in this respect not susceptible to the 
manipulation of princes, had effected, in spite of them, 'the 
distinction of their interests from those of their subjects; 
second, this distinction had not merely 'afforded an inkling' of, 
but. had 'given force to$ the principles of representation; and 
thirdly, these principles were said to be not merely optional or' 
336 
oossible but necessary conditions of the modern state. 
A much more important 
144 factor permissive of the emergence 
of a nation and its state than the mere admission in principle 
that, since rights adhere to two religions, the state cannot 
prefer or be dependent on one, was the undeniable fact that, 
where princes had adopted a religion different from that of most 
of their subjects, there grew from this difference, since religion 
was made an instrument of policy in other than religious matters, 
a so manifold differentiation of the interests of princes and 
subjects that the latter ceased to acquiesce in the tacit con- 
vention that in extra-territorial affairs their prince spoke for 
them. Since the Peace of Augsburg (1555) it had been legally 
established, on the principle cuius regio, eius religio, that 
regardless of the confessional allegiance of the majority of the 
inhabitants of a territory, the religion of their prince was 
deemed to be theirs. Thus, Hegel related, at the beginning of 
the 17th century, the Prince of Pfalz-Neuberg, whose subjects 
were largely Protestant, became a Catholic and, in accordance 
with the Peace of Augsburg, could vote in the Diet and in the 
Reichskammergericht in disregard of their confessional interests 
It was clear, in that case, trat the prince was in no sense 
representative of his subjects, since there was no expectation 
of him that he should care for their interests. There being no 
such expectation it was naturally to he understood that the 
presence of the prince in the Imperial Diet or Courts signified 
nothing beyond itself, no intention to act on behalf of somethinc 
other. Hence 'the ruler of different, even separated, countries 
had only one vote. His Derson and his territory, his personality 
and his capacity as representing his territory, were to all 
appearance not distinct' 
146. Likewise*lif one princedom was 
divided between different princes, each of them had a vote of his 
33? . 
own' 
147, In other words, since the idea had not occurred that 
there ought to be made a distinction between princes 'as princes 
and as territorial representatives' 
148, they were present in 
the Diet only in their personal capacity. 
By the end of the 17th century, on the other hand, the 
distinction between the person of a prince and his capacity as 
a representative, in the Imperial Diet, of his people rather than 
as present on his own behalf had become, according to Hegel, 
'clearer and all the easier to make' 
149, the more so in territories 
which enjoyed representative government within, for on that 
account there had long been established constitutional recognition 
of the fact, cuius regio, eius religio notwithstanding, that there 
was a divergence between the person 
150 
or, more precisely, the 
interest 151 of the prince and those of his subjects. Thus, at 
the end of the 17th century, though the Elector of Protestant 
Saxony became a Catholic, his vote in the Imperial Diet and 
Courts remained Protestant 
152. Likewise, in 1721 and 1749 
respectively, the princes of Wuerttemberg- and Hesse, both largely 
Protestant territories enjoying domestic representation, like 
Saxony but unlike Pfalzneuberg, had, when they became Catholic, 
nevertheless to continue to vote with the Protestant party, the 
Corpus Evangelicorum 
153. That is to say that they had to act 
on behalf of another interest than that of their own persons, to 
act 'purely' 
154 
as representatives because there existed in 
their territories a sentiment of nationality independent of 
princely personality and sustained, in the case of Wuerrtemberg 
until 1770, by representative institutions jealous of their 
'co-governmental' prerogatives 
155. In such territories, in 
short, there was emerging a monistic system in which the Estates' 
claim to be representative was made with a view not to supplica- 
tion of condescending justice, but to participation in government 
ýýR 
(Herrschaft). The territory and its people was increasingly 
taken to be an entity apart from its prince. 
Yet Hegel seems to have had reservations, not indeed about 
the principle of nationality as such, the 'true and genuine 
principle that it is a territory which confers the power and 
right of a vote' 
156, but about the extension of this principle 
of nationality to the German Empire as a whole. By its intro- 
duction, he argued by analogy with the further corruption that 
affects a sick body if 'what nourishes a healthy body$ is given 
it, this principle had 'contributed all the more to the dissolu- 
tion of the Empire' 
157. Does this not appear to put in doubt 
the identification of the national cult, which Hegel was to 
advocate in the NRS, as a cult of the represented nation, indeed 
to put in question whether Hegel attached at all such value to 
representation as has been argued throughout this work? Not at 
all! For, in the first place, it is clear from the draft 
version that Hegel held, more nicely than the medical rhetoric 
of the definitive version would suggest, that only in 'one aspect"58, 
which he promised to, but did not explicitly, mention elsewhere, 
was 'representation of this kind' 
159, that is of the kind to be 
found in Saxony, Wuerttemberg and Hesse, if extended to the whole, 
inimical to its statehood. It could, that is to say, if a 
people were persuaded by their prince of the congruence of his 
interests with theirs, reinforce his capacity to withstand the 
160 
whole and cast it into the abyss of dissolution 
But this is not the prospect for representation which Hegel 
expected or hoped would be realised. For, secondly, as we saw 
in the fourth chapter 
161, the design of the representative 
system which he proposed was adapted to fragment constellations 
of deceptively mutual interest between princes and their peoples, 
which had in the past deluded the latter into support of the 
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former in many causes other than, but confused with, religious 
affairs. Hegel's system was yet to come. That which he berated, 
as is more clear from the perfect tense of the definitive version, 
where it is written that the principle of representation 'has 
contributed' to dissolution, than from the tenseless statement of 
the draft that 'representation of this kind has an aspect wherein 
it unites in itself a power which is capable of withstanding the 
State' 162, was extant in the unregenerate Diet. 
Thirdly, it is clear from the whole train of argument of this 
section of the VSN and its earlier draft that Hegel regarded 
representative government (and its generation of a strong sense 
of nationality having a focus in an agent of public decision - 
constituted anindividual or 'unum morale' 
163 by strict adherence 
to the idea of majority rule -) as the means, alternative and 
successive to religion, to the achievement of togetherness. 
Even in the inchoate notes of February - March 1801, this view 
is quite salient. There, in apposition to a remark that in 
Germany 'nationality' had been 'too unfit' 
164 to resist the 
destructive effects of the dissolution of religious unanimity, 
he had noted that there was no means available to the Emperor, 
for the purpose of preserving the whole, other than, in order to 
withstand the Protestant party, to make new imperial princes 
because he could not win a majority of votes. But since, 
because of the principle of itio in Hartes, Germany was in the 
grip of political strategies designed to avoid the compromises 
of a representative system of arrival at a majority view, this 
means of assuring himself. a majority against an unrepresentative 
165 
minority was in any case quite idle and vain Yet the 
apposition seems to signify an equation in Hegel's mind between 
'nationality', which we have argued to be the best candidate for 
designation as the object of the 'cult' of which Hegel was to 
340. 
write in the NRS (all religious sources of political cult being 
166 
exhausted), and the purpose of building a representative majority 
Though the Emperor is censured in these notes for being himself a 
member of a party-system inimical to majoritarian achievement of 
togetherness or nationality, Hegel seems to have been prepared to 
credit him at least with an intention to serve these ideals, that 
is, as Hegel put it in preparatory jottings of early 1801, to re- 
create the bonds of togetherness in 'heart, sentiment and trust' 
167, 
which religion was no longer competent to cultivate. 
4. Togetherness without regimentation 
If the view is to be sustained that Hegel did indeed see in 
representation a practice deserving to be regarded as an alter- 
religious cult fit to raise the state and its decisions to a power 
whose activity is that of an individual as able as a very God so to 
act that the autonomy of its deeds is not liable to corruption by 
the contingency of fortune rife in the society which it represents, 
and that the interest in which it acts seems so comprehensive 
that all its members feel united in the kind of symbiotic community 
argued in this study to be the ideal Hegel assimilated from the tra- 
dition extending from Althusius to Achenwall, then account must be 
taken of certain statements which seem to contradict that view. 
One which seems to assort ill with the idea of recreation of the bonds 
of heart-felt togetherness by means of representation, is that the 
168 bond so tied 'is an external one bearing on external things .,, ' 0 
This seems to militate against the view that Hegel regarded 
representation as a modern system of secular devotion wherein, . 
according to the VSN, majority is to serve instead of unanimity' 
and, according to the NRS, the nation or people is a substitute 
for God. It seems to go against the view that Hegel expected 
341. 
from represrnta+ive government a sense amor_r citizens of ron- 
1q 
structive commitment ' to the decisions of a majority whence 
emerges a cultic sensuc communis or common 'interests 
70, 
without 
which is inconceivable the maintenance of the ethical totality of 
the nation, that which appears as an awe-inspiring, though not 
therefore jealous 171 or annihilative 
172 God. It seems quite 
uncongenial to the view that it was in representative government 
that Hegel sought a 'majesty and divinity' 
173 inherent in the 
State, with which the individual can identify without abnegation 
of those private affairs which he believed ought not to be subject 
to minute intervention and regulation according to the will of 
the majority 
174. On the contrary, it appears to tell in favour 
of the view that in the 1801 cycles of the VSN at any rate, Hegel 
ultimately defined the function of representation in terms that 
do not seem at all to credit it with the capacity to engender the 
feelings of cultic or mystic communion once afforded by religion, 
nor to integrate in the spirit of a compound society the disposi- 
tions of men content to participate in a disintegral 'society 
without aspirations' 
175. In fact, it appears to tell in favour 
of the view that Hegel, howsoever he may have favoured a cult of 
representation, whose GoO is the nation, preferred that sich a 
God be relativel. 7 'undemanding' 
176. 
If these appearances could be proved to correspond to the 
intentions underlying Hegel's theory of representation, then they 
would subvert the argument of this work that in representation 
Hegel located the idea of a political practice which vouchsafes 
to the citizen the image, available to the ancient republican 
and the primitive German, of a communal activity participation 
in which amounts to membership of an immortal ethical whole, a 
divine individual with which the ordinary man can feel at one. 
Then indeed the State or the God would stand to the civilian 
342. 
devotees of their 'cult' as what Mansfield has ca]ied a 'Deist 
God' , one which sets 
in motion a merely clockwork I-ystem of 
177 
social relationships and affords the associated the advantage of 
escape from jealous government. But it is scarcely credible that 
Hegel, whom we have seen criticise at length the disappearance 
under the 'machine state' of all manner of affectionate relation- 
ships, should have meant by 'external bonds# a system of social 
integration by means of representation which leaves out of account 
the need for the impression upon the material of civil society of 
the form of a 'living together' that amounts to more than spatial 
coexistence in a mechanical universe. 
Great care must be taken, therefore, in the interpretation 
of those passages in the VSN where representation, 'the principle 
of modern states' 
178, is said to be a bond which impinges upon 
the individual not in his innermost being but in the utmost 
currency of personal relationship: civilians have only to 
contribute money, not to dedicate themselves, to the defence of 
the whole 
179. For no,, more of this than of the view expressed 
in the Philosophy of Right, that the demands made upon the individual 
by the modern state must be 'reduced to terms of money, the really 
existent and universal value of both things and services' 
180, 
should it be supposed that Hegel regarded the need of no deeper 
bond than this as if it signified 'an abstract, heartless and dead 
state of affairs' 
181. While the bonds which can be imposed upon 
the modern bourgeois - whose individualism Hegel, at the time of 
composing the VS! % no less than in 1821, believed should be allowed 
free self-determination, so that individuals should not have the 
freedom of their 'substantive activity' 
182 limited by any exaction 
of non-monetary dues - are repeatedly said to be 'external' 
183, 
'togetherness' is the objective sought. Legal bonds, unlike 
customary, are of course external in the sense that their being 
343. 
Lade intelligible involves their becominp' objective. But this 
need not preclude their being heart-felt. Even Hegel's some- 
times legalistic point of view in the Philosophy of Right never 
blinded him to the possibility that, in the form of law, the 
content of ethically serviceable customs remains valid. As for 
the view that the obligation to render money-payment is doubly 
more 'external' than the voluntary sacrifice of life, we may 
venture so far as to say that in 1801 Hegel believed implicitly 
just what he maintained expressly in 1821, that the payment of 
many taxes is characteristic of the deep-seated spirit of freedom 
and legality to be found in 'a constitutionally governed state' 
184. 
Hegel had the good sense to realise that, under modern circum- 
stances, 'sentiment' is not enough. To maintain the semblance 
of the togetherness that used to obtain, it is necessary to 
oblige it. But this does not alter the fact that Hegel had in 
view the preservation by law of the same togetherness that 
custom once assured. To become the same, as was argued in the 
first chapter, it is necessary to change in accordance with more 
rigorous circumstances than were originally encountered. 
For definitive evidence that Hegel held, on the whole, that 
representation can engender even in the bourgeois a spirit not 
only of willingness to pay taxes but also of commitment to the 
common ends to which they are means, a spirit akin to religious 
unanimity but less susceptible to exhaustion, we must turn to 
that part of the VSII concerning what is essential to a State 
that was written after the NRS. For that part is informed by 
the general argument of the NRS that it is essential to the 
modern State that the individual feel himself to be in a relation 
of 'genuine, living, non-servile oneness' with 'absolute ethical 
majesty' 
185 
not only out of 'fear, trust and obedience' 
186, 
but also through education or cultivation 
187 to the recognition 
344. 
of the divinity of the State. 
After having reiterated the inventory, first composed in 
February and March 1801, of matters not essential to sovereign 
statehood, Hegel recurred again in the winter of 1802 to the 
question of representation. 'Before we deal with his assertion 
of the necessity of representation to the modern State, it would 
be well to account for his denial of the necessity of many matters 
alleged by his juristic and other predecessors to be essential 
to any State. Hegel held it to be a matter, 'as regards theory, ... 
of the greater or lesser good and, as regards actuality, ... Of 
chance and caprice' 
188, 
whether the constitution be formally 
monarchical or democratic; whether the supreme public authority 
be hereditary or elective; whether civil rights be uniform through- 
out the citizen body or not; whether civil society tend towards 
equality or inequality; whether there be heterogeneous relations 
of provinces to the central authority; whether there be similarity 
of laws and legal procedures so far as strictly civil laws and the 
administration of justice are concerned; whether weights, 
measures and money be of invariant standard; whether legislation 
belongs to one particular power and how exactly electoral rights 
are allotted; how the kinds and jurisdictions of courts are 
organized; what is the form of administration in general; hdw 
tax liability is determined; and even whether there be great 
differences within the population arising from differences in 
manners, eduction, and language. 
The first two points 
189 
are straightforward contradictions 
of the tradition from Bodin to Pufendorf. Hegel here asserted 
the possibility of a status mixtus. The following ten points, 
especially the last 
190, 
convey Hegels indulgent attitude towards 
administrative and social plurality. It may surprise those who 
think of Hegel as a rationalist in regard to social and legal 
31f 9. 
relationships 
191 to find him not at'all critical of the fact 
that in pre-revolutionary France there was 'such a multirlicity 
of laris that, apart from Roman law which prevailed in several 
provinces, Burgundian law, Breton law etc. ruled elsewhere and 
almost every province, indeed alrost every city, had its own 
customary laiv'. Likewise, those who think of Hegel as a 
192 
sympathiser with the French Revolution may confess their 
perplexity 
193 
at his allowance that such multiplicity in civil 
and penal 
194 (hut not in constitutional) affairs is compatible 
with genuine statehood, as well as at his tolerant attitude 
towards social inequality 
195 
- surely not consistent with any 
supposed sympathy on his part with Rousseau - and the compounding 
effect thereon of fiscal inequity in, for example, the French 
ancien regime 
196. And, of course, those who regard him as a 
precursor of Weberian appreciation of bureau-technical political 
organization 
197 
may wonder why Hegel is positively indifferent 
198 
to standardisation and administrative homogeneity . 
Those, however, who have learnt to regard Hegel as a radical, 
in the sense of the word used throughout this study to signify one 
who requires of the laws and the constitution that they be 
adapted to their customary environment, but in such a way as to 
0 
be"animated by, and in turn to enact 
ý., that alone which is 
vital in it and to mortify that which is 'fatal', will not be 
surprised to find that, as is to be expected, Hegel denied that 
it is necessary to statehood that there should be identity among 
citizens in respect of culture, manners, customs, education and 
languaite 200 . For, as has 
been argued since the first chapter, 
public law need assure conformity only to customs whose content 
is of moment to the self-maintenance of the people. To those 
matters of opinion, such as education and language, which Hegel 
here placed in conjunction with the terms culture and custom, 
346. 
thus signifying that custom contains much whose legal articula- 
tion or clarification is immaterial to the maintenance of civil- 
ization, the state can afford to be indifferent. Only customs 
that affect matters of earnest require to be made the root of 
the integral state. Where this is assured, in modern states 
whose essence is that they are representative, civilization is 
well enough articulated to permit plurality in culture and manners 
to flourish. If law were to attempt to circumscribe the spont- 
aneity of everyday industry and activity, civilisation would 
founder as surely as if no attempt were made to adjust culture 
to the cause of civic enlightenment. 
So long as the constitution conserves that in diverse 
customary traditions which is conducive to 'living together' it 
need not fear the dangers to which custom of itself is susceptible, 
ie habituation and ultimate barbarization. This permissive 
attitude to customary plurality is not, it must be emphasised, in 
accord with what, in the IHRS, Hegel criticized as the 'shapeless- 
ness of cosmopolitanism' 
201. But it is equally far from the 
cultural nationalism of Herder, with whom Hegel has been, quite 
erroneously, supposed to have had an affinity, especially 
regarding the political importance of linguistic homogeneity 
202. 
As far as Hegel was concerned, difference as between classes and 
estates in manners, education and lanCuage are merely superficial 
causes of social aversion and inconsiderable criteria of social 
identification As such they are amerable to pragmatic 
203 
resolution of any centrifugal effect they may have not by legisla- 
tion, but simply through 'the spirit and art of public institu- 
tions' 204. Civilisation (Bildung), as far as Hegel was 
concerned, does not depend upon social and cultural homogeneity. 
On the contrary, cultural heterogeneity was asserted to be 'a 
necessary product as well as a necessary condition of the 
347. 
stability of modern States' 
20 Prmel's preference, then, was 
emphatically for social and cultural plurality. Social plurality 
can be contained as long as political identity is guaranteed. 
This, we can see again from the train of Hegel's argument in that 
part 
206 
written de novo in 1802/03, is assured in the modern 
State by representation. Representation is the condition of 
the promotion of a nationhood quite different from that which 
Herder so prized. Once more adverting to the impossibility 
that, in modern times, religion should perform the task at which 
it alone used to be competent, namely to give men, in spite of 
all their differences, a trusty point of concentricity from 
which they could 'gain confidence in and become sure of one 
another' 
207; 
once again arguing that religion had been histor- 
ically the conditio sine qua non for the foundation of other 
kinds of loneness or trust' 
208; 
maintaining, in accordance 
with the principle that the performance by anything, in the past, 
of a service to which it is no longer adequate is no ground for 
the justification and maintenance of it in the same function, 
either for the present or for the future, that identity in 
religion, and its defence by the State, is something with which 
modern States have found it possible to dispense; still insist- 
ing, that is to say, on the irrevocability of confessional, 
social and cultural differentiation and*on the consequent 
necessity that the State eschew jealous interference on behalf 
of any particular interest, religious or other, Hegel went on, 
as before, to advocate the capacity of representation alone to 
provide apolitical or legal identity fit to contain the 
differentiation of civil society and to impede the excesses of 
the 'subordinate systems of rights and privileges' 
209 in the 
pursuit of private interest. 
He did so in terms much more suggestive than those which 
348. 
he had used in the drafts of 1801, that the virtue of representa- 
tion is that it contributes to a political cult of the majesty. or 
divinity of the state on the strength of which social plurality 
may be permitted without ill-effect upon ethical life. For the 
concentration-of the public authority in one centre for debating 
and deciding upon political affairs of general concern 
210, 
a 
concentration which is distributary at the same time as it is 
unitary 
211, inspires the 'awe of the massest 
212 in virtue of 
which there exists, as once was the case thanks to religion, a 
'fixed centre' 
213. This alter-religious awe is due, Hegel's 
syntax makes it clear, to the representative body, for the 
personal majesty of the monarch is supposed to contribute an 
additional object of cultic devotion, his sacrosanctity: 'If 
this centre is secure on its own account in virtue of the awe 
of the masses, and is immutably sacrosanct in the person of a 
monarch ... then a public authority may without fear or jealousy 
freely hand over to subordinate systems and bodies a great part 
of the relationships arising in society and their maintenance 
according to the laws' 
214. 
As we saw in chapter three, the conception of representation 
as integration, meaning the binding together with bonds of mutual 
trust of the hearts of individual burghers so that they should 
not see in the State a potential threat to their interests but 
regard it as their commonwealth, entails the idea that the State 
must foreswear involvement in the abstract or immediate activity 
of civil society. Unless it do so, there can be no trust but 
only suspicion that one immediate interest will be served by the 
State at the expense of another. Hegel added in 1802/3, as a 
fresh statement of general principle, to that part of the section 
under discussion most of which was written in 1801, that only if 
government refrain from excessive intervention in civil life can 
-ý' 9" 
it depend nn respect for the autonomy of th- Political, for 14-r- 
independence of particular interest and so, Jn the event of 
danger to the sovereign, on the bur: per's sense of his duty to 
subordinate his to the common interest. If government ordin, -, rily 
demands more than what everyone can see is indispensable for the 
whole, resentment of the excess becomes resentment of what is 
essential 
215. If everything on which the public authority can 
count is under its even control, it can count on nothing else 
216. 
It cannot rely on the 'free devotion' 
217 
of the people. On the 
other hand, where there is such a spirit of awe and devotion, 
where the people trusts the government, the government may in turn 
trust the people. Where custom conducive to ethical wholeness 
is enacted and the system thus shaped commands the cultic 
enthusiasm of the people, the economic system may be left to its 
own internal devices, though government may exercise powers of 
marginal intervention to ensure that imbalance does not enter 
218 
the system 
An inward security from the 'pressure of individuals, 
219 is 
afforded the State by the awe felt by citizens who, insofar as 
their habitual activity is not so trammeled by state regulation 
that they do not know at all what action is, know at least how 
to appreciate the ethical activity of the whole as if it were n 
work of art, whose execution, though they are not directly 
involved in it, they can, from their own experience of free 
activity, look upon with enjoyment 
220 
as well as awe. Given 
this security, a public authority may without fear or jealousy 
entrust to civil society the maintenance of its own orderly 
221 
relationships, 'according to the laws' , to be sure, but not 
by restrictive reference to their provisions. These laws Hegel 
described as nothing less than a 'hallowed tradition (proceeding) 
directly from custom itself' 
222 
while of the free activity of the 
3 50. 
citizens he said it is 'inherently sacrosanct' 
223 
and that to 
facilitate and protect it is the most sacred duty of government. 
Hegel would have freedom to administer the internal affairs 
of civil society granted to the citizens and their corporations 
because, in his view, there arises from the participation of the 
individual will in public affairs of an inferior kind, such as 
the administration of justice, education and support of the poor, 
what he called-. 'free and self-respecting self-awareness' 
224, 
a 
feeling among the people of being treated 'with trust and free- 
dom' 225 without which a devout attitude on their part to the 
State, and their reciprocation of its trust in them, is not to be 
expected. The people will trust the State, which is to say that 
they will allow themselves to be represented and so refrain from 
the ambition importunately to determine its course of action in 
advance, or to participate directly in decision-making, -only if 
the State in turn refrains from the jealous interference, which 
excites that ambition, in abstract or not universally touching 
affairs, with which representative government ought to have 
nothing to do. 
5. Conclusion: Civilisation and the modernity of the old model 
It is because representative government has only to impress 
upon a multitude the form of a people that Hegel insisted that 
each 'estate, city, town, commune etc. can itself enjoy freedom 
to do and to execute what lies within its area' 
226,. It is not 
so that a multitude may inhabit the undemanding society argued 
for example by Mansfield (who illegitimately enlists Hegel's 
evaluation of the role of the mediaeval germanic idea of the 
right of the corporation to self=government in support of his 
idea of representation as the basis of passive- government 
227) 
351. 
to be alone capable of representation. Hegel did indeed build 
into his theory of representation the germanic idea of corporate 
freedom. But he did so with a view to ensuring that members of 
civil society should enjoy in their own spheres the exercise of 
their own autonomous vitality so that, on the one hand, they 
might underttand that government in its sphere likewise needs, 
if it is to act effectively, a corresponding autonomy of its own; 
and that, on the other, since citizens need not fear partisan 
intervention, they might regard the actions of the State as if 
they were their own. A State in which corporate self-government 
is not allowed cannot hope either for this understanding or for 
this sense of identification. Its citizens must resent the fact 
that they are deprived of opportunities for independent action, 
and become impatient with the State's independent action even in 
essential matters 
228. And they must doubt the impartiality of 
the State which provides services, such as poor relief and 
229 
education, that benefit others rather or more than themselves 
The kind of State which does not refrain from jealous inter- 
vention in the abstract affairs of civil society, but enacts 
legislation whose greater cost to some and greater benefit to 
others incites invidious calculations corrosive of the hearty 
sense of belonging to a people, Hegel called a machine-state. 
It is well known that Hegel had Fichte in mind as the chief 
theoretical exponent of the view, which, as we have seen, occurs 
also in the work of Kant 
X30, that the State is, as Hegel put it, 
a 'machine with a single spring which imparts movement to all the 
rest of the infinite wheelwork' 
231. When he inveighed against 
the 'pedantic craving to determine every detail, the illiberal 
jealousy of any arrangement whereby an estate, a corporation etc. 
adjusts and manages its own affairs' 
232 
and against their 
usurpation by a 'mechanical hierarchy, highly intellectual and 
352. 
devoted to noble ends' 
233, Hegel clearly had in mind his 
criticisms in the DS and NRS of Fichte's 'community under the 
dominion of intellect' 
234 in which 'there is no doing or stirring 
that is not bound to be subject to some law, subject to direct 
supervision' 
235 
and from which is utterly eradicated the 'faith 
and constancy' which Fichte would have replaced by the compulsion 
of all under the general will 
236. Fichte had been criticised 
for his failure to provide for the mediation of the individual 
and the general will through 'majesty, 
237, the connotations of 
which, as we have seen at length, include the idea of representa- 
tion. He had been attacked for conceiving the State as a 
machine as opposed to an 'organization' 
238. Again, as we have 
seen from various passages in the VSN 
239, this term, antonymous 
toImachine-state', was either identified with the institution 
of representation or, in that it was held to be antithetical 
240 
to the barbarous condition of 'multitudineity' as opposed to 
peoplehood, related to the purpose of representation, which is 
to cultivate enthusiasm for the system of law upon which the 
existence of a people depends. 
Hegel was not, however, intent upon criticising Fichte upon 
merely idealistic grounds for extolling a political culture in 
which the values of a representative system, such as trust, and 
its objectives, namely the mobilisation of peoplehood by means 
of its cult, have no place. On the contrary, he was content 
with nothing less than to show not only that the representative 
State is more congenial to its members than the bureaucratic or 
police State, but also that it deserves tobe regarded as more 
modern, efficient and decisive than the State whose principle of 
universal mechanism Fichte, as well as other spokesmen of such 
States, fancifully supposed gives it the advantage in all these 
respects. We shall shortly see why, in a related. argument, 
353,. 
Hegel made the remarkable claim that States which, according to 
his lights, have reneged on the principle of representation, such 
as revolutionary France and Prussia, are in this respect reaction- 
ary against the direction of modern development. In advance of 
this, it is necessary to give an account of the polemical context 
in which he began to elaborate his challenge to the view, which 
was, in his time no less than it was till of late in our own, 
quite conventional, that the bureaucratic State is much better 
adapted for the pursuit of modernisation than that State which, 
in Hegel's words, leaves much of the work of social management 
to 'native impulsd' 
241. 
It must not be supposed that Hegel's prohibition of state 
intervention in the alleviation of social need is due to a back- 
woodsman's hostility to the progress of measures of equitable 
social reform. Rather it stems from a preference that such 
progress should have as its cause the ethical 'potency' of love 
and compassion, rather than the merely coercive power of 
'intellectual' compulsion. Where that is the case, as has been 
argued throughout this work, there is held to exist the customary'- 
vitality without which the ethical activity of the State cannot 
be well-founded. It stems from a belief that to pretend to be 
representative yet to depend upon coercion is simply to maintain 
a contradiction that can be sustained only by the plea that the 
principal is a principle to which the present must be compelled 
to convert because it is inherently and ever unregenerate. This 
is clearly the exoteric meaning of Hegel's dissent from what he 
identified, as we have seen 
242, 
as the reason for Fichte's 
prejudice in favour of coercion. In the words of the DS, 'one 
finds (in Fichte's construction of the relationship between 
Nature and. Ego) always the same antithesis between a limited 
present and an infinity extraneous to it' 
243. An unrepresentative 
354. 
State will always find cause to deny that the present is yet as 
worthy of representation as the purely absent. A representative 
State must, on the other hand, attempt to establish a harmony 
between the present and the absent. 
It is impossible to attribute to a coercive State either the 
character of modernity or the inclination to fulfill it. 
Although Hegel did not criticise Fichte expressly in terms of 
the problem of modernization, it may be admitted that to transfer 
such terms from what we shall shortly see to be their proper 
context, the question of the durability of States which have 
repudiated the feudal bequest to the modern State, namely the 
principle of representation, serves well the purpose of specify- 
ing what it was in Fichte's idea of state activity that Hegel 
considered to be spurious and derogatory to the principle of a 
representative system. 
As in the VSN 244, so in the NRS, written shortly before the 
final phase of composition of their first half, Hegel denied that 
the machine-state can readily keep itself, as it were, in 
perpetual motion. The manner in which he did so again throws 
into relief his belief that the majoritarian decisions of a 
public authority, consisting of monarch and estates, between 
which maiestas is distrituted as within the 'abiding fixed centre' 
245 
of a durable and stable modern State, alone conduce to the 
decisive and effective expression of the will of a people, while 
attempts to arrive at a satisfactory expression of the general 
will in which, except in the authoritarian sense of representation 
to which Fichte's metaphysics lends itself, representation plays 
no part, so that the interests of the 'limited present' are left 
out of account, must end in political ossification. 
The Fichtean variant of the machine-state, wherein the 
coercive and supervisory administration is supposed to be one 
355. 
'representative' of the general will, while an 'Ephorate' consists 
of 'other representatives' 
246, is designed so that the 'supreme 
will' of the former, under constraint from the latter, will 
converge with the general will. But in Hegel's view this 
mechanical arrangement, whereby a command system (characterized 
as a descending pyramid) is opposed by a system of judicial and 
constitutional review (an ascending pyramid), the whole being 
supposed to be efficient in the mobilisation of the general will, 
can only give rise to a stalemate: 'such a perpetuum mobile ... 
will, instead of moving, settle at once into complete equilibrium 
and become a complete perpetuum guietum' 
247. Fichte's advocacy 
of a circle of equal and opposite legislative forces, in 
preference to the internally conditioned and self-limiting centre 
of representative government whose will is absolutely sovereign 
while comparatively liberal, is likened by Hegel to'the institu- 
tion in revolutionary France of various forms of 'rival and 
paralysing legislative force, 
248, invested in bodies which are 
no more representative, for all these wills are private parading 
as general 
249, than the succession of revolutionary governments. 
Turning now to that part of the VSN, as far as is known 
written largely de novo 
250, 
after the mechanical business of 
, tidying up the sections on military power, finances and territory 
251 
in the winter of 1802/03, we will find that this section on 
Legal Organization 
252 
owes much to Hegel's abiding concern to 
criticise the Fichtean recommendation of a political immobilism, 
the relief of which could readily be found in the liberation of 
the will of the majority from the constraints of private wills 
passing themselves off as constitutional supervisors of govern- 
mental arbitrariness. For, with reference to Germany, Hegel 
criticised, the system whereby Imperial law depended for its 
application upon judicial authorities which were not only incapable 
356. 
of enforcing their decisions, if they got so far as to reach 
them 253, but also obversely, had the power, because constitu- 
tional as well as private rights and obligations were subject 
to their judgment 
254, to hinder the sovereign authority of the 
State and so to paralyse the conversion of the theoretical into 
the real prevalence of the State 
255. 
Thanks to what Hegel called the 'barren history' 
256 
of the 
asymptotic approach towards the conversion of general regulations, 
whose effective application is the condition without which it is 
not possible to speak of the existence of the State 
257, into 
particular executions, Germany remained a State in theory only, 
a Gedankenstaat. This 'barren history' is obviously the cousin 
of 'bad infinity' in Fichte's metaphysics and, in his, politics, 
dead equilibrium 
258. And 'Gedankenstaat' was evidently not 
just a name for contemporary Germany, whose members' territorial 
authority profited from the semblance of its derivation from a 
putative imperium, which can in turn exact no genuine loyalty, 
but for any State where political authority is subject to 
'forensic treatment' 
2590 Thus Hegel, in his draft of a small 
part of the section of the VSN now under discussion, that part 
whose chief significance is that he took the trouble in 1802/03 
to rewrite it word for word as an aid to editorial splicing of 
the first and second halves of the definitive text 
260, 
arraigned 
revolutionary France on the same charge. as that which he brought 
against that aspect of the German political system which inhibited 
the realisation of its potential for modernity. 
Having argued, as we have already seen from another small 
fragmentary draft of this section 
261, that 'the administration 
of justice goes quite beyond itself should State authority become 
its object, because in this manner what is actually only a part 
of State authority is placed over the whole' 
262 
and is made the 
357. 
capricious arbiter of the question whether or not the whole 
should be subordinated to the parts, Hegel went on, though he 
struck this remark out, perhaps as an idea which in 1801 he was 
not yet ready to pursue, to point out that it was 'well-known 
that the - otherwise quite distinct - idea of a juri constitutionel 
in France, which has appeared in various forms as senat 
conservateur, has some similarity with the imperial courts ..., 
263. 
That similarity consisted in their like incapacity, for all their 
appeal to advocates of a mechanical system of checks and balances, 
to regulate the operation of the jealous State, to serve as a 
means to the more than superficial resolution of the conflicts 
of parts of a people with one another and with the whole. 
For all its paraphernalia of supervisors and supervisors of 
supervisors, the machine-state cannot attract the devotion of its 
subjects, for its administrative and judicial structures afford 
them no sense of positive relationship with the whole: the former 
does instead of the citizen what he could do himself, while the 
latter would not be of such account if it were not necessary to 
redress the sense of opposition between the individual will and 
the general 
264 
occasioned by the coercive role of the adminis- 
trators of the general will. Just this. want of a positive 
relationship of the individual to the whole, available to him whom 
independent activity affords a sense of sympathetic affinity with 
the independent activity of the State, so that its deeds appear 
as if they were his own, was what afflicted the political systems 
of France and Prussia. 
In France 'tremendous political experiments' had partly 
realized the political theories propounded by 'would-be philos- 
ophers and teachers of the rights of man', such as Rousseau and 
Fichte 265, and immediate state activity had so eroded the self- 
respect of its citizens as to engender a political culture of 
358. 
passion and passivity, of 'dullness, baseness (continually lapsing 
into shamelessness) and poverty' 
266. The sterility of 
scientific and artistic life in Prussia already bore witness to 
the consequences of the excessive political regulation of civil 
society. To look beyond the superficial appearance there of 
political strength impressed by one man is to see, Hegel argued, 
that the Prussian State lacks the infinite strength afforded by 
the 'all. powerful, invincible spirit' of a 'free and unregimented 
people' 
267. The strength, efficiency and decisiveness of 
Prussia's novel political machinery was 'ephemeral, 
268. It 
was likewise in the case of revolutionary France. Hegel doubted 
whether the machine-state could afford the basis for enduring 
political organization. He predicted that the same dull and 
spiritless life would come to pass in France as in Prussia, if the 
high pitch of its 'pedantry in domination' could be maintained 
269. 
The implication was that neither France nor Prussia, for all 
their pretentious appearance, were modern States at all; For the 
lasting stability of the modern : State depends on a plurality of 
centres of social autonomy and this they had attempted to eradi- 
cate. 
This is probably the most remarkable view that it is possible 
to find in the whole corpus of Hegel's political thought, not 
least for the fact that it confounds those who are accustomed to 
regard Hegel as, in his youth, a revolutionary idealist or, in 
his maturity, a reactionary conformist to the Prussian political 
system, and who tend to allow these monochromatic images to 
invade other periods of his thought than those from which they 
supposedly originate. Even though the best of those who attend 
to Hegel's voice as a friend of the French Revolution acknowledge 
that he denied that it achieved anything durable in institutional 
terms.. 270, though they draw evidence for this only from Hegel's 
359. 
mature works, it nest confound them. For in the VSN, Hegel 
went so far as to argue that revolutionary France, in virtue of 
its departure, notwithstanding the rhetoric of its ideologues, 
from the principles of representative government - that it be 
lawful rather than capricious and arbitrary, independent rather 
than subject to mandatory instruction, structurally 'gracious' 
rather than 'jealous', and so tolerant of an ideologically and 
socially plural society 
271 
- was reactionary in respect of the 
proper trend of modernity. With this trend the political system 
of Austria was, structurally rather than superficially, in genuine 
accord. 
Hegel held France to be reactionary against representation 
in almost the same measure as Prussia, whose procedure from the 
'bourgeois principle' belied its monarch's posturing as the 
'First Servant' of his people and showed him to be, as it were, 
the 'biggest bourgeois' among them 
272. In France and Prussia 
alike the state had become an instrument of preferential social 
intervention: in the former the Third Estate, and in the latter 
the King, had attempted to become everything. 
Revolutionary Frenchmen were portrayed by Hegel as authors 
of dangerous experiments in morals and religion whose results, at 
the least, are very ambiguous 
273 
and not at all the calculable 
enterprises that their protagonists suppose. Though-Hegel was 
clearly out of sympathy with the 'harsh arrangements' in France 
whereby between 1614 and 1789 representation went by the board 
and, except in Richelieu's time, the preeminence of the personal 
over the disinterested capacity of the nobility attained a- 
'shocking' degree of intensity, he discredited the Revolution 
for its failure to make a gradual transition to more satisfactory 
arrangements 
274. The misfortune of France consisted in the loss 
of its true character thanks to the 'complete disintegration of 
360. 
the feudal system' 
275. It was insofar as France had suffered, 
and continued to suffer, degeneration in respect of the essence 
of the modern State, the representative system inherited from 
the feudal constitution 
276, that it lacked a modern constitution, 
though it continued, unlike Germany, to be a State 
277. It was 
not among the 'European States that have not experienced a 
revolution in modern times' 
278 
and so was not a State that was, 
as, according to Hegel, those States were where revolution had 
not interfered with or reversed the conversion of the feudal 
system into a State, more or less organized on the 'modern model' 
279. 
The 'old feudal system' had been able to become stately 
280 in 
countries where the nobility had been permanently and effectively 
depressed so that their possession of estates might not become a 
ground of public station but, in the words of the NRS, be 'kept 
to one side' 
281 Wherever revolution had undermined the 
strengths of the feudal constitution, there remained no possible 
obstacle to a more socially widespread diffusion of possessive 
particularism. 
France was not organized on the modern model, it was not 
among the modern States that subsist by'a representative system 
of feudal provenance. For its successive constitutions had 
renounced the triadic structure of the Estates General and, by 
allowing the bourgeoisie to pervade the representative body rather 
than be confined to separate representation in a Third Estate, a 
confinement which is essential to Hegel's concept of a represent- 
ative system with whose actions all estates can identify 
282, had 
practically given utter preference to the interests of the 
bourgeoisie over those of the First and Second Estates. It may 
seem highly idiosyncratic to those who are accustomed to equate 
modernisation not with the civilisation or cultivation of worthy 
customary roots, but with their eradication, to withhold the 
361. 
accolade of modernity from the world historical event which seems 
above all to exemplify the principle of eradicative perfection. 
But Hegel, despite his abiding awareness of the inspirational 
significance of the French Revolution, its importance, in other 
than institutional terms, as a manifestation of the inadequacy 
of a political preference, in the face of environmental stresses, 
for a merely 'positive' posture, one that equates the maintenance 
of identity with the attempt to 'stay put', clearly did not 
believe that its mythos of national representation 
283 
was 
sufficiently considerate of the customary independence of the 
individual and the subnational groups to which he belongs, or 
sufficiently observant of the principle of political exchange, 
and careful of the sense of the virtuous responsibility for and the 
idea of commitment to the deeds of the community which that 
principle engenders, to furnish the French people with enduring 
institutions sustained by a well-disposed political culture. 
In this respect, it makes great sense to doubt whether France, 
and in general any 'machine-state' which neglects to civilise 
or to cultivate its 'roots', is organised on a 'modern model' 
or has the capacity to make the changes which it proposes endure 
in the hearts of men. For such a State lacks in its very centre 
the most important characteristic inherited from the feudal 
system, namely, an internal constraint upon the tendency of any 
majority to pursue its interests to the detriment of others not 
in agreement with it. Nor could the provision of a mechanical 
system of external constraints, for example, the means of a 
constitutional-court (juri constitutionel) 
284, 
or, in general, 
by a separation of powers 
285 be held to furnish the appropriate 
conditions for the limitation of state activity. For the effect 
of such a system could be to paralyse the majority rather than to 
enable it to act effectively in the pursuit of ends in which all 
362. 
citizens can feel themselves to have an interest. 
The decisiveness in the public interest which Hegel believed 
to be peculiar to States organised on the 'modern model', that 
of a political system within which power is distributed among 
authorities having the same centre, as opposed to one in which 
immobilism is all but guaranteed by the dispersal of authority 
among eccentric powers, is what distinguishes those States which 
had been able to civilise the feudal practice of representation. 
Only those States were modern which had relied upon traditional 
mixtures of maiestas in order to contain the centrifugal forces 
of political particularism, and to prevent the force of 'necessity', 
which Hegel identified with the prevalence of public law, from 
emasculation by the growing pressure of 'chance', which he 
regarded as the characteristic of civil society that Praxis had, 
through insistence upon the right to subject political authority 
to forensic treatment, elevated to the status of a 'political 
principle' 
286. Only those could claim to be able to effect 
the erection of a durable foundation for civilised ethical life 
which were constituted upon the basis, inherent in representation, 
of regard for the cultivation of the independence of the customary 
life of quotidien practical effort and industry, as well as for 
its enlightenment by the torch of law. 
It is in the section on the power of the estates 
287, in 
tandem with that on religion 
288 
which precedes it, that is to be 
found Hegel's theory of representation in its most exoteric form. 
Here is to be found the definitive point of departure, in 1801, 
and return, in 1802-1803, of the whole of the VSN. Here is 
their thematic as well as their editorial axis. Here we may 
discover a summary statement of most of the arguments with whose 
archaeology we have been occupied throughout this study. 
289 
In these. sections, Hegel argued most emphatically that in 
363. 
the modern world of the bourgeoisie, togetherness or the existence 
of a people as the ethical totality which it used to be, must 
depend on the intelligible bonds of law rather than the inartic- 
ulate threads of custom and manners 
290, 
whose 'potencies' it is 
nevertheless the business of law to cultivate and civilise. His 
view was that the inwardness and want of articulation of pre- 
modern ties of mutual obligation rendered them inadequate to 
hinder the disintegrative effects of incipient possessive parti- 
cularism 
291. He believed, further, that only genius, a quality 
exhibited in the modern world by men of power, whose force must 
not, however, be alien or foreign to the customary material to 
which it seeks to impart the form of law, is fit to bring law to 
birth 292. He attributed to the consolidation by the Peace of 
Westphalia of the power of the opponents of the Emperor 
293 the 
fact that while their barbarisation of the Empire was quite legal, 
according to its foreign sanction, they were enabled to act as 
criminals 
294. He held that only Austria's feudal resources had 
so far saved the Empire from the emasculation of its potential 
for statehood by the long standing private right of primogeniture 
in Electoral dynasties, the original cause of territorial con- 
solidation and of the infiltration by foreigners of the membership 
of the Empire 
295. He was convinced that, just as the feudal 
system had, in most of Europe, been a fit basis for the emergence 
of the modern State 
296, 
so it could have been in Germany save 
for the delivery of the public interest out of the hands of a 
potential majority and into the forensic sphere of private right 
297. 
For he argued that Germany's situation was originally no less 
favourable to the development of the State than that of France, 
Spain or England, and that it was among the German people that 
arose the foundation of European-States, namely the spirit of 
trust 298 in which Hegel discerned the larval material out of 
364. 
which might be spun something like the virtuous cloth, woven 
from habitable and intelligible texts, of public relationships 
in ancient Greece, where political community had coexisted with 
social difference thanks to the articulation in the very soul of 
the citizen of the image of the State's activity as the immortal 
embodiment of his own. While Hegel was aware that the warping 
of the bourgeois spirit had everywhere eroded this foundation, 
he believed that it had prepared another, which consisted in the 
fact that the wish of the bourgeois to concentrate upon his own 
affairs had at least one beneficial effect 
299, 
on which modern or 
formal as opposed to primitive or trustful representation depends, 
that there is no presumption on the part of the individual 
intemperately to intrude his presence upon the doing by the whole 
of its own business, but a readiness, akin to'that of the Greeks, 
to mind his own and to abide by the terms of political exchange. 
Hegel doubtless felt that it was a matter of history, about 
which it would be pointless to complain, that a representative 
system was substantially but not formally extant in primitive 
Germany 300 and that the practice of representation had therefore 
evolved without deliberate design and hence with no assurance 
that the concentration in Monarch and Estates of absolute yet 
limited authority 
301 
could, in the face of casual events, resist 
abuse of the terms of political exchange. But this is not to 
say that he did not hope that the maintenance by the princes of 
the spurious appearance of identity between theirs and, the 
interests of their people, so long manipulated, to the end of 
preventing the erection of a geniune State-power,. in the name of 
the drive of the 'German character' for freedom'302, might be 
about to succumb to the necessary principle of the unity of the 
State. For he believed that there had emerged, thanks to the 
religious divisions which the princes had wittingly exploited,. 
365. 
--T% 
but whose consequences were ultimately beyond their control, a 
distinction between the peoples as merely subject to their princes 
and the people, insofar as they came to be represented on their 
own account, as participants with the monarch in the joint exercise 
of Herrschaft 
303. 
Hegel's view was that the system of representation of which 
this distinction is characteristic, and which alone deserves to 
be called modern, whereas that is merely novel which has not a 
durable foundation in customs civilised by the form of law, had 
a capacity lacking in political systems which had dispensed with 
the trusty principle of sovereignty at once distributed and 
concentrated, to repress the pretensions of the powers of part- 
icularity. In Austria and England in particular, the represent- 
ative system had ensured that none could claim effectively to be, 
entirely in their personal capacity, indistinguishable from their 
estates and thus to have interests identical with their subjects, 
who would if that were allowed be unworthy of representation 
304. 
There, as not in Germany as a whole, the aristocracy had been kept 
entirely in a relation to the authority of the State of utter 
dependence and so had been adapted to military and civil service 
305. 
Such States as these, in whose 'firm, universal structure of 
civilization' 
306, in whose gracious and concentric sovereignty 
is inherent durable modernity, as opposed to the high-pitched and 
energetic but doubtfully persistent and merely ephemeral novelty 
of France and Prussia, 
307, 
were regarded by Hegel as exhibitions 
of the model for the kind of political organisation which Germany 
as a whole must adopt in order to escape from the condition of 
barbarity to which the antagonists of its imperium had brought' 
its people. Before we consider the question whether he really 
believed in the possibility of the ultimate modernisation of 
Germany, by which he clearly meant nothing other than its 
366. 
civilisation (Bildung), the making whole of its people through 
law, it is worthwhile to quote in extenso what is probably the 
most important paragraph in the VSN. For it expresses pithily 
most of the points itemised above. Besides, it may give an 
impression, to any reader who is unaware of the implication in 
the idea of the objective necessity of laws of history, that 
there is always available an opportunity for the realisation of 
the need for self-given laws, that Hegel was ultimately uncertain 
whether Germany was capable of political modernisation. In this 
passage it is written that 'Representation is so deeply inter- 
woven with the essence of the feudal constitution, in its develop- 
ment side by side with the rise of the bourgeois, that we may 
call it the silliest of notionsito suppose it an invention of 
the most recent times. By the transformation of free men into 
masters, the feudal constitution, i. e. in modern countries a 
State, has been developed in which each individual no longer has 
a direct voice himself in any national affair; on the contrary, 
all obey a whole founded by themselves, i. e. a State and its 
branches and particularisations (the laws), an abiding, fixed 
centre to which each individual has a mediate relation derived 
from representation. All modern States subsist by representa- 
tion and its degeneration alone, i. e. the loss of its true essence, 
had destroyed France's constitution, though not France as a State. 
It came out of Germany; but there is a higher law that the 
people from which the world receives a new universal impulse 
perishes in the end before all the others, while its principle, 
though not itself, persists, 
308. 
This germinal statement of Hegel's-philosophy of history, 
according to which Spirit progressively discards its passionate 
'instruments, by'-definition ineligible to be regarded as if they 
had the cognitive or pragmatic competence of themselves to devise, 
367. 
much less preserve, the principles of their social and political 
organisation, might appear to suggest that Hegel doubted whether 
the German people had any future at all. It might seem that 
when Hegel wrote that though representation arose from the German 
forests but did not exist there in the constituted form which it 
began to take under the feudal system, a system whose beginning 
depended upon the diluvian departure of the Germanic nation from 
the dwelling-place which contained them as a people, and pre- 
supposed that its founders had for ever run their course as a 
people 
309, he meant that they could never be a nation once again. 
But suppose that, as early as 1801, Hegel regarded law as the 
objective form in which Spirit would condescend to take shape, so 
as to give individuality to a multitude not of itself fit to 
assume identity as an ethical totality. Suppose that he thought 
of law as the expression of an identity whose capacity for auto- 
nomous action, superior but not alien to mortal agency 
310, 
needs 
to be postulated in order to make good the want of ordinary men, 
who are indecisive so long as they do not put their trust in such 
a Being 
311, 
of the capacity to share an intention with others 
and to perform it as one. In that case, it need not be supposed 
that Hegel thought that there was no hope for Germany as a 
national political entity. Rather, he thought that there is 
hope for a people which could once live together upon the basis 
of customs and common interests that gave their community the 
'likeness of a State' 
312, 
only if it translate its valuable 
customs into laws. The custom of 'representation' based upon 
familial trust 
313, 
which arose without formal institution 
314 in 
the forests of Germany would have to be enacted or constituted as 
a system according to which no socially privileged group or 
individual has immediate or advantageous access to the use in 
its own interests of the power of the public authority 
315, 
368. 
This system of integrative mediation 
316 between the public 
authority and individuals is, of course, a system of represent- 
ation properly so-called. Its constitution is alone fit to 
contain the avid pursuit of self-interest 
317 
and to ensure that 
its laws are so made as to be above the reproach that private 
interest has invaded that concentric whole 
318 
which no indivi- 
dual can feel himself obliged to obey if he cannot regard it as 
if it were founded by himself, as if it were the product of his 
own activity 
319. The political culture which reinforces the 
authority of the constitution and laws must, to the end that he 
regard them thus, involve a cult 
320 
of representation, a system 
of devotion to a 'God' that is neither arbitrary nor partial to 
the present interests of any supplicant, neither jealous nor 
hostile to the autonomy of any subject 
321, 
a celebration in 
sensible and intelligible terms of an image of commonwealth and 
common activity, congenial to rather than repressive 
322 
of the 
powers of men of all stations. Such a cult. (whose object is to 
promote the cause of a harmonious political relationship among 
men different in their social capacities, to advance civilisation 
323 
in the face of the tendency of the powers of particularity to 
disorganise the integrity of the whole and to barbarise 
324 the 
life of custom, making of it a habit in which none can dwell but 




self-seekers) we encountered earlier in the guise of a 'new 
mythology', which, by inhibiting intemperate 
327 
pretensions to 
invade the affairs of the whole with the muddles 
328 
of private 
business, -discourages any inclination on the part of individuals 
or groups to have a direct voice in any national affair. This 
is the very aspiration which, it was argued above, Hegel denied 
to have been effectively suppressed by the mythos of the French 
Revolution 329, the conceited pretence of which to be able to 
369" 
invent a new political world regardless of the customs of the 
old encouraged men to suppose that they may fashion that world 
in*their own image and according to their own ends, in contempt 
of the custom-built law that might present them the image of that 
alone which has the cognitive and pragmatic competence to become 
what it intends to remain. 
Though the German people had perished as a customary entity, 
it might yet live again as a legal community. It was the source 
of the political principle of modern freedom. It had only itself 
to revert to that source. For all the modish appearance and the 
iconoclastic style of the French Revolution, it could not supply 
that principle, anymore than could Prussia. 
The machine-state is not organised on the modern model. 
The kind of State which Hegel did deem to be the vehicle of 
political modernity was instantiated in 'all the European States 
that have not experienced a revolution in recent times'33° and 
have by that token preserved the system of representation which 
is the 'system of all modern European States' 
331. Among such 
QtatPq should clearly be included England and Austria. Of these 
two States, despite anomalies in their, systems of representation, 
Hegel clearly believed that they had the capacity to accommodate 
the diversity of culture and manners which he held to be a 
'necessary condition of the stability of modern States' 
332. 
If Germany as a whole was to become a modern State, a possibility 
not precluded by the 'disparate multiplicity' prevailing there in 
matters of civil laws, administration of justice, imposition and 
collection of taxes etc., language, customs, education and 
religion 
333, it would have to develop for itself, and find in 
it a support for itself, the principle of representation which 
it had given to the rest of the world but had hitherto, because 
of the ascendancy of vassals against the feudal lordship of the 
370. 
Emperor, failed to civilise, succumbing instead to the barbaric 
fate of possessive particularism. To this end the best means 
available to the German people would be to rally to the standard 
of Austria and to repudiate the new politics, the politics of 
motion without measure of Prussia and revolutionary France alike. 
There is, therefore, not at all present in Hegel's pre- 
systematic writings what Hans Maier has ventured to call a 'logic 
in his (Hegel's) train of thought' which 'ought' to have led 
Hegel to give the palm to the territorial Machtstaat 
334. Maier's 
admission that it does not and that Hegel was constantly drawn in 
the opposite direction should give pause to those who glibly 
suppose that by political modernity Hegel meant a condition, or 
progress towards a condition, where customs which serve to aid 
men to live together in trust, love and joy, as an ethical totality 
rather than in an atomized heap are eradicated in favour of 
mechanical efficiency in the pursuit by the State of ends which 
are not its business. For by modernity Hegel meant nothing but 
the eternal process of the civilisation of custom, in other than 
matters of opinion, by law, wherein custom does not cease to be 
such but is enabled, if life remains in it, to persist under 
conditions that would otherwise be adverse to it. Its vitality 
is not thereby taken away from it. Rather continued life is 
invested in it 
335. That polity is not modern, according to 
Hegel's lights, which constructs 'a legal system with a novel 
content' 
336. Modernity, rather than being held to consist in 
change from one determination to an utterly other, is taken to 
be identical with the capacity of any civilised people to resist 
its tendency to decline. The power of a constitution, 
strengthened by the dedication of the people to it on account of 
the inherence in it of their customs, to put a term to the 
principle of decadence with which time is instinct, is that which 
371. 
qualifies a political system to be called modern, or fit to 
endure by its constant adaptation to and adjustment of the 
variety of custom in time. We have seen at length that the 
virtue of representative government is that it provides a medium 
of political exchange through which it is possible, given that 
the practical subjectivity of the individual in his quotidien 
activity is on the whole afforded scope to develop in the 
customary or spontaneous form appropriate to it, that whatever 
action the State may take besides should be felt by the individual 
as if it were his own deed, for which he is responsible and to 
which he is committed come what may. It is this virtue, that 
it is best designed to engage the commitment of the modern denizen 
of civil society to the state, that led Hegel to the conclusion 
that representation of a kind which favours no estate deserves, 
above all other kinds and above all non-representative systems 
of government, to be called modern. For without this commitment, 
all political change is hazardous, while it is the will and 
ability to change themselves, even in order to remain the same, 
upon which depends a people's modernisation or, what is the same, 
its remaining civilised under new circumstances. 
372. 
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